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**THE HISTORICAL
ANTIQUITIES OF THE GREEKS**

**WITH REFERENCE
TO THEIR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS**

**FROM THE GERMAN OF
WILLIAM WACHSMUTH.**

VOLUME II.

OXFORD PRINTED BY D A TALBOYS

**THE HISTORICAL
ANTIQUITIES OF THE GREEKS**

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**TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN
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VOLUME II.



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M DCCC XXXVII.

MERIDIAN OF DEMOCRACY.

I. INTRODUCTION.

THE GREAT PERSIAN WAR.

§ 53. In the preceding accounts of the political condition of the Grecian tribes and states, we have beheld them, for the most part, scattered and disunited, and, notwithstanding a certain impress of common nationality may have been perceptible in their tendency to social and festive intercourse, still we shall rarely find them to have been actuated by any disposition to form larger and more comprehensive associations for the purposes of united agency. This, which originally proceeded from the geographical character of the Grecian provinces, had derived additional force from the migrations of the Dorians, Æolians, and Ionians, as well as from the physical peculiarities of the habitations which they occupied subsequently to these and other expeditions. Both interest and pleasure concurred to promote a lively and extensive intercourse upon the seas of Greece, but there could be no inherent tendency to political union amongst these various maritime towns, island states, and mountain tribes, nor is the nation alone to be reproached with the discord, from the baneful effects of which it still seems doomed to suffer.

The attacks of foreign foes aroused, in the noblest tribes of Greece, a spirit of patriotism and a disposition to contract alliances in defence of their common country, and though this struggle failed to produce real and lasting concord, it was, nevertheless, followed by a more distinct consciousness of their nationality, and the commencement of regular political relations amongst them. The individual states no longer testify their former indifference towards each other—their history ceases to be a mosaic, and for more than a century we discover decided manifestations of a political system.

The event which, next to the above-mentioned migrations, exercised a great and decisive influence on the political development of the Greek states, was the Persian war. For the glorious triumphs by which it was signalized, like every struggle in which the native energy and courage of a people enable them to repulse the aggressions of foreign invaders, not only had the effect of securing Grecian freedom against the degrading yoke of the barbarians, but aroused the political energies of the people, and nerved and invigorated the national strength by which those victories had been achieved; whilst the battle of Marathon called up, almost as if by magic, a profusion of the fairest and choicest flowers of civilization and refinement, which still imparted beauty and lustre to the democracy, when Greece was desolated by the horrors of the Peloponnesian war.

Their previous vague and undefined feeling of liberty was now succeeded by the clear conviction of the inestimable value of independence, and the disgrace attending subjection to barbarian domina-

tion. A broad line of distinction was henceforward drawn between Greeks and barbarians, and, notwithstanding the short-sighted policy of single states, afterwards led them to contract ties with them, or the political convulsions of their own country caused bands of mercenaries to enter their service, still the meanest Greek soldier who ate the bread of the great king, was fully conscious of his own superiority over the wretches who fought with gold instead of iron. This continued to prevail till Alexander the Great, disregarding the distinction between the two nations, conceived the extravagant design of uniting Greeks and barbarians, and created the grotesque figures which we behold in the Macedonian kingdoms, dressed up like Greeks, and proclaiming the degeneracy of the age. Till his time it was a national principle, that nature had destined the Greek to govern and the barbarian to serve; and although this principle might not be put forward by the states of Greece in their political intercourse, their respective citizens did not fail to assert it in the treatment of their barbarian slaves¹. But the national pride rose to such a height, both in individuals and communities, that long after the will and the power to perform noble actions had been succeeded by irresolution and exhaustion, it continued to minister to the infatuated vanity of those whose only title to fame was based upon the withered laurels of their fathers. But on the other hand, a more active intercourse was carried on with the barbarians of Africa and Asia after the Persian wars. The two nations con-

¹ Compare the principle laid down by Aristotle above, vol. i. p. 257.

tinued in almost uninterrupted political contact, either in peace or war, till the final extinction both of Grecian and Persian independence. But their respective histories cannot be thoroughly understood during this period, without a careful examination of the relations in which they stood to one another.

The common circle within which the Grecian states were comprehended, became so enlarged after the Persian war, that with the exception of the Ætolians, and other predatory tribes of a similar character, every state, whether great or small, took part, either voluntarily or by compulsion, in the general political movements; but this participation exercised such an influence upon their internal system, and was so affected by it in return, that it henceforward becomes impracticable to separate the history of the external relations amongst the Grecian states, from an account of the variations which took place in their internal condition. The independent development of constitutions now became rare; the former laxer associations which had subsisted amongst the states, chiefly for festive objects, and seldom with a view to deliberation on matters connected with the policy of the nation at large, were supplanted by more extensive hegemonies, whilst the states which asserted them, drew the reins of their authority closer than before, and evinced a disposition to interfere with the internal order of the adjoining states. They were actuated by a similar spirit in their external policy, for in order to secure points of support without their own limits, they endeavoured to enter into alliance with states similarly situated with themselves, and there-

by to provide pledges for their internal constitution. Thus the development of the political relations amongst the states at large, and that of the constitutions of the individual communities, acted and reacted upon one another in such a manner, that their histories become blended, and notwithstanding the extension of the hegemonies, in some measure assimilated the variations they underwent; still, as they were subject to the operation both of external and internal circumstances, they necessarily became more agitated and unstable.

History furnishes few examples to prove that external shocks alone have produced an essential and durable change in a political substance, which was entirely unprepared for and hostile to that change. It will generally be found that where violent commotions appear to have been the immediate consequence of such a shock, the combustible matter into which the spark has fallen, had been long prepared for its reception. This was the case with the Persian war. The political energies of the Greeks were already aroused, and the struggle with the barbarians only served to nerve and invigorate them. Hence, fully to estimate the events to which our attention will subsequently be directed, it is necessary to revert to the intercourse amongst the Grecian states, which formed the subject of enquiry in the latter part of the second and seventh chapters^e. The former has shown us that the political intercourse between the communities of the mother-country had assumed a more diversified aspect, and that Sparta formed a rallying-point for

^e See vol. i. p. 188, sqq.; 420, sqq.

the greater part of them. But under the sway of the tyrants, political life had, in the interior of them, become matured for new changes, and after their expulsion, the ancient aristocracy was not again restored, but the democratical principle impetuously proclaimed itself amidst such remnants of that form of government as had chanced to survive.

The deliverance of Athens from the yoke of the Pisistratidæ marked the commencement of a new era. Herodotus acknowledges this when he extols the youthful strength of the regenerated commonwealth³. This strength it dedicated to the sacred cause of freedom in the auxiliary expedition to Ionia, the incentives to which were the buoyant spirit of democracy and the desire of propagating its youthful liberties, whilst its fiery ordeal was the heroic day of Marathon.

Nearly contemporaneous with the liberation of Athens were the expulsion of the tyrants from the Greek cities on the coasts and islands of Asia Minor, the defection from Persia, and the establishment of democracies. (Olymp. 70. 1; 500. B. C.⁴) By means of the participation of Athens, pure and impure elements here became mingled. No good and lasting fruits could result from the efforts of the Ionian states; they were too destitute of the vigour

³ In the beautiful passage, 5. 78: 'Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν νῦν ἠϋξήντο· δηλοῖ δὲ οὐ κατ' ἐν μόνον ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὥς ἔστι χρῆμα σπουδαῖον· εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννεύμενοι μὲν οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφίας περιοικέοντων ἔσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων μακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο· δηλοῖ ὧν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκάκεον ὥς δεσπότη ἐργαζόμενοι, ἐλευθεροθέντων δὲ αὐτοὺς ἕκαστος ἐωϋτῷ προθυμύετο. Comp. 5. 91, the reflections of the Lacedæmonians: ὥς ἐλεύθερον μὲν ἔδν τὸ γένος τὸ Ἀττικὸν ἰσόρροπον τῷ ἐωϋτῶν γίνοιτο, κατεχόμενον δὲ ὑπὸ τυραννίδος ἀσθενὲς καὶ πειθαρχέσθαι ἐτοῖμον.

⁴ Compare the chronological table at the end of this volume.

and elasticity of youth; the ethical groundwork of their newly-recovered independence was too much impaired, and the immediate incitement to the outbreak of democratic commotion, too remote from national dignity, strength, and solidity. The above-described sentiments of the Athenian Clis-thenes in the extremities to which he was reduced in the party dissensions which preceded the rise of the democracy⁵, were by no means incompatible with friendly dispositions towards the people. But Histiaëus and Aristagoras, whose machinations are closely interwoven with the history of the Ionic insurrection, display the flagrant and revolting ego-tism of political incendiaries, who involved their country in the horrors of war to screen themselves from punishment, and even availed themselves of the general confusion to gratify their own rapacity.

The Grecian states upon the shores and islands of Asia Minor were not only subject to the Persian sway⁶, but groaned beneath the subordinate yoke of local tyrants⁷; the domination of the latter and the Persian supremacy guaranteed each other. The most considerable amongst them, Histiaëus of Miletus, opposed the proposition of Miltiades, during the Scythian expedition of Darius, to break down the bridge over the Danube, in order that by the destruction of the Persian army, free-

⁵ See vol. i. p. 395.

⁶ After the time of Darius Hystaspis, the islands of Lesbos and Chios also became subject to Persia; upon the occasion of the Scythian expedition, Lemnos and Imbros were reduced, Herod. 5. 26.

⁷ See the enumeration of them, Herod. 4. 138. (compare above, vol. i. p. 405.): Daphnis in Abydos, Hippoclus in Lampsacus, Herophantus in Parion, Metrodorus in Proconnesus, Aristagoras in Cyzicus, Ariston in Byzantium, Strattis on Chios, Æaces on Samos, Laodamas in Phocæa, Aristagoras in Cuma, etc.

dom might be restored to the enslaved Greeks. Selfish motives actuated both him and the tyrants of the other states by whom he was supported⁸, and the chains of the Asiatic Greeks still remained unbroken.

Aristagoras, his nephew and successor in the Milesian tyranny, though deficient in courage and energy⁹, was not disinclined to enlarge the bounds of his authority, and as both his character and position rendered him averse to democratic convulsions, he was prepared to resist them whenever the opportunity should offer. Naxos soon enabled him to carry his intentions into effect. In the struggle between the upper orders and the people on that island, demagogy had paved the way to tyranny¹⁰. Naxos appears to have been delivered from the latter earlier, or at any rate not later, than Athens, whose tyrant, Pisistratus, had once formed the prop and support of the Naxian Lygdamis¹¹, whereupon the old party warfare broke out anew. The wealthier inhabitants¹² were expelled by the demus, and applied for assistance to Aristagoras, with whose uncle, Histiaëus, they were connected by a treaty of hospitality, and Aristagoras prevailed upon the Sardinian satrap to lend him a fleet for the reduction of Naxos. The expedition miscarried; Aristagoras dreaded the resentment of the Persian monarch, and the proposals of Histiaëus arriving about the same time, he was inspired with confidence to attempt a revolt¹³.

⁸ Herod. 4. 136. 137.

⁹ ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄκρος, Herod. 5. 124.

¹⁰ See vol. i. § 35. n. 46.

¹¹ See vol. i. p. 404-5.

¹² ἄνδρες τῶν πачίων, Herod. 5. 30.

¹³ Herod. 5. 31—35.

By giving the people in Miletus and the neighbouring states their reward beforehand¹⁴, viz. by liberating them from the tyrants, they ensured their concurrence in their measures; in the council of Aristagoras, Hecataeus the Logographer¹⁵, duly weighing the overweening power of the Persians, opposed the project, but, upon being outvoted, he became the most ardent, and, at the same time, the most circumspect of its advocates; his plan of operations was, however, unfortunately disregarded. Isonomia was proclaimed in Miletus, which example was followed by the other Ionian cities, and by Cuma and Lesbos; Strategi, purely democratic magistrates, were everywhere appointed¹⁶, and ostracism was perhaps at the same time introduced in Miletus¹⁷. The insurrection spread northward as far as the Thracian Bosphorus¹⁸, and southward through Caria and to Cyprus, where, however, the authority of the tyrants was not overthrown¹⁹. These measures were taken without the participation of the mother-country; the tie between the Ionians and their common Athens, the original seat of their tribe, had become so relaxed, and the feeling of political affinity grown so lukewarm, that Aristagoras first applied to Sparta for assistance. Upon meeting with a refusal in that quarter he repaired to Athens; but his representations that the Milesians were descendants of the Athenians²⁰, and that it was incumbent upon the latter to aid

¹⁴ Herod. 5. 37: (ὁ Ἀρισταγόρης) ἰσονομίην ἐποίει τῇ Μιλήτῳ, ὥς ἀν ἐκόντες αὐτῷ οἱ Μιλήσιοι συναπισταίατο.

¹⁵ Herod. 5. 36.

¹⁶ Herod. 5. 38. 99.

¹⁷ On the subject of Milesian ostracism, see Schol. Aristoph. Equit. 851. Phavorin. ὀστρακίνδα.

¹⁸ Herod. 5. 103.

¹⁹ Τύραννοι, Herod. 5. 109; βασιλῆες, 5. 110.

²⁰ Herod. 5. 97.

them in their undertaking, would probably have been attended with no better success, had not Athens reflected that by maintaining the youthful liberties of Ionia, she most effectually secured her own, and moreover felt a desire to humble the insolence of the Sardinian satrap, who had commanded her to receive back the expelled tyrant Hippias²¹. But the freedom of Athens was still exposed to too much danger at home, and too little familiarized with its peculiar element, the sea, cordially to espouse the cause of those who were descended from a common stock with herself, and to carry on the struggle against the exiled tyrants and their supporters with energy and determination.

But the Ionians and their Greek neighbours were too debased by sensual pleasures²² to prefer freedom at the price of toil and privation to servitude, which ensured them the indulgence of luxury, and the treachery of the chiefs to the common cause determined the event. The Ionians made a few desultory expeditions against the barbarians who had not yet completed their preparations, but upon the approach of a Persian land and sea force, they were seized with terror and contrition; they only looked to the numbers of their adversaries, but did not weigh their courage and skill; the numerical superiority of the barbarians disheartened them, and Aristagoras was the first to seek safety in flight²³; Histiaëus, who arrived a

²¹ Herod. 5. 96; comp. vol. i. p. 213.

²² This was most imprudently displayed in the conduct of Aristagoras in Sparta itself, on which account an Ephor said to him: *Οἶκος τὰ Μελήσια*. Zenob. 5. 57.

²³ Herod. 5. 124.

short time afterwards, was bitterly reproached for having prevailed upon Aristagoras to revolt, and for having brought such calamities upon the Ionians²⁴. Miletus and the Grecian fleet assembled near the island of Lade now became the objects of attack; that which the Panionium²⁵ had failed to produce, namely, an energetic resistance, was attempted by the hero Dionysius of Phocæa, who endeavoured to effect his object by exercising them in naval tactics; but the effeminate Ionians were insensible to the greatness of the cause for which they were contending, and only thought of the labour of the present; they could not support the exertions by which Dionysius proposed to train them to victory for more than seven days²⁶. In the battle, the commanders of some Samian and Lesbian vessels, whom the expelled tyrants had gained over to their cause, deserted to the enemy; Dionysius and the Chians alone fought bravely. The vanquished having nothing to expect from the vengeance of the Persians but a cruel and ignominious punishment, a few noble Samians resolved upon emigrating, and thus avoiding the dishonour which awaited them; the bravest amongst them abandoned their island before the return of the tyrant Æaces, the Byzantines and Chalcedonians fled to the Pontus, where they built Mesam-

²⁴ Herod. 6. 3.

²⁵ Herod. 6. 7.

²⁶ The sentiments ascribed to them by Herodotus are highly characteristic, 6. 12: *τίνα δαιμόνων παραβάντες τάδε ἀναπίμπλαμεν; οἵτινες παραφρονήσαντες καὶ ἐκπλώσαντες ἐκ τοῦ νόου ἀνδρὶ Φωκαῖ ἀλαζόνι, παρεχομένῳ νίας τρεῖς, ἐπιτρέψαντες ἡμέας ἐωϋτοῦς ἔχομεν; ὁ δὲ παραλαβὼν ἡμέας λυμαίνεται λύμῃσι ἀνηκέστοισι· καὶ δὴ πολλοὶ μὲν ἡμέων ἐς νούσους πεπτώκασι, πολλοὶ δὲ ἐπίδοξοι τῷτῳ τοῦτο πείσεσθαι εἰσι· πρό τε τούτων τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν γε κρέσσον καὶ ὀτεινὸν ἄλλο παθεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν δουλείην ὑπομεῖναι, ἥτις ἐσται, μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ παρεούσῃ συνέχεσθαι. τοῦ λοιποῦ βῆ πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ.*

bria, whilst the Phocæan Dionysius sailing towards the west in quest of adventures carried on piracy against the Etruscans and Carthaginians²⁷, the hereditary enemies of the western Greeks. Those who remained behind had, in addition to general slavery, to bear the yoke of subordinate tyrants.

On the other hand, an exalted and inspiring subject of contemplation is presented to the mind by the conduct of the Athenians at Marathon, and the pride with which the succeeding century regarded this heroic struggle for the independence of the common country of the Greeks²⁸, was no less just than generous. The fact is recorded in all its lustre and purity; and history may triumphantly repel the assertions of a disparaging criticism²⁹ and the invidious charges of calumny³⁰. She has a more painful task to perform in recounting the murder of the ambassadors by Athens and Sparta³¹, the sending of earth and water, whereby Ægina, infatuated by its jealousy of Athens, testified its submission to the Persian monarch beforehand³², and the treachery of several Eretrians to their native city³³.

²⁷ Herod. 6. 22. 33. 16. 17.

²⁸ Προεινδυνεῦσαι, Thuc. 1. 73. Thus in the epigram Lycurg. adv. Leocrat. 215. ed. R.:

Ἑλλήνων προμαχοῦντες Ἀθηναῖοι Μαραθῶνι
Χρυσόφορων Μήδων ἐστόρεσαν δύναμιν.

Hence Athens τὸ ἄστυ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, Isocrat. de Bigis 213. ed. L.

²⁹ Such as the remark that Miltiades, who proposed to destroy the bridge over the Danube, had lost his hereditary possessions in the Chersonese, and dreading the effects of the king's vengeance, endeavoured to provide for his own safety by involving his country in war. The latter was threatened like himself; the interests of the individual and the community at large were inseparable.

³⁰ e. g. the pretended understanding between the Alcmaeonidæ and the barbarians, Herod. 6. 115. 122. 123. Such an assertion can only have proceeded from the most consummate effrontery.

³¹ Herod. 7. 138; that it was done in Athens at the instigation of Miltiades, is stated in Pausan. 3. 12. 6.

³² Herod. 6. 49.

³³ Herod. 6. 101; Pausan. 7. 10. 1.

The watchword of the Athenians for the next century was hatred to tyrants and hostility to the barbarians. Postponing the consideration of the development of the democratical principle in Athens till the next chapter, let us now confine our attention to the policy of the nation at large, in repulsing the attacks of the barbarians under Xerxes. The glory of Athens failed to put a term to the prevailing discord; it rather served to stimulate the Æginetans, whose envy and jealousy were augmented by the consciousness of their own culpable understanding with the barbarians to carry on their contest with the enterprising and undaunted Athenians³⁴, whilst, unfortunately, the imminence of the danger by which the Greeks³⁵ were threatened, was so far from inducing them to form a general league, that their evil destiny even led many states to espouse the cause of the barbarians³⁶. Thirty-one Greek towns in all bore arms against the Persians, partly, like Athens and Ægina, burying their ancient animosities, and partly disregarding the opposite character of their constitutions, like Athens and Sparta. Themistocles and the Tegean Chileus were chiefly instrumental in the meritorious work of bringing about this spirit of concord³⁷. But as amidst this general patriotism, particular circumstances, as the constitution of Athens for example, imparted unusual energy to the efforts of certain states, so in judging of the conduct of those which sided with the barbarians, it is requisite to examine

³⁴ Herod. 7. 145. Compare on the subject of the previous dissensions, 6. 49. 50; 73. 85.

³⁵ Herod. 7. 9. 3, puts the expression of his patriotic grief at the fatal distractions of his native country, into the mouth of Mardonius, as an encouragement to Xerxes. ³⁶ Plut. Themist. 20.

³⁷ Plut. Themist. 6; comp. Herod. 9. 9.

the particular causes which led them to become traitors to their country.

When a nation is so swayed by passion as the Greeks were³⁸, its political calculations are generally wavering and unsteady, and whilst it is carried away by the violence of the last impression, it grasps with avidity at the first prospect of advantage that presents itself. The Achæans were, however, wholly indifferent to the danger which menaced their country, and obstinately persisted in their ill-judged and selfish repose. Equally careless of the fate of the mother-country with the Achæans, and perhaps influenced by their example, were the Italiots. The Ozolian Locrians, the Ætolians and Acarnanians, were still too remote from political maturity to be conscious of the bond which united their provinces; they were, in all probability, as indifferent to the notion of Grecian nationality, as they were ignorant of an opposition between Greeks and barbarians. Crete, long estranged from the rest of Greece, and secure from danger, remained an unconcerned spectator of the struggle, but had the decency to allege in extenuation of its conduct, that oracles had forbidden it to take part in the contest³⁹.

Corcyra, whose equivocal policy equally prepared it for either issue of the conflict, kept aloof from the struggle, and waited patiently to hail the approach of the victors, whoever they might be.

Gelon, the Syracusan, had the generosity to assemble his whole force against the barbarians; but either his princely pride, which required the chief command, or (as we should be rejoiced to believe)

³⁸ See vol. i. p. 90.

³⁹ Herod. 7. 169. 170.

the expedition of the Carthaginians against the Siceliots, prevented him from carrying his intention into execution ⁴⁰.

The Thebans formed a close alliance with the barbarians, and gloried in their disgraceful efforts to injure their native country. But this resulted less from the depravation of the people than from the infamy of the leaders, Timagenidas and Attaginus ⁴¹. The patriotic enthusiasm which had been excited amongst the people ⁴² was soon extinguished by the efforts of the dynasts.

The Thessalians, who possessed less stability of character than the Thebans, like them were subject to the tyranny of the dynasts; at first, indeed, in consequence of their enmity to the Aleuadæ ⁴³, who were in the Persian interest, they displayed considerable inclination to fight for the great cause; but either the dynasts obtained the upper hand ⁴⁴,

⁴⁰ If it be true that Themistocles would not admit Hiero to the Olympic games, (Plut. Themist. 25. from Theophrastus; Ælian, V. H. 95.) appearances and public opinion may at least have been against the Siceliots. However, from the account of Diodorus (14. 109), that Lysias had opposed the acceptance of Dionysius' Theoria, we are led to suspect that a circumstance relating to the one was transferred to the other. Diodorus speaks in favour of Gelon, 11. 26. Hiero afterwards caused the Persæ of Æschylus to be represented, Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 1055.

⁴¹ Herod. 9. 86; comp. 15; Pausan. 9. 6. 1: *ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις ὀλιγαρχία καὶ οὐχὶ ἡ πάτριος πολιτεία τηνικαῦτα ἴσχυεν.*

⁴² See on this point Böckh, *Explicat. Pind.* 340.

⁴³ Concerning their message to Xerxes, see Herod. 7. 6. On the subject of their pretended kindred attachment, Böckh, *Explicat. Pind.* 331. Amongst the numerous accounts of the Milesian courtesan, Thargelia, who was said to have exercised such an ascendant over the Greeks who visited her, as to gain them over to the interests of the Persian king (Plut. Pericl. 24), there is a very remarkable statement in the Anonym. de mulierib., quæ bello claruere, (Biblioth. d. alt. Lit. und Kunst. Stück. 2. p. 22. ined.) that she became the wife of the Thessalian king, Antiochus, and entertained Xerxes at her house. Compare Philostrat. Letters, 13. p. 920, quoted by Buttmann on the Aleuadæ, *Abb. der Hist. Philol. Cl. d. Berl. Ac. d. W.* 1822. 1823. p. 203, and the light which the latter throws on the subject of Antiochus and his successors. Photius only has *Θαργήλεια*· *Ἀγησαγόρου θυγάτηρ, βασιλεύσασα Θετταλῶν ἅ' ἔτη*· *Μιλησία τὸ γένος, κ. τ. λ.* According to Athenæus, 13. 609. A. she had fourteen husbands. Were there perhaps two of the name, an elder and a younger one?

⁴⁴ This appears to result from Diodor. 11. 2.

or the mass of the people complained, because the Greeks had omitted to occupy the passes of Olympus, and by their retreat to Thermopylæ had left Thessaly entirely unprotected⁴⁵.

Passion and inveterate enmity to overbearing neighbours, were motives which actuated those who fought for, as well as those who were opposed to the common cause. Argos, through the sanguinary conduct of Cleomenes⁴⁶, deprived of its best citizens and rendered wholly powerless, nevertheless abated nothing of its former pretensions to the Peloponnesian supremacy, and chose rather to become the vassal of Persia, than obey the commands of Sparta⁴⁷. However, it merely gave a promise to Mardonius to intercept the passage of the Peloponnesians across the Isthmus, and even this was not attempted. The Argives were satisfied with sending Mardonius intelligence that the Peloponnesians were on their march⁴⁸. On the other part, the patriotism of Mycenæ, Tiryns, the towns of the Acti, Epidaurus, Hermione, etc., as well as Platææ, Thespiæ, and Haliartus⁴⁹ in Bœotia, was strengthened and augmented by their hostility to the capital; but we are assured by Herodotus⁵⁰ that the Phocians sided with the Greeks, because their neighbours and hereditary enemies, the Thesalians, joined the Medes; had the case been re-

⁴⁵ This is the opinion of Herodotus, 7. 172—174; conf. 7. 131.

⁴⁶ Herod. 7. 76—80.

⁴⁷ Herod. 7. 149. However unfavourable a notion we may form of the Hellenism of the Pythia, it is scarcely possible to believe in the genuineness of the oracle, which they alleged, Herod. 7. 148.

Ἐχθρὲ περικτιόνεσσι, φίλ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι,
Εἰσω τὸν προβόλαιον ἔχων, πεφυλαγμένος ἦσο,
Καὶ κεφαλὴν πεφύλαξο· κάρη δὲ τὸ σῶμα σώσει.

⁴⁸ Herod. 9. 14.

⁴⁹ On the subject of Haliartus, consult Pausan. 9. 32. 4.

⁵⁰ Herod. 8. 30.

versed they would have pursued a directly opposite course.

The Thessalian mountain tribes, the Dolopians, Ænians, Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Malians, Phthiotan Achæans⁵¹, as well as the eastern Locrians⁵² and the Dorians⁵³, were compelled by the invading foe to march against their fellow-countrymen; at least there is no positive testimony that they were willing traitors to their country. The Phocians, in spite of their aversion to the barbarians, were likewise constrained to join the Persian standard⁵⁴.

Even amongst the friends of their country the martial ardour was not everywhere equal; the women of Corinth prayed to Aphrodite to inspire their husbands with strength and courage⁵⁵. It was with difficulty that Themistocles succeeded in uniting the states and inducing them to adopt judicious measures for the conduct of the war; and we read with pain that it was in some cases necessary to resort to bribery to awaken a proper interest in the good cause, as in drawing up the fleet at Artemisium, for example⁵⁶. The generous patriotism of the Athenians, and the military sagacity of Themistocles, were in imminent danger of being baffled by the short-sighted politico-military system of defence of the Peloponnesians, by which it was most unscientifically proposed to stay at

⁵¹ Herod. 7. 132. 185. 196.

⁵² Herod. 8. 34; comp. 8. 203; Diodor. 11. 3. 4.

⁵³ Herod. 8. 31; Diod. 11. 4.

⁵⁴ Herod. 9. 17. 18; comp. 8. 30. 32.

⁵⁵ Schol. Pind. Olymp. 13. 32. Compare the Epigram, ap. Plut. de Herod. Malignit. 9. 456. ed. R.

⁵⁶ Herod. 8. 5; comp. Plut. Themist. 8. According to the spurious authority adduced by Plutarch, indeed, Themistocles employed bribery upon other occasions, viz., to influence the Ephors during the construction of the Athenian wall, Plut. Themist. 19. They who attempt to prove too much, seldom prove any thing to the purpose.

home and guard the avenues to the Peloponnesus.

The stratagems, threats, and undaunted resolution of Themistocles were chiefly instrumental in bringing about the memorable day of Salamis. His prudence had prevailed on the Athenians to wave their claim to the command⁵⁷; the prize of victory was adjudged to the Æginetans, though this was probably occasioned by jealousy of Athens⁵⁸.

The most illustrious manifestation of Grecian patriotism was the magnanimous declaration of the Athenians, in answer to the lavish promises of Mardonius, and the anxious fears of Sparta⁵⁹ in the winter before the battle of Plataeæ. It was drawn up by Aristides⁶⁰. If to this we add the stoning of Lycidas and his family⁶¹, because he had advised the Athenians to accept the conditions of Mardonius, as well as the banishment of Arthmius of Zelea, who had been hired by Xerxes to distribute bribes amongst the Greeks⁶², in order to induce them to enter into an alliance with him, we shall be at a loss to comprehend how a plot could have been formed in the Athenian camp before the battle of Plataeæ⁶³, the object of the conspirators being to subvert the democracy, and in case of failure, to fall back upon the Persians. Upon the flight of two of its abandoned projectors, this scheme of

⁵⁷ Plut. Themist. 7.

⁵⁸ Diodor. 11. 27. 55.

⁵⁹ Herod. 8. 143. 144. The Athenians briefly and characteristically describe the common features of Grecian nationality: τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν εἶναι ὁμαίμον τε καὶ ὁμόγλωσσον, καὶ θεῶν ἰδρύματα τε κοινὰ καὶ θυσίαι, ἡθεὰ τε ὁμότροπα.

⁶⁰ Plut. Arist. 10. Plutarch very justly entitles it θαυμαστὴν ἀπόκρισιν.

⁶¹ Herod. 9. 5; Lyc. adv. Leocr. 222. In Demosth. de Coron. he is called Cyrillus, as in the Argumen. Æsch. Pers.

⁶² Argum. Æsch. Pers., Aristid. Panath. 2. 218. (ed. Jebb) and the Schol., not to mention the Athenian orators, who contain such numerous allusions to the decree against Arthmius.

⁶³ Plut. Arist. 11.

treachery and folly was entirely defeated by the prudence and lenity of Aristides.

But how little do the political and military operations of the Spartans appear when compared with those of the Athenians! how narrow-minded their patriotism! how closely bordering on perfidy to the common cause is the indifference which, upon the completion of the Isthmian wall, they testified for the fate of the Athenians⁶⁴, to whom, in their previous terror, they had addressed such urgent entreaties! The selfish and contracted policy of Sparta had rendered her alike insensible to reason and to honour; still the emphatic exhortation⁶⁵ of the Tegean Chileus induced her to march out and win laurels at Plataeæ. Our object being to delineate the political sentiments of the Greeks, and not to describe the effect upon their feelings produced by the sight of the adverse host, we shall not dwell upon the pusillanimity with which the smaller Grecian states hesitated to march out of their encampments, or even the apprehensions of Sparta to come to an engagement with the Persians, whilst Athens everywhere made head against the enemy with enduring self-denial and unflinching fortitude. After the victory, all those states which had not deserted the cause of their country, claimed a share in the glory of the day; hence the Æginetans and others afterwards erected cenotaphs beside the monuments of the Athenians, Spartans, Tegeans, Megarians, Phliasians, Plataeans, Thespians, etc., who had fallen in the fight⁶⁶.

⁶⁴ καὶ ἰδοὺς Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἔτι δέεσθαι οὐδέν, Herod. 9. 8.

⁶⁵ Herod. 9. 9.

⁶⁶ Herod. 9. 85. Doubts are expressed of the authenticity of his account of those who took part in the engagement, and of the interment, in Plut. de

The allied fleet carried the war into Asia⁶⁷; the battle of Mycale achieved the deliverance of the islands and most of the towns on the Ionian coast.

Attention was now turned in the interior to the punishment to be inflicted upon the allies of the Persian monarch; the enmity, which the faithful adherents to the cause of their country testified against those who had so shamefully betrayed it, must, in this instance, be looked upon as originating in a feeling of unanimity, and not, as upon other occasions, as the result of dissension.

The infamous chiefs of Thebes were punished⁶⁸; after which that state sank into utter insignificance, from which it did not again recover for many years. Leutychidas, king of Sparta, marched to Thessaly, whence the Aleuad Thorax had accompanied Xerxes on his flight⁶⁹, but the object of the expedition was defeated⁷⁰ by the sordid cupidity of the commander, who accepted bribes from the Aleuadæ. The proposition of the Spartans to exclude from the council of the Amphictyons all those nations who had borne arms for the great king, is said to have been opposed by Athens (Themistocles)⁷¹.

Athens directed its chief attention to the prose-

Herod. Malign. 9. 460, sqq., ed. R., but the deduction is not complete. Plut. says somewhat more, Aristid. 19. 20. According to Lys. Orat. Fun. 107, ed. R., Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, Athenians, and Platæans fought; according to Diodorus, 11. 32, the Platæans and Thespians were united with the Athenians against the Thebans. But Herodotus appears to be decidedly contradicted by the inscription on the statue of Zeus in Olympia, which was erected by the conquerors of Platææ. This, in addition to the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, contained the names of the Corinthians, Sicyonians, Æginetans, Epidaurians, Troezenians, Eleans, etc.; but also Chians and Milesians!

⁶⁷ In the spring the Greek fleet was at Delos. Herodotus says that they did not dare to advance any further, and that they thought Samos was as distant as the pillars of Hercules! In reading such statements as this, it is impossible for the most lenient critic to acquit Herodotus of the charge of exaggeration.

⁶⁸ Herod. 9. 88.

⁶⁹ Herod. 9. 1.

⁷⁰ Pausan. 3. 7. 8. There is certainly a different account of the affair in Plut. de Herod. Malign.

⁷¹ Plut. Themist. 20.

cution of the war against the barbarians, and this common object of foreign policy served for a number of years to keep up the unanimity of the Greeks⁷². The relative position of the single states, for instance, that of Athens with regard to Sparta, was determined by the remembrance of their common prosperity and adversity, and the benefits which they had received at each other's hands.

The self-esteem of the Greeks and the conviction of their superiority over the barbarians, derived additional force from the victory, which, simultaneously with the defeat of the Persians, the Syracusan Gelon and the Agrigentan Theron (480. B. C.) obtained over the Carthaginians, and that which Hiero the successor of Gelon (474. B. C.) gained in a sea-fight with the Etruscans near Cuma. The eastern and western boundaries of the barbarians were henceforward more accurately defined; the non-Hellenes were either despised on account of the servile character of their political institutions, or hated and treated as enemies in consequence of their want of civilisation. However, language still continued to be a chief point in estimating the national difference between Greeks and barbarians⁷³.

II. DEMOCRACY IN GENERAL.

§ 54. The nobility being deprived of their hereditary distinctions of property, military honour,

⁷² According to Pausan. 9. 35. 2, it was decreed that the temple which the Persians had burned down should not be rebuilt, in order that their ruins might be *ἐχθους ὑπομνήματα*.

⁷³ *Βάρβαρος παλίγλωσσος*, Pind. Isthm. 6. 35. In the same manner Æsch. Agam. 1192, *ἀλλόθρουν πόλιν* speaking of Troy, comp. *ἄγλωσσος*, Sophocl. Trach. 1061.

and exclusiveness of family, their strength as an order became broken, the acquisition of property and warlike exploits imparted elevation to the character of the common freeman, the tyranny had reduced both orders to like subjection, and the Persian war had crowned them with the same laurels. That class which, once raised above the mass, and separated from it by a wide gulf, had engrossed all power and advantage in the state, was now looked upon as one of the ingredients of that mass; according to the democratic spirit of the age, all honours and privileges necessarily proceeded from, and reverted to the great body of the people. None of the ancient aristocracies, with the exception of that of Sparta, as far as this can be called an aristocracy, were henceforward recognised as legitimate dispensations of government; they had lost the moral sanction of opinion¹. Nevertheless aristocracy was not everywhere subverted, nor was democracy uniformly exempt from the machinations of the ambitious and the interested, who sought to raise themselves above the bulk of the people; but public opinion, even where the people were subject to the despotism of a dominant order, was decidedly opposed to this species of authority, to which it applied the odious name of oligarchy; tyranny had in some instances found means to array itself in the garb of the olden monarchy; but oligarchy had been unable to assimilate itself to the ancient aristocracy.

It became a generally acknowledged maxim that

¹ Concerning the opinion of Thucydides on the *ὀλιγαρχία ἰσόνομος*, see below, § 60, on the subject of the oligarchy.

the *demus* constituted the aggregate people², and a citizen could only belong to the state by becoming incorporated with the mass ; still this had not yet degenerated into fanatical hostility to every species of hereditary possessions yet annexed to the remnants of the ancient aristocracy ; they were suffered to retain various honours and privileges, especially in matters connected with religion, as the inalienable right of certain families. It would seem as though the selfishness of individuals who would willingly have taken those distinctions from their possessors, had been compelled to yield to the prevailing feeling of the majority, who were of opinion that the *demus* which had subjected those pre-eminent citizens to its laws, derived lustre from their excellence ; they beheld with pleasure those scattered amongst their own ranks, whom they had regarded with envy as an exclusive order, they respected those whom they had been unwilling to revere, and testified confidence and esteem where they had refused homage. This fusion of nobles and commons necessarily imparted increased solidity and worth to the people, and greater security and splendour to the state ; moreover, as the public mind was not yet contaminated, those who were most conspicuous for moral worth were entrusted with political power, so that it became customary to speak of an aristocracy within a democracy³. But on the other hand the populace began to be excited, foul matter was stirred up,

² On the appellations of the mass of the people, see Appendix, § 60. n. 4.

³ Hence, the constitution of Clisthenes is called aristocracy by Plut. Cim. 15. Hesych. : 'Αριστοκρατούμενοι· ὑπὸ ἀρίστων κρατούμενοι ἢ δήμου ἢ ἐτίμων τῶν καλλίστων. Compare concerning the better aristocracy below in § 60, on the oligarchy.

and polluted the channels of public feeling. This was in some degree effected by the intrigues of the nobility, who now formed part of the civic body; equality was irksome to them; oligarchical machinations spread disaffection amongst the multitude, whose mind became so inflamed with party-animosities, that respect for true merit began to abate. But a dissolute mob-government did not succeed to a calm and moderate democracy in the Grecian states in the same manner as in Rome, where by force of the manumission “*per vindictam*,” without the concurrence of the people, virtuous as well as vicious foreigners might obtain admittance into the citizenship; the degeneracy in question must be traced to those curses of the Greek nation, selfishness and discord; the popular feeling and the laws alike excluded all barbarian admixture; none but Greeks could be citizens, barbarians being at the most only tolerated as *Metœci*⁴. But it must be confessed, that intercourse with the wealthy barbarians and the prosperity which crowned the Grecian arms, though they ennobled and exalted the national feeling, had in many respects pernicious consequences. Finally, as the proclamation of Marius commanding the “*capite censi*” to perform military service, instead of adding strength to the Roman citizenship, only became a means to increase the influence of rude manners, so by arming the indigent portion of their population, the Greek states were more injured than benefited.

Correspondent to the original solid and sub-

⁴ Such were probably the *δχλος βαρβάρων διγλώττων Βισαλτικῶν* in the towns of Chalcidice, Diodor. 12. 68.

stantial character of the democracy, was the idea of equality expressed by the word *ἴσον*⁵. The notion of an absolute equality like that which exists in the dreams of modern levellers, the equality of all in right and privilege, without regard to merits and services, was not unknown to the Greeks; but even from the very beginning the idea was never conceived without all limitation whatever, as certain conditions were tacitly acknowledged to be essential to it, in the same manner as the *Dokimasia* preceded the drawing of lots amongst the candidates for public offices. Even in the alluring promises of equal rights⁶ held out to the sharers in an expedition for founding a new colony, it is far from improbable that superior authority was tacitly promised to him who was best equipped for the expedition or the hereditary possessor of an important priesthood, to the most intelligent, the best, or the bravest amongst the adventurers. Rational ideas, generally speaking, prevailed upon the subject, and therefore the *ἴσον* was rather a means to preclude the introduction of an *ἄνισον* or *πλέον*⁷, oppression by means of unconstitutional despotism, than to endow all with equal privileges; and one of its chief characteristics was that it conferred upon every citizen a right to vote when laws were enacted for the collective people, to elect the functionaries appointed to administer those laws, and to make them re-

⁵ See vol. i. § 46. n. 67.

⁶ *ἐπ' ἴση καὶ ὁμοίᾳ*, Thuc. 1. 27.

⁷ Eurip. *Phœn.* 548. 549:

— τὸ γὰρ ἴσον νόμιμον ἀνθρώποις ἔφυ,
τῷ πλείονι δ' αἰεὶ πολέμον καθίσταται
τοῦλασσον, κ. τ. λ.

See the definition of this term in Aristot. *Pol.* 5. 1.

sponsible for their acts. At the same time regard was had to the due proportion between the services which the citizen rendered to the state, through his personal merit or the advantages of fortune, and the distinctions conferred upon him. Hence, the object and scope of the *ἰσόν* were to prevent a citizen from raising himself above the great body of the people, and the law, which was the expression of their united will, and to render all uniformly subject to its authority; but this principle was in some democracies carried to such lengths that the mere pre-eminence of an individual, even though unattended with evil designs, was considered dangerous to legal equality, and ostracism was accordingly introduced; but within the measure of excellence which the state tolerated in an individual, the law of equality was applied to him in such a manner that extraordinary virtue in a citizen was recognised in a higher degree than was strictly consistent with the legal equipoise⁸.

The first of the above notions, namely, that the law, having proceeded from all, is equally binding upon all, consequently that it expressly forbids the usurpation of power on the part of an individual or class, is implied by the word *Isonomia*, the once highly valued privilege of the free-citizens of Greece. It was equivalent to democracy⁹, like which it by no means precluded the existence of gradations according to a valuation. Herodotus entitles it the most admirable of constitutions, and

⁸ This is the *ἰσότης κατ' ἀξίαν*, Aristot. Pol. 5. 1. 7. 8. Compare the exposition of the *ἰσομοιρεῖν* in Thuc. 6. 39.

⁹ It is thus employed by Herod. 3. 143; 5. 27, in speaking of the abolition of the tyranny of Mæandrius on Samos, and that of Aristagoras in Miletus, and the establishment of a popular government.

describes, as its characteristics, that the authorities were appointed by lot, were required to give an account of their conduct, and that every matter for deliberation was submitted to the general body of the people, for, he adds, "every thing is contained in the mass"¹⁰. He likewise uses the word *Isocrateia* in contradistinction to tyranny¹¹.

The praises of *Isonomia* in the democratic writers are very frequently accompanied by those of *Isegoria*. It was chiefly in Athens that the name and the thing itself were brought to maturity, and the word was peculiar to that state; the common Grecian term was *Isologia*¹². The tendency to public speaking was a prominent feature in the character of the Greeks, and as the spirit of the Grecian republics granted their members the right of expressing their opinions on matters which affected the interests of the state¹³, the free and unimpeded exercise of this right was regarded by the Greek as the palladium of his liberties; whereas in oligarchical and aristocratic states oratory was generally prohibited by the magistrates¹⁴; the popular assembly was the chief theatre of *Isegoria*. Hence the word designates the most essential property of citizenship, namely, its right to take part in the proceedings of the supreme legislative body,

¹⁰ See the speech of Otanes, 3. 80.

¹¹ Herod. 8. 92. 1.

¹² *Mæris*: *ίσηγορία*, 'Αττικῶς — *ίσολογία*, 'Ελληνικῶς. The exercise of this right, liberty of speech, is the *παρόρησία* of the Attic orators.

¹³ Pindar, *Pyth.* 2. 160: ὁ λάβρος στρατός, i. e. democracy. Eurip. *Phœn.* 401. 402:

τί φυγάσιν τὸ δυσχερές;

ἐν μὲν μέγιστον, οὐκ ἔχειν παρόρησίαν.

Comp. Soph. *Œd.* Col. 66.

¹⁴ Plut. *de Virtut. Eth.* 7. 759: δὴ τοὺς ῥήτορας ἐν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις οἱ ἀρχόντες οὐκ ἐῷσι παθαίνεσθαι. Comp., on the subject of prohibitions of this nature in Sparta and the Cretan states, Sext. Emp. *adv. Math.* 292. 4. Orl.

and not only implies that every one might exercise this right, but also that he was entitled to do so, on every subject without restriction ; for although the council was charged with the special management of various branches of the administration, the people had by no means renounced their privilege of deciding in the last resort on those matters, on which the former had previously deliberated ; on the contrary, with the further progress of democracy, the Bule gradually became more dependent upon the popular assembly, being more especially occupied in bringing state matters into the form in which they might be most conveniently discussed by the general body.

Though the equality of civil rights expressed by the foregoing words, as already stated, rendered it impossible that any individual should raise himself above the people and the laws, it by no means declared that, as no one was permitted to pass the boundaries fixed by the laws, therefore within the same, every one was entitled indiscriminately to aspire to the chief honours of the state ; in the delegation of legal powers and privileges, the people were in fact chiefly guided by aristocratic principles. For although it was essential to the more matured democracy to appoint by lot to public offices, still the good sense and proper feeling of the lower orders led them to reflect that those citizens who were possessed of most energy and intelligence, or had the greatest portion of the state-burthens to bear, were entitled to a commensurate share in the government. The lower orders were unwilling to confide in a member of their own body ; the just appreciation of personal ad-

vantages generally led them to fix upon proper persons for the public service. But here we are called upon to consider the evil side of the democratic character. For state offices legally brought with them no other recompense than honour; they rather involved the necessity of considerable sacrifices, and were fraught with imminent danger both to property and life. The inferior citizen renounced these the more readily, as the actions of the magistrates were liable to be judged by him as a constituent portion of the mass in its judicial capacity. Although unwilling to encounter this responsibility himself, he did not omit to watch the actions of others, with all the venom of democratic suspicion and jealousy. Hence, the public officers were as frequently the sport of the evil passions, as of the credulity and ignorance of the people, who, whilst they implicitly relied on the official abilities of a person, firmly expected that whatever that person undertook, would necessarily be crowned with success, whilst he was compelled to bear the whole weight of their indignation whenever the force of circumstances had prevented him from fulfilling their chimerical expectations.

The most important office under the more matured democracy was that of Strategus, as in Athens, Syracuse, Tarentum, Argos, Thurii; the Demiurgi ranked next to them. Both grew more influential as democracy advanced; we find that there were Polemarchs in the oligarchical Thebes, as well as in the democratic Mantinea.

From considering such offices as were ordained by law, we naturally turn to that peculiar species

of political power, which, without definite official functions exempt from obligation and responsibility, and supported by popular infatuation and intemperance, at length raised itself to such a height as to endanger the stability of the laws themselves, and to cripple and control the operations of those, to whom were entrusted the regular duties of the administration. Such was the Demagoguery, which, the offspring of Isegoria, was nurtured by the officious tendency of the popular assembly to interfere with every department of state, and finally accomplished in political wiles and rhetorical subtleties under the instructions of the sophists. The people who exercised so jealous a control over the actions of the legally-elected functionaries, abandoned themselves without reserve to the guidance of those non-official orators, who affected the most obsequious deference for the popular will, whilst they obstructed the regular functionaries in the performance of their constitutional duties, by their censure and accusation, or assailed them with all the acrimony of their envy and slander; at the same time cloaking their real designs under the semblance of zeal for the public good. The same considerations which inspired the inferior citizen with diffidence in his own abilities to discharge the duties of office, made him feel the necessity of a leader in the deliberations of the popular assembly; and the more the bulk of the people engrossed the power of the state, the more they required to be guided by persons of this description¹⁵. Thus the demagoguery was enabled by

¹⁵ Plutarch. Dion, 32, states, that the Syracusans had deserted Dion for Heraclides, *διὰ τὴν γεγενημένην ἐκ τοῦ κρατεῖν ἀνεσιν καὶ θρασύτητα πρὸ τοῦ δῆμος εἶναι τὸ δημαγωγεῖσθαι θέλοντες.*

circumstances to supply the place of the former *Æsymnety*.

The odious character which subsequently attached both to the word and the thing itself, must not, however, be looked upon as incident to their origin. The rise of demagoguery was a natural consequence of the political system of Greece, *Isegoria*; the influence of the demagogues did not assume its subsequent invidious character till after the total depravation of the popular mind. Every statesman was more or less necessitated to associate with the people, and endeavour to obtain their approbation of his authority and his projects: this is demagoguery in its larger signification¹⁶. Corrupt practices crept in as soon as the demagogues incited the people to disregard the existing laws, and by laying down the pernicious doctrine, that the last expression of the popular will was at all times entitled to have the force and efficacy of law, undermined the stability both of law and prescription, thus teaching them to resign themselves to the dictates of turbulence and passion. This rank and baneful system thrived most luxuriantly at Athens and Syracuse; it attained its zenith in the course of the Peloponnesian war¹⁷; whilst the name grew more odious in proportion as the system itself degenerated¹⁸.

¹⁶ Hence *Mægis*: Πολιτεύειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι λέγεται, πολιτευτῆς οὐ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ δημαγωγός παρὰ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς· πολιτευτῆς, Ἑλληνικῶς.

¹⁷ See below, § 65.

¹⁸ That the word was originally used in a good sense is evident from Aristoph. *Equit.* 191:

Ἡ δημαγωγία γὰρ οὐ πρὸς μουσικοῦ

Ἐστὶν ἀνδρός, οὐδὲ χρηστοῦ τοῦς τρόπους.

Comp. Valckenaer *Diatr.* in Eurip. *Deperd. Dram. Reliq.* 264. b. In Thucyd. 4. 21, Cleon is called ἀνὴρ δημαγωγός κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ὧν; there is nothing unfavourable in this. Xenoph. *Hell.* 5. 2. 7, does not merely say demagogues, but τῶν βαρίων δημαγωγῶν. He employs δημαγωγοί, 2. 3. 27, in the sense of men opposed to the oligarchy.

Besides the term demagogue, the name *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου* was frequently employed to designate the person who exercised a similar species of authority. As the regular officers of state could not perform their duties without mingling with the people in the manner of demagogues, so it is not impossible that the appellation *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου* may have been applied to a regular functionary; but it is a matter of doubt whether it was so employed or not¹⁹. Indeed we observe in the writers of the democratic period generally, from Herodotus downwards, a disposition to give general designations of political objects without definiteness or precision of expression; as, for instance, *τὰ πράγματα* for state, *τα τέλη* or *οἱ ἐν τέλει* for magistrates, etc²⁰.

III. THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY.

a. The Character of the People.

§ 55. The history of the predominance of the democratical principle begins with the battle of Marathon and the administration of Miltiades. Miltiades was the first to quicken and energize the political system established by Clisthenes, to foster and direct the powers of the Athenians, and to teach them to think and act greatly. "In my opinion," says Isocrates¹, "a god who respected the virtues of the Athenians brought about that war, in order that they who possessed such distinguished qualities, might not pass their lives unhonoured and unknown," etc. In truth there was something miraculous in the rapid rise of

¹⁹ See Appendix i.

¹ Panegy. 23. sub fin.

²⁰ See Appendix i.

the Athenians; it was not by advancing on a path to which they had been long accustomed, or by pursuing the bent of manners and feelings confirmed by habit and sanctioned by experience, that they attained the summit of political greatness. In every department of public life things presented themselves to these brave republicans under new and unwonted aspects; in whatever they undertook, they were obliged to quit the political path of their forefathers, and to explore new fields of enterprise, whilst they availed themselves of the extraordinary conjunctures that presented themselves with surprising skill and effect. The war with Ægina first made them familiar with the sea². No sooner had they launched their fleets, than they appear in the character of heroes skilled in naval tactics, and exhibit familiar acquaintance with the perils and caprices of an element which it requires the highest degree of human industry and courage to encounter. Hence the beautiful observation of Plato, who considered the civil virtues of the Athenians³ as a gift of the gods, and the deserved encomium of Thucydides on the Athenian bravery, which, in his opinion, had proceeded from the intellect and the will, and not from habit⁴, whilst their very enemies were forced to acknowledge that the fecundity of the Athenian mind had

² Herod. 7. 144: οὗτος γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος συστάς ἔσωσε τότε τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους.

³ De Legg. 1. 642. D.: τὸ ὑπὸ πολλῶν λεγόμενον, ὡς, ὅσοι Ἀθηναίων εἰσὶν, ἀγαθοὶ διαφερόντως εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι, δοκεῖ ἀληθέστατα λέγεσθαι· μόνοι γὰρ ἀνεὺ ἀνάγκης, αὐτοφυῶς, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ, ἀληθῶς καὶ οὔτι πλαστῶς εἰσὶν ἀγαθοί.

⁴ Thuc. 2. 39:—ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν (Λακεδαιμόνιοι) ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται· ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνειμένως διαιτῶμενοι οὐδὲν ἤσσαν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰσοπαλεῖς κινδύνους χωροῦμεν.

developed new excellence in new channels of enterprise⁵.

The masterly hand of Thucydides has sketched the chief virtues of the Athenian character in the speech of the Corinthians to Sparta, and in the funeral oration of Pericles. In the former, real admiration forces its way through hostility, envy, and fear; in the latter, we hear the accents of the great leader of the people, who was incapable of adulation. But listen to the words of the great historian himself.

“ They are, say the Corinthians⁶, fond of innovation, equally quick in conceiving and in executing their projects.—Bold beyond their strength, daring beyond the dictates of prudence, in extremities full of hope.—Never inactive—ever roaming from place to place—they think to make fresh acquisitions by going abroad—victorious over the enemy, they push forward as far as possible; vanquished, they fall back but little. They use their bodies for the state as though they were not their own, whilst their mental capacities are ever in their power, and ready to be dedicated to the service of the commonwealth. When they fail to accomplish their schemes, they think they have lost a portion of their property⁷. But when they are successful, they value the acquisition but slightly in comparison with what they expect from the future.

⁵ The Corinthians in Thucyd. 1. 71 :—*ἦσαν χαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζόμενοις ἔναι πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ. Διόπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ τῆς πολυπειρίας—κεκαίνωται.*

⁶ Thuc. 1. 70.

⁷ Compare 4. 55 : *οἷς τὸ μὴ ἐπιχειρούμενον αἰεὶ ἐλλιπὲς ἦν τῆς δοκίσεως τὶ πράξειν.*

When a project fails, with reviving hope they think of another expedient to meet the occasion. For with them alone to hope is to possess, because they so speedily execute that whereon they have determined; and to accomplish all this they willingly encounter toil and danger at every time, enjoying but little what they possess, because they are ever occupied in acquiring more. They consider no other day to be a festival than that on which they perform what is needful, and deem inactive rest a greater grievance than toilsome occupation. Therefore should any one sum up their character by saying, that they were born never to be at rest themselves, nor to suffer others to be so, he would speak the truth."

Still more pure and exalted are the commendations which Pericles bestows on their intelligence as the parent of their excellence. "We scrutinize and revolve matters, says he^a, inasmuch as we are of opinion that words do not prejudice deeds, but rather, the not being instructed by debate before we proceed to action. For it is our distinction, to make the boldest attempts, and to deliberate upon what we are about to engage in; whereas with others, ignorance inspires courage, and deliberation makes them falter. Those must surely be possessed of the greatest souls who, well knowing the terrors and the gratifications of life, shrink not from danger.—In fine, I say, the whole state is the instructress of Greece; and, in my opinion, every single citizen with us is capable of dedicating his personal faculties to the most multifarious objects with dexterity and grace."

^a Thuc. 2. 40.

Thucydides does not say too much⁹. History presents no parallel to the combination of intelligence and force in their character, their certainty in conception and performance¹⁰, their simplicity of life amidst the eager pursuits of commerce, their delicate and matured perception of the beautiful, and their perfection in the productions of art, amidst unprecedented efforts to subdue the roughest of elements, constant service in arms, and incessant sacrifices for the good of the commonwealth. The leaders lofty and towering models for the imitation of succeeding ages, the multitude capable of appreciating their exalted worth; no chasm between the intelligence and power of both.

The champions of Marathon¹¹ was the name which their degenerate descendants loved to apply to the heroes of the glorious days of Athens. That period must, however, be extended till the breaking out of the plague and the death of Pericles. Till then, the poison which lurked in the Attic honey¹² did not predominate so far as to corrupt the purer channels of healthful life; the exercise of their powers expanded and invigorated, but did not consume them; liberty was sufficient for their happiness, and the healthful constitution of their minds fitted them for its enjoyment¹³. But their career had been too violent and abrupt; the bow required unbending; the better qualities of the Athenian character, incapable of withstanding the shocks to which they

⁹ Comp. Isocrates Panegy. cap. 22, and Areopagit. p. 224. ed. Lange, where, however, the attempt at rhetorical effect is too evident.

¹⁰ Most appropriate are the words of Thucyd. 2. 40: φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας.

¹¹ Arist. Acharn. 181. Μαραθωνομάχαι, Nub. 986.

¹² Plutarch. Dion 58.

¹³ Thuc. 2. 43: τὸ εὐδαιμον τὸ ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δὲ ἐλεύθερον τὸ εὐψυχον κρίναντες.

were exposed, became the sport of waywardness and caprice.

We must not stigmatize, as the peculiar failing of the Athenians, that arrogance¹⁴ which was common to the whole Grecian race; the Athenians were justly entitled to extol the days of the men of Marathon and the time of Pericles; but vain and empty conceit alone induced them to ascend to the mythical age, and represent the glory of Athens as so ancient as to be lost in the remoteness of antiquity¹⁵; their claims to Autochthony¹⁶ were founded in a proud and honourable feeling, which deterred them from mixing with the barbarians, and therefore rendered them their enemies¹⁷. As long as the exploits of the Athenians corresponded with their confidence in their own powers, there was no lack of its attendant magnanimity¹⁸ and love of honour, which sought to derive lustre from acting nobly¹⁹. The heart of the Athenians, untainted as they were by craft and deceit, resembled a pure and spotless tablet; they enacted no laws for the exclusion of strangers, but granted them unrestricted access and the liberty of viewing whatever they desired²⁰;

¹⁴ Φρόνημα. See the speech of the Athenians, Thuc. 1. 80. sqq., in which they express a well-grounded confidence in their own powers.

¹⁵ The commonplaces of the orators concerning the reception of the Heraclidae, the interment of the Argives by Thebes, the battle of the Amazons, etc., are well known; thus Lycurg. adv. Leocr. 194: τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχει μέγιστον ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ἀγαθόν, ὅτι τῶν καλῶν ἔργων παράδειγμα τοῖς Ἕλλησι γέγονε.

¹⁶ Compare vol. i. Append. xi.; also see Eurip. ap. Lycurg. adv. Leocr. p. 204. R.

¹⁷ Οὐ μίξοβάρβαροι, hence μισοβάρβαροι, Plato.

¹⁸ Μεγαλοψυχία. See a description of them, Aristot. Eth. Nicom. 4. 7, where see Zell.

¹⁹ This is also a common topic of the orators, e. g. Demosth. in Lept. 500: οὐδεὶς πώποτε τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν εὖ ποιῶν δοκεῖ νικῆσαι; yet there is some truth in it.

²⁰ Peric. ap. Thuc. 2. 39: τὴν τε γὰρ πόλιν κοινὴν παρέχομεν καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε ξενηλασίαις ἀπείργομέν τινα ἢ μαθήματος ἢ θεάματος, ὃ μὴ κρυφθὲν ἂν τις τῶν πολεμίων ἰδὼν ὠφελῇθῃ.

and in this virtuous age, irascibility²¹ and the arrogance which was just beginning to evince itself²², were equally balanced with pity²³, and the endeavour to gain love and affection. But it cannot be denied that the multitude, as well as the majority of the leaders, were tainted with envy and the lust of gain.

b. Rank of Persons.

§ 56. No sooner did the Athenians become the objects of their own admiration, than they began to set a higher value upon their citizenship, and to dispense it with a more sparing hand. But attempts to obtain it by surreptitious means became proportionally more numerous, and notwithstanding the laws rendered admittance to it a matter of difficulty¹, the authorities were, for a length of time, too heedless to oppose successful resistance to the devices employed to evade their regulations. Hence the unprecedented number of spurious citizens, when Pericles at length thinned their ranks; four thousand seven hundred and twenty were sold into captivity², as the law directed³. It was a natural consequence of the infrequency of naturalization, that birth still continued to be the chief qualifica-

²¹ The Athenians are called *ὀργίλοι*, Schol. Aristoph. Pac. 605.

²² *Υβρις*. See Thucyd. 2. 65.

²³ Comp. vol. i. § 15. n. 10. This is likewise extolled by Demosth. c. Timoc. 753: *τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἐλεῖν*. Comp. (Ps.) Plato Menex. 244. E.: *ἀεὶ λίαν φιλοκτίρων ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ ἡττονος θεραπείς*. The fine imposed upon Phrynichus, because he had given a dramatic representation of the destruction of Miletus, a city in alliance with Athens, and had thereby grieved the hearts of the Athenians, is very remarkable, Herod. 6. 21; conf. Plut. Præcep. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 243. R.; also the unique decree as to the indefatigable mule, Plut. de Instinct Animal. 10. 41.

¹ According to Ps. Demosth. cont. Neær. 1375, six thousand votes were necessary to decide for the naturalization of a person. This law, doubtless, dates from the age before Euclid, and probably from Solon himself.

² See vol. i. p. 370.

³ Plut. Pericl. 37; Philoch. ap. Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 716; (Siebelis Philoch. 51); Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 98; Meier de Bon. Damnât. p. 80.

tion for the citizenship; still, before the time of Pericles, little importance was attached to the origin of the mothers of citizens, and marriages with foreign women were looked upon as of so little disparagement, that the first men in the state, like Miltiades, made no scruple to contract them, while no disabilities attached to their children in consequence. The wife of Miltiades, Hegesypile, was, it is true, a Thracian king's daughter⁴. It is related of Themistocles, that in consequence of his mother's not having been a native of Athens, he was compelled to perform his youthful exercises in the Cynosarges⁵, being forbidden to associate with the legitimate children of Athenian citizens. But if any credit is to be attached to this statement⁶, which does not appear to be the case, as Themistocles was already Archon⁷ before the memorable day of Salamis (probably 481. B. C.), and consequently had undergone the necessary family scrutiny⁸, it is probable that the low origin of his mother, who appears to have been an enfranchised slave⁹, was the cause of the enactment. Pericles was the first rigorously to enforce the law, which directed that both the parents of any one to whom the franchise descended by hereditary succession,

⁴ Herod. 6. 39.

⁵ Plut. Themis. 1; Athen. 13. 576. C.; Ælian. V. H. 12. 43; comp. vol. i. p. 369. n. 16.

⁶ Photius Lex.: Κυνόσαργες—ἐκεῖ οἱ νόθοι ἐτελοῦντο, οἱ μήτε πρὸς πατρός μήτε πρὸς μητρός πολῖται—but Themistocles was descended from the ancient race of the Lycomedæ! However, νόθος might probably be employed afterwards to signify one who was only ματροξένος, e. g. Pollux 3. 21.

⁷ Thucyd. 1.93: ἐπεισε τοῦ Πειραιῶς τὰ λοιπὰ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς οἰκοδομεῖν· (ὕπῃρκετο δ' αὐτοῦ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀρχῆς, ἥς κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν Ἀθηναίους ἤρξε·) and Schol. πρὸ δὲ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἤρξεν ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα. Accord. to Corsini Fasti Att. 3. 144, sqq. See Clinton, Fasti Hellen. Oxon. 1824; Introd. XIII. XIV.

⁸ See vol. i. § 47. n. 41.

⁹ See the passage, n. 4.

should have been citizens¹⁰; an exception to the rule was afterwards made in his favour, and his natural son was permitted to enjoy the full rights of citizenship¹¹.

The citizens of all ages capable of bearing arms, amounted, till the Peloponnesian war, to between twenty and thirty thousand¹²; the official computation of Pericles in Thucydides¹³ gives thirteen thousand Hoplitæ for service in the field, and sixteen thousand including the Metœci, for the garrison; besides these there were twelve hundred horsemen, in which number were comprised the mounted bowmen who did not belong to the citizens. But it is stated in Plutarch¹⁴, that when a census was taken at the distribution of some Egyptian corn, Olymp. 83. 4. (445. B. C.) it was ascertained that there were no more than fourteen thousand two hundred and forty genuine citizens: but, unless naturalization had been permitted, it is impossible to account for such an increase in their number between that year and the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; moreover, the destructive Samian war took place in the interval; the difficulty will be removed by assuming that only the poorer citizens partook of the supply of corn before alluded to¹⁵.

¹⁰ *μόνους Ἀθηναίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ δυοῖν Ἀθηναίων γεγονότας*, Plut. Pericl. 37. This had, till that time, been a mere traditional observance, which was probably frequently disregarded, comp. vol. i. p. 369.

¹¹ Plut. ubi sup.; comp. below, § 64. n. 5.

¹² Herod. 5. 97, says of Aristagoras, *τρεῖς μυριάδας Ἀθηναίων ἐπεισε*; Aristoph. Ecclesiaz. 432. 433, says: *πολιτῶν πλεῖον ἢ τρισμυρίων ὄντων τὸ πλῆθος*; only a rough calculation in both cases.

¹³ Thuc. 2. 13.

¹⁴ Plut. Pericl. 37.

¹⁵ Philochorus ap. Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 716. (Siebel. Philoch. 51.) appears to express himself more precisely than Plutarch: *τοὺς γὰρ λαβόντας γενέσθαι μυρίους τετρακισχιλίους διακοσίους μ'*. Comp. Böckh, Staatsh. 1. 37. 98.

The legal regulation of the classes, as far as we are enabled to judge, still continued to be based upon the scale of valuation as established by Solon; but from the increasing wealth of the state and of individuals, the assessments of Solon's time, so far as they had been altered by Clisthenes, must have been considerably too low for the fortunes of this period; it is not only probable that there were more pentacosiomedimni than before, but that the surplus property of individuals over and above the maximum assessment was very considerable; moreover, the second and third classes might possibly approach each other very closely and exceed the rate fixed in the valuation of Solon, by which means Aristides was enabled so much the sooner to abolish the exclusive eligibility of the first class to the archonship¹⁶; and lastly, the Thetes likewise ascended in the scale, and the state was rich enough to furnish them with arms to enable them to serve as Hoplitæ¹⁷. The classes were upon the whole divided into the very rich, those in good circumstances, and the poor; there were no beggars in Athens; but the Athenians at all times attached great importance to wealth.

The hereditary nobility had long ceased to form a caste furnished with exclusive family privileges. But in Athens, as probably in all countries and all ages, public opinion looked with reverence upon ancient and illustrious ancestry; this feeling moreover derived strength from the implicit recognition of the heroic root, from which various families pre-

¹⁶ Plut. Arist. 22: γράφει ψήφισμα, κοινήν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἰρεῖσθαι, where, however, we must suppose the Thetes to have been tacitly excluded.

¹⁷ This was the case in the Peloponnesian war, Thuc. 6. 43.

tended to be sprung, as for instance, not to mention the Alcmaeonidæ, when Miltiades, Alcibiades, and Themistocles the historian, derived themselves from Ajax ¹⁸, Andocides, from the race of the Ceryces from Hermes ¹⁹, Lycurgus, the orator, an Eteobutad from Erechtheus ²⁰. In various houses, particularly in those to which an hereditary priesthood was annexed, the pedigree was most carefully continued. The importance which was thus manifested for this species of distinction was not, it must be owned, founded in political law, but derived its sanction from public opinion alone ²¹. Wealth was in the nature of things, the most effectual prop of the hereditary nobility, as in the case of the often-mentioned family of the Hipponici and Callias ²²: but Athens was called upon to make great and unwonted exertions, and to go through severe ordeals, in which nobility and riches were of little avail; the period of political and civil virtue had commenced; counsel and action, military courage, bodily strength and address, the courageous and cheerful sacrifice of property and life, and even the production of works of excellence in the domain of the fine arts—all this, by the aid and support of public favour, opened the avenues to superior rights, to offices and dignities ²³, and even by virtue of express and positive

¹⁸ Didymus ap. Schol. Pind. Nem. 2. 19.

¹⁹ Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orator. 9. 316. R.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 345. 355. Comp. in general, vol. i. § 30.

²¹ Aristoph. Vesp. 627 : οἱ πλουτοῦντες καὶ πανὸν σεμνοί. The last word conveys the notion of a noble and lofty personal bearing.

²² Ἰππόνικος Καλλίου καὶ Ἰππονίκου Καλλίας. Aristoph. Av. 283. See Heindorf ad Plat. Protagor. p. 465; Clavier sur la famille de Callias, mém. de l'institut, classe d'hist. vol. iii. Concerning the riches of this family, see in particular Athen. 12. 536. F. sqq. Comp. below, § 65. n. 53.

²³ Thus Sophocles was appointed one of the Strategi against Samos in re-

enactments, was rewarded with determinate privileges.

External distinctions of this description emanating from the state, gradually led to the formation of a class of honorary citizens whose position and rank in society may in some measure be compared with those of the chivalric orders of merit in modern days, when these correspond with their title and the object and intention of their foundation²⁴. The list begins with Harmodius and Aristogiton, to whom almost heroic honours were paid²⁵. The most ancient distinction on record is that of being entertained at the public expence in the Prytaneum²⁶, which was said to have existed as early as in Codrus' time²⁷; it was either granted for once, or for life, and was occasionally conferred upon the descendants of a public benefactor; in the case of prytanes and ambassadors²⁸, it was an honour which was assigned to the office, not to the person. Intemperance was unknown at these repasts²⁹. Still greater advantages were associated with the Ateleia, the exemption from all contributions to

turn for the gratification which his Antigone had afforded to the people. Argum. Soph. Antig.

²⁴ Köler: Had the ancients rewards for public services, similar to the orders of knighthood in modern times? Dörptsche-Beitr. 1813, vol. ii. and 1818, vol. i.

²⁵ Demosth. de Falsa Legat. 431. 16, sqq.: — οὗς νόμῳ διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας, ἃς ὑπῆρξαν εἰς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, ἐπὶ ταῖς θυσίαις, σπονδῶν καὶ κρατήρων κοινωνοὺς πεποίησθε καὶ ᾄδετε καὶ τιμᾶτε ἐξίσου τοῖς ἥρωσι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς.

²⁶ Σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείῳ. Cic. de Orat. l. 54.

²⁷ Lycurg. con. Leocr. 196. R. mentions a Cleomantis: — ἡ πόλις αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἐγγόνοις ἐν Πρυτανείῳ αἰδῖον σίτησιν ἔδοσαν.

²⁸ Pollux, 9. 40: — ἐστία τῆς πόλεως, παρ' ἧς ἰσιτοῦντο οἷτε κατὰ δημοσίαν πρεσβείαν ἤκοντες, καὶ οἱ διὰ πρᾶξιν τινα σιτήσεως ἀξιοθέντες, καὶ εἰς ἐκείνην ἀείσιτος ἦν.

²⁹ Plut. Sol. 24; Athen. 5. 186. It is remarkable that Solon only allowed a citizen to be entertained once at the public expense, but punished him who refused to obey the summons; for he looked upon such conduct as ὑπεροψίαν τῶν κοινῶν, Plut. ubi sup.

the state, which were not connected with the defence of the country, consequently neither from the trierarchy nor the property-tax³⁰. Regular donations and pensions were sometimes granted. Solon appointed five hundred drachmas as the reward for an Olympic victor, and a hundred for an Isthmian³¹; the state acted with great liberality towards the son and daughters of Aristides³². The debts of the renowned general Phormio were paid³³. On the other hand presentation with a crown, conferred nothing but honour, as long as crowns were made of boughs, and not of gold³⁴. They were granted to Buleutæ as a reward for the faithful discharge of official duties, or for having built ships³⁵; it was not till after the time of Aristides, Themistocles and Cimon, that that honour was conferred upon private individuals; Pericles was the first who obtained it³⁶; afterwards it became very frequent, and numerous legal provisions were made on the subject³⁷. A statue³⁸ was first erected to Solon, but probably more as a purely historical memorial, than as a mark of personal distinction, in which intention statues were erected to Harmodius and Aristogiton³⁹; no example again occurs till the time of Conon⁴⁰; however, in the interval,

³⁰ Böckh, Pub. Econ. 2. 5. 82.

³¹ Plut. Sol. 23.

³² See Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 267.

³³ Pausan. 1. 23. 12.

³⁴ Στέφανος.

³⁵ Thrasybulus received a crown of boughs, (θάλλον στέφανος.) Æsch. in Ctesiph. 577. R.

³⁶ Argum. Demosth. in Androt. 587. On such occasions the Buleutæ, according to the words of the law used, αἰτεῖν παρὰ τοῦ δήμου δωρεάν.

³⁷ Plut. Cim. 8.

³⁸ Val. Max. 2. 6. 5.

³⁹ Æsch. in Ctesiph. 434; conf. 427. 431. 437; Demosth. de Coron. 265; Isocrat. in Callim. 669.

⁴⁰ Εἰκών.

⁴¹ Demosth. in Lept. 478; comp. Pausan. 1. 8. 5.

⁴² Demosth. ubi sup.

an honour closely allied with it, namely, the liberty of erecting Hermæ with inscriptions upon them⁴³; was granted to Cimon. Lastly, amongst these must be counted the Proedria.

The Atimia, which will be treated of afterwards in the exposition of public law, must be looked upon as the reverse of the above-named distinctions of merit, viz. as an instrument to deprive public defaulters or dilatory debtors to the state of civil rights and civil honours⁴⁴; the infliction of positive infamy, as in Sparta in the case of bachelors⁴⁵, was unknown to Athenian legislation.

Especial consideration must next be devoted to the relation of the Cleruchi; this system commenced before the Persian war, and notwithstanding it sustained several forcible interruptions, it was continued till the battle of Chæronea; it was however brought to maturity in the time of Pericles⁴⁶. The general characteristic of this relation was that the Athenians settled in foreign countries; so far it comes within the notion of a colony. In order to understand the true nature of this system, which was a source of advantage to the Athenians for a short period of time, but which rendered them the objects of more hatred and hostility than their other political crimes and infirmities, it is necessary to take a survey of the foreign settlements of the Athenians.

The Thracian Chersonesus. The Dolonci by whom it was inhabited, being in need of assistance against the neighbouring Apsinthians, became ac-

⁴³ Plut. Cim. 7, et Æsch. in Ctesiph. 572, sqq.

⁴⁴ Comp. vol. i. p. 369.

⁴⁵ Plut. Lyc. 15.

⁴⁶ See in general Raoul-Rochette *établiss. des col. Grecq.* vol. iii. iv.; Böckh, *Pub. Econ.* 1. 455, sqq.

quainted with the elder Miltiades, the son of Cypselus, and invited him to settle amongst them. This took place Ol. 56. 1; 556. B. C.; he came with a number of voluntary companions, who acknowledged him as their chief, and built a wall of defence against the Apsinthians, extending from Cardia to Pactye⁴⁷. The dominion of the country situate within the wall⁴⁸, after him devolved to his brother's son Stesagoras; after his death the Pisistratidæ sent his brother Miltiades there with one trireme, Olymp. 65. 3, or 66. 2, 518. or 515. B. C.; the latter joined Darius in his march against the Scythians⁴⁹, and took to flight, upon the approach of a Phœnician fleet after the subjection of Ionia⁵⁰; upon the expulsion of the Persians the Chersonese became public property. The chief places were Sestos, which Xanthippus wrested from the Persians, Olymp. 75. 2; 478. B. C.⁵¹, Cardia, Pactye, Crithote⁵², Alopeconnesus⁵³, Elæus⁵⁴; to these were afterwards added Doriscus⁵⁵ and Serrhium⁵⁶ in the vicinity westward of the Hebrus; Sigeum, which was occupied by Pisistratus⁵⁷, must be looked upon as belonging to the tyrants, not to the state; further southward on the Æolian coast Adramyttium was accounted an Athenian colony⁵⁸.

Lemnos and Imbrus were in the undisturbed possession of the Pelasgians, who had once migrated

⁴⁷ Herod. 6. 33—41: comp. Corsini, Fast. Attic. 3. 103, sqq.

⁴⁸ A current phrase of later times was τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν τειχῶν, Dem. de Falsa Legat. 390. 3.

⁴⁹ Herod. 4. 137.

⁵⁰ Herod. 6. 41; comp. above, § 53. n. 28.

⁵¹ Diodor. 11. 37.

⁵² Harpocr. Stephan. Byzant.

⁵³ Demosth. in Arist. 675. 20, sqq.; Etym. M. Ἀλωπηκ. see 75, Sylb.

⁵⁴ Demosth. in Arist. 672. 20.

⁵⁵ Here it was where, as far as Herodotus knew, the Persian Mascames defended himself, Herod. 7. 106.

⁵⁶ Demosth. adv. Phil. 133; de Falsa Legat. 390.

⁵⁷ Herod. 5. 94.

⁵⁸ Strab. 13. 606, Ἀθηναίων ἀποικὸς πόλις.

there from Attica⁵⁹, till in Olymp. 67. 3; 510. B. C. the Persian Otanes subjected them to the Persian rule⁶⁰. In the course of the following years, probably during the insurrection of the Greeks of Asia Minor, Miltiades effected the conquest of Lemnos from the Chersonese, drove out the Pelasgians, and peopled the island with Athenians, or at all events with natives of the Chersonese of Athenian extraction. The destiny of Imbrus appears even at that time to have been similar to that of Lemnos; on his flight from the Phoenicians Miltiades went there⁶² before he sailed to Athens.

In Eubœa, Olymp. 68. 3; 506. B. C. the domains of the Chalcidian Hippobotæ were confiscated, and some Athenians were sent there to take possession of them; but the Hippobotæ appear to have recovered their lands during the Persian war⁶³.

Scyros was inhabited by piratical Dolopians⁶⁴ till the time of the Persian wars; Cimon (Ol. 76. 1; 476. B. C.) reduced them to slavery and founded an Athenian settlement on the island⁶⁵. Halonnesus was also reckoned amongst the most ancient possessions of Athens in the time of the orators⁶⁶.

Amphipolis, Eion, and the mining towns opposite Thasus. The tract of country at the mouth of the Strymon, where Histiaëus, the founder of the city of Myrcinus, Aristagoras⁶⁷, and afterwards

⁵⁹ Herod. 6. 140; on the subject of the last Pelasgian king Hermon, consult Hesych. and Suidas, Ἐρμώνιος χάρις, and Zenob. Prov. 3. 85.

⁶⁰ Herod. 5. 26.

⁶¹ Herod. 6. 140; comp. Thucyd. 7. 57.

⁶² Herod. 6. 41.

⁶³ Comp. vol. i. Appendix xiii.

⁶⁴ Thuc. 1. 98; Diodor. 11. 60, has Pelasgians and Dolopians.

⁶⁵ Thuc. et Diodor. ubi sup. Plut. Cim. 8.

⁶⁶ Argum. Demosth. de Halonn. p. 75. R.

⁶⁷ Herod. 5. 11. 23. 124; Thuc. 4. 102. Aristagoras was slain there, 497. B. C. (Clinton.)

the Macedonian Alexander⁶⁸ (φιλέλλην) had in vain endeavoured to obtain a permanent footing⁶⁹, was opened to the Athenians by Cimon, the conqueror of Eion⁷⁰. Soon after the first attack which the Athenians made on Thasus, Olymp. 78. 4; 465 B. C., thirty-two years after the death of Aristagoras⁷¹, ten thousand men, consisting of Athenians and their allies, were sent into the provinces on the Strymon⁷²; but were soon afterwards cut off by the Thracians near Drabescus⁷³. An army sent to take possession of those mining towns which had hitherto been Thasian, viz. Daton, CEsyme, Scapte Hyle⁷⁴, etc. was soon afterwards destroyed by the Edones near Daton⁷⁵. Agnon, Olymp. 85. 4; 437. B. C., first made the settlement of the Athenians on the Strymon permanent; the town Ennea Hodoi was now called Amphipolis⁷⁶: it is possible that the right to make use of the mines was asserted with greater energy after the capture of Thasus.

Pericles increased and extended the Athenian settlements, and provided for their security. Ol. 82. 1; 452. B. C. he sent five hundred citizens to Naxos⁷⁷, two hundred and fifty to Andros, and probably a body of them to Eubœa, a thousand to the country of the Bisaltæ⁷⁸, a thousand to the

⁶⁸ Demosth. de Phil. Epist. 164. 19.

⁶⁹ On the subject of nine unsuccessful expeditions which the Athenians made thither, see Schol. Æsch. de Falsa Legat. 755. R.

⁷⁰ Herod. 7. 107; Thuc. 1. 98.

⁷¹ Thuc. 4. 102.

⁷² Thuc. 1. 100; Diod. 11. 70; Corn. Nep. Cim. 2.

⁷³ Thuc. 1. 100.

⁷⁴ Comp. Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 334. 335.

⁷⁵ Herod. 9. 74; Schol. Æsch. ubi sup.; Pausan. 1. 29. 4, who is not free from error.

⁷⁶ Thuc. 4. 102; 5. 11; Schol. Æsch. ubi sup.

⁷⁷ Plut. Per. 11; Diod. 11. 88, has a thousand, but some of these probably remained in Eubœa and Andros. Comp. Pausan. 1. 27. 6, where it is said that Tolmidas led Cleruchi to Eubœa and Naxos.

⁷⁸ Plut. ubi sup.

Chersonesus⁷⁹; Ol. 83. 4; 445. B. C., two thousand to occupy the possessions of the expelled **Histiæans** in Eubœa⁸⁰; Athenians went to join the settlers in **Sinope**⁸¹, **Amisus**⁸² and **Thurii**⁸³, (Olymp. 84. 2; 443. B. C.) In the first year of the Peloponnesian war the **Æginetans** were expelled, and **Cleruchiæ** in their island were allotted to Athenian citizens⁸⁴.

With the further progress of the Peloponnesian war, to these were added **Mytilene**⁸⁵ and its districts⁸⁶, **Potidæa**⁸⁷, **Scione**⁸⁸, **Colophon**⁸⁹ and **Melos**⁹⁰. **Delos**, whither, Olymp. 89. 2, upon the expulsion of its inhabitants, Athenian **Cleruchi** migrated, was soon afterwards restored to the **Delians**⁹¹. The settlements in **Samos**⁹² belong to the age of Philip.

There is a remarkable difference between the whole of these settlements and the transmarine colonies of the earlier age. Those citizens who had voluntarily separated or been expelled from a community could not, as in ancient times, found states, without the participation of the parent-towns; the sea no longer divided them as it once did, when the waves seemed to exercise a sort of oblivious power over the mother-towns and their colonial offspring; and finally, those favourable circum-

⁷⁹ Plut. ubi sup.; Diodor. 11. 88.

⁸⁰ Thuc. 1. 114; Plutarch, Pers. 23; Theopomp. ap. Strab. 10. 445.

⁸¹ Plut. Pericl. 20.

⁸² Strab. 12. 547; Appian Bell. Civ. 8. 83.

⁸³ Diodor. 12. 10, and Wessel.; Heyne opusc. 2. 138, sq.

⁸⁴ Thuc. 2. 27; Diod. 12. 99; Diog. Laert. 3. 2.

⁸⁵ This orthography I have now ascertained to be better authenticated than **Mitylene**.

⁸⁶ Thuc. 3. 59.

⁸⁷ Thuc. 2. 70.

⁸⁸ Thuc. 3. 62; Diod. 12. 76; Isocr. Paneg. 31.

⁸⁹ Thuc. 3. 34.

⁹⁰ Thuc. 5. cap. ult.

⁹¹ Thuc. 5. 1. 32.

⁹² Strab. 14. 638.

stances, which had once enabled detached hordes to obtain secure and commodious habitations, had long ceased to prevail. The expedition of the elder Miltiades alone appears in the light of a private enterprise; and this probably was not entirely effected without the concurrence of Pisistratus; but the most prominent characteristic of all the settlements which were henceforward made was, that a close connection was to be kept up between them and the mother-town; amongst their immediate objects was that of providing for poor citizens, and securing the authority of the state in conquered countries, by sending citizens there, who, upon receiving grants of land, took upon themselves the duty of defending the settlement, and constituted a kind of garrison⁹³, and finally to obtain influence over a foreign and independent state, by sending a number of citizens to defend it, who contracted relations with their new country, without entirely severing the ties which bound them to the parent-town. The word *Cleruchia*⁹⁴, which now became usual in lieu of the former *Apoikia*, is very expressive, inasmuch as, instead of the negative idea implied by the latter, it chiefly conveys the positive notion of property to be expected and formally appropriated⁹⁵.

We shall be enabled to form an accurate concep-

⁹³ Plut. Pericl. 11, says of Pericles: ἀποκουφίζων μὲν ἀργοῦ καὶ διὰ σχολήν πολυπράγμονος ὄχλου τὴν πόλιν, ἐπανορθούμενος δὲ τὰς ἀπορίας τοῦ δήμου, φόβον τε καὶ φρουρὰν τοῦ μὴ νεωτερίζειν τι παρακατοικίζων τοῖς συμμάχοις.

⁹⁴ See Harpocr. and the other Lexicographers. The antiquity of the word κληρος and of the notion of distribution, the devolution of a district by lot, is evident from the mythus concerning the partition of the earth by the gods into places set apart for their respective worships. There is another expression, however, besides κληροῦχοι in Thucydides; he calls those who go to Melos ἀποίκους, and to Ægina ἐποίκους, 2. 77.

⁹⁵ Agripeta, the Cleruchus, Cic. de Natur. Deor. 1. 26.

tion of the Cleruchia, and of the points wherein it differed from the Apoikia in general, by observing the relation in which the individual partaker of a Cleruchia stood to the parent-town; for the Cleruchi did not wander forth in quest of adventures, or for the purpose of colonising a district in which cultivation had been hitherto unattempted and political society was yet to be commenced, but received allotments of property already laid out and improved, which immediately maintained their proprietors, and in most cases even took possession of Grecian, not of barbarian lands, by virtue of the right of conquest, which had been asserted in the earlier ages in the Greek territories by Thessalians, Boeotians, and Dorians. But on the other part, the more certain the competence to be derived from a Cleruchia, the less it involved the necessity of renouncing the ties which bound the Cleruchus to his own country; the Cleruchia was rather an appendage to the citizenship in the mother-town; the personal rights of the Cleruchus there remained unaltered; they were not even temporarily suspended; he never entirely withdrew from the state, and always continued to be numbered amongst its members⁹⁶; his colonial property was assessed in the public valuation like his possessions in the mother-country, and he was subject to the jurisdiction of the Athenian courts; the term of his residence in the Cleruchia was optional, like that of a townsman upon his estate in the country⁹⁷, during which he was cer-

⁹⁶ A temporary absence is alluded to by Æsch. c. Tim. 78: ἀπεστίν ἐν Σαμῶ μετὰ τῶν κληρούχων. This is likewise implied in the calculation, Demosth. de Symmor. 182. 16.

⁹⁷ Hence γεωργεῖν, the peculiar expression (comp. the Roman arare, Cic. in Verr. 3. 5. 11); ὥς ἐγεωργοῦμεν ἐν τῇ Ναξῷ, Plat. Euthyphr. 4. B.; τοὺς ἐν Χερρόνησῳ γεωργοῦντας, Isocr. ad Philip. 118. ed. Lang.

tainly prevented by absence from exercising various personal rights, whereby, however, neither he nor his children, who might happen to be born in the Cleruchia, in anywise forfeited their title to their municipal rights in themselves⁹⁸. Of course, when a Cleruchus left no property in Athens, and was constantly absent, his dormant rights lost part of their efficacy, as the ties which connected him with home grew relaxed.

But it is certain that the communities did not stand in this confidential relation to the mother-town in their aggregate capacity; for although the individual Athenian, who happened to reside in one, was in every respect looked upon as a citizen of the capital, subject to its jurisdiction, entitled to return there at any time he thought proper⁹⁹, and rated according to his property there, it was inevitable, from the mixed nature of the population, that various Cleruchias, to which either confederates had been admitted, or in which the former possessors had still remained in the character of Pericæci, should, in some measure, be treated as aliens or dependents; and the position of the communities as such, does not, upon the whole, appear to have been so advantageous as that of the Roman municipia. The relation was of the most simple kind between the mother-state and those countries whence the original inhabitants had been expelled, or where they had been subjugated after the Athenians had become all-powerful at sea, such as His-

⁹⁸ e. g. Plato's father, Cleruchus in Ægina, Diog. Laert. 3. 2; Aristophanes, *ibid.*; Acharn. 652. Schol.; the father of Epicurus in Samos, Diog. Laert. 10. 1; Strabo, 19. 638.

⁹⁹ A right which even the Metæcus Lysias of Thurii asserted, *Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat.* 9. 322.

tiæa, Ægina, Scione, Potidæa, Mytilene; here the community was considered wholly dissolved, as Capua was by the Romans, after it had been reconquered in the second Punic war¹⁰⁰; the estates distributed were laid under contribution as public property, and the owner paid a proportion of their produce to the state, according to his assessment in the public valuation, and thus, whilst individual citizens acquired property, the state was indemnified for the tribute which the conquered community had formerly paid¹⁰¹. The arrival of Cleruchi in communities, like Thurii and Sinope, which Athens held in dependence without exercising despotic authority over them, effected no sort of change in the nature of the relation between them, and as the principal object contemplated was to provide for the citizens, it was expected that by their means a favourable feeling towards the parent city would be kept up in their new habitations. But the footing on which Lemnos, Imbrus, Scyros, and Amphipolis stood, seems doubtful; they appear to have partaken far more of the nature of the Apoikia than the Cleruchia, notwithstanding the maintenance of union and relationship. The essential difference between these communities and those before enumerated, which must be looked upon as dissolved, is, that the former laid claim to a founder (*κρίστης*), as when Amphipolis referred its origin to Agnon¹⁰², and still earlier, the Chersonese to Mil-

¹⁰⁰ Liv. 26. 16. Ager omnis et tecta publica populi Romani facta. Ceterum habitari tantum, tanquam urbem, Capuam, frequentarique placuit; corpus nullum civitatis nec senatus, nec plebis concilium, nec magistratus esse, etc.

¹⁰¹ Hence the Lesbians, who had been despoiled of their property, were no longer required to pay tribute, Thuc. 3. 50.

¹⁰² Thucyd. 5. 11.

tiades¹⁰³, and probably Lemnos to the same; in Scyros, Cimon was considered the founder of the community¹⁰⁴. Communities of this description could not be looked upon as strictly incorporated with the mother-town, and this, of necessity, reacted upon the position of the inhabitants (without reference to those Athenians who arrived afterwards, and who may be compared with the Chape-tones in Spanish America). Hence, notwithstanding Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scyros were considered to form such essential portions of the Athenian state, that they were guaranteed to it by the peace of Antalcidas¹⁰⁵, we still find that the Lemnians and Imbrians are mentioned separately from the Athenians¹⁰⁶. But the colonial relation of Amphipolis was the less calculated to be of an intimate character, as the Athenians, who settled there at the period of its foundation, must have been so far less numerous than the barbarians; wherefore, when Brasidas afterwards arrived there, so little attachment was manifested for Athens¹⁰⁷.

The position of those Athenians who were not citizens continued, upon the whole, to be regulated by the laws of Solon¹⁰⁸, but the spirit in which they were administered of course varied with the temper of the Athenian people; and in some instances new provisions, either prescriptive or positive, were

¹⁰³ Herod. 6. 38: καὶ οἱ τελευτήσαντι Χερσονησῖται θύουσι, ὡς νόμος, οἰκιστῶν, κ. τ. λ. There was also a Prytaneum there, Herod. ubi sup.

¹⁰⁴ Diod. 11. 60.

¹⁰⁵ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 1. 31; Demosth. in Phil. 1. 49. 27, speaks of a descent which Philip made upon Lemnos and Imbrus—αἰχμαλώτους πολίτας ὑμετέρους ᾤχετ' ἄγων, where it is hardly possible that an Athenian garrison can be meant.

¹⁰⁶ Thuc. 3. 5; 4. 28; 5. 8; 7. 57: Ἀθηναῖοι—καὶ αὐτοῖς τῇ αὐτῇ φωνῇ καὶ νομίμοις ἔτι χρώμενοι Λήμνιοι καὶ Ἰμβριοι.

¹⁰⁷ Thuc. 4. 102, sqq.

¹⁰⁸ See vol. i. p. 370, 371.

probably added. The Metœci, whose number increased ¹⁰⁹ with the power and commerce of Athens, and through the encouragement of intelligent statesmen, like Themistocles ¹¹⁰, were required to perform every species of service, even that of Hoplitæ ¹¹¹. By thus taking upon themselves civil burthens, they approached so closely to the citizenship, that they were enabled surreptitiously to appropriate to themselves its rights in the extraordinary degree already stated; but the legal barrier between citizens and slaves ¹¹² was by no means removed.

The slaves were very numerous, amounting to upwards of three hundred and fifty thousand ¹¹³; they were likewise required to perform certain public services, which, strictly speaking, were the exclusive right of citizens; thus slaves fought at Marathon; in other respects their condition was destitute of legal rights. The law forbidding any slave to bear the name of Harmodius or Aristogiton ¹¹⁴, one of the most striking expressions of the democratic spirit, appears to belong to the age of Clisthenes. It is not quite certain whether there were Perioeci in the Cleruchias; it is probable that the Thracian husbandmen in the Chersonese, etc., as afterwards the Mytileneans, stood upon a footing of this description.

¹⁰⁹ Diodor. 11. 43, who, however, must not be believed when he states that Themistocles dispensed the Metœci from the payment of all taxes. Did Themistocles perhaps institute the *ισοτελεῖς*?

¹¹⁰ With their families, they amounted to about forty-five thousand souls, Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 38, sqq. ¹¹¹ Thucyd. 2. 31.

¹¹² Compare at large Ste.-Croix, in the Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscrit. t. 47.

¹¹³ Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 38, sqq.

¹¹⁴ Gell. Noct. Att. 9. 2.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CITY OF ATHENS, c. *The Political Authorities.*

§ 57. Though the constitution which Solon had begun to render democratic had been divested of various still remaining and not unimportant aristocratic ingredients, it was not yet entitled to the appellation of pure and unmixed democracy¹. It is an essential feature in the two constitutions, that though aristocracy and oligarchy place themselves in absolute and direct opposition to democracy, democracy can never become so entirely developed as to eradicate every approach to aristocracy, wherefore absolute and unqualified equality of the citizens, as to a share in the supreme power, can never maintain itself for any length of time; claims and requisitions, either hereditary or newly acquired, will always raise a certain number of citizens above the multitude. But the democratic form may be secured and maintained in tolerable integrity, by means of the particular provisions of the constitution for regulating a share in the chief power; and wherever these continue to be purely democratical, we are not only at liberty, but are bound to apply to such a constitution the name of democracy². Still it is of paramount importance to ascertain the true nature of the substance and matter contained within the external form we have described, and this, if we may be allowed the expression, can only be gathered from the general tone of the constitution. So far, then, without reference to the formal dis-

¹ Plut. Cim. 15, says, Cimon wished τὴν ἐπὶ Κλεισθέους εὐχέλαιαν ἀριστοκρατίαν. See how this must be interpreted, § 54. n. 3.

² Here we may apply the excellent description of Tittmann, Griechische Staatsver. 520, sqq., in its full force.

inction between the Areopagus, as an aristocratic body, and the democratic authorities, we may speak of an opposition, and even of a protracted struggle between aristocracy and democracy within the distinctly defined democratic forms of the constitution, in which the object of the contending parties was not to subvert these forms³, but to engross the greatest possible share of that power which could be obtained through them.

The tendency of the Athenians to navigation and maritime warfare was regarded by the ancient politicians as calculated to arouse democratic feelings⁴. In this, as in the case of the three dramatic unities—that which had previously been the actual fact in Athens, became the basis upon which a general principle was afterwards constructed. But in Athens the feeling of the *demus* became emboldened by the consciousness of its exploits against the barbarians, and of the ascendant it had gained over those formidable rivals of Athens at sea, Ægina and Corinth. Nevertheless, the recognition of the mob and the insolence of a seditious populace were alike foreign to the character of the Athenian state, which, until the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when the plague swept away a number of its best citizens, and Pericles amongst the number, may be compared to a body directed by its noblest members, to whose guidance the remainder yielded ready obe-

³ Concerning the reckless attempt of some aristocratic adventurers in the camp at Platææ, see above, § 53. n. 61.

⁴ Aristot. Pol. 5. 2. 12 :—*μᾶλλον δημοτικοὶ οἱ τὸν Πειραιᾶ οἰκοῦντες τῶν τὸ ἄστυ.* Comp. 5. 3. 5 : *ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νικῆς, κ. τ. λ.* Comp. Plut. Themist. 19.

dience⁵. High and low vied with each other in endeavouring to promote the aggrandizement of their country, and to render the commonwealth great and illustrious, whilst the leaders and their followers cheerfully encountered toils and dangers, and sacrificed whatever they held most dear with an enthusiasm which scarcely admitted of contentions amongst the orders, and even when they did arise, the danger which threatened their common country induced them to lay aside their differences⁶. Hence, from the noble and lofty sentiments which pervaded the public mind, there can be no doubt that the true *Kalokagathoi* were very numerous. These were found in abundance amongst ancient and illustrious families, and in the ranks of those sturdy warriors whose glory perhaps only dated from the battles of Marathon or those of Salamis and Plataeæ. To attempt exclusively to confine the *Kalokagathoi* to a particular class, is an aspersion upon the dignity of the Athenian citizens of that age⁷. The best amongst them were chosen for the discharge of the most influential functions, and thus, as was observed above, notwithstanding the sovereignty which resided in the *demus*, we are authorized to assume the existence of a kind of aristocracy⁸ in

⁵ See the expressive aphorism of Simonides, *πόλις ἄνδρα διδάσκει*, ap. Plut. an Seni Respub. etc. 9. 134, R.

⁶ The *Atimoi* were adopted amongst the citizens upon the approach of Xerxes, Plut. Themist. 11. Andocid. de Myster. 36. (when the battle of Marathon was fought,) more correctly 53, (when the king approached).

⁷ Thucydides indeed, 8. 48, opposes them to the *demus*: *τούς τε καλοὺς καὶ γαθοὺς ὀνομαζομένους οὐκ ἐλάσσω αὐτοὺς νομίσειν σφίσι πράγματα παρέξειν τοῦ δήμου*, and the word *ὀνομαζομένους* even seems to imply that such was their ordinary denomination; but Aristoph. Equit. 227, et pass. uses it in the sense of good citizens. Compare above, § 54.

⁸ Pericles ap. Thucyd. 2. 37: *καὶ ὄνομα μὲν, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰς ὀλίγους, ἀλλ' εἰς πλείονας ἦκειν, δημοκρατία κέκληται· μίτεστι δὲ, κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους*

the public administration. Though the confidence with which the demos submitted to the guidance of the most distinguished men of the state was great, it still had its vulnerable parts, which being but slightly agitated, the whole body immediately suffered violent commotion, and repulsed those by whom it had hitherto been guided. The apprehension that its liberties might be invaded took possession of its mind, and those to whom it had yielded ready obedience before, were now doomed to suffer from its waywardness and cruelty. This was brought about by the constant alarm of conspiracies against the popular government. Hence the most glorious period in the annals of the Athenians coincided with that in which the foulest blot upon their character, envy and ingratitude towards their benefactors, are most conspicuous, and when the most illustrious ornaments of the state fell victims to ostracism. But this play of the passions cannot be fully understood unless we direct our attention to the simultaneous struggles of faction. Before, however, these party contentions, and the character of the leaders can be properly described, it will be requisite to cast a glance at the political bodies in which the sovereign powers of the constitution chiefly resided.

The relative position of the Ecclesia, the Bule, and the Heliaea underwent no material alteration. It is unnecessary to allude here to the influence which the custom of paying the Ecclesiasts and Heliasts had upon the spirit and mode of their

πρὸς τὰ ἴδια διάφορα πᾶσι τὸ ἴσον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀξίωσιν, ὥς ἕκαστος ἐν τῷ εὐδοκιμῇ, οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους τὸ πλεῖον ἐς τὰ κοινὰ ἢ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς προτιμᾶται. Comp. the Schol. 5. p. 387, Bipont.

proceedings; but even at this stage we must not omit to mention the great moral and political power which the popular orators acquired in the Ecclesia; and, on the other hand, the increase in the importance of the Bule, caused by the great extension of their duties, especially in matters relating to navigation and sea trade.

The Areopagus continued to exercise its dignified and important functions till Pericles diminished its authority. As it was composed of such Archons as had vacated office, and as these had in the first instance been chosen from amongst the most powerful of the citizens, it was natural that aristocratic feeling should prevail in it. But its vocation was less to create than to preserve, and it was, moreover, so exclusively concerned with the interior, that during that agitated period when the destinies of Athens were so powerfully affected by external events, its paternal duties were thrown considerably into the background by the youthful and enterprising vigour of the other authorities⁹.

Amongst the offices of state the archonship remained unchanged, but by the law of Aristides other citizens besides Pentacosiomedimni were declared eligible to it¹⁰. Still regard was almost always had to the property of the candidates, and various other features of the ancient dokimasia were retained¹¹. But even this office was not the stage on which a mind occupied in directing the complicated external relations of Athens could dis-

⁹ The account in Plut. Themist. 10, that the Areopagus, in the year 480, gave every warrior eight drachmas, cannot be understood of a grant of public money, for it took place *οὐκ ὄντων δημοσίων χρημάτων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις*; does it not rather refer to an extraordinary liturgy defrayed by the rich men in the Areopagus?

¹⁰ See § 55. n. 17.

¹¹ Comp. vol. i. § 47.

play itself; it was rather a preparation for the serene duties which awaited the blameless ex-Archon in the Areopagus¹². The numerous offices which, upon the growth of the Athenian power after the time of Clisthenes, arose out of the ten Phylæ¹³, were chiefly concerned in the duties of the administration; but from this time the Strategi¹⁴ began to participate extensively in the exercise of the supreme power. As the maritime empire, which was a consequence of the Persian war, secured to the demus greater power and authority upon the whole, so it likewise increased the influence of those popular officers whose avocations were most closely connected with it. Such were the Strategi, as instituted by Clisthenes, and such must have been their character, wherever extensive claims were made on the martial achievements of the demus; wherefore Strategi alone were appointed by Aristagoras in Ionia¹⁵; in a later age the democracies had Strategi for their chief magistrates. At Marathon we behold all the ten Strategi corresponding to the ten Phylæ, and the chief command was held by them in rotation¹⁶. Afterwards it was a rare occurrence that all were sent out, as generally three only were fixed on for that purpose¹⁷, one usually having the chief command,

¹² Therefore, when Pericles was not appointed Archon, and consequently could never become an Areopagite, (Plut. Per. 9.) neither he nor the Athenian people had any cause for regret.

¹³ See vol. i. p. 401.

¹⁴ Tittmann, *Gr. Staatsverf.* 266: "We are almost led to conjecture that the Strategi, in the time of Pericles for instance, were entrusted with peculiar legislative functions."

¹⁵ Herod. 5. 38.

¹⁶ Herod. 6. 103.

¹⁷ One of the numerous examples was, in the case of Pericles, Agnon and Cleopompus, Thuc. 2. 58.

and the others officiating as joint commanders¹⁸; but the powers of the last were more limited. Strategi extraordinary were likewise occasionally appointed¹⁹. The responsibility of these officers was asserted in all its rigour, and in doing so the people frequently acted in the most arbitrary manner. The commander was only entitled Autocrat, because, in the measures which he adopted, he was not dependent on a council of war, or on the decrees of a municipal assembly. The discretionary power of renowned heroes and statesmen was less limited in this sphere, than that of a functionary whose duties were confined to the management of internal affairs. But the official position which Themistocles occupied during the contest with the Persians must have been of a very extraordinary character²⁰; after having been Archon he became an Areopagite, and once more resumed the conduct of the war, the greatness of the danger, and the distinguished qualities of the man inducing the state to repose unusual confidence in him. Aristides had Strategi associated with him in the command at the battle of Plataeæ²¹.

The spirit of the constitution, as evinced in its progressive development, necessarily exercised considerable influence upon the mode in which appointments to office took place. Democratic

¹⁸ To this refers the *Νυκίας—τρίτος αὐτός*, Thuc. 4. 42. *Φαίαξ—τρίτος αὐτός*, Thuc. 5. 4, ubi sup.

¹⁹ Concerning the time when the regular Strategi entered upon their office (spring), see Seidler on the date of the representation of the *Antigone*, Allg. Lit. Zeit. 1825, n. 26. p. 209, sqq.

²⁰ Pericles, when Strategus, likewise had more extensive powers than ordinary generals; Thuc. 2. 65 :—*στρατηγὸν εἶλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ πρᾶγματα ἐπέτρεψαν*.

²¹ Plut. Arist. 20.

equality requires that the principle of appointment by lot should be applied to the greatest possible extent. This was the invariable practice with the archonship from the time of Clisthenes; but the Athenian demus was wise enough to follow that course, to which even the consideration of its own advantage must have prompted it, and retained the custom of electing all those officers whose duties required superior intelligence and experience, or involved unusual responsibility, such as the Strategi and commanders—Taxiarchs, Phylarchs, Hipparchs, Ambassadors, the President of Finance, the *Tamias*²², etc.

It results from the foregoing that the archonship is of no importance in the history of the development of the constitution; the Eponymus receives his due share of attention elsewhere. Our object requires a careful examination of the Strategia, which is closely connected with the most important operations of the state. Nevertheless, the power which was exercised by the legitimate officers began, even at this early period, to be opposed by that authority which, without office or title, afterwards became so formidable in the hands of the orators in the popular assembly²³, and which is frequently classed by subsequent writers with that of the Strategi²⁴; but the mischief which resulted from it was still inconsiderable, and no separation yet existed between Strategia and Demagogy. The great leaders of the Athenian people of that age fulfilled their political destination in the

²² See vol. i. p. 400.

²³ See, on the subject of the demagogue Epicydes, the rival of Themistocles, Plut. Them. 6:—*ὄντα δεινὸν μὲν εἰπεῖν, μαλακὸν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν*, κ. τ. λ.

²⁴ Plut. Phoc. 7.

senate and the field with their valour and their eloquence, and directed their efforts towards securing the welfare of the state, and did not disdain the aid of the muses²⁵ in the prosecution of their object; they needed not the degrading arts of the subsequent demagogues, they directed the views of the people, and to all that was noble and great, swayed their minds by the power of superior intelligence and strength, and in all respects differed as widely from the selfish demagogues of after-times, as the kings did from the tyrants in the opinion of the Greeks in general.

The brilliant series of political heroes who have rendered the glory of Athens imperishable is described by one of the ancients as a school of practical politicians, beginning with Solon, and numbering Themistocles amongst its chief ornaments²⁶; our list commences with Miltiades. We have already spoken of the purity of his sentiments at the time of the battle of Marathon; and the little we know of his political life, both before and after that event, contains nothing calculated to excite any doubts as to his patriotism. It cannot be denied, that whilst engaged in the performance of his public duties he also consulted his own advantage; which object is fully consistent with a due regard for the public good; and it would indeed be to pollute the pure streams of history, if it should be affirmed that the benefits

²⁵ The maxim of Archilochus is beautifully introduced by Plut. in treating of this subject, Phoc. 7 :—

*Ἀμφότερον, θεράπων μὲν Ἐνναλίῳ θεοῖο
καὶ Μουσίων ἱρατᾶν δῶρον ἐπιστάμενος.*

²⁶ Plut. Them. 2. Mnesiphilus is there called the preceptor of Themistocles. Plut. an seni Respub., etc., 9. 175; de Herod. Malign. 9. 447; Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. 302. B.

which a good citizen might have derived from his patriotism were an evidence that selfishness had been the mainspring of his conduct. But unfortunately the sentiments of the Athenians but too much partook of this malevolence, and Miltiades had to encounter more than one struggle with personal and political opponents. When he fled from the Chersonese to Athens, they instigated public proceedings against him for having been tyrant in the former place²⁷. Upon the failure of his expedition against Paros, to which, according to Herodotus, he had been actuated by the personal hostility he bore a Parian who had denounced him to the Persians²⁸, and upon his failure in performing his promise to enrich the people²⁹, he was capitally accused by Xanthippus, the son of Ariphron, as a traitor to the people³⁰. This proceeding was agreeable to the laws, and he was placed in confinement till he should have indemnified the people for the expenses of the unsuccessful expedition³¹. There is no evidence that the conduct of Xanthippus was dictated by party feeling; and it is equally impracticable to determine which of the two, in point of birth and family connections, was least connected with the Optimates³², and which endeavoured to outstrip the other in popularity. Nevertheless, if in Athens, as is so frequently the case in republics, we may assume political opinions

²⁷ Herod. 6. 104.²⁸ Herod. 6. 132.²⁹ Herod. ubi sup.³⁰ Herod. 6. 136.³¹ According to Plato, *Gorgias*, 526. D., he was only saved from the *Barrathrum* by the *Prytanis*.³² Concerning the family of Miltiades, see Sturz, *Pherecydes*, p. 84, sqq.; on the alliance of Xanthippus with the house of the Alcmaeonidae, whose pedigree may be seen in Böckh, *Explic. Pindar.* 303.

to have been the hereditary badge of particular families, there is every reason to suppose that Miltiades, the father of Cimon, was less closely allied with the *demus* than Xanthippus, the father of Pericles³³.

THEMISTOCLES AND ARISTIDES.

It is erroneous to oppose these two contemporaries and colleagues to each other, as representatives of the opinions of different parties, Themistocles of the democrats, Aristides of the aristocrats; Aristides had been favourably disposed towards Clisthenes³⁴, who placed the archonship upon a more democratic basis; he and Themistocles were equally devoted to the *demus*. The real opposition between them arose from the difference of their views concerning the welfare of Athens, and this produced a rivalry between them for the chief place in the administration³⁵. Aristides either does not appear to have reflected on the project of an Athenian maritime supremacy at all, or to have regarded it as perilous and pernicious; he perhaps foresaw danger in the determination of the Athenians to depart from the simplicity and rustic virtues of their forefathers, and to trust their unpractised powers to a faithless element in pursuit of uncertain and precarious advantages; civil virtue and integrity in the perform-

³³ I am not inclined to put faith in so very doubtful an authority as Stesimbrotus of Thasus (Plut. Themis. 4.), who states that Themistocles was opposed by Miltiades on the building of the fleet, etc.; otherwise the narrative contains evidences of party differences.

³⁴ Plut. Arist. 30.

³⁵ Antiquity likewise had its *chronique scandaleuse*; the philosopher Ariston pretended that their enmity arose in consequence of their both being attached to the beautiful Stesileus of Teos, Plut. Them. 3; Arist. 2.

ance of public duties at home, were more in accordance with his feelings. Themistocles, on the other hand, according to Plutarch³⁶, looked upon Marathon rather as a means than an end; he wished Athens to develope her powers, and boldly track her course along that element to which the hand of nature visibly directed her. The opinion of Aristides had greater moral weight; that of Themistocles resulted from more enlarged views, from a just estimation of passing occurrences, the dangers to be apprehended from Asia, and the restless jealousy of the neighbouring nations. The execution of these projects was retarded by Aristides, whose adherents were probably sufficiently numerous both from the moral dignity of his character, and the natural indolence and supineness of men, which make them averse to incur perils abroad when they may enjoy ease and security at home. This led to a contention in which Themistocles was the assailant, when Aristides was unable to ward off the ostracism in which it resulted³⁷. But how little this political hostility was tinged with personal animosity, may be gathered from the manner in which these illustrious men acted towards each other in the sequel. In the eventful night before the battle of Salamis, Aristides apprized Themistocles of a circumstance on which his very preservation depended; this corresponds with the greatness of mind with which Themistocles received the bearer of the intelligence³⁸. Aristides had no share in the banishment of Themistocles, which took place afterwards³⁹;

³⁶ Plut. Them. 3.³⁹ Herod. 8. 79, sqq.³⁷ Plut. Arist. 5.³⁸ Plut. Arist. 25.

for notwithstanding he had at first opposed upon principle the project of maritime aggrandizement, immediately after the first glorious essays of the Athenians in naval warfare, he desisted from all further opposition to the creator of the Athenian glory; indeed we behold him cheerfully and honourably dedicating his virtues to the service of the state in that field which had been opened to the Athenians by the courage and enterprise of Themistocles⁴⁰.

Their political projects and exertions corresponded with their respective qualities, and though they doubtless formed a sufficiently accurate estimate of their own powers, the sequel proves that Aristides entertained too mean an opinion of his own military talents. The character of Themistocles has been drawn by Thucydides⁴¹, and we cannot do better than give his own words. "Themistocles strikingly displayed the power of nature, and was in this respect so distinguished above others as to deserve the highest admiration. For by innate intelligence alone, unaided by study either in youth or after-life, he determined upon the proper course to be pursued in critical conjunctures after short reflection, and was a sagacious calculator of what the future was likely to produce. Whatever he undertook, he was capable of explaining, and even in matters wherein he was inexperienced, the judgment he expressed was not

⁴⁰ According to Theophrastus (Plut. Arist. 35.), in the foreign relations of his country he was even capable of a line of policy which was not exactly consistent with the maxims of justice. — τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον, περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τοὺς πολίτας ἄκρως ὄντα δίκαιον, ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς πολλὰ πράξαι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς πατρίδος ὡς συχνῆς ἀδικίας δεομένην.

⁴¹ Thuc. 1. 138.

far wrong. He foresaw the good or evil in that which the future still concealed, and upon the whole it may be affirmed, that he was signally fitted both by the vigour of his genius and his promptness in deliberation, to take the proper steps in sudden emergencies."

The career of Themistocles commenced during the first Persian war; it is probable that he was amongst the combatants at Marathon⁴². The subsequent excitement of the Athenian people acted very favourably upon the expansion of his powers, his entrance into the political world, his authority, and introduction to office; the spirit of innovation was aroused, and he fostered and encouraged it. There is no doubt that Themistocles soon obtained great importance in the popular assembly by his eloquence; it is recorded that when a youth he exercised himself in pronouncing judicial harangues⁴³, and though he may have been a mere speaker, and not an accomplished orator⁴⁴, his speeches carried great weight with them; they were convinced by their perspicuity and the patriotism of their sentiments. For example, he prevailed upon the Athenians no longer to distribute the silver from the mines of Laurion amongst themselves, but to apply it to the purpose of building a fleet⁴⁵. The first occasion upon which he enjoyed the confidence of the people in an office of high trust was as Strategus and mediator in the

⁴² But if we may judge from the high rank which he held shortly afterwards, he could not have been a beardless youth at the time.

⁴³ Plut. Them. 2; Corn. Nep. Them. 1.

⁴⁴ In the same manner Phocion, as compared with the great master in oratory, Demosthenes, was *εἰπεῖν δεινότερος*, Plut. Phoc. 5.

⁴⁵ Plut. Them. 4; Corn. Nep. 2.

war between Corinth and Corcyra⁴⁶; when archon, 481. B. C., he began to build the walls of the Piræus⁴⁷. The Strategia in the memorable year 480. is said to have been contested with him by the demagogue Epicydes⁴⁸; having secured his election he swayed the will of the Athenians by his varied intellectual powers: by stirring appeals to their patriotism, and even by stratagem when necessary, he succeeded in collecting the people on board their vessels⁴⁹, recalled the exiles⁵⁰, banished the Persian agent Arthmius⁵¹, and eventually crushed the barbarians. He completed his patriotic labours by restoring the fortifications of Athens, and finishing the works at the Piræus, at the same time eluding the jealous vigilance of Sparta⁵². It is with pain that we must lay to his charge the same failing with his modern transcript, Marlborough, the desire of amassing wealth⁵³. But this was not the cause of his downfall; his vast power had rendered him irksome to the Athenians and hated and dreaded by the Spartans; the first opposition he had to encounter appears to have been from the coalition between aristocratic party-feelings and foreign intrigue; Cimon the aristocrat and Philolacon was amongst his adversaries⁵⁴. He was first expelled by ostracism, Olymp. 77. 2; 471. B. C⁵⁵, whereupon he repaired to Argos,

⁴⁶ The accounts of these disputes are contradictory; Thuc. 1. 136, he is called *ἐκπεγέρης* of the Corcyræans; Corn. Nep. 2. has Corcyræos fregit; the most probable account is that of Plut. Them. 24, that he had brought about a reconciliation between the Corinthians and Corcyræans, and made the Corinthians pay twenty talents to the Corcyræans, etc.

⁴⁷ Thuc. 1. 93.

⁴⁸ Plut. Them. 6.

⁴⁹ Herod. 7. 143.

⁵⁰ Plut. Them. 11.

⁵¹ Plut. Them. 6.

⁵² Thuc. 1. 90—92.

⁵³ Plut. Them. 21. His fortune increased from three talents to eighty or a hundred. See Theopompus and Theophrastus ap. Plut. Them. 25.

⁵⁴ Plut. Arist. 25.

⁵⁵ Thuc. 1. 135.

but the enmity of Sparta did not cease to pursue him even in exile; it charged him with having been privy to the designs of Pausanias, Olymp. 78. 3; 466. B. C. An Alcmaeonid, Leobates, likewise accused him of high treason⁵⁶; but Cimon ungenerously pursued Epicrates, and caused him to be put to death for having conducted the wife and children of the fugitive to him⁵⁷. The thirst of vengeance in the soul of Themistocles seems to have yielded to attachment to his native city; he would not bear arms against his country. The evening of his life was illustrated by a remarkable proof of the extraordinary capacities he possessed; within a year he acquired such proficiency in the Persian language⁵⁸ as to be able to speak it with fluency, which must have been by no means an easy task to a Greek.

Aristides is commonly distinguished by the epithet of "the Just"⁵⁹; he might, with greater propriety, be called the "Disinterested," as he presided over the public economy with blameless integrity, was inaccessible to corruption, and wholly exempt from the wish to obtain the property of others. This must be taken into consideration in weighing over the accounts of his poverty⁶⁰; he probably was not indigent, but testified no desire to add to his fortune⁶¹, which was inconsiderable compared with that of others; a circumstance the more calculated to excite surprise, in an age when the love of gain was

⁵⁶ Plut. Them. 23, de Exil. 8. 389. The father of Leobates, Alcmaeon, is named, Plut. Arist. 25, Precept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 212.

⁵⁷ Plut. Them. 24.

⁵⁸ Thuc. 1. 138.

⁵⁹ Plut. Arist. 6.

⁶⁰ See Plutarch, Arist. 1, the discrepancies in the accounts.

⁶¹ See as to his rejection of the offers of his rich cousin Callias, Plut. Arist. 25.

so universal, and the opportunities of amassing riches were so abundant. Evidences of the same feeling may be discovered in his political conduct; his uncompromising integrity rendered abortive all attempts at speculation on the part of Themistocles and others⁶²; his resistance of the plans for promoting the maritime aggrandizement of Athens, flowed from a conviction that it was unlawful for that state to appropriate to itself the rights of others; the manner in which he determined the respective quotas of the maritime states to the expenses of the Persian war, is eulogised as a model of integrity and justice; and it may with great safety be asserted, that few would have failed to avail themselves of so excellent an opportunity of enriching themselves, or to determine the proportion of each state to the burthens of the war, according to the presents by which they might have been propitiated.

CIMON.

Cimon, who was for a considerable period the leader of the Optimates, and not wholly unconnected with Aristides⁶³, overcame Themistocles, and was himself supplanted by Pericles. The splendour of Cimon's victories has, in some degree, dimmed the lustre of his political character. It cannot be denied that his conduct to Epicrates, the friend of Themistocles, was marked by revolting inhumanity. But upon the whole, his native generosity of mind was not debased by the rancour of party feeling; he was the never-failing advocate of the free citizen, and his profuse liberality caused him to be suspected of

⁶² Plut. Arist. 4.

⁶³ Plut. Cim. 5.

aiming at demagogy⁶⁴. His title to glory was not derived from his victories in foreign warfare alone, but no less from the munificence with which he dedicated the treasures he had amassed in military expeditions⁶⁵, to the gratification of his fellow-citizens at home, and to the construction of works of ornament and utility in his native city⁶⁶. His conduct as a party leader must be viewed in connection with the opinions he entertained as to the principles by which he considered the foreign policy of Athens ought to be guided. He advocated the maintenance of friendly relations between Athens and Sparta; the aristocratic party beheld one of its own supports in the spirit of the Spartan constitution; in fact, that state had conduced to raise up Cimon against Themistocles⁶⁷, whilst the former was the personal element by which the union between the two states was cemented. Still his military genius, and a wish to avail himself of the support of Sparta in the vigorous prosecution of the war against the great king, may have partly occasioned his political attachment to the Spartans. This is the origin of the pernicious custom of regu-

⁶⁴ See Plut. Cim. 10; Peric. 9; Theopomp. ap. Ath. 12. 533. A. B. However, several contributions are ostentatiously enumerated amongst his titles to praise on the score of liberality, which were no more than his duties as a citizen; for instance, the entertainment of his demotæ, the Laciadæ, one of the liturgies of the wealthy Athenians (*ιστίασις*).

⁶⁵ *Ἐφόδια τῆς σπαριαῖας*, Plut. Cim. 10. The inability of Cimon to pay a fine of fifty talents, must be referred to the period when his hereditary possessions on the Chersonesus were in the hands of the enemy; the recovery of the Chersonesus, after the victory on the Eurymedon (Plut. Cim. 14), was probably the means of restoring some of his property to him. The debt of his father had already been discharged by the wealthy Callias, to whom Cimon gave his sister Elpinice in marriage, Plut. Cim. 5. He was not wholly inaccessible to corruption, if we may judge from the accusation brought against him with respect to Alexander of Macedon, to which we shall afterwards return.

⁶⁶ Such were the southern wall of the Acropolis, the foundation of the long walls, the Academy, Plut. Cim. 14. Gorgias said (Plut. Cim. 10.) that he had amassed treasures, *ὡς χρῆτο, χρῆσθαι δὲ ὡς τιμῶτο*.

⁶⁷ Plut. Themist. 20; Cim. 16.

lating the internal system of Athens by considerations as to the policy of Sparta, after which the aristocrats were called Philolacones, and the democrats Antilacones; the latter were undoubtedly the more consistent and determined of the two, whilst the former could neither place firm reliance upon Sparta, nor act with vigour and resolution themselves. The rupture which took place with Sparta soon afterwards, was attended by the downfall of the Athenian aristocrats.

PERICLES WITH HIS ASSOCIATES AND OPPONENTS.

Shortly after Cimon's victory near the Eurymedon⁶⁸, there arose a representative of the demus against the aristocrats in the person of Pericles, the son of Xanthippus and Agariste, the niece of Cleisthenes; but Cimon retained his authority unimpaired for many years⁶⁹. After the expedition against Thasus (Olymp. 78. 45. 465. B. C.), he was accused of having been bribed by Alexander, king of Macedon, to refrain from attacking his possessions⁷⁰. This is the first occasion on which Pericles appears in the character of his adversary. The latter is said to have been moved to clemency by the entreaties of Cimon's sister, Elpinice. The result of this prosecution was, that Cimon was adjudged to pay a heavy fine⁷¹. He was still powerful enough,

⁶⁸ According to Diodorus (11. 60), Olymp. 77. 3. (470. B. C.) Clinton has Olymp. 78. 3. (470. B. C.) referring *μετὰ ταῦτα* in Thuc. 1. 100. to the reduction of Naxos; but whether correctly or not appears questionable, as *μετὰ ταῦτα* may, with equal propriety, be referred to the transfer of the empire of the sea to the Athenians, and to the regulation of the tributes (1. 96).

⁶⁹ The political career of Pericles lasted forty years (Cic. de Orat. 3. 34; comp. Plut. Pericl. 14); his death took place in the year 429.

⁷⁰ Plut. Cim. 14; Pericl. 10.

⁷¹ To this must probably be referred the passage, Demosth. in Aristog. 688. 25, sqq.—*καὶ Κίμωνα, ὅτι τὴν πατρίον μετεκίνησε πολιτείαν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ* (this must have rather been a ground of accusation than the words of the in-

in Olymp. 79. 1; 464. B. C., to procure a decree for affording assistance to the Spartans in the war with the rebellious Helots; it was in vain that the proposal met with violent opposition from the Antilacon Ephialtes⁷²; Cimon himself took the command of the auxiliary army against Ithome⁷³. During his absence⁷⁴, Pericles laid the foundation of a new political system, by which he proposed to establish an Athenian supremacy, instead of maintaining a balance of power between Athens and Sparta, as heretofore. He was as confident that the Athenians possessed the requisite courage and energy to obtain the hegemony of Greece, as that he himself was the man destined to direct them in the attempt. But this object was only to be realized by calling up all the latent powers of the state, by eradicating from the minds of the people their prejudices and scruples, and by inspiring them with courage and inclination for extraordinary efforts, whilst it was equally necessary to counteract the influence of aristocratic impressions; hence a contest with the remains of Cimon's party became unavoidable.

Amongst those who co-operated with Pericles at this period was Ephialtes, the son of Sophonides⁷⁵, whom many of the ancient and modern writers contemptuously denominate a vile and worthless de-

dictment), *παρὰ τρεῖς μὲν ἀφῆσαν ψήφους, τὸ μὴ θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι· πεντήκοντα δὲ τάλαντα εἰσέπραξαν.*

⁷² Plut. Cim. 16.

⁷³ Thuc. 1. 102. Plutarch speaks of two expeditions of the Athenians against the Messenians, Cim. 16. 17; but this must only be understood of the discharge of the crew.

⁷⁴ Plut. Cim. 15. says, when Cimon, upon the termination of the law-proceedings against him, *πάλιν ἐπὶ στρατείαν ἐξέπλευσε.* It is here unnecessary to understand any other expedition than that against Ithome.

⁷⁵ Ælian, V. H. 2. 23.

magogue, but whom an attentive examination of the accounts of the ancients will enable us to pronounce an upright statesman and citizen. Though poor⁷⁶, he is said to have been liberal⁷⁷, just, and disinterested⁷⁸; he is described as an honourable man⁷⁹ by Plutarch⁸⁰, and placed in the same rank with Aristides and Cimon. At the suggestion of Pericles he appears to have made an attack upon the power of the Areopagus⁸¹. This resolution did not proceed from any desire to detract from the dignity which characterized that noblest ornament of Athens as such; but from a conviction, that as long as the archonship continued to be filled by the upper orders, the Areopagus, which was supplied from it, must, by means of its moral dignity, its reputation for justice, and the spotless purity of its proceedings, necessarily keep up aristocratic feeling⁸², and generate a spirit in the mass of the citizens at variance with the projects of Pericles. But it cannot be satisfactorily ascertained in what respects the authority of the Areopagus was restricted; its jurisdiction is asserted to have been

⁷⁶ *Æl. ubi sup.*

⁷⁷ *Heracl. Pont. 1*: 'Εφιάλτης τοὺς ἰδίους ἀγροὺς ὀπωρίζειν παρείχε τοῖς βουλευμένοις, ἐξ ὧν πολλοὺς ἐδείπνιζε, in which, however, there is no indication of poverty.

⁷⁸ *Plut. Cim. 10*; *Æl. V. H. 13. 39*; *11. 10*; *Valer. Max. 3. 8. 4.*

⁷⁹ *Plut. Demosth. 14.*

⁸⁰ Some scattered accounts of his political agency are extant. Ephialtes once commanded thirty triremes as Strategus, *Plut. Cim. 13*. He proposed that the tables of Solon's laws should be removed from the citadel to the Prytaneum and market, which was accordingly executed. *Pollux, 8. 128*; *Harpocr. and Phot. Lex. ὁ κάτωθεν νόμος, where τοὺς ἄξοντας καὶ τοὺς κύρβεις — εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον καὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν μετέστησεν 'Εφιάλτης. Pausanias saw the tables in the Prytaneum, 1. 18. 3. Comp. Plut. Sol. 25.*

⁸¹ *Plut. Cim. 15*; *Pericl. 7*; *Arist. Poll. 2. 8. 3.* The Ephialtes of the comic poet Phrynichus was probably not intended for him (see *Fabric. bibl. ed. Harl. 11. 405.*) Phrynichus does not appear in history before 435 or 429 (see *Clinton, 3. 429.*)

⁸² *Plut. Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 213. R.*: βουλήν τινες ἐπαχθῇ καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὴν κολούσαντες, κ. τ. λ.

limited, and it was only in certain cases that it retained the power of pronouncing judgment⁸³; but this statement, which refers to criminal justice⁸⁴, cannot be depended upon, or at any rate it is imperfect; at the same time there is reason to suppose that the judgments of the Areopagus were liable to the Euthyne in the popular tribunal⁸⁵, whilst the effect of its interposition in the capacity of censors of the public morals became greatly weakened⁸⁶, when those matters of which it once took exclusive cognizance came before the ordinary law courts.

The insulting manner in which the Spartans treated the Athenians at Ithome⁸⁷, did not fail to affect the authority of Cimon in Athens; and Pericles perceiving this to be a favourable moment for his attack, succeeded in banishing him by ostracism, Ol. 79. 4; 461. B. C.⁸⁸ During Cimon's absence his party was not idle; according to an unquestioned statement of Thucydides⁸⁹, the hopes of the aristocrats rose high upon the appearance of a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia; they went so far as to negotiate with it secretly, with the view of overthrowing the democracy, and opposing obstacles to the construction of the long walls. At this juncture Ephialtes was murdered by Aristo-

⁸³ Plut. Pericl. 9: — ὥστε ἀφαιρεθῆναι τὰς πλείστας κρίσεις; Cim. 15: τῶν δικαστηρίων κυρίους ἑαυτοὺς ποιήσαντες (οἱ πολλοί), κ. τ. λ.

⁸⁴ Meier und Schömb. Att. Proc. 143. n.

⁸⁵ Ibid. 216.

⁸⁶ Comp. vol. i. p. 388. 389.

⁸⁷ Thuc. 1. 102: — μόνους τῶν ξυμμάχων ἀπέπεμψαν — εἰπόντες — ὅτι οὐδὲν προσδεύονται αὐτῶν ἔτι.

⁸⁸ Plut. Cim. 17; Pericl. 9. The statement that Cimon was accused by Pericles on account of his relation to his sister Elpinice, is nothing but the prattle of the grammarians, which probably originated with Didymus. See Ps. Andoc. con. Alcib. 129; Schol. Aristid. Plut. 2. 128.

⁸⁹ Thucyd. 1. 107; comp. Plut. Cim. 17.

dicus of Tanagra⁹⁰; in all probability not without the concurrence, and perhaps even at the instigation of the conspirators; the demus became apprehensive of attempts to subvert the constitution⁹¹, and all who were capable of bearing arms marched towards Tanagra. Cimon's innocence became apparent; he himself as an exile was not allowed to take part in the engagement, but a hundred of his friends, cheered and encouraged by his presence, laid down their lives for their country on that memorable day⁹². Pericles performed prodigies of valour⁹³."

The gloomy picture presented by the animosities of contending factions, is somewhat relieved by the exploits of those brave warriors, Myronides, Tolmidas, and Leocrates; though remote from demagoguery themselves, they were by no means the decided opponents of Pericles and the demus, and their whole career was marked by the endeavour to vie with one another in noble actions. Myronides the son of Callias⁹⁴, who had at Plataeæ been joint-commander with Aristides⁹⁵, was extolled as a brave soldier both by his contemporaries and by succeeding generations⁹⁶; he was a faithful supporter of the existing democracy, and justified the confidence of his fellow-citizens by endeavouring to promote its interests by expeditions into Bœotia, Phocis, and Thessaly. Leocrates had also been

⁹⁰ Diodor. 11. 77; Aristot. ap. Plut. Pericl. 10. At the time of Antiphon the murderers were not yet known, de Herod. Mal. 737.

⁹¹ Thucyd. 1. 107: — *καί τι καὶ τοῦ δήμου καταλύσεως ὑποψία ἦν.*

⁹² Plut. Cimon, 17.

⁹³ Plut. Pericl. 10.

⁹⁴ Diodor. 11. 81.

⁹⁵ Plut. Arist. 20.

⁹⁶ Diod. 11. 89, *ἀνὴρ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ θαυμαζόμενος*. To this probably refers the significant *μελάμπυγος*, Aristoph. Lysis. 802, analogous to the *δασύπρωκτος* and the emblem of noble manhood (was it perhaps the origin of an equally bold and expressive designation in modern times?)

one of the colleagues of Aristides at Plataeæ⁹⁷; in the war against Ægina, Olymp. 80. $\frac{3}{4}$; 457. B. C., he was entrusted with the chief command⁹⁸. Tolmidas, a general of more boldness than prudence, during the banishment of Cimon, brought to a successful conclusion several of the enterprises which had been commenced by Pericles; after the death of Cimon, Olymp. 83. 2; 447. B. C., in spite of the remonstrances of Pericles⁹⁹, he marched with a body of volunteers against the Thebans and allied aristocrats of Bœotia, and perished with the flower of the Athenian Hoplitæ at Coronea¹⁰⁰.

After the battle of Tanagra¹⁰¹, the position of the enemies of Athens becoming critical, Pericles drew up a decree for the recall of Cimon¹⁰², that through his mediation a peace might the more readily be brought about between Athens and Sparta. The return of Cimon was far from leading to the fall of Pericles and the democracy, and the generosity with which Pericles consulted the welfare of the state has been justly extolled¹⁰³. No change was effected in the interior of the state after the return of Cimon, who soon after marched out to gather fresh laurels in the war against the barbarians, the chief theatre of his valour, when death closed his career in the moment of victory. Olymp. 82. 4; 449. B. C.

Thucydides the son of Melesias¹⁰⁴, a relation of

⁹⁷ Plut. Arist. 20.

⁹⁸ Thucyd. 1. 105.

⁹⁹ Pericles said: *τόν γε σοφώτατον οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται σύμβουλον ἀναμείνας χρόνον.*

¹⁰⁰ See a review of his campaigns in Pausanias, 1. 27. 6.

¹⁰¹ Plut. Cim. 17.

¹⁰² Plut. Pericl. 17.

¹⁰³ Plutarch, Cim. 17: *οὕτω τότε πολιτικάι μὲν ἦσαν αἱ διαφοραί, μέτριοι δ' οἱ θυμοὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐανάκλητοι σύμφερον· ἡ δὲ φιλοτιμία πάντων ἐπικρατοῦσα τῶν παθῶν τοῖς τῆς πατρίδος ὑπεχώρει καιροῖς.*

Cimon, replaced him as leader of the aristocratic party; though he appears to have been a brave man ¹⁰⁵, he was in all respects inferior to Pericles, and is loud in the commendation of his great qualities ¹⁰⁶. His party attempting to expel Cimon by ostracism, the latter retaliated; and, Olymp. 84. 1; 444. B. C., Thucydides was compelled to quit the city ¹⁰⁷. His return seems to have taken place shortly afterwards ¹⁰⁸, but his party was almost dissolved, and individually he possessed but little political influence ¹⁰⁹. After the expulsion of Thucydides, Pericles continued to guide the helm of the state till his death, and though during this period he was not without enemies, he had upon the whole no formidable competitors to contend with. As his political character attained maturity in the course of these fifteen years, this is the proper place to describe its most prominent features.

Pericles had all the virtues which an Athenian could possess, and only shared the faults of his fellow-citizens from motives of policy. The annals of Greece present not his equal for intelligence, fortitude, and the qualities that enable men to rule others. Exhibiting the characteristics of his nation in unequalled perfection, he towers above the mul-

¹⁰⁴ Plut. Pericl. 11: *κηδεστήν Κίμωνος*. Schol. Aristid. Plut. 2. 118: *γαμβρόν ὄντα Θουκυδίδην τὸν Μιλησίου τοῦ Κίμωνος*.

¹⁰⁵ The last mentioned Scolion adds, in all probability unjustly, *σκυλακώδη ὄντα καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν*. See the praises expressed of him in Menexenus 94, D., and by Aristotle ap. Plut. Nicias, 2.

¹⁰⁶ See the appropriate observations of Plut. Pericl. 8: "*Ὅταν, εἶπεν, ἐγὼ καταβάλω παλαίων, ἐκεῖνος ἀντιλέγων, ὥς οὐ πέπτωκε, νικᾷ καὶ μεταπίθεται τοὺς ὀρῶντας*". There is a story of his suddenly becoming silent in the court, Aristoph. Vesp. 536.

¹⁰⁷ Plut. Pericl. 14.

¹⁰⁸ He was probably the Strategus in the war against Samos. Thuc. 1. 117.

¹⁰⁹ In Aristoph. Acharn. 703, he is called *κύφος*, bowed down with age.

titude, which he governed like a being of a higher order; his grave and majestic countenance, the index of a mind too proud to flatter and to cringe to the people, presents a marked contrast to the truckling complaisance of the time-serving demagogue¹¹⁰. His character was trained under the instructions of Damon, the greatest political theorist of that age¹¹¹, Zeno the Eleatic, and Anaxagoras the Clazomenian¹¹², the influence of the last more especially served to dispel the mists of popular prejudice from his mind, to impart to it moral strength and dignity, and to inspire him with the desire of political distinction¹¹³. From the very commencement of his career, his solicitude for the public welfare knew no pause, either from pleasure or from the desire of repose¹¹⁴. In warlike exploits, Pericles was not inferior to the bravest soldiers of his time¹¹⁵; as a commander, he united consummate prudence to undaunted courage, and never failed to respect the free citizen, the Greek, and the Athenian, who fought under his command¹¹⁶. His eloquence, which was the first that deserved the name¹¹⁷, swayed the passions and the will of

¹¹⁰ Thucyd. 2. 65. κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἢ αὐτὸς ἤγε, διὰ τὸ μή, κτώμενος ἐξ οὐ προσηκόντων τὴν δύναμιν, πρὸς ἡδονὴν τι λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἐπ' ἀξιώσει καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν τι ἀντειπεῖν. Sine ulla liberalitate, Cicero de Offic. 1. 4. On the subject of his πρόσωπον καὶ συνεστηκός, see Plut. Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 193; comp. Plut. Pericl. 5.

¹¹¹ Plut. Pericl. 4; Plat. Alcib. 1. 118. B. He was ostracised ὡς μεγαλοπράγμων καὶ φιλοτύραννος, Plut. ub. sup. ¹¹² Plut. Pericl. 3.

¹¹³ Plut. Pericl. 4: μάλιστα περιθείς ὄγκον αὐτῷ καὶ φρονήμα δημαγωγίας ἐμβριθέστερον ὅλως τε μετεωρίσας καὶ συνεξάρσας τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ ἡθους Ἀναξάγορας ἦν. ¹¹⁴ Plut. Pericl. 7. ¹¹⁵ Compare above, n. 90.

¹¹⁶ His remark, Plut. Apophth. 6. 706; Qu. Sympos. 8. 453: Πρόσεχε Περικλεῖς· ἐλευθέρων μέλλεις ἄρχειν, Ἑλλήνων καὶ Ἀθηναίων.

¹¹⁷ Cicero Brut. 7. Concerning the share which Anaxagoras had in the rhetorical education of Pericles, see Plato Phædr. 207. A. Aspasia is called his σοφιστρία during his preparation, Schol. Aristoph. Achar. 532; Clem. Alex. Strom. 4. 523. B.: Ἀσπασίας—ἀπέλαυσεν—Περικλῆς εἰς ῥητορικὴν; comp. Harpocr. Ἀσπασία.

the fickle multitude¹¹⁸ with irresistible force; he was conscious of the power of his words, but did not trust to the impulse of the moment; he never spoke unprepared¹¹⁹, always assumed a dignified and imposing demeanour¹²⁰, and uniformly rejected the rhetorical artifices of the demagogues¹²¹. But the choicest flower in the wreath of his virtues, was a total exemption from the sordid wish to amass riches in the public service¹²²; an exemplary manager of his own fortune, he administered the public finances with a probity no less scrupulous than that of Aristides. Thus conscious of his own integrity and greatness, when the welfare of the state was at stake, he fearlessly braved the clamour of the assembled multitude, and discoursed on the posture of public affairs with the convincing eloquence of truth. But his austere perfection knew no sympathy with the vulgar multitude; he seldom transacted state-matters in person¹²³, and then only when he feared that others might not deliver his commands with energy and effect¹²⁴.

But what did this eminently-endowed and all-

¹¹⁸ Thucyd. 2. 65; ὁπότε γοῦν αἰσθητό τι αὐτοῦ παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας λέγων κατέπλησεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι· καὶ δεδιώτας αὐτὸν ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστηεν· πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν. The comic poets said that he bore thunder and lightning upon his tongue, Plut. Pericl. 8.

¹¹⁹ Plut. de Lib. Educand. 6. 20.

¹²⁰ Aristid. Plat. 2; μηδαμοῦ τῆς σεμνότητος ἀφίεσθαι.

¹²¹ Plut. Nic. 3; ἀπὸ τ' ἀρετῆς ἀληθινῆς καὶ λόγου δυνάμειος τὴν πόλιν ἀγων οὐδενὸς ἐδεῖτο σχηματισμοῦ πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον οὐδὲ πιθανότητος; comp. Plut. Pericl. 8. ¹²² Thucyd. 2. 65; Plut. Pericl. 15. 16. 25.

¹²³ He was a practical illustration of the truth of the τὸ σπάνιον τίμιον of Plato (Euthydem. 334. B.); Plut. Pericl. from Critolaus, ὥσπερ τὴν Σαλαμινίαν τριήρη ἑαυτὸν πρὸς τὰς μεγάλας χρείας ἐπιιδούς, τὰλλα δὲ φίλους καὶ ῥήτορας ἐταίρους καθιεῖς ἔπραττεν. Amongst the less important instruments of Pericles are commemorated Menippus, Charinus, and Lampon, Plut. Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 237; Metiochus, ub. sup. 234.

¹²⁴ The muse of history blushes at such assertions as that contained in Schlözer's Univers. Hist. 267—"What a licentious rabble had they (the Athenians) become, since the days of the profligate Pericles!" What a noble contrast to this vulgar invective do the exalted reflections of Heeren present! Political Hist. of Greece, 228, sqq.

powerful ruler accomplish? What fruits did Athens reap from his exertions? What influence had he on the Athenian character? Some persons have reproached him with having, in order to maintain his position, ministered to the most glaring foibles of the Athenians, cupidity and the love of pleasure, and with having thereby corrupted the national feeling, and exhausted the resources of the state. That he gratified the demus by means of cleruchias and judicial salaries¹²⁵; adorned Athens with the Propylæa, the Parthenon, etc., and allowed the people the gratuitous indulgence of their love of dramatic exhibitions and of art, by instituting the Theoricon, cannot be denied. But will any one assert, that notwithstanding this sternness of word and mien, he strove to win the favour of the multitude by his largesses and profusion? Enquiry will show how entirely destitute of foundation is the assertion, that he sought to maintain his ground by pandering to the avarice of the people. His endeavours to retain the reins of power were wholly untainted by self-interest, and when a statesman renounces his own personal enjoyments and gratifications, and shrinks from no amount of toil and sacrifice to ensure the welfare of the state, as he did, malevolence will strive in vain to sully the purity of his fame: he at the same time, taught the people to disregard hardships¹²⁶; habituated both young and old to the use of arms, and exercised them in naval tactics; banished dissipation; stimulated energy and activity; taught individuals

¹²⁵ He had no share in the introduction of the regulation for paying the ecclesiasts, Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 245.

¹²⁶ *Μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους*, Thucyd. 2. 63. This was his great principle of action. Compare the beautiful description of the manner in which this led to *εὐπορία*, Plut. Pericl. 12.

to deem their own interests subordinate to the claims of the people at large¹²⁷, and extended the supremacy of his fellow-citizens over adjacent as well as remote islands and shores. Were the benefits already alluded to too large a compensation for the zeal and devotedness of the Athenians? Is there no difference between enabling a brave and indefatigable community of warriors to enjoy refec-tion and recreation after their labours, and pandering to the depraved appetites of a gluttonous and sensual populace? The former calls forth as much as the latter paralyzes strength, and through Pericles, both the productive power and the material prosperity of the state were augmented; the limited revenue and penurious consumption of the preceding age were replaced by ample gains and a corresponding expenditure; and we ask, is not that society whose powers are brought into full and effective operation, and in which nature has, in various channels, been rendered subservient to the objects of political life, more perfect, than that whose necessities are indeed moderate, but whose resources are undeveloped? It remains to be asked how long could this straining of the sinews of the state continue? What did Pericles expect from the future, and who was to possess the same command of resources as he did? The sequel, unfortunately, but too clearly proves that his institutions contained no internal pledge of stability. Like too many great rulers, he adapted the state to his own strength, and though this, more or less, diffused itself through its various channels, the action of the political machine was the more liable to be impeded, after

¹²⁷ See his exposition of this principle, Thucyd. 2. 60.

his death, in consequence of his extensive innovations and the removal of various barriers against evil passions, from which no inconvenience had resulted as long as abuses were prevented by his vigilance. Add to this, that the artificial fabric of the state reposed upon a basis of external power, and, as every one must admit, upon despotic force, and this is liable to rapid vicissitudes.

The government of Pericles lasted till the third year of the Peloponnesian war, during which he was not exempt from the attacks of enemies. History has not preserved the name of any demagogue of importance in the interval between the banishment of Thucydides and the Peloponnesian war; a Cephisodemus¹²⁸, Simmias¹²⁹, and Cleon¹³⁰, seem to have raised their voices against Pericles, whilst the comic poets sought to discover some handle for ridicule in his great and exalted character¹³¹; penned lampoons against him and his friends, and held up to derision the obedience of the demus. But in viewing the indications of sycophancy presented by the malignant attacks upon Pericles' friends, Anaxagoras¹³² and Phidias¹³³, and his mistress Aspasia¹³⁴, at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, we have a sad presage of the corruption which was so soon destined to follow.

¹²⁸ Schol. Aristoph. Acharn. 405: *λάλος ῥήτωρ*, κ. τ. λ.

¹²⁹ Plutarch *Præcept. Reipub.* Gerend. 9. 212.

¹³⁰ Plut. *Per.* 33.

¹³¹ Plut. *Pericl.* 13. Compare below on the subject of the comedy in its relation to democracy. Still more injurious to his fame with posterity than these attacks of his contemporaries, have been the calumnies of such polluters of history as the Thasian Stesimbrotus, who pretended that Pericles carried on a criminal intercourse with the wife of his own son, Athen. 13. 589. D.; Idomenens, who laid to his charge the murder of Ephialtes, Plut. *Pericl.* 10. etc. Plutarch exclaims against Stesimbrotus in noble indignation: *Καὶ τί ἂν τις ἀνθρώπους σατυρικοὺς τοῖς βίοις, καὶ τὰς κατὰ τῶν κρειττόνων βλασφημίας, ὥσπερ δαίμονι κακῷ, τῷ φθόνῳ τῶν πολλῶν ἀποθίοντας ἐκάστοτε, θαυμάσειεν*, κ. τ. λ.

¹³² Under the archonship of Euthydemus (431. B. C.), Diodor. 12. 39. Concerning the sycophancy of Cleon on the occasion see Diog. Laert. 2. 12.

¹³³ Plut. *Pericl.* 31.

¹³⁴ Plut. *Pericl.* 33; Diodor. 12. 38.

He himself was accused soon after the war had broken out¹³⁵—the petulance of the demus required a victim—Pericles made atonement, and regained unlimited confidence. Such an authority over a demus jealous of its sovereignty, a monarchy in the truest sense of the term¹³⁶, as firmly established as power, based upon public opinion and personal superiority on the one side, and on real obedience on the other, can be, if considered dispassionately, will outweigh all Cimon's victories over the barbarians.

d. The States dependent upon Athens.

§ 58. The maritime ascendancy of Athens effected a relation amongst the states which equally differed from its imperfect prototype, the supremacy of Corinth over its colonies in earlier times, and the Spartan hegemony before and during the Persian war, which never arrived at maturity; it bound its members by closer ties than any preceding confederacy had done, and considerably influenced the peculiar form of their several constitutions, partly because it gave strength and support to the democratic principle in Athens, and partly because it disseminated the same principle over a great number of states. That this may be thoroughly understood, it is necessary to trace the gradual steps by which the maritime power of the Athenians attained such a height, that an undisputed dominion over islands and coasts at length gave rise to the distinction between the Athenian empire and the Athenian state.

¹³⁵ Thucyd. 2. 59, sqq.; Plut. Pericl. 32.

¹³⁶ Thuc. 2. 65: ἐγίνετό τε γόγω μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. Cicero calls him princeps consilii publici, de Orator. 1. 50.

By sending twenty ships to the Ionian war, Athens displayed an intrepidity which was wholly unconnected with the calculation of political strength. After the battle, Miltiades first encouraged the Athenians to make an attempt to reduce the islands of the Ægean sea; a pretext was easily found; Paros was accused of siding with the Persians; but the undertaking failed. The measures of Miltiades were probably not so much the commencement of a series of operations designed to secure to Athens the maritime supremacy of Greece, as the result of his love of military adventure; but Themistocles conceived the design of an Athenian empire of the sea, on a bold and enlarged scale¹. Ægina, Corinth, and Corcyra, the three most considerable naval powers of the Grecian mother-country, did not view the ambitious projects of Athens without inquietude; but still they omitted to unite for the purpose of opposing her designs. Sparta, from the geographical character of the country, and the manners and pursuits of its inhabitants, had no opportunity of familiarizing herself with nautical affairs, wherefore, maritime power could not, in this stage, be the object of her policy; still the sea-states were likewise subject to her command when the dissensions with Persia begun. Aristagoras first repaired to Sparta; at Artemisium and Salamis, the second-rate Greek states refused to fight under the banners of Athens, and demanded to be led by Sparta²; whereupon the latter prosecuted the war for several years alone.

¹ Thucyd. 1. 93: τῆς γὰρ δὴ θαλάσσης πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀνθηκρία ἐστὶ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ξυγκατεσκεύαζε.

² Herod. 8. 3.

After the battle of Mycale, we first discover how inadequate the Lacedæmonian hegemony was to the new form which the relations of the Greeks to the Persians had assumed, and we perceive the endeavours of the Athenians to open to themselves a new field of enterprise. The Peloponnesians, in the spirit of their ancient system of defence, proposed to remove the Ionians to the mother-country³; the Athenians protested against such a proceeding, upon the ground that the Peloponnesians had no right to pass decrees affecting Athenian colonies⁴—an argument which involved a bold infraction of the existing political system. The Athenians, full of alacrity and intelligence, vehemently urged the prosecution of the war; desirous of enlarging their boundaries, they felt that they had only laid the first foundations of their greatness; the sea incited their love of enterprise, and they panted for novelty and distinction. In the first assembly of the Greeks, after encountering the Persians on Grecian ground, Aristides brought forward a proposition for the annual celebration of the Eleutheria at Plataeæ, and for the continuation of the war against the barbarians⁵. The Spartans hereupon appear to have become sensible of the advantages attending the hegemony in such a war. Anxious to enjoy it, without molestation, and impressed with the idea that the Peloponnesus was the real bulwark of Greece, they strove to prevent

³ Herod. 9. 106.

⁴ Herod. *ub. sup.*; 'Αθηναίοισι δὲ οὐκ ἰδόκει ἀρχήν, Ἰωνίην γενέσθαι ἀνάστατον, οὐδὲ Πελοποννησίοισι περὶ τῶν σφετέρων ἀποικιέων βουλευεῖν. Comp. Thucyd. 6. 82. Aristagoras indeed in his attempts to ingratiate himself, had already reminded them of this tie, Herod. 5. 97.

⁵ Plut. Aristid. 21; Diod. 11. 55; Pausanias (10. 55. 2.) mentions another decree designed to keep up their hatred to the Persians, in which it was declared that the temples which they had destroyed should not be rebuilt.

the Athenians from completing their walls⁶. The stratagem which Themistocles made use of to deceive them upon that occasion, was only a fair retaliation for their own previous duplicity; he accomplished considerably more than the fears of Sparta had anticipated; completed the Piræus, and by that means, as an ancient author expresses himself, annexed the town to the sea⁷, upon which it henceforward became dependent; but the tradition, recounting his design to burn the confederate fleet of the Greeks⁸, must be numbered among those anecdotes with which the characters of the public men of that age have been so liberally decked out. The overt and undisguised operations of Themistocles alone would have sufficed to destroy the naval hegemony of Sparta, even if the task of asserting it had devolved upon a less unskilful, arrogant, and profligate leader than Pausanias.

Pausanias, more a despot than a general, was guilty of various acts of violence against the other commanders. He had the insolence to claim the victory of Plataeæ, and the weakness to cause an inscription to that effect to be placed in the temple of Delphi. His whole conduct was one tissue of perfidy⁹, and strikingly illustrates the evils calculated to arise from a rigorous adherence to ancient forms, when the discipline by which they were supported has become relaxed, and the humanising influence of civilisation has not supplied its place. His character was the more odious to the

⁶ Thucyd. 1. 90, sqq.

⁷ Plut. Themist. 19; τὴν πόλιν ἐξῆψε τοῦ Πειραιῶς καὶ τὴν γῆν τῆς θαλάσσης.

⁸ Plut. Arist. 22.

⁹ Thucyd. 1. 128, sqq.

Greeks, from the striking contrast it presented to that of his contemporaries, Aristides and Cimon¹⁰. Some of the Ionians, namely, the Chians and Samians¹¹, revived their kindred ties, and declared their readiness to enrol themselves under the banners of Athens; their example being followed by the Lesbians, the commanders appointed by Sparta to supply the place of Pausanias were sent back. Sparta herself, whose desire to retire from the naval war against Persia, and whose anxiety to guard her native manners against foreign corruption¹² overbalanced her jealousy of Athens, hoped to maintain her hegemony on the continent upon its ancient basis the more easily, the more the Athenians directed their views towards Asia, and accordingly resigned the hegemony by sea, Olymp. 75. 4; 477. B. C.¹³ Now the Athenians imparted a more systematic form to the armed confederacy of those states which continued to take part in the war, whilst Aristides regulated their respective contributions with the utmost equity, and fixed the total amount at four hundred and sixty talents; the treasure of the confederates was deposited at Delos, the primeval sanctuary of the Ionian Nesiotæ, and the charge of guarding and administering it was confided to the Athenians, for the latter of which duties they appointed Hellenotamiæ¹⁴. The federal congress of the Greeks who had fought against the army

¹⁰ Plut. Arist. 23.

¹¹ Thucyd. 1. 95; οἱ τε ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες—καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ Ἴωνες—φοιτῶντες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡξίουσιν αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές.

¹² Thucyd. 1. 95; οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, φοβούμενοι, μὴ σφίσιν οἱ ἐξιόντες χεῖρους γίνωνται—ἀπαλλαξέοντες δὲ καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ πολέμου, κ. τ. λ.

¹³ Diod. 11. 41; comp. Clinton Fasti Hellenici, append. VI. According to Dodwell, not till Olymp. 77. 2.

¹⁴ Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 189, sqq.

and fleet of Xerxes, was, during the war¹⁵, generally assembled on the Isthmus, and does not appear to have been convened again. But the union formed by the Athenians by no means supplied its place, in the sense of an association of the collective Greeks, as it was never proposed to transfer or concede to them a hegemony of this description. We must not be misled by the use of vague and indefinite expressions so frequent amongst the writers of antiquity, as, for instance, when they speak of an Athenian hegemony generally, without any qualification¹⁶. The league was virtually formed for the purpose of enforcing the determination expressed by Athens, to protect the Ionians in the seats they then occupied; their apprehensions of further attacks from the Persians were soon dispelled; the inland states of the mother-country took no further part in the war, and the remaining states of the Peloponnesus, together with Ægina, in the train of Sparta, disappear from our view. With the exception of Eubœa, no state of the mother-country seems to have paid a war-tax, nor to have sent ships to the allied fleet. Thus the armed confederacy of Sparta, with its ancient federal council¹⁷, subsisted together with that of Athens; whilst all the claims of the former to take the lead in the politics of the mother-country remained in full force.

The assertion of Herodotus, that in the spring after the battle of Salamis the Greek fleet under the command of Leutychidas king of Sparta, had anchored at Delos, fearing to continue the voyage

¹⁵ Herod. 7. 175 ; 8. 123.

¹⁶ e. g. Demosth. Phil. 3. 116. 20. R. ; προστάται μὲν ὑμεῖς ἐβδομήκοντα ἔτη καὶ τρία τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐγένεσθε.

¹⁷ This was the κοινὸν συνέδριον. See below, § 61. n. 3.

towards the east, because Samos appeared as distant as the Pillars of Hercules¹⁸, rather seems to contain a satirical allusion to the irresolute conduct of Leutychidas, than seriously to imply that they dreaded a passage with which both the Lacedæmonians and Athenians must long have been familiar; still we cannot but be astonished at the celerity and confidence with which the Athenians traversed the Ægean sea, and the boldness and skill with which they united so vast a number of scattered islands and maritime places into one great confederacy. This was not promoted by continued attachment to the league on the part of those who had at first voluntarily entered it, and the Athenians were obliged to maintain it by different means from those by which it had been formed. The proneness of the Greeks to split themselves into distinct and independent communities would probably have severed the bands of this confederacy, as it had done those of so many preceding ones, as soon as the danger which had called them into existence was past, had not the Athenians employed coercion to keep up that connection which had at first been voluntary. Their powerful fleets and victorious seamen crushed every effort for the recovery of independence, and those states which, undaunted by the celerity of their movements and their formidable squadrons, endeavoured to throw off their allegiance, soon yielded to the force of their arms. But unfortunately the Athenians were not satisfied with exercising that power which was necessary to prevent defection from the league; that which had

¹⁸ Herod. 8. 132 :—τὴν δὲ Σάμον ἠπιστάτο δόξῃ καὶ Ἡρακλείας στήλας ἴσον ἀπέχειν. Comp. § 53. n. 66.

originated in fear of the enemy, and been continued as an honorary preeminence, was now converted into a source of pecuniary advantage¹⁹; the allies were compelled to become the servile instruments of their aggrandizement, and had moreover to suffer from the effects of their violence and arrogance. The assertion that the Athenians first learned this system from the example of Pausanias²⁰, is not strictly correct, though there is no doubt that the increased severity of their conduct was greatly promoted by the efforts of the more powerful states of the confederacy to recover their liberties.

The history of the administration of Themistocles does not contain a shadow of evidence that the sea-states had complained of oppression; when he laid Paros under contribution and besieged Andros²¹, the war was not yet ended. After Pausanias had entered into an understanding with the barbarians, Cimon renewed the war against them with great vigour, and hereupon services of a very onerous nature were imposed upon the allies. Cimon proposed to accept from those who considered personal service a grievance, a commutation in empty vessels and money²². The smaller states, to which this was a very welcome regulation, neglected the precautions requisite to their security, whilst the dexterity and strength of the Athenians, who were thus compelled to perform duty so much the more frequently, proportionally

¹⁹ Thuc. 1. 75: *ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προσαγαγεῖν αὐτήν (τὴν ἀρχήν) ἐς τόδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελείας.*

²⁰ Isocrates, Panath. 425. calls the Athenians *ὀψιμαθεῖς* in oppressing the Greeks; he says that the Lacedæmonians had repeatedly done so before them.

²¹ Herod. 8. 111. 112; Plut. Themist. 21.

²² Thuc. 1. 99; Plut. Cim. 11.

increased; Chios, Lesbos, and Samos, were the only states which still kept up their naval force and continued to perform service in person. Others, reverting to the period when they were exempt from all control, refused to do one or the other, and flew to arms. Force was first employed against Naxos, which was reduced, Olymp. 78. 3; 466. B. C.²³; the Athenians now began to display a more grasping spirit. Some of the possessions of Thasus on the Thracian coast, had fallen into the power of the Persians, and required to be delivered from the Persian garrisons by which they were occupied; we may infer from the expeditions to Eion and Daton, that this was chiefly effected by the Athenians, who upon pretext of compensating themselves for their exertions, retained possession of those places; hereupon Thasus took up arms, but after holding out nearly three years it was reduced; Olymp. 79. 2; 463. B. C. By disarming these two important islands, contracting alliances with powerful republics, such as Argos, Thessaly, and Megara, sending forth cleruchias and founding colonies, the power of Athens rapidly increased. During the lifetime of Aristides, and with his concurrence, the treasure of the allies was removed from Delos to Athens²⁴.

Under the government of Pericles Athens attained the zenith of her greatness; free states were reduced to subjection, and the bands of her despotic ascendancy were strained to the utmost

²³ Thuc. 1. 98: — πόλις ξυμμαχίς παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς ἰδουλώθη.

²⁴ The year is uncertain; was it perhaps Olymp. 79. 4? According to Diod. 12. 38, Pericles was the superintendent of the treasury; according to Plut. Pers. 12, it was at his instigation that the treasure was removed; but Plutarch, Arist. 75, says the Samians were the occasion of it.

possible degree; but this was preceded by severe struggles. When Pericles took upon himself the direction of affairs, Athens had not yet extended her authority over the surrounding states; Ægina could ill conceal its chagrin at the loss of its dominion over the Saronic gulf; Corinth, which had formerly been upon terms of friendship with Athens, looked back with fruitless regret to the time when it had lent ships to the Athenians, and being disquieted and endangered by their attempt to navigate the Corinthian gulf, took umbrage at the forcible march of an Athenian army through the Corinthian territory, and began to display its rancour and animosity. The Athenians were long accustomed to prefer force to every other mode of settling their differences. The insolence of Ægina required to be chastised, and at the close of a naval war with Ægina, Corinth, etc., Olymp. 80. 4; 456. B. C., the first was reduced, disarmed, and compelled to join the Athenian confederacy²⁶. From the time of the rupture between Athens and Sparta, in the war against the Messenian Helots, the rebels continued to receive assistance from Athens, and when, in the tenth year of the war, Olymp. 81. 2; 455. B. C., Ithome was obliged to surrender, such of the Messenian combatants as escaped unhurt were conveyed on board an Athenian fleet to Naupactus, a fortress of which the Athenians had taken possession a short time before, on the coast of the Ozolian Locrians²⁷, whilst this

²⁵ Plut. Cim. 17.

²⁶ Thuc. 1. 108: — ὡμολόγησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Αἰγινῆται — τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τείχη τε περιελόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες φόρον τε ταξάμενοι ἐς τὸν ἑπείτα χρόνον.

²⁷ Thuc. 1. 103.

town, whose new inhabitants were faithful allies of the Athenians, became one of their chief bulwarks in the western seas. Pericles, as before stated, soon afterwards sent cleruchi to Naxos, Andros, and Thrace, as well as to the Thracian Chersonesus and to Sinope. In consequence of the revolt of Eubœa, Olymp. 83. 3; 446. B. C., Chalcis²⁸ was reduced to still more galling servitude, and Histiaëa was destroyed. The passage over to Asia was rendered secure by the cleruchi on Naxos, the entrance to the inner channel of Eubœa by those in Oreos (Hestiaëa), the voyage to the northern seas by those of the Chersonesus, and the settlements of Athenian cleruchi in Sinope, was designed to protect the navigation along the coasts of the Pontus, of which the Athenians had deprived the enfeebled Miletus. The active part taken by Athens in the foundation of Thurii, resulted from the design of extending her naval power over the west. Pericles had still to sustain one hard and sanguinary conflict before the authority of Athens over islands and coasts could rest upon a secure basis; in Olymp. 84. 4; 441. B. C., Samos raised the standard of liberty, and its example was followed by Byzantium; under the direction of the philosopher Melissus²⁹, Samos defended itself with desperate valour against the superior force of Athens and the military skill of Pericles, but being subdued in the following year, its chains were still more firmly

²⁸ Thuc. 6. 76. the Athenians are accused of Χαλκιδέας — τοὺς ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ — δουλωσαμένους ἔχειν. This is alluded to in the jests of Strepsiades on the subject of Eubœa, Aristoph. Nub. 213: οἷδ' ὑπὸ γὰρ ἡμῶν παρετάθη καὶ Περικλέους.

²⁹ In Suidas, Μέλιτος, there is a tradition to the effect, that Melissus conquered the tragedian Sophocles in a sea-fight, Olymp. 84.

rivetted than before³⁰. Hereupon Byzantium returned to its allegiance.

It is impossible, even with the aid of conjecture³¹, to determine with any degree of probability how many and what townships were comprised under the maritime empire of Athens, which flourished in its greatest extension after the reduction of Samos, as even the names of many of the places included under it are doubtless forgotten. Aristophanes³², in making their amount the basis of a sportive proposition in political economy, fixes them in round numbers at a thousand. The chief of them were Ægina, Eubœa, the Cyclades, with the exception of Melos and Thera³³, the islands and cities of the southern coast of Thrace, the towns on the Hellespont, on the Propontis, the Thracian Bosphorus³⁴, part of those on the Pontus, the islands and nearly all the towns of the western coast of Asia Minor³⁵, and probably some of the towns of Lycia; in the Crissæan gulf Naupactus, in the Ionian sea Cephallenia and Zacynthus³⁶; on the gulf of Tarentum Thurii was, if not dependent upon, at least in alliance with Athens. But strictly speaking, it is necessary to distinguish between those places to which cleruchi had been sent, and

³⁰ Thuc. 1. 115, sqq.; Diod. 12. 27. 28. Compare Seidler in the preface to Hermann's edition of the Antigone, Süvern on some of the historical and political allusions in the ancient tragedy, Böckh, in the Antigone of Sophocles (both lectures in the Berl. Ak. der Wiss. 1824), and Seidler's supplementary remarks (Allg. Lit. Zeit. 1825. Jan.)

³¹ Comp. Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 439, sqq., Kortüm zur Geschichte hellenischer Staatsverfassungen, 1821, p. 46, sqq.

³² Vesp. 707, sqq.; comp. Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 443.

³³ Diod. 12. 42.

³⁴ Here was also a place called Nymphæum. Harpocr. Νύμφ.

³⁵ Thuc. 2. 9. On the subject of Rhodes in particular, see 7. 57.

³⁶ Thuc. 7. 57: Κεφαλληνες μὲν καὶ Ζακύνθιοι αὐτόνομοι μὲν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ νησιωτικὸν μᾶλλον κατεργόμενοι, ὅτι θαλάσσης ἐκράτουν Ἀθηναῖοι.

such states as were held in dependence by means of the confederacy and by force.

The degree of dependence varied in the single states³⁷. Athens enjoyed a general pre-eminence; Pericles laid down the principle, that she was not bound to give an account of the monies contributed to the expenses of the war³⁸. This principle he asserted, and the aggregate amount of the contributions was probably, by means of a despotic decree, raised to six hundred talents³⁹. The Athenians did not scruple to declare that the stronger were entitled to command the weaker⁴⁰, and followed up their declaration by a corresponding line of conduct. Pericles was fully conscious that the fear of punishment alone restrained the allies from defection, and that the authority which, like a tyranny, had been unjustly acquired, could not be relinquished without danger⁴¹. Hence, the most conspicuous feature in his policy was distrust of the allies⁴². Sixty Athenian triremes cruised about the Grecian seas the whole year round, and the citizens did duty on board by rotation⁴³; the Athenian squadrons covered the seas, and the dismayed allies regarded the rapidity of their movements with a terror almost amounting to supersti-

³⁷ Comp. Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 430, sqq., and Kortüm ubi sup.; the principal passage is in Thucyd. 6. 85: — τοὺς — ξυμμάχους, ὡς ἕκαστοι χρήσιμοι, ἐξηγούμεθα, Χίους μὲν καὶ Μηθυμναίους (Mytilene had already been reduced to servitude), νεῶν παροκῇ αὐτονόμους, τοὺς δὲ πολλὰς χρημάτων βιωτὲρον φορᾶ, ἄλλους δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλευθέρως ξυμμαχοῦντας, κ. τ. λ.

³⁸ Plut. Pers. 12.

³⁹ Plut. Arist. 24; comp. Thuc. 2. 13.

⁴⁰ Thuc. 1. 76: — αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος, τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι. Compare the pregnant negotiations of the Athenians and Melians, especially 5. 98. 105, also 6. 82, and 5. 47, where in the alliance between Athens and Argos these words occur: ξύμμαχοι, ὧν ἄρχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι.

⁴¹ Thuc. 2. 13: — ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν (τὴν ἀρχήν), ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον.

⁴² Διὰ χειρὸς ἔχειν, Thuc. 2. 13. ubi sup.

⁴³ Plut. Pers. 11.

tion ; this feeling was increased by the proceedings of the magistrates called Inspectors⁴⁴, and Secret Officers⁴⁵. Meanwhile the Athenians, elated with the consciousness of their superiority, daily became more overbearing, and abandoned themselves without reserve to that tone of insolence in which they had so early become proficient⁴⁶. In the political phraseology of the time it became customary to make distinct mention of allies and subjects⁴⁷ ; although the former name, like the Roman word *socii*, sometimes occurs as a common denomination for free and dependent states⁴⁸, the latter expresses the true nature of most of them, and the semblance of the federal character was only retained in a few outward forms of etiquette. It is scarcely necessary to mention that the foregoing remarks do not apply to those independent allies of Athens, to whom equal rights with that state were secured by the terms of their confederacy, as Argos, Megara, Plataeæ, etc.

At the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, the three states Chios, Mytilene, and Methymna⁴⁹, had retained nothing more than the shadow of their former Autonomia, together with the exercise of a few of the rights included under it. As they had never ceased to equip and maintain fleets of their own, they did not pay

⁴⁴ Ἐπίσκοποι. See Harpocr. ἐπισκ. Also φύλακες. Schol. Aristoph. Av. 1022. Comp. Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 436. 437 ; Pollux, 8. 52, likewise designates the Hellenotamiae τὰς πολιτείας αὐτῶν (τῶν νησιωτῶν) ἐφορῶντες. But no reliance can be placed upon that. Comp. Kortüm, 56. n. with Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 189.

⁴⁵ Κρυπτοί. Bekker, Anecd. 273.

⁴⁶ Diodor. 11. 70 : βιαίως καὶ ὑπερηφάνως ἤρχον.

⁴⁷ ἔθymμαχοι and ὑπήκοοι, Thuc. 6. 22, et passim.

⁴⁸ Thuc. 6. 43.

⁴⁹ Thuc. 2. 9. The Lesbian townships, Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eressus, were at that time subject to Mytilene. Thuc. 3. 18.

contributions in money ⁵⁰; Chios in particular was distinguished for the cheerfulness and punctuality with which it furnished its supplies of men and ships ⁵¹. Hence the name of the Chians was mentioned in the public prayer at Athens ⁵², as well as was that of the Plataëans. These states doubtless ordered their own affairs without the fear of any restraint or interference on the part of the Athenians. On the other hand, Athens appears to have laid claim to a right which the chief powers of former federal unions had never possessed, viz., that of judicially deciding upon the mutual disputes of two or more states, and forbidding them to take up arms for the settlement of their differences ⁵³.

The payment of tribute alone, as *ὑποτελεῖς φόρου*, did not necessarily involve the idea of subjection, nor could it have done so according to the principles of international law which prevailed in ancient Greece. During the Peloponnesian war we still find that Autonomia was by no means incompatible with the obligation to pay tribute ⁵⁴; but as so many towns and states were subject to the latter, in consequence of having ceased to occupy themselves with military affairs—the three states before mentioned forming the sole exceptions—an idea of degradation gradually became associated with it. A far more essential feature of subjection

⁵⁰ Thuc. 7. 57.

⁵¹ Eupolis ap. Schol. Aristoph. Av. 880.

⁵² Theopomp. ap. Schol. Aristoph. Av. 880.

⁵³ Plut. Pericl. 25, it is stated that the Athenians had made war upon the Samians, because in the war against Miletus they *παύσασθαι—καὶ δίκας λαβεῖν καὶ δοῦναι παρ' αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐπέιθοντο*.

⁵⁴ In the peace of Nicias, Thuc. 5. 18, it was stipulated that Olynthus, Stagirus, etc., should retain their autonomia, but *ἀποδιδόντων τὸν φόρον*.

was the obligation to plead before the tribunals of Athens and the administration of criminal justice by that state⁵⁵, a relation which had already subsisted between Epidaurus and its colony Ægina⁵⁶. But after a community has lost the right of punishing one of its citizens with death, and it becomes absolutely necessary to transfer other important judicial matters to the courts of another state, it is almost needless to enquire whether it still possesses freedom or not, and in Grecian republics in particular this mode of wounding the public mind in its most sensitive part could not fail to dispel any illusions as to the real nature of their dependence. Hence, it would be a vain and futile enquiry to ask if states of this description had retained the privilege of regulating their constitution, electing the magistrates, and determining the manner in which the administration was to be conducted. But the Athenians took peculiar delight in exercising this sort of jurisdiction; and their passion for the business of the law-courts was unfortunately combined with the sordid wish of obtaining the salary which Pericles had appointed for the judges. The confederates who, like all the Greeks, were extremely jealous of any interference in their judicature, were the more keenly alive to this infraction of their rights, as, notwithstanding the assiduity of the Athenians in attending the courts of justice, the number of suits accumulated to an inordinate degree, and the indignation of the litigants at being forbidden to plead before their own

⁵⁵ See below ἀπὸ συμβόλων δικάζεσθαι. Bekker. Anecd. 436; Hesych, etc. Concerning the exercise of the criminal jurisdiction, see Antiph. de Cæd. Herod. 727.

⁵⁶ Herod. 5. 85. See vol. i. p. 196.

supremacy, meetings were held at Delos⁶⁷, when in all probability the ancient panegyris was revived; but after the treasure was removed, the sanctuary lost its importance.

IV. DEMOCRACY WITHOUT THE EMPIRE OF ATHENS.

§ 59. In the present section I propose to show, that also without the limits of Athens, the representative of the age, the democratic principle became widely disseminated, almost universally establishing itself without the influence of external causes, as the spontaneous and natural product of the age, and having its principle of growth within itself. We have already seen that in some states monarchy was immediately succeeded by a popular government, which may be compared to a partition of the property of the defunct father among his children, the nobility, like sons already arrived at maturity, immediately entering into possession in the majority of them; that the encroachments of the last, and the aspiring efforts of the demus, which afterwards became ripe for political agency, produced dissension, wherein the aristocracy occasionally made voluntary concessions, concord being restored by *Æsymnety* or legislation, and democracy thereby obtaining security and sanction; and finally, that in other states it was first necessary to go through the fiery ordeal of tyranny. No community was wholly exempt

⁶⁷ Thucyd. 1. 96 :—*ξύνοδοι ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν ἐτίγνοντο*. In this point of view the revival of the Delia in the Peloponnesian war by the Athenians (Thuc. 3. 104.) is very significant.

from this movement, which set in from various quarters towards democracy. The sacrifices and victories of the *demus* in the Persian war had inspired it with confidence, which the example of Athens served to keep alive. Some states, however, present no decided indications of advancement till the Persian war, or shortly after it; at least history is silent respecting them till that period. Equally scanty are its accounts of legislation in general. The disposition of the Greek states to regulate their political condition by means of a constitution framed with calm and deliberate reflection almost entirely ceased. This presupposes a certain moderation in the masses, a diffidence of their own intelligence and ability, the recognition of superior wisdom and experience in pre-eminent members of the commonwealth, and a determination calmly to await the produce of the future. All this ceased. Laws were proposed, framed, and promulgated in the midst of the people at large; their desire to participate in this, the highest employment of human reason, was uncontrollable—their confidence in their abilities for the task unbounded; they left nothing to time, but eagerly grasped at the advantage of the present, hazarded crude and hasty decisions upon intricate questions, and rashly built, and felt no anxiety for the stability of the fabric.

Now in an historical view of the various manifestations of the democratic principle during its development, it is not only necessary to consider the states in which it attained maturity and vigour, but also those in which its growth was prematurely arrested. But in order to prevent confusion, I

shall premise an account of the several states in which democracy prevailed during the interval between the victories over the Persians and the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, whether distinguished for permanence and solidity in respect of time, or for the strength and decision with which the democratic spirit demonstrated itself; but the subject of those states in which mere tumults arose, whilst aristocracy or democracy effectually maintained itself, will be reserved for the following chapter.

1. ARGOS ¹.

The diminution of its territory, after the towns of the Actè, Epidaurus, Trœzen, etc., separated themselves from it, and its dreadful overthrow by the wild Cleomenes, have been adverted to above ². This event determined its subsequent history, both internal and external. There is strong reason to suppose that the relation of the citizens of Argos to those in the neighbouring towns had before been in the nature of a supremacy, like that of the Spartans over the Laedæmonians; but after the butchery of its citizens upon that occasion, several places, such as Cleonæ, Orneæ, and Midea, declared themselves independent. Strabo ³ calls them disobedient. Soon after the Persian war Cleonæ was in alliance with Argos ⁴, upon the same footing as Tegea, but was attacked by Corinth as a separate and distinct community ⁵.

¹ Besides Kortüm, p. 124, sqq.; Tittmann, p. 355, sqq.; Müll. Dor. 2. 108. 140. 142; see also Manso, Sparta 1. 2.

² Vol. i. 200.

³ Strabo 8. 373.

⁴ Strabo 8. 377. Comp. § 61. n. 7.

⁵ Plut. Cim. 17.

In the middle of the Peloponnesian war⁶ it still continued to assert its liberty, and its federal relations to Argos. Mycenæ too, mindful of its regal splendour in the ante-Doric age, once more raised its head, and conceived hopes of being able to regain its lost ascendant.

Thus, whilst Argos had been, as it were, almost entirely confined within itself and the small townships situated within the jurisdiction of the city, it had been exposed to imminent danger from the effects of intestine commotions. The Gymnesii, whom Herodotus denominates slaves⁷, revolted, and succeeded in possessing themselves of the supreme power, which they retained for a number of years. Their usurped authority was not overthrown till the sons of those whom Cleomenes had slaughtered attained manhood, and drove them out. The Gymnesii seceded to Tiryns, where they put themselves in a posture of defence, and made war upon Argos, but were eventually subdued⁸. Argos, however, was not satisfied with the restoration of its internal independence; it was also desirous of recovering its ancient sway over the adjacent country. But its citizens were too much reduced in numbers to be able to effect this object, wherefore it began to employ coercive measures⁹. By attacking those places singly which had detached themselves from it, it easily reduced them, whilst such of the conquered as did not fly were transplanted to Argos, where they were invested with the franchise; thus, by employing measures of conciliation, the state was

⁶ Thuc. 5. 67.

⁸ Herod. ubi sub.

⁷ Herod. 6. 83.

⁹ Herod. 7. 156.

secured and consolidated. A similar fate to that of Tiryns¹⁰, which lost its independence¹¹ upon the forcible entry of the Gymnesii, soon after the Persian war, befel Orneæ¹², Midea, Hysiaë, and several other towns¹³. Orneatæ nevertheless occur in the Peloponnesian war as allies of Argos¹⁴; thus the city had either not been entirely deprived of its population, or new inhabitants had been sent to it from Argos. Orneæ was not destroyed till the eighteenth year of the Peloponnesian war¹⁵. Hysiaë, too, was still in existence during the same war, but it was probably nothing more than a fortress¹⁶ garrisoned by Argives. Mycenæ was reduced by famine¹⁶ in the first year of the seventy-eighth Olympiad; force had been employed in vain against the massive strength of its Cyclopean walls. Half of the citizens of this ancient place, who partly traced their origin to the old Achæan times, fled to Alexander (Philhellen) in Macedonia; a portion of the remainder escaped to Cleonæ and the Achæan Ceryneia, whilst the rest were made slaves¹⁸. Hermione was also conquered¹⁹; but could not be maintained.

The internal constitution of Argos was importantly modified by the naturalization of the above-mentioned Perioeci. As the ancient citizens did not, as subsequently in Thurii and Amphipolis, make arrogant and invidious pretensions, and

¹⁰ Pausan. 5. 32. 2.

¹¹ Pausan. 2. 25. 7.

¹² Paus. 2. 25. 5.

¹³ Paus. 18. 27. 1:—καὶ εἰ δὴ τι ἄλλο πόλισμα οὐκ ἀξιόλογον ἐν τῇ Ἀργολίδι ἦν.

¹⁴ Thuc. 5. 67.

¹⁵ Thuc. 6. 7.

¹⁶ Χωρίον τι τῆς Ἀργείας. Thuc. 5. 83.

¹⁷ Diodor. 11. 65.

¹⁸ Paus. 7. 25. 3; Diod. ubi sup.

¹⁹ Strabo, 8. 375.

thereby excite disaffection in the new-comers, equality of rights and democracy necessarily made rapid progress. It is probable that the democratic germ existed at a very early period in Argos; it was nurtured and developed by hatred to Sparta, the prevalence of naturalization, and the alliance with Athens; and democratic institutions are beheld in full vigour and maturity at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war²⁰.

We are but imperfectly acquainted with the forms of the constitution, and whether it was purely democratic or not; the latter point can only be deduced from the relative position of the council and the popular assembly. Upon the approach of Xerxes Spartan ambassadors submitted a proposal to the council, to the effect that Athens should join the confederacy against the Persians, and that body returned them an answer, without having previously consulted the popular assembly²¹. But it is evident, from the nature of that answer, that the council had been prepared for the arrival of the ambassadors, and that the people had invested it with plenary powers beforehand. In the Peloponnesian war Corinthian ambassadors treated with the magistrates and the people²² concerning an alliance. The same constitution, however, somewhat anomalously contained an institution peculiar to pure democracy, viz., ostracism²³; and another by which the government of the many might easily succumb to

²⁰ Thuc. 5. 29 et 44: πόλιν δημοκρατουμένην.

²¹ Herod. 7. 148.

²² Thucyd. 5. 28; comp. 5. 41, where the Lacedæmonians direct the question of the alliance to be submitted τῷ πλήθει.

²³ Aristot. Pol. 5. 2. 5; Schol. Aristoph. Eq. 865.

the efforts of oligarchy, viz., the maintenance of a thousand native warriors, chosen for their strength and riches (*λογάδες*), and destined to fight in the advanced ranks of the army²⁴. The kingly office subsisted in name till the time of the Persian war²⁵, long after its substantial attributes had passed away. Associated with the council in the duties of the administration were the Eighty and the Artynæ, of whom cursory mention occurred above²⁶. The important record preserved to us in Thucydides²⁷, relating to the league between Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, names the magistrates from the four states who swore to the league, and were appointed to administer the oath to the plenipotentiaries of the other states. The similarity of these duties would lead us to conclude that there was a correspondent affinity in the offices themselves. A synoptical view of them will obviate the necessity of entering into separate details below. Those appointed to take the oath—

in Athens: the Bule and the *ἐνδημοὶ ἀρχαί*;

in Argos: the Bule, the Eighty, and the Artynæ;

in Mantinea: the Demiurgi, the Bule, and the other Magistrates;

in Elis: the Demiurgi, the *τὰ τέλη ἔχοντες*, and the Six Hundred.

Those who administered the oath—

in Athens: the Prytanes;

in Argos: the Eighty;

in Mantinea: the Theori and the Polemarchs;

in Elis: the Demiurgi and Thesmophylaces.

²⁴ —οἷς ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλοῦ ἀσκησιν τῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρεῖ-
χεν. Thuc. 5. 67; comp. Diod. 12. 75.

²⁵ Herod. 7. 149; comp. vol. i. 223.

²⁶ Vol. i. 226.

²⁷ Thuc. 5. 47.

The Eighty are here mentioned as distinct from the Bule, and therefore can hardly have corresponded to the Athenian Prytanes. We are almost tempted to conjecture that there was another council similar to the Athenian Areopagus; or may we here apply the statement of the great etymologist²⁸, that Demiurgi had previously existed (pre-eminently or earliest?) in Argos and Thessaly? And did not the name arise till afterwards? Assuming this to be correct, they must have been a description of civic deputies, a sort of controlling board or commission.

The Strategi, who were five in number, are mentioned as special magistrates²⁹. It may easily be supposed that their dependence upon the people at large, and their responsibility, were considerable. They were not allowed to enter the city, upon their return from a campaign, until they had undergone a scrutiny³⁰, at a place called Charadron. It cannot be determined whether the chiefs of the demus, with whom Alcibiades treated in the Peloponnesian war³¹, as well as the leaders of the people mentioned by Æneas the Tactician³², are to be considered as regular officers, or as demagogues.

2. MANTINEA AND TEGEA.

After the downfall of the monarchy in these two leading states of Arcadia, democracy had continued to subsist as the natural form of government. Still both exhibited evidences of develop-

²⁸ In V. Δημιουργοί.

²⁹ Thuc. 5. 59.

³¹ Plut. Alc. 14.

³⁰ Thuc. 5. 60.

³² Cap. 11; comp. Append. i.

ment, though they were neither simultaneous nor uniform. This partially resulted from the position in which they severally stood toward the adjacent provinces. The relation of Mantinea to Argos was no less intimate than that of Tegea to Sparta; this alone is sufficient to explain why Mantinea outstripped its sister-town, and produced a wise and judicious legislator³³ in Demonax. Before the time of Epaminondas nothing is known on the subject of organic changes in Tegea; yet we are led to conjecture that its defection, soon after the Persian war³⁴, from the armed confederacy headed by Sparta, had been accompanied by intestine commotions, as was the case at a later date. The political condition of Mantinea was modified soon after the Persian, or at all events before the Peloponnesian war, by the Synoikismus of the four rural townships with the capital³⁵. This measure was effected with the co-operation of Argos³⁶. Henceforward Mantinea assumed a more commanding attitude with relation to the neighbouring districts, and reduced the Parrhasians to the condition of Perioeci³⁷. The union of the rural communities, though it did not accelerate the march of democracy, could not fail to impel the state-machine with greater violence, and to divert it from its ancient course. Hence resulted the necessity for new legal ordinances. Nicodro-

³³ See vol. i. p. 318.

³⁴ See § 61. n. 7.

³⁵ Strabo, 8. 337: *ἐκ πέντε δήμων ὑπ' Ἀργείων συνωκίσθη*. Xenoph. Hell. 5. 2. 7: *διωκίσθη τετραχῇ καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὥκουν*. The apparent contradiction may indeed be reconciled by assuming, that Xenophon tacitly considered the original town as the fifth part.

³⁶ See vol. i. p. 269.

³⁷ Thuc. 5. 33, (below § 62. n. 95.) Comp. 5. 29, concerning a district of Arcadia, which Mantinea had reduced to subjection.

mus, the favourite of the Melian Diagoras, is recorded as the legislator of the Mantineans, and to the latter is ascribed the chief share in those enactments³⁸. Nothing definite has been transmitted respecting the substance of his laws; their provisions, upon the whole, were looked upon as unusually perfect³⁹. Their date cannot be determined with accuracy, but if Diagoras was obliged to fly from Athens⁴⁰ in Olympiad 91. 2; 415. B.C., the year after the subjugation of Melos, in consequence of his atheism, but more probably because he was a Melian, and afterwards perished by shipwreck⁴¹, the legislation in question would fall about the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. With regard to the election of the magistrates, allusion has already been made to the remarkable institution of a board of electors⁴².

3. ELIS.

The union of the rural townships with the city⁴³, to which Oxylus had paved the way several centuries before⁴⁴, was at length consummated in the second year of the 77th Olympiad, 471. B. C. The downfall of the oligarchy was accelerated by the above-mentioned effects of the Synoikismus. The original aristocracy had made way for the oppressive oligarchy of the Ninety⁴⁵; but it was necessary for the overstrained bands of govern-

³⁸ *Æl. V. H. 2. 23.*

³⁹ *Ῥυνομώτατοι (οἱ Μαντ.) Ælian. 2. 22.*

⁴⁰ *Diod. 13. 6.*

⁴¹ This Diagoras can hardly have been the person who was said to have overthrown the government of the Eretrian knights. See vol. i. p. 268, and Bayle, *Dict. Hist. et Crit.* under Diagoras.

⁴² *Aristot. Pol. 6. 2. 2. Comp. vol. i. p. 269.*

⁴³ *Diodor. 11. 54.*

⁴⁴ *Paus. 5. 4. 1.*

⁴⁵ *Aristot. Pol. 5. 5. 8; comp. vol. i. p. 262.*

ment to be relaxed. But the new council, the before named Six Hundred, and the Demiurgi, were of a democratic character; it is not impossible that the superior magistrates (*οἱ τὰ τέλη ἔχοντες*) and the Thesmophylaces⁴⁶ may have somewhat partaken of the ancient aristocratic character. The progress of democracy is moreover attested by the increasing coolness of Elis towards Sparta. Here, too, as in Argos, there was a band of three hundred Logades⁴⁷, who were especially devoted to the career of arms. It might naturally be supposed that the continued attachment of the inhabitants to a rural life, and the excellent practice of sending itinerant judges about the country⁴⁸, by preventing the mass of the population from flocking to the city, would have guarded Elis against the dangers of ochlocracy: nevertheless it was afterwards convulsed by the wildest excesses of faction. The Olympic council and the Hellanodicæ were extraordinary magistrates, whose powers were delegated to them for a short period only; no particulars have been transmitted concerning their influence upon the interior⁴⁹.

4. MEGARA⁵⁰.

Democracy here had degenerated into the most dissolute mob-government before the beginning of the Persian war. We have already⁵¹ adverted to the reckless depravity which prevailed in this obscure state, and caused its name to be linked with

⁴⁶ Thuc. 5. 47.

⁴⁷ Thuc. 2. 25. Comp. below, § 73. n. 46.

⁴⁸ Polyb. 4. 73. 8.

⁴⁹ See Tittmann, *Gr. Staatsv.* 367.

⁵⁰ I have examined Reinganum's work on ancient Megaris, 1825, in search of exact particulars respecting the constitution, but to no purpose. The principal merit of the book consists in chorography and topography.

⁵¹ Vol. i. p. 204.

that of Abdera, though its excesses were still more reprehensible. The ridiculous presumption of the Megarians was aptly characterized in the sarcastic answer of the oracle⁵², the native poet Theognis deplores their corruption⁵³, and Aristotle stigmatizes their system as devoid of order and just subordination⁵⁴. The removal of the rural population into the city powerfully contributed to establish the government of the many⁵⁵, and this was no sooner effected than, probably in imitation of Athens, ostracism was introduced⁵⁶. The continued outrages of this prematurely-corrupted people and their leaders, stimulated the wealthier orders to overthrow the dominion of the rabble. An oligarchical party had assumed the reins of power before the Peloponnesian war, and this occasioned the defection of Megara from the Athenian confederacy⁵⁷.

5. AMBRACIA AND LEUCAS.

Whilst in the mother-city, Corinth, the mass of the people still continued to occupy the middle or a still lower grade in the political scale, they attained the chief authority in nearly all its colonies. The overthrow of the ruthless Periander was immediately followed by the establishment of democracy⁵⁸; the multitude could not long be kept within bounds, and the qualification for a

⁵² Vol. i. p. 90.

⁵³ v. 43. 66. 215. 825. etc.

⁵⁴ 'Αραξία and ἀναρχία. Pol. 5. 2. 6.

⁵⁵ Theog. 53.

⁵⁶ Schol. Aristoph. Eq. 851.

⁵⁷ Müller, Dor. 2. 167, justly infers, from Aristot. Pol. 5. 4. 3, that the expelled nobility had already returned, before the Peloponnesian war, with arms in their hands, and that the offices had been conferred upon those alone who had fought against the people (Aristot. Pol. 4. 12. 10).

⁵⁸ Arist. Pol. 5. 3. 6; 5. 8. 9.

participator in the supreme power, which before had been moderate, being now made very low⁵⁹, violent distractions ensued. In Leucas aristocracy made way for popular government, as soon as the law prohibiting the alienation of landed property was infringed, and the nobles became impoverished.

6. CORCYRA.

Towards the end of the Peloponnesian war, Corcyra presents the spectacle of a demus agitated by the wildest political commotions, whose seditious cabals derived fresh strength from the ineffectual opposition of the wealthy class; nor can it be determined with any degree of certainty whether this arose from the intercourse of the Corcyræans with Illyrian and Italian barbarians, and the increase of civil prosperity and self-confidence⁶¹, their collisions with the Etruscans who dwelt along the east coast of Upper Italy, or their early conflicts with the mother-town, Corinth. Our knowledge of the constitution is very scanty; there were, as might naturally be expected, a Bule⁶², and a popular assembly in which the chief power resided⁶³. Mention is likewise made of leaders of the demus (*προστάται τοῦ δήμου*), who were either officers like the Demiurgi, or mere demagogues⁶⁴. A somewhat disgraceful peculiarity is recorded of the Corcyræans: a large whip is said to have been frequently employed in their civil brawls⁶⁵.

⁵⁹ Arist. Pol. 5. 2. 9.

⁶⁰ Arist. Pol. 2. 4. 4.

⁶¹ Zenob. 4. 49: — ὑπερηφάνους γὰρ εὐπραγοῦντας τοὺς Κερκυραίους φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης γενέσθαι.

⁶² Thuc. 3. 70.

⁶³ Thuc. 3. 81.

⁶⁴ Thuc. 3. 70. 75. 82; Æn. Tact. 11.

⁶⁵ Schol. Aristoph. Av. 1471: Κερκυραία μάστιξ. συνεχῶς δὲ Κερκυραίοις ἀταξίαι γίνονται· διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν οὖν ἐπεπόλασε παρ' αὐτοῖς ἡ μάστιξ, ὥστε διπλαῖς χρῆσθαι μεγάλαις καὶ ἐλεφαντοκόποις.

7. EPIDAMNUS.

The changes in the condition of the ancient aristocracy here were effected gradually. In the first place⁶⁶, the above-mentioned Phylarchs, a Gerusia of an ancient aristocratic character, were replaced by a democratic Bule⁶⁷; but the families of the nobility were not deprived of all their privileges. Most oppressive in its operation was the oligarchical regulation by which a single magistrate engrossed all the powers of government⁶⁸; and which accordingly led to long and severe struggles⁶⁹. Aristotle⁷⁰ states that a dispute concerning a marriage occasioned the insurrection which resulted in the overthrow of the government of noble families. A citizen betrothed his daughter to the son of another, the latter became a magistrate and punished the former, who thereupon placed himself at the head of the party which was excluded from power, and effected the downfall of the nobility. It is not certain whether this occasioned the civil feuds which concurred in producing the Peloponnesian war. The event of this contest, however, was favourable to the upper orders; the Corcyraeans reinstated the fugitives, and the former constitution appears to have been revived in various particulars. Aristotle, for instance, speaks of a privileged class and of a magistrate charged with the whole administration, as still existing in his time⁷¹. Those who possessed

⁶⁶ Vol. i. p. 261.⁶⁷ Arist. Pol. 5. 1. 6.⁶⁸ Arist. Pol. ubi sup.; comp. 3. 11. 1.⁶⁹ Thuc. 1. 24 : στασιάζσαντες δὲ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἔτη πολλά, κ. τ. λ.⁷⁰ Pol. 5. 3. 4.⁷¹ See Append. i.

the full rights of citizenship abstained from all trades and crafts which were exercised by public workmen⁷², for the most part chosen from the numerous *Metœci* in the place⁷³.

8. SYRACUSE.

Under the domination of the Syracusan and Agrigentan tyrants, the greater part of the Greek states in Sicily lost all independence, several cities, such as Gela, Camarina, Eubœa, Megara⁷⁴, Catuna, and Naxos⁷⁵, deprived of their inhabitants, became scenes of desolation; and even the citizenship of Syracuse was degraded by the admission of bands of foreign mercenaries. The last named city threw off the yoke of the tyrant, Olymp. 78. 3; 446. B. C.; and gave the signal for a series of violent convulsions, during which the immoderate desire of liberty did not allow of that line of policy in which force is tempered by justice and self-denial. Aristotle, indeed, apparently represents the constitution of Syracuse till its final triumph over the Athenian power as a democracy blended with genuine aristocracy (*Politeia*), which was not followed by pure democracy till afterwards⁷⁶; but he is not consistent in the denomination he employs, in another passage⁷⁷ calling it an unqualified democracy, at the same time that his account is at variance with established facts. Democracy, accompanied by the most violent demonstrations of strength and fearlessness in the mul-

⁷² Arist. Pol. 2. 4. 13.

⁷³ Æl. V. H. 13. 16.

⁷⁴ Herod. 7. 156.

⁷⁵ Diod. 11. 49; comp. Strabo, 6. 268; Schol. Pind. Nem. 9. 1; Böckh, expl. Pind. 348.

⁷⁶ Arist. Pol. 5. 3. 6.

⁷⁷ Arist. Pol. 5. 10. 3.

titude, now followed. A necessary preliminary to all other measures was to stamp the citizenship afresh. The former Gamori seem to have been almost extirpated, and no further mention occurs of them. In addition to the descendants of the ancient Syracusans and the naturalized inhabitants of such towns of the surrounding country as had been reduced in war, there were ten thousand foreigners in the city⁷⁸, who had formerly been in the pay of the tyrants. According to Aristotle⁷⁹, these last were also admitted to the citizenship, but Diodorus⁸⁰ states that such as were then naturalized, were excluded from all participation in the elections (*ἀρχαιρεσιῶν τιμῆς*). However this may have been, collisions could not fail to arise between the ancient citizens of Syracuse, who prided themselves upon their hereditary rights, the mercenary soldiers who had hitherto been superior to them, and still confided in their arms, and the inhabitants of the neighbourhood who had been naturalized, and looked for an adequate compensation for the home they had quitted. These at length broke out into open hostilities. The foreigners, probably the mercenaries alone, occupied Acradina and Tyche, the two principal quarters of Syracuse, but were besieged and defeated in a sally, Olymp. 79. 2 ; 463. B. C. At the same time the inhabitants of the adjoining districts, who had been naturalized, viz. those of Catana, prepared to return to their former habitations. A portion of these had in the interval been occupied

⁷⁸ Diod. 11. 68.

⁷⁹ Arist. Pol. 5. 2. 11 : — καὶ Συρακοῦσιν μετὰ τὰ τυραννικά τοὺς ξένους καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους πολίτας ποιησάμενοι ἰστασίασαν.

⁸⁰ Diod. 11. 68.

by the mercenaries of the tyranny, whose leaders now endeavoured to maintain their independence. But Syracuse helped to reconquer Catana, to which its former inhabitants once more returned. The same happened with several other towns which were now freed from the foreigners who had been forced upon them, whilst it was agreed that such of their citizens as were in Syracuse at the time should be reinstated in their domestic rights, the mercenaries all being sent to Messana⁸¹. Still, notwithstanding the storm had thus burst over Sicily, tranquillity was far from being restored, either in Syracuse or the other cities. It was impossible to reconcile the discordant elements of the citizenship and to impart to it its former unity, whilst its exclusiveness ceased to be preserved; moreover, naturalization and divisions of land produced discontent⁸².

Tyndarides aspired to the tyranny in Syracuse; his violent death did not deter others from making similar attempts. Hence the people introduced petalism, by which the expulsion of any citizen who appeared dangerous to the constitution might be effected, the citizens voting with olive leaves⁸³. This opened a door to the machinations of the demagogues, and the more powerful amongst the citizens entirely withdrew from public affairs for fear of incurring suspicion. The pernicious effects of this measure became apparent in the evils that

⁸¹ Diod. 11. 76.

⁸² This is alluded to in the speech of Alcibiades, Thucydides, 6. 17 : ὄχλοις τε γὰρ ξυμμίκτοις πολυανδροῦσιν αἱ πόλεις καὶ ῥαδίας ἔχουσι τῶν πολιτειῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ἐπιδοχάς.

⁸³ Diod. 11. 87.

ensued⁸⁴; and even the people themselves at length became conscious of their folly, and abolished petalism. Nevertheless Thucydides describes the period by which it was succeeded as one of unbridled anarchy⁸⁵. Demagogy, with its attendant evils, calumny and hostility to all who possessed any distinguishing excellence, continued unabated. Its character may be collected from the speech of Athenagoras in Thucydides⁸⁶. Its activity is proved by the circumstance that a peculiar style of public eloquence, totally distinct from the sublimer oratory of Pericles, was invented here, chiefly by Corax and Tisias⁸⁷, the Leontine Gorgias, whose native city was no less agitated by the cabals of the demagogues, afterwards introducing it into Athens, a city which Syracuse closely resembled, both in its taste for the drama and in its whole mode of thinking⁸⁸. A difference of orders only existed in the actual pre-eminence of individuals remarkable for their riches or personal qualities. Athenagoras calls his adversaries *the young*⁸⁹, which probably only involves a satirical allusion to the youth of Hermocrates, the bravest amongst the more powerful citizens.

The position of the authorities is known but very imperfectly. The popular assembly⁹⁰ decided upon war and peace⁹¹, chose the officers, etc.

⁸⁴ Diod. ubi sup., where the delineation is not, as so frequently with this author, a mere collection of vague generalities.

⁸⁵ —τῶν πολλῶν ἀξύντακτον ἀναρχίαν. Thuc. 6. 72.

⁸⁶ Thuc. 6. 38.

⁸⁷ Taylor in Vit. Lys. ap. Reiske. Or. Gr. p. 6. 110. Comp. Quintil. 2. 17. 7; 3. 1. 8; Schol. Hermog. Reiske. Or. Gr. 7. 195.

⁸⁸ Plato, Hippias Maj. 282, A.; Pausan. 6. 17. 4.

⁸⁹ Thuc. 6. 39, νεώτεροι; 6. 40, νέοι.

⁹⁰ Like the Athenian —τὸ πλῆθος. Thuc. 6. 38.

⁹¹ Thucyd. 6. 73. 103.

Leaders of the people (*δήμου προστάται*) appear to have borne the character of distinct functionaries⁹². Jealousy of the power of the authorities, and a design to enable a greater number of citizens to be nominated to important offices of state, had occasioned the appointment of fifteen Strategi⁹³.

9. AGRIGENTUM.

The tyranny ended here with Thrasydæus, the profligate son of Theron, Olymp. 77. 1 ; 472. B. C⁹⁴. It was followed by a moderate democracy. All the citizens were not entitled to decide upon all matters without distinction ; a council of a thousand was chosen from among the principal citizens⁹⁵, and probably appropriated to itself the principal share of the supreme power. Nevertheless the people appear to have exercised the chief authority in the law-courts ; the philosopher Empedocles accused two rich men, who were suspected of aiming at the tyranny, in consequence of which they were put to death⁹⁶. He moreover abolished the council of a thousand, and appointed in their stead a magistrate for three years, to which dignity others besides persons of wealth and rank were eligible. He was destined to experience the inconstancy of popular favour ; the same people who at one time wished to proclaim him king, afterwards allowed the children of his old political opponents to drive him into exile⁹⁷. Agrigentum, upon the whole, attained a higher degree of prosperity during the democracy ; but considerable

⁹² Thucyd. 6. 35.

⁹³ Thucyd. 6. 72.

⁹⁴ Diod. 11. 53.

⁹⁵ Diog. Laert. 8. 66 : *ἀθροισμα*. On the subject of a similar one in Rhegium, see Heracl. Pont. 25.

⁹⁶ Diog. Laert. ubi sup.

⁹⁷ Diog. Laert. 8. 67.

allowance must be made in reading the fantastic description of Diodorus⁹⁸.

10. TARENTUM.

Democracy owed its existence here to an extraordinary circumstance. A great number of the nobles were slain in a battle against the Japygians, Olymp. 76. 3; 474. B. C.⁹⁹, by which means the people attained greater power¹⁰⁰. But nowhere did the nobility display so generous and at the same time so prudent a spirit of concession as here; they suffered the poor, amongst whom the fishermen¹⁰¹ were particularly numerous, to enjoy the proceeds of their estates¹⁰². The magistrates were chosen partly by election and partly by lot; no one could be appointed general for a longer time than one year, and then only once¹⁰³. Thus contentment and a love of order were fostered in the minds of the people, and prosperity flowed from the judicious distribution of civil and political rights¹⁰⁴.

11. THURII¹⁰⁵.

The consequences of civil contentions and their attendant excesses, led to the downfall of ancient Sybaris¹⁰⁶. The scanty remnants of the former citizens endeavoured some time afterwards, Olymp. 81. 4; 453. B. C., under the directions of

⁹⁸ Diodor. 13. 81. sqq.

⁹⁹ Herod. 7. 170; Diodor. 11. 52.

¹⁰⁰ Aristot. P. 5. 2. 8.

¹⁰¹ Aristot. P. 4. 4. 1.

¹⁰² Aristot. P. 6. 3. 5.

¹⁰³ Diog. Laert. 8. 79.

¹⁰⁴ Strabo, 6. 280:—*ἰσχυσαν—οἱ Ταραντῖνοι καθ' ὑπερβολὴν πολιτευόμενοι δημοκρατικῶς.*

¹⁰⁵ See, besides Heyne, Opusc. 2. 138, sqq., Kortüm and Tittmann, Schneider ad. Aristot. Pol. 5. 6. 5; 6. 5. 10.

¹⁰⁶ Diodor. 12. 9.

Thessalus, to re-establish the fallen state; but all their efforts were ineffectual. Hereupon the Athenians were induced to send a number of their own citizens and members of other communities to restore it. The departure of the colonists took place under the command of Lampon and Zenocrates, Olymp. 84. 2; 444. B. C. (according to Corsini, Ol. 83. 3¹⁰⁷). Many brave men, amongst whom was Herodotus, shared in the expedition to this city, which was henceforward called Thurii. According to a suspicious authority¹⁰⁸, the high-minded Protagoras drew up the constitution of Thurii; but it is more probable that here, as in the adjacent Chalcidian states, the institutions of Charondas were adopted, with such modifications as the difference of time and place required¹⁰⁹. But the young community soon suffered from the baneful effects of civil discord. The arrogant pretensions of the ancient Sybarites produced struggles between them and the new-comers, which ended in the expulsion of the former¹¹⁰. The tranquillity consequent upon their departure was not again interrupted till the decay of the Athenian maritime power exposed the naturalized Athenians in Thurii to insult and aggression.

The principal authorities of the city were the Symbuli and the Strategi. The province of the former was to ward off danger from the constitution¹¹¹, and abuse of power in the latter was guarded

¹⁰⁷ Compare above, § 56. n. 83.

¹⁰⁸ Diog. Laert. 9. 50, from Heracl. Pont.

¹⁰⁹ Diodor. 12. 11; Heyne, Opusc. 2. 161.

¹¹⁰ Aristot. Pol. 5. 2. 10; Strabo, 6. 263; Diod. 12. 22. The passages in Arist. Pol. 5. 6. 6. and 5. 6. 8, relate to subsequent disputes. See below § 75. n. 68.

¹¹¹ Arist. Pol. 5. 6. 8.

against by a law forbidding any citizen to hold the office more than once in five years ¹¹².

To the list of these democratic states, which attained their full maturity before the Peloponnesian war, might be added many others; but little else is known of their history than the bare fact that they were democracies. The following are deserving of special mention: Cyrene, in which a popular government was introduced upon the death of the fourth Arcesilaus, about 450. B. C.; his death was effected by violent means ¹¹³; Achaia, whose ancient democratic institutions evinced so little inherent tendency to progress and advancement that in Pellene they even began to incline towards aristocracy; Plataeæ, which was probably impelled by its growing democratic spirit to shake off the yoke of the Theban tyrants, and was supported by Athens in the maintenance of its democracy; Naupactus, which was peopled with the emancipated Helots of the Messenian race, in whom democratic feeling must have been fostered by the remembrance of former slavery, and by gratitude towards Athens; and lastly, Crotona, where, after the downfall of the Pythagorean aristocracy and the convulsions by which it was followed, Achæan institutions were established ¹¹⁴.

V. THE OLIGARCHY.

§ 60. During the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, the character of the ancient aristocracy underwent a radical change.

¹¹² Aristot. ub. sup.

¹¹³ Schol. Pyth. 4. init.; comp. Thrige, Hist. Cyren. 210; Böckh, Expl. Pind. 266.

¹¹⁴ Vol. i. p. 266.

Aristocracy, even in those places where its strength had not been impaired by the inroads of tyranny, could no longer maintain its commanding attitude, and defend itself against the aspiring and grasping spirit of the age; it was compelled to retreat, and in attempting to repulse its eager assailant, lost part of its characteristic dignity and purity; the paternal feelings which it had formerly testified for the mass of the people were supplanted by suspicion and resentment, as soon as the latter attempted to assert their political rights, which during their non-age had been dormant; this in a short time brought on a rigid despotism. Moreover, the numerical increase of the nobility bore no proportion in most states to that of the *demus*; the numbers of ancient families became gradually reduced, and, as a natural consequence, notwithstanding individuals retained the pride of birth and ancestry, they lost their strength and confidence as an order. Meanwhile a new class had arisen in various states, consisting of the members of the ancient nobility, of wealthy, and, in some instances, of meritorious individuals, denominated "the pre-eminent" (*γνώριμοι*)¹. This was, however, deficient in the stability which characterized the old aristocracy; changes in the families which composed it succeeded each other more rapidly, and as its former exclusiveness could no longer be maintained, the mass lacked solidity and consistence. Still less was it able to obtain the sanction of public opinion. The upstart whose pretensions ran counter to the interests of the *demus*, was more liable to incur

¹ Thucyd. 3. 65: *ἄνδρες πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει*. But this is the language of the oligarchical Thebans.

envy and odium than a member of the ancient nobility, whose claims to superior rank and privileges were deducible from remote antiquity. This was especially aggravated by the selfish character of the new aristocracy². At the same time, the democracy were indefatigable in directing the attention of the people to this selfishness, and scrupled not to impute it to others who were exempt from it, so that the breach became widened on both sides; while the sarcasms of the demus and the calumnies of its leaders were unceasingly levelled against those members of the nobility whose purity of character ought to have shielded them from suspicion, or drove men to form evil designs who had never thought of them before. The mischief was not effected all at once, it is true³. Before the Peloponnessian war its progress had been gradual, but the aristocracy lost the healthful soundness of the good old time, and in their degeneracy did not long retain nobility, wisdom, and majesty. The consuming fever of faction raged without intermission, and frustrated all attempts at reconciliation. The dominant order, whose authority was based upon force, delighted in oppression and outrage, whilst the demus was impatient for rebellion and revenge.

Meanwhile new political appellations began to prevail. Nicknames and epithets in general are more frequently derived from external circumstances and coincidences, than from any intrinsic

² Thucyd. 8. 89: κατ' ιδίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας—ἐν ᾧ περ καὶ μάλιστα ὀλιγαρχία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη ἀπόλλυται· πάντες γὰρ ἀθύημερόν ἀξιοῦσιν, οὐχ ὅπως ἴσοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος εἶναι. The latter equally applies to usurpers, parvenus, renegadoes, etc.

³ As e. g. Hermocrates and his friends by Athenagoras in Syracuse, Thucyd. 6. 35.

qualities in the objects they designate, and it is during the prevalence of civil feuds and dissensions that men are especially active in applying sobriquets to themselves and their adversaries. This is the history of names like the Neri and Bianchi, the Gueux, Caps, Roundheads, Cabliaux, etc. The same impress is clearly perceptible in many of the appellations of the oligarchy, and though some appear to have been sincere tributes to the merits of those to whom they were applied, we must not overlook the bitter, and sometimes extravagant political irony which is conveyed by others; the *Best*, the *Illustrious*, the *Stately* will be viewed in their proper light when compared with the *Fat*, the *Clumsy*, etc.; and it is owing to the caprice of language alone that the ironical tincture has disappeared. Especially deserving of remark is the custom of designating orders according to their mass or bulk⁴, those who towered above the multitude being called the Few (ὀλίγοι) and their authority oligarchy, whilst the multitude, as such, is described in its plurality and fulness⁵. Both these denominations probably originated with the great bulk of the people; they liked to estimate themselves according to their weight, and the despots who

⁴ Comp. vol. i. p. 225, sqq.

⁵ Οἱ πολλοί, τὸ πλῆθος, τὸ πλεον. Οἱ πλείονες, Thuc. 8. 73. Generally in contradistinction to the ὀλίγοι, as in Thucyd. 8. 9. 14: 4. 78; 6. 38. The democratic constitution itself is called δῆμος (δῆμος generally rather signifying the form, the frame πλῆθος and ὄχλος the substance) for instance, Thuc. 6. 89: πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι δῆμος ὠνόμασται. It is however likewise termed πλῆθος; Thuc. 6. 60: τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει; 6. 89: ἡ προστασία τοῦ πλήθους. Comp. Aristoph. Vesp. 666. πλῆθος frequently signifies the assembled people, the Ecclesia, as in Thucyd. 4. 22; Aristoph. Acharn. 317. In the same manner ἀναφέρειν ἐς τοὺς πλεῦνας, Herod. 7. 149. Here too δῆμος likewise occurs in the sense of πλῆθος, Thucyd. 5. 45. init.

raised themselves above them, according to the smallness of their numbers. However, the word oligarchy in this stage was far from necessarily supposing a degenerate constitution in the absolute sense in which it was afterwards used by the philosophers; Thucydides admits of an oligarchy with Isonomia, a sort of aristocracy⁶. But the signification of Dynasteia⁷, as expressing the illegal and usurped authority of several, was one of unmitigated odium, and no less imbued with political venom than the analogous word Tyrannis in its later acceptation as applied to the domination of one person. The same may be observed of Hetaireia, as an association detrimental to the public weal, and formed to foment sedition and revolution⁸. However, like the words liberty, equality, religion, etc. in modern times, contending factions arrayed themselves beneath general constitutional names, and under cover of these committed unbridled outrages.

1. SPARTA.

Sparta was still the chief amongst the aristocratic-oligarchical states; till the Persian war her constitution had been aristocratical in the noblest sense of the word, within certain democratic limits, which, though destitute of important or active influence, still served to keep up the remembrance

⁶ Thuc. 3. 62. The Thebans are speaking of the condition of Thebes in the Persian war: *ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἡ πόλις τότε ἐτύγχανεν οὔτε κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνομον πολιτεύουσα, οὔτε κατὰ δημοκρατίαν.*

⁷ The Thebans continue in the same strain: *ὑπερ δὲ ἐστὶ νόμοις μὲν καὶ τῷ σωφρονεστάτῳ ἐναντιώτατον, ἐγγυτάτῳ δὲ τυράννου, δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν εἶχε τὰ πράγματα.*

⁸ See Append. iii. on the words which were used as denominations of the dynasts, and which were taken from some quality they possessed.

of popular liberty ; after the Persian war oligarchy arose by a regular process of development. Sparta now became one of the main pillars of oligarchical despotism in other states, and openly declared her resolution to maintain it.

The constitution of Sparta was framed upon the principle of a rigid exclusion of foreigners, and upon ignorance of their luxuries and vices. But even before the Peloponnesian war Sparta had been impelled by her lust of conquest to overstep her own narrow boundaries, and afterwards those of the Peloponnesus itself, while the events of that war necessarily brought her into contact with the rest of the Greeks, whose intercourse was marked by a restless spirit of activity and by the utmost diversity of political relations. Her prescriptive usages and the purity of her nationality could not withstand the combined influence of the nation at large ; the Spartans who were only in their proper element when drawn up in the field, or in the stern discipline of the camp, were not proof against the temptations presented to them by the luxurious lives of their kinsmen and countrymen ; this sowed the seeds of corruption ; new wants and new wishes began to struggle with their former blind resignation to the laws. But a sudden relaxation of legal rigour was impracticable. No middle course, whereby ancient customs might be reconciled with modern innovation, was attempted ; nothing could prevent the disease from breaking out externally or from preying internally. Both evils ensued. Sparta had attained the zenith of her glory with the martyrdom of Leonidas and his band ; the halo which had encircled her brow arose to heaven, whilst the

grave closed upon her heroic sons who had offered up their lives for the liberties of their country. Her decline dates from the battle of Plataeæ. At the time she was leading the Grecian armies to victory against their hereditary foes, her children had already begun to imbibe that poison which was destined to corrode the sinews of the Lycurgan institutions: The reckless outrages of Pausanias served as a warning to the upper orders, who at length, though too late, resorted to the only expedient that was left them, viz., a restoration of the ancient system of separation and exclusion at home⁹. The two safeguards of the Spartan constitution, the regulation for imparting dignity to the citizenship by providing it with an inferior class in the half-citizens and slaves, and that for conferring such distinctions upon deserving members of the state as should be proportioned to their civil virtue, became gradually impaired. Unrestricted intercourse with the rest of the Greeks during the Persian campaigns, acted with the same force upon the Lacedæmonians and Helots, as upon the Spartans themselves, and diverted them from the path of custom. The Helots had not wholly forgotten the liberty of their forefathers, and their thirst of vengeance was not assuaged by the paltry privilege of being allowed to participate in the spoils of war. Their disaffection was fomented by the first man in the state, Pausanias, who, as regardless of virtue and justice as he was perfidious towards his people, offered the Helots freedom and civil rights

⁹ Thuc. 1. 95: καὶ ἄλλους οὐκέτι ὕστερον ἐξέπεμψαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, φοβούμενοι, μὴ σφίσιν οἱ ἐξιόντες χεῖρους γίγνωνται. Comp. Dion. Chrys. 2. 59. R.: ὁ Σπαρτιάτης — τὸν νησιώτην καὶ τὸν Ἴωνα καὶ τὸν Ἑλλησποτιον ἀφείκελ αὐτὸν ἐσωφρόνιζε.

on condition that they would rise against the citizens¹⁰. His treacherous scheme was never carried into effect, and the earthquake, which happened soon after his death, Olymp. 78. 4; 464. B. C. was the signal for the Helots and some of the towns of the Perioeci to revolt¹¹. The Spartans were obliged to employ all their strength to avert danger from their own community, and were unable to reduce the insurgents to their former state of dependence.

To the decrease of the servile class must be added the diminution in the numbers of the citizens themselves. This must not be ascribed to the losses occasioned by the Persian war and the earthquake alone, but also to that decrease in the population which the whole course of ancient history proves to have been a universal consequence of the deterioration of the national character—a circumstance calculated to operate with peculiar force under Lycurgan institutions, which required an extraordinary increase in the citizens, though in themselves by no means adapted to promote it. A state could not now, as formerly, be said to be most prosperous and flourishing with the least possible number of citizens; and not only the ascendancy which Sparta still endeavoured to maintain amongst the states in the Peloponnesus after she had relinquished the command by sea, but also her own safety against the servile order rendered it indispensable that the ranks of the citizens

¹⁰ Thuc. 1. 132.

¹¹ Thucyd. 1. 101: — καὶ τῶν περὶοίκων Θουριᾶται τε καὶ Αἰθελῆς ἐς Ἰθώμην ἀπίστησαν. Comp. Pausan. 4. 24. 2; Plut. Cim. 16; Diod. 11. 64.

should be replenished. This led to naturalization on an extensive scale, in consequence of which the aristocracy gradually became converted into an oligarchy of ancient citizens. This was fully accomplished in the course of the Peloponnesian war; but the task of entering fully into the subject, as well as of considering the position occupied by the political authorities in pursuance of the changes which had been effected in personal rank, must be reserved for a future section.

2. BŒOTIA.

Thebes bore the same relation to Sparta amongst the oligarchical, as Argos did to Athens amongst the democratical states of Greece. Nowhere had aristocracy sooner degenerated into oligarchy than in Thebes, where it had already reached its zenith during the Persian war¹². The chiefs, Timagenides, etc.¹³, who exulted in their nefarious league with the barbarians, met with the just reward of their treason to the common cause, and the oligarchy itself was suspended. Little is known of the state of public affairs from the capture of Thebes, after the battle of Plataæ, till the Peloponnesian war. Democracy, which, however, was but very imperfectly constituted, prevailed for a time. After the battle of Tanagra (Œenophyta?)¹⁴ oligarchy once more raised its head, and Thebes

¹² See the passage from Thucydides above, n. 5. Comp. § 53. n. 41.

¹³ Herod. 9. 86-88.

¹⁴ Aristot. Pol. 5. 2. 6 : *ὅλον καὶ ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων ἢ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη*. But the joint victory of the Thebans and the Spartans at Tanagra sixty-two days before, is more correctly considered to have been the signal for the subversion of democracy, which was afterwards re-established for a short time in Bœotia, without Thebes, by Myronides, the conqueror of Œenophyta. See the next section.

henceforward became, in conjunction with Sparta, a main pillar of the oligarchical system till the time of Pelopidas and Epaminondas. Towards the beginning of the Peloponnesian war the chief authority was in the hands of Eurymachus¹⁵, the son of Leontiades, who had fought at Thermopylæ¹⁶.

In faithful alliance with oligarchical Thebes was Orchomenus, which once, under the command of Thersander, had made its submission to the Persians¹⁷, and which, when Thebes was humbled and subdued, became the retreat of the oligarchical fugitives of the neighbourhood¹⁸. The dominant order were called knights, and maintained their authority longer than the oligarchs in Thebes, and there is every reason to suppose without interruption¹⁹.

Thespiæ, notwithstanding its hostility to the last named city, was likewise governed by an aristocracy²⁰, which possessed in an eminent degree the solid and substantial characteristics of the ancient nobility.

3. THESSALY²¹.

The whole country bore the yoke of oligarchs, and the struggles of the oppressed demos²² in some parts led to civil warfare. But nothing was done to ameliorate its condition; the authority

¹⁵ Thucyd. 2. 2.

¹⁶ Herod. 7. 205, who is however contradicted by the author of the dissertation de Malign. Herod. Plut. 9. 440, R.

¹⁷ Herod. 9. 16.

¹⁸ Thucyd. 1. 113.

¹⁹ Diod. 15. 79.

²⁰ Comp. vol. i. p. 263. n. 30.

²¹ See, besides Tittmann, Griech. Staatsvf. 388, sqq., 713, sqq., Buttmann, über die Aleuaden, Berl. Abhand. histor. phil. El. 1822, 1823, p. 203, sqq.

²² Vol. i. p. 266.

remained in the hands of the Aleuadæ and their relatives the families of Antiochus²³, and the Scopadæ, till tyranny from Pheræ forged new chains for the people.

The principal states were Larissa and Crannon, the former of which continued to be the seat of the Aleuadæ²⁴. The three brothers, Thorax, Eurypilus, and Thrasydæus were contemporary with Xerxes; the first, who was the guest and friend of Pindar²⁵, accompanied him on his flight²⁶. Thargelia and Antiochus were spoken of above²⁷. Tumults were excited amongst the people by the demagogy of the Politophylaces, who were selected from the oligarchs, whereby the authority of the Aleuadæ became insecure²⁸. The Scopadæ ruled in Crannon, the original seat of their line²⁹. No particulars are known concerning their forefather Scopas³⁰. Diactorides the Scopad is mentioned³¹ as early as 600. B. C., amongst the suitors at Sicyon; the second Scopas, renowned for his riches³², and the subject of a poem by Simonides, in which is recorded his preservation when the room in which the guests were assembled fell in³³, descended from Creon and Echecratia, in Crannon. He regulated the tax of the Periœci³⁴. His son was Creon, the father of the younger Scopas, a drunkard³⁵, who lived at the time of the Pelopon-

²³ Theoc. 16. 34. Comp. Böckh, Expl. Pind. 332.

²⁴ Comp. vol. i. p. 220. n. 27.

²⁵ Pind. Pyth. 10. 100.

²⁶ Herod. 9. 1. 58. Comp. the citations in Böckh, Expl. Pind. 333.

²⁷ § 53. n. 43.

²⁸ Aristot. Pol. 5. 5. 5.

²⁹ Cicero de Orat. 2. 86; Schol. Theocr. 16. 36. Comp. Quintil. 11. 2. 15.

³⁰ He is mentioned Quintil. ubi sup.

³¹ Herod. 6. 127.

³² Critias, Distich Plut. Cim. 10. Comp. Cicero ubi sup. et Cato Mas. 18.

³³ Cic. et Quintil. ubi sup.

³⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. 6. 1. 7.

³⁵ Athen. 10. 438, C. Ælian. V. H. 2. 41; 12. 1.

Thessian war³⁶. The descendants of one of these Creons were called Creondæ³⁷.

Pharsalus appears to have been dependent upon Crannon in the time of the second Scopas³⁸, but was in all probability the residence of the house of Antiochus, which was allied to the Aleuadæ and Scopadæ. Antiochus is called the son of Echekratidas³⁹, the contemporary of Simonides⁴⁰. He had a son named Echekratidas, and his grandson Orestes was expelled from Pharsalus a short time after the Persian war. The latter experienced kindness from Athens⁴¹, whilst the Athenians were afterwards befriended by the Pharsalian Menon⁴². There are no means of ascertaining whether the party which rose against Orestes, and was opposed to Menon, was, as in the rest of Thessaly, of a democratic nature; Menon himself possessed a great number of Pericæci⁴³.

4. STATES IN ALLIANCE WITH SPARTA IN THE PELOPONNESUS AND ON THE ÆGEAN SEA.

To those already enumerated must be added Corinth, Epidaurus, Træzen, Hermione, Halieis, Sicyon, Phlius, Ægina, and Melos. Rigid oligarchy existed in few of these states, and even indications

³⁶ See below, § 67. Concerning the Scopadæ in general, see Perizon. ad Æl. V. H. 12. 1; Van Göns (Duker) de Simonide Ceo, Utrecht, 1768; Schneider ad Aristot. Pol. add. 491, sqq.; Heindorf ad Plat. Protag. § 72. Böckh, Expl. Pind. 333. 334; Buttmann on the Aleuadæ ubi sup. 190, sqq.

³⁷ Theocr. 16. 39.

³⁸ Xenoph. Hell. ubi sup.

³⁹ In the Scholion on Theocritus, 16. 34, 'Ἐχεκράτιδος must be read instead of 'Ἐκκράτιδος. See Böckh, Expl. Pindar, 334; Buttmann on the Aleuadæ, p. 201.

⁴⁰ Buttmann, ubi sup. 204, sqq.

⁴¹ Thucyd. 1. 111.

⁴² Thuc. 2. 22. Comp. the following section.

⁴³ See § 62. n. 54.

of a rising democracy are perceptible in Sicyon⁴⁴; the oligarchy⁴⁵ in Ægina soon became subject to the paramount jurisdiction of Athens, and it was in Melos alone that it was rigorously maintained⁴⁶.

5. CRETE.

The dynasty of the Cosmi, in the single states of Gnossus, Gortys, Lyctus, and Cydonia, repressed every attempt of the people to assert their liberty; but their government itself was brought so near to dissolution as to be utterly unworthy of the name of a constitution⁴⁷, whilst the character of the Cretan people was entirely corrupted.

6. HERACLEA ON THE PONTUS.

Democracy was the form of government established at the foundation of the colony, but the reckless proceedings of the demagogues who rose against the principal inhabitants, and drove them out of the city, led to the overthrow of the constitution. The exiles effected their return by force of arms, and then founded an oppressive oligarchy, which continued in existence till the age of Philip⁴⁸.

⁴⁴ Vol. i. p. 266.

⁴⁵ Vol. i. p. 261.

⁴⁶ The Athenian ambassadors (416. B. C.) say, *ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις*. Thuc. 5. 84.

⁴⁷ Vol. i. p. 261.

⁴⁸ Aristot. Pol. 5. 5. 5. Comp. vol. i. p. 268.

7. THE GREEK STATES ON THE WESTERN SEAS.

The nobility governed firmly, and with the dignity of the olden time, in Apollonia⁴⁹, in the Epizephyrian Locri⁵⁰, and in Massilia⁵¹.

The subject of the nobility of Delphi, and of other places not comprised under the democratic or oligarchical states, will be treated in the following chapter.

⁴⁹ Vol. i. p. 260.

⁵⁰ Vol. i. p. 215. Hence the encomiums which Pindar pronounces on the state of affairs there. Olymp. 10. 11. 17.

⁵¹ Vol. i. p. 264.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND OLIGARCHY IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF GREECE.

**FROM THE FLIGHT OF XERXES TILL THE END OF THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.**

I. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF GREECE TILL THE BEGINNING OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

§ 61. Immediately that the youthful and vigorous democracy of Athens began to advance, the internal and external policy of states became more closely interwoven, and a change took place in the position of the Grecian communities towards each other, in consequence of the daring encroachments of the democracy, to which they gradually grew hostile. After the preceding outline of the progress which took place within the individual states, in conformity to a native and inherent principle of advancement, I next propose to show how the states of Greece, upon the development of the Athenian democracy, divided themselves into two hostile confederacies, one comprising the democratic, and the other the oligarchical party; and how these henceforward became mainly instrumental in determining the external variations which the political system underwent; it will, moreover, be seen, that this in its turn importantly modified the internal organization of the several states, whose independence grew more limited from day to day,

and if not directly controlled by despotic authority, was, at least indirectly, endangered by the reaction of the pressure from without.

About the time that democracy entered upon its most flourishing period, Sparta possessed the hegemony over the whole of Greece, and consequently took the command of her armies against the barbarians in Asia. After the victory, she punished Thebes and Thessaly¹ (Olymp. 77. 2; 470. B. C.), framed a general treaty for the pacification and independence of the Grecian states, and at the same time regulated the amount which they were respectively required to contribute to the further expenses of the war². Till Pausanias commenced his career of outrage, the general concerns of the Greeks were discussed in the Synedrion at Sparta³, where it was also proposed to arraign Themistocles⁴. It cannot be denied that the feelings of Sparta towards Athens, immediately after the victories over the barbarians, became tinged with jealousy, as the history of the embassy concerning the erection of the Athenian walls⁵ testifies. Still Sparta beheld the progress of the Athenians without inquietude, and in such a spirit resigned into their hands the command in the naval war against the barbarians⁶, whether in Olymp. 75. 4.

¹ See above, § 53. n. 66—69.

² Thucyd. 3. 68. The festival of Zeus Eleutherius at Platææ, is said to have been instituted by Aristides, Plut. Arist. 20.

³ Diodor. 11. 55. For the history of the Grecian Synedrion during the Persian wars, consult O. Müller's Prolegom. 406, sqq.

⁴ Plut. Them. 23;—*κριθησόμενον—ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν*.

⁵ Thucyd. 1. 90.

⁶ The description of the feelings of the two states towards one another at that time is too highly coloured by Diodor. 11. 27, who states, that owing to Sparta's jealousy, the prize of victory at Salamis was awarded to the Æginetans (comp. Herod. 8. 122), and that through fear of the displeasure of Athens, a double prize was afterwards given to Themistocles, whereupon the Athenians, indignant at his having accepted it, deprived him of the command.

or 77. 3. cannot be accurately determined.ⁱ But after having relinquished the general hegemony, it became of vital importance to her to maintain her old position in the Peloponnesus, and to retain the command of the land armies. But many of her confederates were no longer disposed to obey her orders, and through the inactivity of the majority of them, during the protracted Persian war, it was the more natural that internal dissensions should break out amongst them. Tegea, which had once been amongst the most faithful allies of Sparta, now turned its arms against her (Olymp. 77. 4; 469. B. C.), and entered into a league with Argos, which accordingly rendered it assistance⁷. Sparta obtained a victory over her enemies at Tegea, and once more, when all the Arcadians, except Mantinea, sided with Tegea, at Dipæa⁸, in the land of the Mænalians⁹. The position of the Arcadians upon this occasion was unnatural; the hegemony of Sparta went forth unharmed from the contest, and some time afterwards she succeeded in restoring and consolidating the Peloponnesian league. But Sparta was again crippled for several years by the revolt of the Helots¹⁰, and the war against those in Ithome (Olymp. 78. 4—81. 2; 464—455. B. C.) She had just been upon the point of commencing hostilities against Athens, by sending assistance to Thasos, which the latter had reduced to great extremities¹¹. In spite of the succours which the Philolacon Cimon led from Athens against the

⁷ Herod. 9. 35, and thence Pausan. 3. 11. 6.

⁸ ἐν Διπαῖσιν.

⁹ Pausan. ubi sup.; comp. Pausan. 8. 8. 4; 8. 45. 2.

¹⁰ See § 60. n. 9.

¹¹ Thucyd. 1. 101.

Ithomatians, the rupture was deferred but for a short time. The siege of Ithome being greatly protracted, the Spartans became jealous of the Athenians, and dismissed them with contumelious language ¹².

Thereupon Athens, for the first time, entered into a league with Argos and with some of the states of Thessaly. In Argos, the natural impulse of the democracy towards that of Athens was combined with rooted jealousy of Sparta; the relations with Thessaly, as before remarked, are but imperfectly understood, but it seems less probable that the object of Athens was to renew the former hospitable treaties, such as had subsisted between the Pisistratidæ and Cineas, than to reap advantage from the dissensions which reigned in Thessaly, and which offered a convenient handle for her designs. Olymp. 80. 3; 457. B. C., Athens ¹³ was joined by Megara, which was doubtless impelled to such a course by the violence of democratic feeling kept alive by its border feuds with Corinth; the city of Megara was connected with its harbour, Nisæa, by means of long walls, whereby it became more closely associated with Athens ¹⁴. The summons of Pericles to the Greeks collectively to assemble for the purpose of deliberating on the subject of the temples, which had been burned down by the barbarians, must probably be referred to this period ¹⁵. Its unfavourable reception might easily have been foreseen. The restriction of the

¹² Thucyd. 1. 102.

¹³ Diodor. 11. 79.

¹⁴ Thucyd. 1. 103.

¹⁵ Plut. Pericl. 17, indicates the time: Ἀρχομένων δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀχθεσθαι τῇ αὐξήσει τῶν Ἀθηναίων, κ. τ. λ.

Corinthian trade by the naval operations of Athens, the coercion which that state began to employ towards Corinthian colonies, such as Potidæa, etc., and the instigations of Sparta, who, unable to appear upon the scene of action herself on account of the Messenian war, was, nevertheless, desirous of throwing obstacles in the way of the Athenians, determined Corinth to arm against Athens; its allies were Ægina and Epidaurus. But Athens, impatient for the commencement of hostilities, did not await their attack. Several battles were fought both by land and sea; Corinth was humbled, Ægina blockaded, and Athens now endeavoured, by occupying the Geraneia, to confine the Peloponnesians within their own peninsula¹⁶.

Sparta having meanwhile restored tranquillity to the Peloponnesus, and closely invested Ithome, was now able to direct the whole power of her armed confederacy against the Athenians. The revival of this league nearly coincides in order of time with the establishment of the Athenian Synteleia, concerning which a few observations must be premised¹⁷. The Spartan confederacy differed both in its ostensible object and intrinsic character from that of Athens; the latter state assumed to itself the right of interfering with the internal affairs of its confederates, reducing them to a state of almost servile dependence, whereas the league of Sparta was purely military¹⁸, and did not restrict the inde-

¹⁶ Thucyd. 1. 105. 106.

¹⁷ Comp. at large Manso Sparta, Kortüm z. Geschicht. Hell. Staatsv. p. 31-46; Müller, Dorians, 1. 178, sqq.

¹⁸ We may safely assume that there was a *ξυμμαχία*—ὥστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν, Thuc. 1. 44, where the *ἐπιμαχία*, as a defensive alliance, is also specified. Comp. on the subject of these terms, Thuc. 3. 70. 75; 5. 47. 48. *Ὀμαιχμία*, Thuc. 1. 18, is the actual military alliance, but *ξυμμ.* is also used instead of *ἐπιμαχ.* e. g. Thuc. 6. 22. 23. 25.

pendence of the confederate states, as regarded their domestic constitution and administration; hence the merit of respecting their *Autonomia*, *Autoteleia*, and their claims to be *αὐτοδικοί*, is attributed to Sparta¹⁹. By the terms of the confederacy, each of its members was bound to arm and do military service in time of war. Supplies²⁰ were demanded from the single states²¹ as necessity required, but probably according to a fixed scale. There was no joint treasury²². Matters which regarded the interests of the league were discussed in the federal assembly²³ at Sparta or Olympia, and decided by vote, the confederates having equal votes²⁴. There was no federal tribunal; but all violence proceeding from intestine dissensions, or otherwise, was repressed by the ascendant of Sparta, the Olympic Hieromenia, and occasionally by an appeal to the Delphic oracle, or to other arbitrators²⁵. The principle of mutual representation was mostly, though not always, acted upon. The Doric spirit which Sparta found means to keep up among the members of the league, in some measure atoned

¹⁹ Thucyd. 5. 79: πόλεις τὰ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ—αὐτόνομοι καὶ αὐτοπόλεις, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες, κατὰ πάτρια δίκας διδόντες τὰς ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας. Comp. 5. 77: τὰς δὲ πόλεις τὰς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ μικράς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους, κ. τ. λ. Comp. 5. 27. But on the other hand see Pericles' observation on the ἐπιτηδείως τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις αὐτονομεῖσθαι, Thuc. 1. 144.

²⁰ Τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, Thuc. 2. 10. e. g. the materials for besieging and fortifying, Thuc. 3. 16; 7. 18, as well as ships in the Peloponnesian war. Thuc. 2. 7; 3. 16.

²¹ Περιαγγέλλειν κατὰ πόλεις, the peculiar province of Sparta, Thucyd. 2. 10. 85.

²² Thuc. 1. 141.

²³ Thuc. 1. 67: ξύλλογον τὸν εἰωθότα.

²⁴ Ἰσόψηφοι, Thuc. 1. 141. Comp. 5. 30: εἰρημένον, κύριον εἶναι, ὃ, τι ἀν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν συμμαχῶν ψηφίσηται, but with the proviso in favour of Sparta: ἥν μή τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ᾖ. See an example of voting, 1. 125.

²⁵ At least this occurs in the disputes between Corcyra and Corinth, Thuc. 1. 28, and in the treaty between Argos and Sparta, Thuc. 5. 79.

for the absence of more binding ties. But owing to the circumspect slowness of Sparta, and the independence which was secured to the confederates individually, the league was deficient in energy and vigour. In the field Sparta had the sole command²⁶, and Spartan officers²⁷ were appointed to lead the contingents of the allies. But, on the other hand, the Spartan generalissimo summoned the chief officers of the confederate army to attend a council of war²⁸.

Relying upon the assistance of her allies, Sparta had sent an army from the Peloponnesus towards the north, with the view of defending Doris against the Phocians²⁹. But the expedition was not solely destined to defend the Grecian continent. Sparta was desirous of regaining a position in northern Greece, and though she might not avow it, her chief object in taking this step appears to have been to march back through Bœotia, and raise up Thebes against the Athenians, whilst the Dorian sea-states should offer them battle. This being accomplished, and the Athenians having taken the field in favour of the disaffected Bœotians, they were beaten at Tanagra, OL. 80. 4; 457. B. C.³⁰, whereupon a treaty was concluded between Sparta and Thebes³¹, which confirmed the authority of the latter over the rural districts of Bœotia. Thus Argos and Thebes, the two states which had betrayed their common

²⁶ e. g. Thuc. 5. 54.

²⁷ Ξεναγοί, Thuc. 2. 75.

²⁸ Thuc. 2. 10:—τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων πασῶν καὶ τοὺς μάλιστα ἐν τέλει καὶ ἀξιολογωτάτους παρῆναι.

²⁹ Thuc. 1. 107; Diod. 11. 81.

³⁰ Thuc. 1. 108.

³¹ Diod. 11. 81; Justin 3. 6. Comp. Thuc. 3. 62; Müller, Orchom. 417. n.; Böckh, Explic. Pind. 532.

country, were once more restored to dignity and importance, the former by Athens, the latter by Sparta; but at the same time the chief towns of their respective territories were averse from their authority, those of Bœotia being in favour of the Athenian, and those of Argolis of the Spartan connection. Two more battles were fought in Bœotia. The victory which Myronides obtained at Oenophyte, sixty-two days after the battle of Tanagra, enabled him to re-establish the influence of Athens in Bœotia, except at Thebes and Orchomenus, whereupon democracy was everywhere introduced under the Athenian banners³². Myronides also succeeded in gaining over Phocis, which was distracted by internal quarrels, but probably not without guaranteeing to the people the possession of the chief power. The Opuntian Locrians were compelled to give a hundred of their richest citizens as hostages for their fidelity³³. The Athenians failed in their attempts to reinstate the expelled Pharsalian Orestes³⁴. In the meantime Ægina had been reduced and constrained to join the Athenian Synteleia, Olymp. 86. 4; 456. B. C.

After the return of Cimon, which took place in the fifth year of his exile³⁵, 456. B. C., there appeared prospects of a reconciliation between Sparta and Athens; the mediation of Cimon had first effected a three years' armistice, and ultimately in Olymp. 82. 1; 450. B. C., a five years' truce between Sparta and Athens, and a thirty

³² Thuc. 1. 108.³³ Thuc. ubi sup.³⁴ Thuc. 1. 111.³⁵ Plut. Cim. 17. 18; Corn. Nepos, 3; Ephor. ap. Schol. Aristid. Marx, 224.

years' peace between Sparta and Argos³⁶. It was with this intention that Pericles had caused Cimon to be recalled, and Athens retained her influence in Bœotia and Phocis for some time longer.

Cimon next directed the Athenian arms against the hereditary enemy in Asia, when the victory of Cyprus, Olymp. 82. 4; 449. B. C., was the means of extorting from the great king, what the Athenian orators term a glorious peace, usually entitled the peace of Cimon. But even granting the encomiums which the orators so lavishly bestowed on Athens to have been little more than empty declamation³⁷, one thing at least is certain, that in consequence of the expedition of Cimon, Persia, for a period of thirty years, ceased to be the object of care and inquietude to the Greeks. The real facts of the case appear to have been that Athens submitted the articles of her much-vaunted peace to the Persian monarch, who was too proud to accede to such terms, and too weak to obtain any that were more favourable, whereupon the Athenians construed his silence into assent, and regarded their actual dominion of the seas and coasts as though it had been stipulated by treaty. That the western coast of Asia was not delivered from the Persian yoke by the battle of Mycale, is demonstrated by the history of Themistocles who found a secure retreat in Ephesus, and subsequently derived an income from Lampsacus, Myus, and

³⁶ Thuc. 1. 112.

³⁷ See the criticism in Meier de Bon. Damnat. p. 117—122; Dahlmann *Forschungen auf dem Gebiete d. Gesch.* vol. i.; Krüger in *Seebode Archiv.*; Müller, *Dor.* 1. 186.

Magnesia, which were bestowed upon him by the Persian monarch absolutely, and not merely *in partibus*³⁸. In the Peloponnesian war there was a royal general in Ephesus, and the barbarians had so far the ascendant there as to place the lives of the Greeks in danger³⁹.

After the death of Cimon the animosities which had slumbered once more awoke. The two leading powers were at first contented with making indirect attacks upon one another, but even these undertakings sufficiently reveal the endeavours of each to obtain the hegemony. Sparta sent troops to Delphi against Phocis⁴⁰, apprehensive lest the efforts of the last to foster and promote the democracy established there by the Athenians might endanger the rigid oligarchy of the priests in Delphi. But even in this instance the views of Sparta were not those which she alleged; her real object was to secure to herself the Promanteia and Proedria as a counterpoise to the high priesthood of Athens at the Panegyris of Delos. This was the opinion of Pericles, who immediately marched to Delphi, appointed the Phocians presidents of the Delphic sanctuary, and appropriated the Promanteia to the Athenians. Meanwhile oligarchical fugitives from various towns and villages in Bœotia had assembled in Orchomenus, where their ranks were swelled by Locrians, Eubœans, and others of the oligarchical party⁴¹. An army composed

³⁸ Thuc. 1. 138.

³⁹ Plut. Lysand. 3.

⁴⁰ Thuc. 1. 112; Plut. Pericl. 21. Concerning the separation of Delphi from the Phocians, see Plut. Cim. 17; Strabo, 9. 423: — ἀπέστησαν τοὺς Δελφοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ συστήματος τῶν Φωκίων Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ἐπέτρεψαν καθ' αὐτοὺς πολιτεύεσθαι.

⁴¹ Thucyd. 1. 113: — καὶ ὅσοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἦσαν.

of the flower of the Athenian troops was beaten at Coronea, Ol. 83. 2; 447. B. C., and together with the Athenian ascendancy fell the democracy of Boeotia⁴². Oligarchy appears to have been established in Phocis about the same time. Megara, doubtless at the instigation of an oligarchical party, revolted from Athens, Ol. 83. 3, whose enemies were now joined by Eubœa, where, though the ancient equestrian system was not wholly extinguished, considerable oppression had prevailed. An army marched from the Peloponnesus, Olymp. 83. 3; 445. B. C.⁴³. Pericles bribed the Peloponnesians to retire, reduced Eubœa, and concluded a thirty years' truce. Athens ceded Megara, Pagæ, Achaia (in Megaris?)⁴⁴, Trœzen⁴⁵, and recognised their independence. The provision that any state not in alliance with either of the two powers should be at liberty to join whichever of them it should think proper⁴⁶, proves how inveterate must have been the hostility between combatants, who in the very act of laying down their arms, were still careful to keep up the remembrance of their animosities. Hence the statement of Thucydides that Corcyra had been in alliance neither with Sparta nor Athens⁴⁷, is especially worthy of remark.

The subjugation of Samos, a project by which Pericles designed to consummate the maritime

⁴² Thucydides says, l. 113. somewhat singularly: — πάντες αὐτόνομοι πάλιν ἐγένοντο.

⁴³ Thuc. l. 114.

⁴⁴ Müll. Dor. l. 193. However, were it not for the position of the word between the names of two Megarian towns, we might assume it to have been the district of Achaia, where Athens had certainly endeavoured to obtain firm footing, and whence it had undertaken an expedition against Sicyon. Thuc. l. 111.

⁴⁵ Thuc. l. 115.

⁴⁶ Thuc. l. 35.

⁴⁷ Thuc. l. 31.

supremacy of Athens, was followed by the establishment of a constitution on that island, which was intended to guarantee the Athenian power⁴⁸. In the course of the war some of the Peloponnesian states had prepared to take up arms, but had been prevented from accomplishing their purpose by Corinth⁴⁹; and it was probably owing to the advice of the valiant king Archidamus that Methymna's application for assistance in its defection from Athens was unsuccessful⁵⁰.

II. STATE OF PARTIES IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

§ 62. The collisions between the two principal powers and their confederates had divided the whole of Greece into two conflicting portions; every state was now compelled to declare for one or the other of these leaders, and this division superseded all former associations, whether for festive or other objects.

The armistice had not quenched the fire of discord, and a breath might fan it into a flame. In considering the accounts of the occasion of the war, we must be careful to distinguish between the internal tendency, the external impulse, and the ostensible pretext. The first resulted from the efforts to obtain the ascendancy on the one hand, and the fear of oppression on the other, or from the indignation of those on whom the yoke had already been imposed; and like most ineffectual crises which only irritate and increase the inflammation, the previous hostilities had rather

⁴⁸ § 58. n. 62.

⁴⁹ Thuc. 1. 140.

⁵⁰ Thuc. 3. 2.

stimulated than allayed the animosity of the combatants. The external occasion was the interference of Athens with the colonial disputes of Corinth, a state in the highest degree tenacious of its colonial relations. The expelled oligarchs of Epidamnus attacked the demus of their parent-city sword in hand, and the latter being unable to obtain succours from Corcyra was assisted by Corinth, under whose auspices Corcyra had founded the colony of Epidamnus. Hereupon Corcyra, whose democracy was almost dissolved in anarchy, coalesced with the oligarchical fugitives of Epidamnus. Corinth was supported by Megara, which now faithfully adhered to the mother-town, Epidaurus, Hermione, Trœzen, Phlius, Elis, Thebes, Paleis in Cephallenia, Ambracia, and Leucas; Corinth was the object of almost universal hatred. In the further progress of the war Corinth and Corcyra applied to Athens, whose importance in nautical affairs was acknowledged by both; but their object was to obtain her alliance not her arbitration¹. Athens could not long hesitate as to the course she should pursue. Permanent friendship was not to be looked for from Corinth, whilst a league with Corcyra might promote her design of destroying the Peloponnesian power at sea. Pericles accordingly decided for the league with Corcyra, which proceeding did not, according to the principles of Grecian law, involve any infraction of the thirty years' armistice on the part of Athens. Whilst the Athenians and Peloponnesians were fighting off Corcyra², Corinth and its

¹ Thuc. 1. 24—43.² Thuc. 1. 45—55.

allies were exasperated to the last degree by the rigour with which Athens treated the Corinthian colony Potidæa in Chalcidice. This city, wavering in its forced obedience to the Athenians, the latter commanded the inhabitants to demolish a wall which guarded their city on the side of Pallene, give hostages for their fidelity, and dismiss the Corinthian Epidemiurgi. A secret correspondence was now carried on between Potidæa and the Peloponnesians, and the former, relying upon the assurances of assistance it had received, revolted from Athens, and was immediately besieged. The Peloponnesians now assembled in Sparta to complain of danger individually and collectively, when the Spartans, at the persuasion of the bold Ephor Sthenelaidas, resolved on war³. As the thirty years' truce, however, had not been openly and completely violated by the attack which Athens had made upon a town in Thrace, it was thought proper to save appearances by alleging various grievances against Athens, and these served for the ostensible pretext of the war. The chief accusations were, that Athens⁴ had imposed⁵ commercial restrictions upon Megara⁶; that she had neglected to punish the Alcmaeonidæ, who were polluted with the blood of Cylon's adherents, and that she tolerated Pericles⁷. They then declared that she should be required to consent to the independence of all the Greek states⁸.

³ Thuc. 1. 56—88.

⁴ Thuc. 1. 126, sqq.

⁵ Thuc. 1. 139: *καὶ μάλιστα γε πάντων καὶ ἐνδηλότατα προὔλεγον, κ. τ. λ.* This coincides with the vehement allusions to the subjects contained in the Attic comedy. Aristoph. Pac. 609, sqq.; Archarn. 509, sqq.

⁶ Aristoph. ubi sup.

⁷ Thuc. 1. 126.

⁸ Thuc. 1. 139.

It was natural that Athens should decline, as soon as she paused in her career of aggrandisement. By not advancing she lost ground, and every concession entailed a long train of losses. On the other hand what a boundless prospect was offered to the stirring and enterprising spirit of the Athenians by that element on which they reigned supreme; what advantages must they not have hoped to derive from a naval war! As obviously as this would seem to result from all principles of common policy, as well as from the particular character of the Athenians, still there have not been wanting numerous writers, both in ancient and modern times, who have ascribed the war to personal motives in Pericles, and those not of the most dignified order. Aristophanes⁹ attributes it to an insult offered by the Megarians to two women who were upon intimate terms with Aspasia; Diodorus¹⁰ asserts that it originated in the embarrassment of Pericles when called upon to give an account of his administration of the public revenue; and Plutarch¹¹ says it was occasioned by the anxiety he felt for the fate of Pheidias, who had been impeached. It is impossible wholly to absolve Pericles from the imputation of having been guided by motives of a personal nature in the course he pursued; and the strenuous endeavours of modern writers to dissolve historical

⁹ Pac. 540, sqq. Aristophanes is outdone by the Schol. Thucyd. vol. v. 334. 2nd edit.: οἱ δὲ φασὶν ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ψῆφον εἰσήγαγε διότι οἱ Μεγαρεῖς Ἀσπασίαν τὴν διδάσκαλον Περικλέους ὕβρισαν πόρνην αὐτὴν ἐγκαλοῦντες. According to Duris of Samos, whose partiality it is easy to explain, and Theophrastus, who not unfrequently appears to have been deficient in critical acumen, Aspasia occasioned the Samian and Peloponnesian wars. Harpocr. Ἀσπασία.

¹⁰ Diocl. 12. 38.

¹¹ Plut. Pericl. 32.

occurrences from all connection with personal considerations, and to represent the public acts of kingdoms and states as exclusively official, and as the results of purely political calculations, are as unsuccessful as they are useless. Is the patriot to be debarred from carrying into execution those plans which he may consider conducive to the prosperity of his country, because they may be fraught with advantage to himself? Meiners has successfully vindicated the character of Pericles¹².

The sentiments of the Greek states during this twenty-seven years' struggle were not uniform at every part of the period. The passion by which so many had been actuated at the commencement of the war became still more inflamed and acrimonious during its progress, and a very small number of them occasionally gave ear to the dictates of calm and sober reason. The immediate causes of the rupture, the struggle for the hegemony on the one side, and the lust of power and love of liberty on the other, lost none of their force with the continuance of the contest, whilst most of those who took part in it were fully conscious of the motives by which they were actuated. But they did not contend for a purely political principle; the struggle was not between despotism and liberty; the rancour of both parties was increased by their difference of nationality, and the war found constant aliment from the variety of the contending principles, the increasing exasperation, and the particular incitements of the combatants; they fought less for any common cause than for all

¹² Meiners, *Gesch. der Wissensch. in Griechenl. und R.* 1. 123, sqq.

sorts of separate interests arising out of their various characters and positions; that opposition which had at first been political, now became national, and thus the war struck at the very roots of political society in Greece.

The principal opposition laid down by Thucydides is that of tribes and constitutions; but this general principle, to which he gives so much prominence, was greatly modified and restricted by particular circumstances. What has been observed of the Greeks in general, applies with full force to Thucydides; their scientific mode of considering subjects, led them to seek a unity which did not exist in political life. The classification of the confederates on both sides, according to the two first principles of opposition, is merely approximative; individual circumstances prevailed to too great an extent to allow of so broad a distinction.

I. The opposition of tribes, or more strictly speaking, of Dorism and Ionism, of the inland and the maritime, the solid and fixed, as distinguished from the unsettled and the roving, which is so frequently noticed by Thucydides, and on which he dwells with such complacency¹³, especially applies to the two leading states, Sparta and Athens. There can be no doubt that the ties of kindred and extraction had considerable weight with the latter; and her exertions to obtain the hegemony were, doubtless, accompanied by the wish to uphold Doric usages and feelings, but Athens was

¹³ *Karà τὸ ξυγγενές*, Thucyd. 6. 6; 76. 77. 58, etc.; proclamation addressed by the Dorians to the Dorians, 6. 80; the pride of the Dorians on account of their community of extraction, 6. 77; in contradistinction to the Ionians, as Nesiotæ, 7. 5 (Gylippus); comp. 6. 82; 7. 57; 8. 25, etc.

obviously actuated by a more selfish policy, and her representation of the Ionic principle was wholly subordinate to the hegemony, which she asserted by means of her armies and fleets, and which, as the ruling state, it was essentially her interest to uphold. But in their declarations, indeed, the two leading powers studiously dwelt upon the bond of affinity, whilst every exertion was made to revive the half-forgotten tie between mother and daughter-towns, and to apply it to new political combinations¹⁴. But these two tribes or races by no means comprised the whole of the members of these conflicting confederacies. The Æolian and Achæan tribes were more or less involved in the contest, as well as various others, which had remained in their ancient state of separation, such as the mountain races around Thessaly. Most of the Æolic tribes, indeed, and especially Thebes, sided with the Dorians, but on the other hand, Sparta declared, in the remarkable proclamation to those who were desirous of joining the settlement at Heraclea in Trachin, that the Achæans were not amongst her friends¹⁵. Hence it results that what has been represented as a division of parties, based upon the difference of tribes, was in reality made in conformity to political interests, which must be explained from the peculiar reasons, external circumstances, and particular sentiments of the various states which composed it.

The force of external circumstances is eminently perceptible in the case of the Athenian Synteleia.

¹⁴ Thucyd. 6. 6; 6. 82.

¹⁵ Thucyd. 3. 92: καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τὸν βουλόμενον ἐκέλευον ἔπεσθαι, πλὴν Ἰώνων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν καὶ ἔστιν ὧν ἄλλων ἔθνη.

Whilst Athens possessed the sovereignty of the seas, the Ionians and Dorians were equally impatient of the yoke, and upon the downfall of the Athenian naval power, they both hastened to throw off their allegiance, and it is even affirmed that the Ionians set the example. When the Athenians first took possession of the shores of Asia Minor, they had respected the ties of consanguinity indeed¹⁶; but they afterwards openly declared that the right of the stronger was the only bond of their confederacy¹⁷. A striking contrast to this system of coercion and terror was presented by the proclamation of freedom which went forth from Sparta¹⁸, and which especially conduced to loosen the bands of the Athenian Synteleia. The credulity with which the Greeks ever listened to the delusive promise of the stranger, was proportioned to their own deficiency in the consistency and moderation requisite for the enjoyment of genuine freedom. Amongst the free allies of Athens, with the exception of Chios, which, however, only enjoyed a sort of half liberty, we scarcely find any Ionians at all. Those states which lay without the reach of the Athenian empire, were nearly all indifferent to the tie between them and their Greek kinsmen, such as the states on the Pontus, Massilia, etc. On the other hand, the Doric states, Argos and Naupactus, were, from particular reasons, stanch allies of Athens.

The key-stone of the Peloponnesian Symmachia was the hegemony of Sparta. This did not, however, comprise all the Dorians of the Peloponnesus, for Argos stood alone, and was even hostile to it; nor were all its members Dorians, as the Arcadians

¹⁶ Herod. 9. 106.¹⁷ § 58. n. 40.¹⁸ Thucyd. 2. 8. 72; 4. 85.

were of ancient Pelasgic and the Eleans of Cauconic-Ætolian extraction. Nevertheless, the intercourse of several centuries, and the influence of Doric manners and customs, had greatly conduced to remove the barriers by which these discordant races had been divided. The nearest ally of Sparta without the Peloponnesus was Megara, but not solely or especially on account of its attachment to Dorism; amongst those not of Doric extraction were Thebes and its Bœotian dependencies, Locris and Phocis. Thebes endeavoured to gain over the Æolian Lesbians to the league, by reminding them of their common descent from an Æolian tribe¹⁹. Sparta called upon the transmarine Dorians in Italy and Sicily to join her²⁰, but a long time elapsed before they took any active part in the war. Internal dissension prevailed amongst the states in Crete, some of which were of Doric origin; and even the attack of the Athenians upon Cydonia²¹ did not induce them to take up arms for the Peloponnesian cause.

II. The opposition of constitutions. This did not necessarily arise out of the peculiarity of extraction²², but only coincided to a certain extent with the difference of tribes, democracy with the Ionians, oligarchy with the Dorians; namely, so far as the two leading powers, Athens and Sparta, declared themselves the representatives of the rival principles. We shall afterwards see how little sincerity there was in their professions of interest for the causes themselves; the establishment of the constitution which they upheld was not an end but a

¹⁹ Thucyd. 3. 2; 6. 5. 100.²⁰ Thucyd. 2. 7. 86.²¹ Thucyd. 2. 85.²² See vol. i. 260, sqq.; comp. 66. 67.

means. Such is the character which Nicias gives of Sparta's zeal for oligarchy²³, and the self-interested motives of Athens were equally apparent. It cannot be denied that zeal for their respective constitutions had a considerable share in determining the various states as to which side they should espouse; but even this was not so much a result of the constitutions in themselves as of the ulterior advantages which they expected to reap from them. Most of the states were guided by the selfish but natural policy of endeavouring to obtain the right of ordering their own affairs, by joining one or the other of the leading combatants. But the majority of them were distracted by violent party animosities at home. There existed in very few any uniform or decided feeling for or against a particular constitution; hence, then, while nominally and ostensibly they belonged to the two confederacies, the oligarchs were in reality almost universally in favour of Sparta and the demus of Athens. It was upon these grounds that after the recovery of Mytilene, the Athenian Diodotus recommended the employment of clemency, lest they should estrange the affections of the popular party²⁴. For that reason the Athenians were so mortified by their discomfiture in Sicily, because, contrary to custom, the Syracusan demus had fought against them²⁵. Few of the states remained steadfast in their external relations with either confederacy, which, in consequence of domestic feuds, fluctuated according to the ascendant which either party happened to obtain in the interior, whilst through every

²³ Thucyd. 6. 11 : πόλιν δὲ ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιβουλεύουσιν.

²⁴ Thucyd. 3. 47.

²⁵ Thucyd. 7. 55.

vicissitude the demus remained devoted to the Athenian, and the oligarchs to the Spartan confederacy. Hence Thebes and Megara, whose constitutions were oligarchical, refused to enter into an alliance with democratic Argos²⁶. But whilst all the various moving principles of demagogy and oligarchism (some of which were of a personal nature) appear to resolve themselves into this opposition of constitutions, and to explain the policy which led particular states to side with the Athenians or Peloponnesians, other political interests, of almost infinite diversity, affected the position of the single states in the respective leagues. These, for the most part, dated from an earlier age, on which account their activity was most apparent at the beginning of the war. Hence, before we proceed, it will be necessary to take a brief survey of the collective members of the two leagues, according to their tribes, constitutions, and other motives of action, as well as according to the variations in the state of parties during the war. In considering this last point, it will be necessary to divide the war into three periods, viz., from its commencement 2. till the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily, and, 3. till its conclusion.

I. TO THE PEACE OF NICIAS.

A. ATHENIAN CONFEDERACY.

a. *The Synteleia (including the Lesbians and Chians.)*

The states included under the Athenian Synteleia, and the feeling which prevailed in them re-

²⁶ Thucyd. 5. 31.

spectively, have already been described. Although the yoke of Athens pressed most heavily upon the nobles and the wealthier orders, it is probable that in various communities the struggle for freedom and independence was common to all classes. But during the first period of the war the curse of discord had not yet poisoned the sources of Grecian society, and nobility and commonalty were alike impatient of a foreign yoke, and eager for deliverance from the tyranny of the Athenians. This however in most cases proceeded from the preponderance of the upper classes. Those states which had been compelled to enter into the Athenian league, betrayed a spirit of disaffection from the very beginning of the war. The mission of Methymna to the Peloponnesians has been adverted to above. Potidæa was the first to revolt. The indignant Ægina had already sent clandestinely to Sparta²⁷, when Athens prevented the proposed defection by expelling the whole population²⁸. The defection of Mytilene followed in the fourth year of the war, and upon being once more reduced, it ceased to be a political community²⁹. As early as the year 430. B. C., intestine strife had broken out in Colophon, whereby the Persians obtained possession of the town and blockaded the citizens in the harbour of Notium; these dissensions still prevailed during the fourth year of the war, the bias of one party being towards the barbarians; but the Athenians took the place, and only suffered their own adherents to reside there under Athenian laws³⁰.

²⁷ Plut. Pericl. 29.

²⁸ Thuc. 2. 27; Diodor. 12. 44.

²⁹ Thuc. 3. 1, sqq.; Aristot. Pol. 5. 3. 3. assigns as the reason of its defection: *ἐξ ἐπιπλήρων στάσεως γενομένης*.

³⁰ Thuc. 3. 34, sqq.; comp. Arist. Pol. 5. 2. 12.

Chios having in the seventh year of the war built new walls, the jealousy of the Athenians took the alarm, and they caused them to be demolished; whereupon Chios gave pledges for its fidelity³¹. In the ninth year of the war the Athenians expelled the Delians, whom they suspected of carrying on a correspondence with Sparta³²; but their island was afterwards restored to them. When Brasidas proclaimed freedom to the Greek settlements in Chalcidice, they all with one accord threw off their allegiance to Athens; Acanthus, Stagira, Amphipolis, Torone, Scione, Mende, etc., received the Spartan liberator with open arms³³, whilst Scione crowned him with a golden wreath, as the deliverer of Greece³⁴. Amphipolis paid him the same honours after his death as it had previously done to Agnon, the founder of the city³⁵. But the demus soon after succeeded in placing Mende once more in the hands of the Athenians³⁶.

b. The independent confederates of Athens.

(ἀπὸ ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι, Thuc. 7. 57.)

Eminently distinguished for its zeal, fidelity, and fortitude in danger and distress was Platææ, whose aversion to the despotism of Thebes equalled its enthusiasm in the cause of popular liberty. But the oligarchical party which existed there at the beginning of the war entered into relations with Thebes³⁷, and thus brought ruin and desolation

³¹ Thuc. 4. 51. On the caution of the Chians, comp. 8. 24.

³² Thuc. 5. 1.

³³ Thuc. 4. 85, sqq.

³⁴ Thuc. 4. 121.

³⁵ Thuc. 5. 11.

³⁶ Thuc. 4. 131.

³⁷ — ἰδίας ἔνεκα δυνάμει, Thuc. 2. 2.

upon their native town. Such of the Plataeans as had fled before the destruction of their city became denizens in Athens, and were afterwards removed to Scione³⁸. The zeal and fidelity of Naupactus were not inferior to those of Plataeæ; its citizens, grateful to Athens for having rescued them from their perilous situation in Ithome, and established them in their new place of abode³⁹, nourished the most inveterate hatred against their hereditary enemies, the Spartans, who were descended from the same race with themselves. The conduct of Corcyra was influenced more by aversion to Corinth than attachment to Athens. Democratic feeling here degenerated into mob violence. Corcyra disclaimed all intention of breaking the ties of affinity which bound it to the Peloponnesians, with whom it wished to keep up relations of friendship⁴⁰, and declared that it only intended to co-operate with Athens according to the terms of the confederation. Accordingly, when the partisans of the Corinthian oligarchy were butchered with all the cruelty of fanatical hostility, Athens received but little assistance from Corcyra. The greater part of the Acarnanians had from the second year of the war been in the interest of Athens⁴¹. But they were still so backward in political culture that their proceedings could not be guided by much calculation or design⁴²; their chief inducement to take part in the war was the hope of spoil, and they joined the Athenians out of hatred to the Corinthian settlement, and possibly out of aversion to the Corinthian intercourse.

³⁸ Thuc. 5. 32.³⁹ Thuc. 1. 103.⁴⁰ Thuc. 3. 70.⁴¹ Thuc. 2. 9; comp. 62.⁴² Comp. vol. i. p. 93.

The half-Greek Argos Amphilochium was especially hostile to the Ambraciots who were spread over the neighbouring coasts; the Ambraciots took the city, but the fugitives having, with the assistance of Athens, effected their return, drove out the Ambraciots, and from that time continued faithful allies of the Athenians⁴³. On the contrary, the town of Œniadæ⁴⁴ and the tyrant Euarchus in Astacus⁴⁵ were for the Peloponnesians. Mention occurs⁴⁶ of a federal council (*κοινὸν*) of the Acarnanians towards the end of the war, in Stratos, the largest town in the country⁴⁷; but it is uncertain whether that body, or individual communities only were in alliance with Athens. Cephallenia and Zacynthus fought in the Athenian ranks rather from compulsion than inclination⁴⁸. The Ozolian Locrians who for a short time espoused the cause of the Athenians, displayed the usual qualities of the barbarians, venality, rapacity, and faithlessness⁴⁹. Upon the approach of a Spartan army the Amphissæans declared for the Peloponnesians⁵⁰. In Thessaly the people were entirely on the side of Athens⁵¹; but the tyranny of the Dynasts prevented them from following the natural bias of their feelings. But in consequence of the distractions which prevailed there, the ranks of the Athenians were swelled by detachments from Larissa, Pharsalus, Crannon, Gyrton, Pheræ, etc.⁵², and especial mention occurs of Polymedes, Aristonus, and the Pharsalian chief Menon; the last of these

⁴³ Thuc. 3. 68.⁴⁴ Thuc. 2. 82.⁴⁵ Thuc. 2. 30. 33.⁴⁶ Xen. Hell. 4. 6. 4.⁴⁷ Thuc. 2. 80.⁴⁸ Thuc. 7. 57 : *αὐτόνομοι μὲν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ νησιωτικὸν μᾶλλον κατεργόμενοι, ὅτι θαλάσσης ἐκράτουν Ἀθηναῖοι.* Comp. 2. 7. 66.⁴⁹ Thuc. 3. 95.⁵⁰ Thuc. 3. 101.⁵¹ Thuc. 4. 78.⁵² Thuc. 2. 22.

sent the Athenians during their attack upon the Mendean settlement, Eion near Amphipolis⁵³, twelve talents and two or three hundred horsemen of his own⁵⁴. Some of the mountain-tribes around Thessaly, consisting of Ænians or Ætæans⁵⁵, Dolopians, and Malians, were at enmity with the Dorian colony Heraclea⁵⁶, but took no active steps in favour of the Athenians⁵⁷. The subject of the Italiots and Siceliots will be treated in the second chapter.

B. THE PELOPONNESIAN CONFEDERACY.

a. *The Peloponnesian Symmachia properly so called.*

The most prominent state of the league after Sparta was at this time Corinth. Though its attachment to Sparta had dated from a very remote period, it had never been intemperate, or wholly incompatible with friendship for Athens and its youthful democracy⁵⁸. But now its hatred to Athens reached the highest pitch, in consequence of the protection which the latter afforded to Corcyra, its rivalry in maritime trade, and the irreparable injury it had done to the colonial system of Corinth. The Argolic towns, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermione, Halieis, and Phlius adhered to Sparta through the whole course of the war with their wonted zeal and fidelity, which

⁵³ Thuc. 4. 7.

⁵⁴ ἰππεῦσι πενέταις ἰδίοις; Ps. Demosth. de Syntax. 173. 4. 5. R; Dem. in Aristocr. 686. 29.

⁵⁵ See vol. i. 46. n. 15.

⁵⁶ See below.

⁵⁷ According to Ps. Demosth. in Neær. Sparta summoned the Malians, Ætæans and (!) the Ænians πανδημί to her assistance in besieging Plataeæ. It is not very surprising that they did not obey the summons.

⁵⁸ Vol. i. p. 203.

derived additional force from their incessant, and by no means unfounded apprehensions of Argos. Tegea's neighbourly relation with Sparta had been revived, but Mantinea⁵⁹, which had for a long time leaned towards Argos, showed considerable lukewarmness in its alliance with Sparta. The remaining states of Arcadia, such as Orchomenus, etc., were for Sparta. However, even at that period the Arcadians evinced the readiness to serve for pay which afterwards became so conspicuous a feature in their character; and even Asiatic barbarians could purchase the services of Arcadian bands⁶⁰. Megara, still reckoning itself amongst the Peloponnesian Dorians, as before its separation from Corinth, groaned beneath the yoke of oligarchs, but even the lower orders were probably exasperated against their insolent neighbours, who, besides preventing them from disposing of their hardly-earned produce⁶¹, devastated their sterile lands twice every year⁶². Pellene in Achaia was induced to enter the Symmachia from jealousy and fear of its opposite neighbour Naupactus⁶³.

b. Other Members of the Confederacy without the Peloponnesus.

Amongst these the first place, judged by the standard of public opinion, must be assigned to the Delphic oracle and its Hierarchy. The Pythia openly declared that the Delphic god would employ his whole power in favour of Sparta⁶⁴. The

⁵⁹ Its troops are mentioned, Thucyd. 3. 107: 111.

⁶⁰ Thuc. 3. 34.

⁶¹ Aristoph. Acharn. 519, sqq.

⁶² See below, § 63. n. 4.

⁶³ Thuc. 2. 9.

⁶⁴ Thuc. 1. 118: καὶ αὐτὸς ἔφη ξυλλήψεσθαι καὶ παρακαλούμενος καὶ ἄκλητος. Comp. 2. 54.

intimate connection which had subsisted from the earliest times between the oracle and its pious believer Sparta, and the fear which the oligarchs entertained of the Phocians, drew the bands of their union still closer than before. But an oligarchy upheld by Sparta appears to have maintained an opposition between the Phocians and Athenians, which was entirely at variance with the popular feeling⁶⁵. Their enmity to the Thessalian Dynasts, the effects of which had usually been, that the Phocians were found amongst the enemies of Thessaly, still existed, it is true⁶⁶; but it had lost the greater part of its force, as the whole of these were not opposed to Athens. But the first place, in point of strength, must be assigned to Thebes, which, though governed by oligarchs, was the sworn enemy of Athens in consequence of her cruelty to Plataeæ. The rest of the Bœotians⁶⁷ followed the example of the capital; some of them by compulsion, as was the case with Thespiæ, which, despite of its hereditary aristocracy, was disaffected to the Thebans, wherefore, being accused of an understanding with Athens, it was in the ninth year of the war deprived of its walls by the Thebans⁶⁸. At the same time there were also partisans of Athens and democracy in other Bœotian towns, and even in Orchomenus⁶⁹, which had at one time offered a retreat to oligarchical fugitives, and still was the stronghold of equestrian aristocracy. Amongst the Locrians of Opus, who were accustomed to follow the example of Thebes,

⁶⁵ Comp. above, § 61.⁶⁶ Vol. i. § 27. n. 37.⁶⁷ Thuc. 4. 93, mentions the Haliartians, Coronæans, Copæans, and others about the lake (περὶ τὴν λίμνην), Thespians, Tanagræans, and Orchomenians.⁶⁸ Thuc. 4. 133.⁶⁹ Thuc. 4. 76.

oligarchy likewise prevailed⁷⁰. The Thessalian Dynasts have already been alluded to, and notwithstanding their oligarchy, they rarely or never crossed their frontier to assist the Spartans. The inhabitants of the little district of Doris, being harassed by the irruptions of the Cætæans, sent to Sparta for assistance. This occasioned the foundation of the Peloponnesian colony Heraclea, in Trachin, in the sixth year of the war⁷¹, which was designed to become a powerful auxiliary in time of war; but the neighbouring mountaineers, the Ænians (Cætæans), Dolopians, and Malians, opposed it from the beginning⁷², and the narrow-minded Spartan oligarchy never suffered it to attain maturity within⁷³. The Ætolians first fought out of hatred to the Acarnanians⁷⁴ and Naupactus, and latterly to defend themselves against the army which invaded their territory under the command of Demosthenes the Athenian⁷⁵. In Acarnania we have seen that Cæniadæ and Astacus were for the Peloponnesians. Ambracia, Anactorion, and Leucas sided with Corinth out of hatred to the arrogant and importunate Corcyræans. Even the Epirot Chaones fought for the Peloponnesians⁷⁶, doubtless on account of their aversion to Corcyra. On the southern coast of Thrace, Chalcidice, and the barbarian Bottiæans adhered to the confederates. The collection of the inhabitants of the surrounding cities within Olynthus had very im-

⁷⁰ Thuc. 1. 108.⁷¹ Thuc. 3. 92; Diodor. 12. 77.⁷² Thuc. ubi sup. 5. 51. Afterwards Agis marched out from Decelea against the Cætæans, *κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν ἔχθραν*. Thuc. 8. 3. On the subsequent oppression of the inhabitants of Heraclea by the Cætæans, see Xen. Hell. 1. 2. 18.⁷³ Thuc. 3. 93; 5. 12.⁷⁴ Vol. i. p. 137. n. 39.⁷⁵ Thuc. 3. 97, sqq.⁷⁶ Thuc. 2. 80.

portant results. It was first inhabited by Bottiæans, when the Persian general Artabazus caused some Chalcidians, under Critobulus to be removed thither from Torone⁷⁷; hereupon, in the year before the Peloponnesian war, the Macedonian king Perdiccas collected all the inhabitants of the adjacent Athenian colonies within the walls of Olynthus⁷⁸. From that time Olynthus constituted a general capital, much in the same manner as Megalopolis, which in a later age formed the focus and centre of the Arcadian townships; but it had destroyed the several cities whose inhabitants had been transferred to it⁷⁹. When the Chalcidians are afterwards mentioned, the Olynthians are frequently meant⁸⁰. In examining the character of these Græco-Thracian towns in general, we must especially bear in mind the mixed nature of their respective populations, which chiefly consisted of barbarians.

We have seen that, according to custom, the Achæans, with the exception of Pellene, did not take any active part in the contest. Patræ laid no restrictions upon the traffic of Athens, but at the same time allowed a Corinthian fleet the use of its harbour⁸¹. To the neutral states we may moreover add Melos and Thera, Crete, Cyrene, the Pontic states, Apollonia on the Ionian sea, the greater part of the Italiots, and Massilia.

Unfortunately both parties must be reproached with having drawn barbarians into their quarrel. The Macedonian Perdiccas, whose imbecile and

⁷⁷ Herod. 8. 127.

⁷⁹ Thuc. ubi sup.

⁸¹ Thuc. 2. 83. 84.

⁷⁸ Thuc. 1. 58; Diod. 12. 34.

⁸⁰ e. g. Thuc. 2. 58. 79. 101. 4. 7. 79.

wavering conduct places him on a par with Tisaphernes, fully deserves the name. Thrace was, with few exceptions, in favour of Athens; particular mention must be made of Sitalces, prince of the Odrysæ⁸², whose son Sadocus had become an Athenian citizen⁸³; both mercenaries and slaves went regularly to Athens. But Sparta incurred universal obloquy by sending a deputation to the Persian monarch⁸⁴, a measure which had been decided upon at the very beginning of the war⁸⁵; but this, though it commenced its journey, never reached its destination. Several succeeding embassies were equally unsuccessful⁸⁶, and a similar destiny attended one which set out from Athens, but retraced its steps upon being informed of the death of Artaxerxes⁸⁷. How distinctly may we here perceive the prelude to the peace of Antalcidas!

2. FROM THE PEACE OF NICIAS TILL THE DISCOMFITURE OF THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY.

The revival of a friendly feeling between Sparta and Athens had been at last prevented by Brasidas and Cleon alone, the former remarkable for his military genius, the latter notorious for riot and debauchery⁸⁸. Their death was followed by the peace of Nicias, a crude and ineffective expedient, which only served to remove the temporary griev-

⁸² Thuc. 2. 29.

⁸³ Thuc. 2. 67; Aristoph. Acharn. 145. Compare, on the subject of the kingdom of the Odrysæ, Kortüm z. Gesch. hell. Staatsverf. 169, sqq.

⁸⁴ Thuc. 2. 7.

⁸⁵ Thuc. 2. 67.

⁸⁶ One of the king's answers, intercepted by the Athenians, contained the following words, which would almost appear to have been written in jest, Thuc. 4. 50: οὐ γιγνώσκειν (τὸν βασιλέα) ὅ, τι βούλονται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρεσβέων οὐδένα ταῦτά λείπειν.

⁸⁷ Thuc. ubi sup.

⁸⁸ Thuc. 5. 16.

ances which had borne most recently upon the contending parties, but brought with it no radical and lasting cure for the evils which existed, incapable of reconciling the combatants, and of inspiring them with any confidence in its duration. It stipulated, amongst other points, that all should have unimpeded access to the national sanctuary in Delphi, and that the Autonomia of that institution should be respected; that the Thracian towns Argilos, Stagira, Acanthus, Scolos, Olynthus, and Spartolus should be permitted to remain neutral, with the reservation of a right in Athens *to persuade them* to join her confederacy if she should think proper. Amphipolis, Scione, Torone, and Sermylus became dependent upon Athens⁸⁹, etc. Corinth, Megara, Thebes, and Elis violently opposed the ratification of the peace, but the majority of voices at the Peloponnesian congress decided in favour of it⁹⁰. Sparta entered into another treaty with Athens⁹¹. Hereupon violent distractions arose amongst the Peloponnesians, which may be compared to the political blindman's buff at the time of the league of Cambray, the holy alliance, and the quadruple treaty of Herrenhausen and Wusterhausen. The league which Sparta concluded with Athens without the concurrence of the Peloponnesians was foreign to the spirit, and incompatible with the provisions of the Peloponnesian confederacy; but the dissatisfaction which it excited was converted into consternation and rage when the final clause of that treaty became known. This declared that if Athens or Sparta thought

⁸⁹ Thuc. 5. 18.⁹¹ Thuc. 5. 23.⁹⁰ Thuc. 5. 17.

proper to take from or add to it, they should be at liberty to do so without any infraction of its provisions on either side. Sparta, who thus abandoned her allies, and even coalesced with their enemies in oppressing them, was assailed by a whole host of angry passions; suspicion, jealousy, terror, and indignation took possession of the minds of the allies. The frail bond which had united the Peloponnesian confederacy could not withstand this shock. Corinth invited Argos to enter into a coalition against Sparta⁹²; Argos, still indignant at the loss of Cynuria⁹³, was by no means averse to the proposal. Mantinea, whose differences with Tegea had, in the ninth year of the war, broken out into actual hostilities⁹⁴, and which, during the war against Athens, had conquered the land of the Arcadian Parrhasians, was particularly apprehensive of the resentment of Sparta⁹⁵; democracy became a means to promote an alliance between them. In a like predicament was Elis, which had reduced the Lepreatians, whereupon Sparta had despatched a body of Hoplitæ to their aid, and restored the independence of Lepreum⁹⁶. Lastly, the Thracian towns⁹⁷ were fearful lest they might again fall under the yoke of Athens. Corinth prosecuted the affair with the greatest ardour and alacrity, whilst Thebes and Megara limited their interference to words, out of repugnance to an alliance with the democratic Argos⁹⁸. Tegea, where, however, a hostile faction was not idle⁹⁹, as well as Orcho-

⁹² Thuc. 5. 27.⁹⁴ Thuc. 4. 134.⁹⁶ Thuc. 5. 31. 49.⁹⁸ Thuc. ubi sup.⁹³ Thuc. 5. 14. 41.⁹⁵ Thuc. 5. 29.⁹⁷ Thuc. 5. 31.⁹⁹ Thuc. 5. 62. 63.

menus ¹⁰⁰, Epidaurus, etc., still adhered to Sparta. Corinth finding itself unable to effect a general league against Sparta, became greatly alarmed, and strange plots and counterplots now ensued. Corinth failed in its efforts to bring about an alliance between Thebes, Megara, and the Thracian towns, and afterwards with Argos, in order by that means to gain access to Sparta ¹⁰¹. But the mutual suspicion of Athens and Sparta once more awoke. The restitution of those places which had been occupied during the war was deferred, and Athens retained possession of Pylos. The Spartans required Thebes to cede Panacton to the Athenians, with the hope of obtaining Pylos for themselves ¹⁰². But the Thebans razed Panacton to the ground, and excited fresh disturbances. Argos, fearing that Athens might become a party to Sparta's negotiations with Thebes, endeavoured to become reconciled with Sparta ¹⁰³; but Athens feeling indignant at the demolition of Panacton, Alcibiades complained of the intrigues of Sparta, and sent clandestinely to Argos ¹⁰⁴. Argos hereupon again joined its ancient ally Athens, and relying upon its support, concluded a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with Elis and Mantinea, in the twelfth year of the war, Olymp. 90. 1; 420. B. C.; each state being precluded from entering into a separate league with Sparta ¹⁰⁵. Thus Corinth once more declared for Sparta ¹⁰⁶. The Eleans forbade the Spartans to attend the

¹⁰⁰ Thuc. 5. 61.¹⁰² Thuc. 5. 36.¹⁰⁴ Thuc. 5. 42, sqq.¹⁰⁶ Thuc. 5. 48.¹⁰¹ Thuc. 5. 37. 38.¹⁰³ Thuc. 5. 40. 41.¹⁰⁵ Thuc. 5. 44, sqq.

Olympic festival¹⁰⁷; Alcibiades conquered Patræ for Athens, and erected long walls there¹⁰⁸; and the Argives ravaged the territory of Epidaurus. Meanwhile a breach once more ensued between Sparta and Thebes, because the latter had thrown a garrison into Heraclea in Trachin, upon pretence of defending it against its hostile neighbours, but Sparta hesitated to commence hostilities¹⁰⁹. This wild disorder lasted for several years, until the battle of Mantinea, in the fourteenth year of the war, at length put an end to this shadow of a confederacy. The Eleans had retired before the engagement, because the allied army had refused to march against the Lepreatians at their request¹¹⁰. Sparta now restored peace in the Peloponnesus, and endeavoured to provide for its continuance by introducing oligarchy into some of the cities least to be depended upon, such as Argos¹¹¹, Sicyon¹¹², Achaia¹¹³, Pellene¹¹⁴, etc. In the meantime, through the victory of the demus over the oligarchs in Argos, the Athenians had soon recovered that city, and now advised the Argives to build long walls, the bulwark of democracy and the Athenian confederacy¹¹⁵. This, however, did not disturb the tranquillity of the Peloponnesus, for, notwithstanding the Argives fought amongst the

¹⁰⁷ Thuc. 5. 49.

¹⁰⁸ Thuc. 5. 53. A Patræan said, the Athenians will devour us; Alcibiades replied: *Ἴσως—κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πόδας, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ κατὰ τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀθρόως.* Plut. Alcib. 15.

¹⁰⁹ Thuc. 5. 52.

¹¹⁰ Thuc. 5. 62.

¹¹¹ Thuc. 5. 76. 79.

¹¹² Thuc. 5. 82.

¹¹³ Thuc. ubi sup.

¹¹⁴ It is evident, from Xenoph. Hell. 7. 4. 17, compared with Diod. 15. 68, that Pellene alone is to be understood whenever Achaia is mentioned in Xenophon. Comp. my Disput. de Veterum Scriptorum Græcorum Levitate, etc. p. 8. 9. Lips. 1825.

¹¹⁵ Thuc. 5. 82.

Athenians in Sicily and in Asia¹¹⁶, and served against the oligarchists in Athens¹¹⁷, Sparta did not make any direct attack upon them. Moreover, although Athenians had fought at Mantinea, the peace continued to subsist between Athens and Sparta, in form at least, for some time afterwards, till Alcibiades at length set the conscience of the Spartans at rest, and provoked them to fortify Decelea. Meanwhile Athens committed an act of unparalleled outrage upon Melos, which, with a Dorian population, had preserved a strict neutrality. The Athenians commanded the inhabitants to join their maritime confederacy against the Spartans, and upon their refusal, they took the place, slaughtered the men, and reduced the women and children to slavery¹¹⁸.

The tide of war rolled towards Sicily. That confusion and absence of all steadfastness and consistency in alliance and counter-alliance which characterized the mother-country had, from the beginning of the war, prevailed here. The policy of the Italiots seemed to be chiefly directed to the object of maintaining tranquillity and consulting their own safety: none of the states of that island evincing any disposition to take part in the war which distracted the mother-country. Such was the preponderance of Syracuse, that every other calculation appeared to be absorbed in the apprehensions to which the grasping disposition of that state gave rise. But during the first stages of the war, the principle of relationship operated as an additional bond of alliance amongst the enemies of

¹¹⁶ Thuc. 7. 37 ; 8. 28.

¹¹⁸ Thuc. 5. 84, sqq.

¹¹⁷ Thuc. 8. 86.

Syracuse. Leontini, suffering from the oppression of Syracuse, had, in the fifth year of the war, sent the orators, Gorgias and Tisias, to ask assistance of the Athenians¹¹⁹; the Chalcidian settlements in alliance with it had made a similar application, upon the ground of their Ionic origin¹²⁰. But the Doric Camarina was also in league with them, whilst the majority of the inhabitants of Messana, though that city was not exempt from dissensions, were attached to the Athenian party till the seventh year of the war¹²¹. Syracuse was supported by all the other Siceliots, except Agrigentum, which kept aloof from both parties, as well as by the island of Lipara¹²² and Locri¹²³. On the other hand Rhegium, impelled by hatred to Locri, sided with Leontini and Athens¹²⁴. In the eighth year of the war, the noble Syracusan, Hermocrates, adjusted the differences of the contending parties¹²⁵. Dissensions having arisen in Leontini, the demus was expelled, after which the oligarchists being compelled to quit the town, united with Syracuse¹²⁶.

The recommencement of hostilities and the expedition of the great Athenian army to Sicily, were occasioned by the assault of the Selinuntians on Egesta, a city not of purely Grecian origin. Selinus was in relations of friendship with Syracuse, and Egesta sent to Athens for assistance, its ambassadors being accompanied by some of the expelled democrats of Leontini¹²⁷. In the seventeenth year of the war¹²⁸, Olymp. 91. $\frac{1}{2}$; 415. B. C., the

¹¹⁹ Thucyd. 3. 86; Diodor. 12. 53; comp. Plato Hipp. Maj. 282. A.; Paus. 6. 17. 4. ¹²⁰ Thucyd. 3. 86.

¹²¹ Thucyd. 4. 2. 24. 25; 5. 4.

¹²² Thucyd. 4. 2. 24. 25.

¹²³ Thucyd. 4. 59, sqq.

¹²⁷ Thucyd. 6. 6. 19.

¹²² Thucyd. 3. 88.

¹²⁴ Thucyd. 3. 86; 4. 2. 24. 25.

¹²⁵ Thucyd. 5. 4.

¹²⁶ Thucyd. 7. 28.

Argives and Megarian fugitives, besides the Nesiotæ, joined the expedition of the Athenians against Syracuse, for it was against that city that their preparations were chiefly directed, whilst the Mantineans and Cretans served for pay¹²⁹. The towns of the Italiots, and even Rhegium amongst the number¹³⁰, now almost unanimously sought to remain neuter. Tarentum and Locri refused to allow the Athenians to land¹³¹, and Crotona afterwards forbade them to march through its territory¹³². It was not till the expulsion of the Peloponnesian party had been effected in the following year, that Thurii and Rhegium assisted the Athenians¹³³. Amongst the Siceliots, Naxos voluntarily espoused the cause of Athens; but Catana¹³⁴, which was surprised by Pericles, did so partly by compulsion. At first Gela alone declared for Syracuse, Camarina remaining neuter¹³⁵. But the ranks of both parties received gradual reinforcements. Troops from those states which respectively belonged to the Athenian and Peloponnesian leagues, arrived in the heat of the engagement before Syracuse. The muster-roll of Thucydides¹³⁶ is an extraordinary document, for in enumerating the combatants on both sides, he is reluctantly compelled to record several facts totally at variance with the division which he attempts to establish, viz., into Dorians and Ionians. The Athenians, among whom were counted the Lemnians, Imbrians, and the cleruchi of Ægina and Histiaea, were supported by warriors from Chalcis, Eretria, Styra and Carystus in

¹²⁹ Thucyd. 6. 43.¹³¹ Thucyd. ubi sup.¹³³ Thucyd. 7. 35.¹³⁵ Thucyd. 6. 67. 87.¹³⁰ Thucyd. 6. 44.¹³² Thucyd. 7. 35.¹³⁴ Thucyd. 6. 51.¹³⁶ Thucyd. 7. 57. 58.

Eubœa; Ionians from the Cyclades Ceos, Andros, Tenos, and from Miletus, Samos, and Chios; Æolians from Methymna, Tenedos, and Ænos; Dorians from Rhodes, Cythera, Corcyra; Achæans from Cephallenia and Zacynthus—all islanders or inhabitants of maritime districts, and, with the exception of Corcyra, compelled to perform service. To these must be added Messenian Dorians from Naupactus and Pylos, democratic fugitives from Megara, Argives impelled by hatred to Sparta and the self-interested calculations of individuals¹³⁷, Mantineans and other Arcadians¹³⁸, Ætolians and Cretans for pay, Acarnanians on account of their friendship for Demosthenes, and perhaps allured by the hope of spoil, and lastly, a party from Thurii and Metapontum, Rhegium¹³⁹, Naxos, and Catana. The allies of Syracuse were Camarina, Gela, Selinus, and Himera; the only Spartan amongst them was Gylippus. The most ardent of the combatants were the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians. The Arcadians, constrained by their oligarchs the Sicyonians, fought for hire, and the efforts of the Thebans were inspired by their inveterate hatred to Athens. Thespiæ had, in the first year of the war, endeavoured to cause an insurrection in Sicily¹⁴⁰. Lastly, Cyrene had sent two triremes and commanders¹⁴¹. The Sicilians fought first on the one side, then on the other¹⁴². Athens endeavoured to gain over to its cause the Etruscans and Carthaginians¹⁴³.

¹³⁷ Ἀργεῖοι μὲν οὐ τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἔνεκα μᾶλλον, ἢ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων τε ἔχθρας καὶ τῆς παραυτίκα ἑκάστοι ἰδίας—ἠκολούθουν.

¹³⁸ ἐπὶ τοὺς αἰὶ πολέμιους σφίσιν ἀποδεικνυμένους ἔναι εἰωθότες.

¹³⁹ Comp. Thucyd. 7. 33. 36

¹⁴⁰ Thucyd. 6. 95.

¹⁴¹ Thucyd. 6. 58.

¹⁴² Thucyd. 7. 1.

¹⁴³ Thucyd. 6. 88.

III. FROM THE DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY TILL THE END OF THE WAR.

All previous relations were now, with few exceptions, dissolved. Individuals eagerly sought opportunities to serve as mercenaries, while the communities were suffering from the effects of exhausted treasuries; this was aggravated by the dissensions which broke out in the interior of various states, and especially those which dread of the Athenian power had hitherto held in tranquillity and subjection. The *demus* was still generally in favour of Athens¹⁴⁴, but the oligarchs once more raising their heads, contracted engagements with the Peloponnesians, and prepared to throw off the Athenian supremacy. The Athenian party had been driven out from many states which had preserved their independence, and amongst others from Thurii, whereupon the banished Rhodian Dorieus took the command of a Thurian squadron against the Athenians¹⁴⁵. The Peloponnesians now conceived the hope of effecting the final destruction of their exhausted adversary, whilst the expectation of sharing in the spoil of their once haughty but now fallen mistress, allured to the war large detachments from the west; Syracuse, Selinus, Tarentum and Locri¹⁴⁶, sent ships to the assistance of the Peloponnesians. But still more pernicious than this state of agitation and excitement were the intrigues of Alcibiades, and afterwards of Lysander, and no previous feature in the war

¹⁴⁴ Thucyd. 8. 8.

¹⁴⁵ Ps. Plut. in vit. Lys. 9. 322; comp. Thucyd. 8. 35. 39; Xenoph. Hell. 1. 1. 1; 1. 5. 19.

¹⁴⁶ Thucyd. 8. 27. 91.

had operated so injuriously to the character of the nation at large, as the disgraceful avarice which induced them to flock around the barbarians, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, who no longer feared the Greeks after the disasters of the Athenians in Sicily. Alcibiades set the example, but he was too proficient in political wiles and subtleties to be duped by the clumsy artifices of Tissaphernes, whom he very soon moulded to his own purposes; Sparta soon followed his example, and incurred just reprehension by her three treaties with Tissaphernes¹⁴⁷, in which she abandoned the Greeks of the west coast of Asia, in the same manner as she afterwards did at the peace of Antalcidas. But many of these maritime states gradually withdrew from the Athenian confederacy. Amongst these were Chios, (though not without violent opposition on the part of the demus, which it required all the severity and determination of the oligarchs to overcome¹⁴⁸,) Erythræ, Clazomenæ, Lebedos, Methymna, and Mitylene, which had again raised itself from its ruins. To these must be added Ephesus and Miletus, which displayed great energy in their opposition to Athens, Rhodes, Abydos, Lampsacus, Byzantium, and Thasus, whence, however, the Lacedæmonian party were soon after expelled¹⁴⁹, Olymp. 92. 3, and at length, to the inexpressible dismay of the Athenians, Eu-

¹⁴⁷ Thucyd. 8. 18. 37. 58.

¹⁴⁸ Thucyd. 8. 15. 23. 38; Diodorus, 13. 65, narrates that the Lacedæmonian Cratesippidas brought back Chian exiles, Ol. 92. 4, who thereupon expelled six hundred of their adversaries. The Prostatæ of the demus appear to have been banished first; they propitiated the Lacedæmonian by means of bribes. Divisions amongst the oligarchs themselves had resulted in the expulsion of some of them.

¹⁴⁹ Xen. Hell. 1. 1. 32. Comp. respecting the recovery of Thasus, Olymp. 93. 1, by Thrasybulus, 1. 4. 9; Diodor. 13. 72.

bœa¹⁵⁰, which endeavoured, like Athens, to connect its dependent towns with the sea by means of long walls, and unite itself to the continent by throwing a bridge over the Euripus. By the seasonable establishment of an unqualified democracy, Samos was preserved to Athens¹⁵¹, and its main bulwark in the war, Methymna, was reconquered¹⁵². After Alcibiades returned to the Athenian fleet, treachery and force effected various changes in the constitution of the league, though none of the maritime states were any longer capable of passing independent and unanimous decrees. Samos and Naupactus remained faithful to Athens till the last. For some time Syracuse took part in the naval war against Athens in the west; but the Carthaginians like the eastern barbarians, emboldened by the overthrow of the Athenian maritime power, soon fitted out formidable armaments against the Siceliots, when the arms of Syracuse had ample occupation at home.

III. THE CHARACTER OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON THE INTERNAL CONDITION OF THE GREEK STATES IN GENERAL.

§ 63. The relentless destiny of the Greeks in this unhallowed war, seemed to reveal itself in the natural phenomena of the time; earthquakes were felt almost every year during its continuance; Ætna cast forth fire; eclipses terrified the people; drought, famine, and the plague¹, swept away mul-

¹⁵⁰ Thucyd. 8—15. 21. 23. 44. 60. 80. 95.

¹⁵¹ Thucyd. 8. 21. 73. See below, § 65. n. 173.

¹⁵² Thucyd. 8. 23; Xenoph. Hell. 1. 6. 13.

¹ See Thucyd. 1. 23; 2. 8; 28. 48, sqq.; 3. 89. 116; 4. 52; 5. 50; 6. 95; Diod. 12. 59.

titudes of the best and bravest of the citizens. But the terrors of nature were less dreadful than the passions of men; covetousness and revenge, hatred and rage, sordid avarice and bloodstained cruelty, vied with each other in the working havoc and destruction; towns were levelled with the ground, the vanquished and defenceless were remorselessly butchered, and all that the nation had been used to regard with veneration was abandoned to profanation and insult. The inviolability of heralds and sanctuaries, and the custom of granting quarter to, and exchanging prisoners², which had hitherto been observed amidst all their political vicissitudes, were now utterly disregarded in the rage and exasperation that prevailed.

It cannot be denied that the Peloponnesians commenced this system of outrage and atrocity. The Megarians with a revolting violation of international law slew the Athenian herald Anthemocritus³, just before the commencement of the war. The decree which the Athenians passed in consequence breathed the most implacable hostility; they proclaimed a war of extermination against Megara, and death to every Megarian who should set foot upon Athenian ground; whilst an obligation was appended to the oath of the generals to invade the Megarian territory twice every year⁴. Allowing that the latter possibly committed this outrage under the influence of blind passion, what can be said in extenuation of the calm and deliberate treachery of the

² Vol. i. p. 197. 198.

³ Plut. Peric. 30; Harpocrat. Ἀνθεμόκριτος.

⁴ Plut. ubi sup.; comp. Thuc. 2. 31; 4. 66.

Peloponnesians at the beginning of the war, and their profanation of that which religion had sanctified. I allude to the attempt of the Thebans to possess themselves of Platææ in spite of its independence, which had long been recognised, and the inviolability secured to it in consequence of its connection with the temple and festival of Zeus Eleutherios⁵. It is true that hereupon Platææ showed no quarter to the Theban prisoners⁶. In a short time it became the general usage of warfare to kill the prisoners on both sides; it was a rare occurrence that a free passage was granted to the garrison of a reduced fortress, as in the instance of Potidæa⁷; the men were generally put to death, and the women and children reduced to slavery. This was the fate which Platææ⁸ experienced at the hands of the Spartans, whose conscience afterwards tormented them⁹. The Athenians imbrued their hands in the blood of the Æginetans who were expelled¹⁰ from their island¹¹ at the beginning of the war, and afterwards led away from their habitation in Thyrea and put to death¹²; a similar fate befel the Scionæans¹³ and Melians¹⁴. The massacre of the Mytilenæans, which had been resolved upon at the instigation of the sanguinary Cleon, was confined

⁵ Plut. Aristid. 21, on the festival Eleutheria. It is there stated consistently with the accounts in Thucyd. 2. 71, that the Greeks had determined after the battle of Platææ: Πλαταιεῖς δ' ἀσύλους καὶ ἱερὸν ἀφείσθαι τῷ θεῷ, θύοντας ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

⁶ Thucyd. 2. 5; comp. Ps. Demosth. in Neær. 1378.

⁷ Thucyd. 2. 70:—*ξυνέβησαν, ἐξελεῖν αὐτοὺς καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς ἐπισκόρους ξὺν ἐνὶ ἱματίῳ, γυναῖκας δὲ ξὺν δυοῖν, καὶ ἀργύριον τι ῥητὸν ἔχοντας ἐφόδιον.*

⁸ Thucyd. 3. 68.

⁹ Thucyd. 7. 18.

¹⁰ Cic. de Offic. 3. 11. Is it true that they were deprived of their thumbs, and if so did it take place then, or had it already occurred in 456?

¹¹ Thucyd. 2. 27; Diod. 12. 44.

¹² Thucyd. 4. 57.

¹³ Thucyd. 5. 32.

¹⁴ Thucyd. 5. 116.

to the thousand prisoners in Athens¹⁵. Amongst the very rare instances of humanity it is recorded of Conon that he pardoned and liberated¹⁶ the noble Rhodian Dorieus whom he had taken prisoner, Olymp. 93. 2. whilst commanding a squadron from Thurii, whither he had fled upon being driven from Rhodes by the Athenians. The Syracusans condemned the Athenians and their allies whom they took prisoners to die a lingering death in their stone-quarries¹⁷, or reduced them to the condition of slaves. Lysander completed this long series of atrocities, by executing the three thousand Athenians who had been made prisoners at Ægos Potamos¹⁸. This act of vengeance against enemies who had borne arms against them is less revolting than the gratuitous cruelty of the Spartans, in murdering the traders of neutral towns whom they found on board the vessels they captured¹⁹. Some ambassadors from the Peloponnesians to the Persian king who were seized in Thrace and delivered up to the Athenians, were by them put to death as spies are at the present day²⁰. No promises were considered binding; and men, in other respects brave and honest, did not scruple to employ artifice to get their victims into their power, in corroboration of which may be adduced the conduct of Paches, who used insidious and equivocal words in treating with an Arcadian commander²¹.

¹⁵ Thucyd. 3. 50.¹⁶ Xenoph. Hell. 1. 5. 19.¹⁷ Thucyd. 7. 86; comp. Diodor. 13. 19, sqq.; Plut. Nic. 28.¹⁸ Plut. Lysand. 13; Xenoph. Hell. 2. 1. 32, who as usual states too few, and Pausan. 9. 31. 6, where the number appears to be somewhat exaggerated.¹⁹ Thucyd. 2. 67; comp. 3. 32.²⁰ Thucyd. 2. 67.²¹ Thucyd. 3. 34; comp. Polyæn. 3. 2.

The exasperation of the combatants, as it caused them to disregard every motive to mercy and reconciliation, founded in the remembrance of their common nationality, so it even urged them impiously to assail that on which religion had conferred sanctity and immunity. As the altar of Jove the Deliverer had been desecrated by the destruction of Plataeæ, so the Spartans, impelled by hatred of the Eleans, violated the sanctity of the Olympic territory²², and the Athenians drove the Delians from their island²³. Those appointed to preside over and to tend the supreme national sanctuaries, the ministers of the Delphic god and the Olympic Zeus, are chargeable with the grossest partizanship; the Peloponnesians obtained supplies of money from them²⁴, and sent them in return spoil taken in war. The Amphictyonic council, which, soon after the Persian war, had displayed its patriotism by offering a reward for the head of the traitor Ephialtes, by the inscription on the heroes of Thermopylæ, and the decree for the expulsion of the Dolopian pirates from Scyros²⁵, had dwindled into a mere shadow, and through the whole course of the war no example is recorded of its efficiency, either in word or deed. The nationality of the Greeks being thus deprived of its noblest attributes, they became the more liable to fall into the snares of the barbarians, and no longer possessed fortitude enough to withstand the seductions of Persian gold.

²² Thucyd. 5. 49; where the Eleans appear to enjoy the immunity in their own right.

²³ Thucyd. 5. 7. On the Delians, see 5. 32.

²⁴ Thucyd. 1. 121; 4. 134; Plut. Lysand. 1; comp. vol. i. p. 166. n. 77.

²⁵ Vol. i. p. 179. See some very pertinent remarks on the subject, Plut. de Orac. Pyth. 7. 579, 581. R.

But this gloomy picture is drawn into full and terrible distinctness by the baneful flames of civil discord, which raged with the most devastating fury. The evils caused by these intestine convulsions were still greater than those which resulted from the attempts of the belligerents to injure one another, though they were aggravated by the combination between the internal faction and the enemy without. The civil feuds which sprang up at the beginning of the war, attained strength and maturity with its further progress. All were occupied with traitorous designs in endeavouring to secure assistance from without, in order to overpower the adverse faction at home²⁶, whilst the suspicion and calumny excited by these proceedings, at length sowed the seeds of treason, in minds which had hitherto been uncorrupted²⁷.

Now, in examining the opposite constitutions which the two leading powers were bent upon establishing and maintaining, we must, as before observed, be especially careful to distinguish between the real and substantive representation of democracy or oligarchy, and the mere employment of their names as a means to advance other objects. Each of the two leading states, in declaring its resolution to support certain political principles, was actuated by the design of strengthening, securing, and extending its own hegemony²⁸. Moreover, in so doing, they everywhere established their own customs and usages, which were afterwards transplanted to other states, where, frail and

²⁶ As Agesilaus afterwards scattered the seeds of discord, Polyæn. 1. 1. 33.

²⁷ See the admirable description of Thucydides, 3. 82.

²⁸ See the judgment which Aristotle pronounces on the well-known facts, Pol. 5. 6. 9.

insecure in themselves, and deprived of the nurturing and fostering influence of custom and congenial feeling, they could not strike firm roots and bid defiance to the shocks by which they were assailed. Nor was it possible, from the prevalence of party feeling and the consequent necessity of external aid and support, to establish any fixed constitutional forms which should be recognised by all. One party eagerly grasped what foreign power offered, whilst the other indignantly rejected it; the former refused to admit the other to a participation in its newly-acquired power, whilst the latter was unwilling to submit to the authority of its rivals. Selfishness destroyed all public spirit, and political antagonists no longer recognised a higher and purer aim. On the one side stood the demagogues with their fanatical partisans; on the other the dynasts with their armed bands, whilst there was no third element to appease and to reconcile them²⁹, the ordinance of Solon forbidding any citizen to remain neuter in civil dissensions, now weighed like a curse upon Greece. The law no longer had sanction and efficacy, the dynasts endeavouring to render their own power paramount to its authority; whilst the demagogues and their mob-partisans recognised no other law than that contained in the last of their own crude and unsettled decrees.

The two parties not only refused every offer of accommodation, and obstinately adhered to what they considered to be their rights and prerogatives, but committed the most wanton and

²⁹ Aristot. Pol. 4. 9. 11: ὁ ποτέροις ἂν μᾶλλον συμβῇ κρατῆσαι τῶν ἐναντίων, οὐ καθιστᾷσι κοινὴν πολιτείαν οὐδ' ἴσην, ἀλλὰ τῆς νίκης ἄθλον τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς πολιτείας λαμβάνουσι.

frightful excesses, and pursued each other with a ferocity which nothing short of actual extermination could assuage. Hence, then, proceeded such decrees as that of the Samian demus, which, with a sort of retributive justice, forbade its members to intermarry with those of the wealthier order³⁰, as well as that of the same class in Corcyra, which, like the Florentine citizens of the fourteenth century after Christ, excluded the dynasts from all honours and dignities³¹; the proposal of the demus of Leontini to make a distribution of the lands³²; and, finally, the climax of party-hatred, in the fearful oath of the oligarchs of a Grecian state, to work the demus all the mischief in their power³³. In many instances more citizens had fled or been expelled by their opponents, than had remained at home. If the chief constituents of the state are not its lands and houses, but its moral elements, its living members, where was it, under such circumstances, to be sought? The murderous ferocity of the populace broke out in such fearful excesses on Corcyra³⁴, as were scarcely paralleled even during the bloody scenes of the French revolution. But the conquerors at length fell out amongst themselves; party-animosities began to break the ties by which they had once been associated; and we subsequently behold enrolled amongst the opponents of the demus those who had at first co-operated with it in repressing the aggressions of the oligarchs³⁵.

³⁰ Thucyd. 8. 20.

³¹ Thucyd. 3. 70.

³² Thucyd. 5. 4.

³³ Arist. Pol. 5. 7. 19: *καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι καὶ βουλευέσω ὃ τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν*. A sentiment for which the Grecian oligarchy will be held up to everlasting reprobation.

³⁴ Thuc. 3. 81.

³⁵ See § 65. n. 173.

IV. THE INTERIOR OF THE INDIVIDUAL STATES
DURING THE WAR.

a. ATHENS.

aa. *The Athenian Democracy in general.*

§ 64. The plague, which broke out in the second year of the war, and continued to rage with unabated fury during the whole of the third, formed a crisis in the history of the Athenian demos: from that moment it began to decline. Some idea may be formed of the ravages which it committed on human life from the fate of the besiegers before Potidæa, where, out of four thousand heavy-armed, one thousand and fifty perished within fifty days¹. But it was not human life alone that it destroyed; it likewise extinguished civil virtue. "For," says Thucydides², "a person now more easily ventured to partake of those pleasures which he had tasted secretly before, as people beheld the rapid changes which occurred, the rich dying suddenly, and those who were formerly indigent quickly succeeding to their wealth. Therefore they hastened to seize the opportunity of enjoyment, deeming that their properties and their lives were theirs only for the day. No one was inclined to suffer hardships for that which was considered virtuous, as he knew not that he might not perish before he could attain his object; but whatever a man found grateful to his taste, or conducive to his interest, he judged to be honourable and profitable. The fear of the gods and the

¹ Thucyd. 2. 58.² Thucyd. 2. 53.

laws of man did not restrain them; they thought it indifferent whether they were devout or not, as they beheld all involved in the same destruction; none expected to live till they should be brought to justice and punished for their crimes, for a much heavier doom already decreed impended over their heads, and they thought it proper that they should snatch some enjoyment before it should descend upon them." Great, indeed, was the degeneracy of the Athenian citizens from their former dignity and worth. As the plague had committed greater havoc from the circumstance of all the inhabitants of the country having thronged to the town to escape from the Peloponnesian invaders, so a boundless corruption of manners ensued after the citizens' relinquished rustic pursuits, and thus ceased to reap the fruits of those laborious and primitive occupations, whilst the town-populace thereby sustained a most disproportionate increase. It may easily be supposed that these evils extended to the public education of the Athenians, and that its most important branch, the gymnastic art, together with the stricter moral habits it engendered, were henceforward neglected⁴, which ultimately had the most detrimental influence upon the whole temper and tone of public feeling. Meanwhile the citizens had become reduced in number, and their ranks were still further thinned by the continued drafts upon them occasioned by the war. This led to the employment of extraordinary measures to supply the

³ Thucyd. 2. 14. 16. Comp. Aristoph. Equit. 805, sqq. concerning the benefits which were expected to result from a revival of a rural life.

⁴ Aristoph. Eq. 1070, where, however, the desertion of the gymnastic schools is attributed to the *λαλία* and *στωμυλία*.

deficiency; but though these replenished the numbers of the citizens, they were very far from adding to their moral weight and dignity.

Pericles, bowed down by the loss of his legitimate sons, obtained a decree declaring it lawful for the sons born of a foreign woman (*νόθοι*), to be inscribed in the Phratrias, like those of the full blood⁵. Whether the operation of this decree was confined to his own son by Aspasia, cannot be determined. Even though, like the Athenians⁶, we should not judge too harshly of the conduct of that great man, whose heart was broken, it is evident that the ancient order of things could no longer continue. The statement, that after the plague a decree was passed rendering it lawful to have children by several wives, at the same time that monogamy alone was legally recognised, is enigmatic and suspicious. It is possible that concubines (*παλλακαί*) may have been meant here, as they were subsequently protected by the laws, and an adulterer detected in the act might be killed⁷; nevertheless it is very doubtful whether they were allowed during the lifetime of the real wife. The naturalization of individuals appears to have been attended with less difficulty than before; whilst the surreptitious entrance into the citizenship, as may be presumed from the allusions of the comic poets⁸, also became more common. An honour-

⁵ Plat. Pericl. 37. Comp. Meier de Bon. Damnat. 7. 70.

⁶ Plat. ubi sup.:—*ἡ παρούσα δυστυχία τῷ Περικλεῖ περὶ τὸν πόλεον ὥς δίκην τινὰ δεδωκότι τῆς ὑπεροψίας καὶ τῆς μεγαλαυχίας ἐκείνης ἐπέκλασε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις.*

⁷ Diog. Laert. 2. 26. Comp. Athen. 13. 556, A. Hieronymus the Rhodian is the authority in Athenæus for the popular decree.

⁸ Lysias de cæd. Eratosth. 35. 36.

⁹ Compare the following section, n. 169.

able feature in the character of the Athenians was the naturalization *en masse* of their faithful allies from Plataeæ in return for their attachment and sacrifices¹⁰. By a decree passed Ol. 88. 1 ; 427. B. C.¹¹, they were declared Athenians, divided into phylæ and demi, and made partakers of all the privileges of Athenian citizens, except that of being admitted to the family sacrifices and to the archonship, for which the law required pure citizenship for three generations (*ἐκ τριγονίας*); this had already been preceded by the *jus connubii*¹², and perhaps even by Isopolity¹³. This decree was engraved upon a stone column in the citadel¹⁴. The Plataeans were afterwards removed to the depopulated Scione¹⁵, where they were placed upon the footing of cleruchi. Most pernicious were the consequences of arming the Metæci and the slaves¹⁶, at the end of the war, before the battle off the Arginusæ, with the promise of liberty and civil rights. The confusion which it introduced into the ranks of the citizens, seems to have extended to the accounts of it ; according to Diodorus, none but Metæci and slaves obeyed the summons¹⁷; according to a scolion on Aristophanes¹⁸, the slaves were enfranchised, and other passages state that

¹⁰ See generally Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 282.

¹¹ See the decree itself, Ps. Demosth. in Neær. 1377. 1380.

¹² To this Isocrat. refers, Plat. 531 : *διὰ γὰρ τὰς ἐπιγαμίας τὰς δοθείσας ἐκ πολιτίδων ὑμετέρων γέγοναμεν.*

¹³ On that account, perhaps, in Thuc. 3. 63, in the speech of the Theban, they are called the *πολίται* of Athens after their first alliance with that state. Comp. Meier, de Bon. 52 n.

¹⁴ Ps. Demosth. ubi sup. 1381.

¹⁵ Thucyd. 5. 32. Comp. § 62. n. 38. They are described amongst the Athenian troops as *ψιλοί*, Thuc. 4. 67.

¹⁶ Xenoph. Hell. 1. 6. 24.

¹⁷ Diod. 13. 97.

¹⁸ Aristoph. Ran. 33 : *οὗς ἡλευθέρωσαν.*

they became citizens¹⁹ with Platæan rights²⁰. From a comparison of these statements with a proposition of Hyperides²¹ after the battle of Chæronea, we may assume that the slaves were enfranchised and made Metœci, the Metœci being created citizens.

The regulation of the classes upon the whole remained unchanged, but in the course of the war some Thetes were levied for Hoplitæ, and equipped at the public expense²²; services of a superior character called forth higher pretensions, and self-esteem soon generated insolence. The knights comprised the flower of the Athenian youth, but were, at the same time, a nursery of youthful presumption; the name no longer, as heretofore, designates the second class alone, but includes the younger members of the upper orders indiscriminately, who served as cavalry, to the number of a thousand²³, and therefore denotes their age and the nature of their service²⁴. Their character may be collected from the drama of Aristophanes. The upper classes in general no longer appear to have been separated by such broad lines of distinction as before. The family nobility still maintained itself to a certain extent, viz., in those houses to which a high-priesthood was annexed. They still retained their elevated position in the opinion of the people, but were not invested with special prerogatives, except in connection with priestly functions.

¹⁹ See below, § 71. n. 40.

²⁰ Aristoph. Ran. 694: *καὶ Πλαταιᾶς εὐθὺς εἶναι κᾶντὶ δούλων δεσπότας*. Comp. Hellanicus ap. Schol. 706.

²¹ Lycurg. c. Leocr. 170. R. ed.:—*τοὺς ἤνδρες δούλους, ἐλευθέρους τοὺς δὲ ξείνους, Ἀθηναίους*.

²² Thucyd. 6. 43; comp. Harpocr. *Θῆτες*.

²³ Aristoph. Equit. 225.

²⁴ Comp. Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 283, sqq.

In fact, the ancient nobility exerted themselves but little to impart the moral lustre of dignity and virtue to their rank. The brilliant qualities which Alcibiades possessed could not blind people to his wilfulness and profligacy. The wealth and profusion of Megacles, Callias, etc., served rather to bring them into disrepute than to render them popular; they all plunged too deeply into the excesses of the mob to escape infection. An insignificant remnant of the former Optimates still survived, but they were scattered, dispirited, and powerless, and scarcely important enough to furnish incentives to party divisions. Aristophanes has left us a somewhat similar picture of the knights, in his play of that name. The Laconistæ, as they were called, were chiefly fops, who aped the dress and manners of the Spartans; swaggering bullies, with coats, sticks, and mustachios²⁵. Still the upright and patriotic citizens, Kalokagathoi, were not even yet wholly extinct.

THE POPULAR ASSEMBLY AND THE DEMAGOGY.

If the plague had a detrimental effect on the citizenship generally, the death of Pericles was signally injurious to the political agency of the people. Pericles had released the demos from various restrictions, in order to inspire it with the full consciousness of its own strength, and made increased demands upon its powers in return for benefits which he alone had been able to impart to it; at

²⁵ Aristoph. Av. 1281, sqq.

Ἐλακωμάνουν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι τότε
ἐκόμων, ἐπείνων, ἐρρύπων, ἐσωκράτουν,
σκυτάλι' ἐφόρουν.

Compare the Scholia. See also Vesp. 475, sqq., and below, § 71. n. 75.

the same time, he individually had engrossed much that had before been contained in the laws, whilst by adapting the machinery of state to his own vast powers, and by rendering his own authority paramount to the letter of the law, he had availed himself of passing events with increased energy and effect, and made compensation for a departure from established forms by the extraordinary success which crowned his exertions. But after his death the law was unable to resume its ancient authority. The people, whose manifold energies he had roused into activity, though their particular direction had still depended upon his will, continued to evince the same restlessness and impatience of repose, when his wisdom and circumspection no longer acted as a check on their proceedings. Hence the passion for frequenting the Agora²⁶ became a prominent characteristic of the Athenians; combined with this was the reliance which the demus placed upon its own sagacity, and the reckless temerity with which it obeyed the impulses of the moment; whilst its suspicion took instant alarm at any attempt to control its despotic proceedings, and its contempt for existing institutions was only equalled by its rash and insane love of innovation²⁷. The turbulence²⁸ and impudence of the Athe-

²⁶ Ἀγοραῖος (Aristoph. Ran. 1015; Eq. 218.) doubtless derived its invidious signification from the public system of Athens. Compare Heindorf ad Plut. Protag. § 91. In the speech of Andocides (?) against Alcibiades, (p. 132.) the latter is reproached with having corrupted the Athenian youth by his example, as they were now always loitering about the market-place instead of visiting the gymnasia.

²⁷ It was observed by Plato, the comic poet, that so changeable were the Athenian institutions, that a person would be unable to recognise them after a three months' absence, Sext. Empir. adv. Math. 70. E. Compare the speech of Cleon, Thucyd. 3. 37.

²⁸ Plato describes this very forcibly, de Repub. 6. 492. A. B., though without expressly mentioning the Athenians: "Ὅταν ξυγκαθεζόμενοι ἄθροοι πολλοὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἢ τινα ἄλ-

nians²⁹ rose to such a pitch, that the Attic glance (*Ἀττικὸν βλέπος*) at length became the symbol of effrontery. This undignified frivolity was accompanied by intrigue, covetousness, and the thirst of blood³⁰. In spite of this immoderate desire of the people to govern themselves, they nevertheless continued as before to submit to the guidance of some person who chanced to be the object of their favour; this only served still more to deprave their character, and to pave the way for the rise of the demagogues, whose encroachments became bolder after the death of Pericles. The ease with which fair words won their way to the Athenian mind, powerfully contributed to increase the growing corruption³¹. Eloquence began to be cultivated in the age of Pericles, when the sophists exerted themselves to disseminate a taste for rhetoric; statesmanship and rhetoric henceforward, in the language of democracy, became synonymous terms³². The latter art was the more practised by persons of inferior condition and by younger men, in proportion as the more highly gifted and older citizens lost the respect with which they had been habitually regarded³³; moreover, it became usual to compose

λον κοινὸν πλήθους ξύλλογον ξὺν πολλῷ θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινῶσιν, ὑπερβαλλόντως ἑκάτερα καὶ ἐκβοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες πρὸς δ' αὐτοῖς αἱ τε πέτραι καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ᾤσιν ἐπηχοῦντες, διπλάσιον θόρυβον παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου τε καὶ ἐπαίνου.

²⁹ Aristoph. Nub. 1174, sqq.; Thucyd. 3. 83: καὶ τὸ εὐηθεῖς, οὐ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη.

³⁰ Diogen. Prov. 3. 12: Ἀττικὸς ὑπέχει τὴν χεῖρα ἀποθνήσκων.

³¹ See at large Valckenaer, Diatribe in Eurip. perditor. Dramat. reliq. Cap. 23; compare Rochefort, sur l'Utilité des Orat. dans la Rép. d'Athén. in the Mém de l'Acad. des Inscript. t. 43.

³² Hence Pollux, 4. 16: Πητορικὴ ἢ αὐτὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ· ῥητορεύειν πολιτικὸν εἶναι.

³³ Compare the beautiful dialogue, Xenoph. Memorabil. Socrat. 3. 6. The law of Solon, enacting that those who were above fifty years of age should be called first, had fallen into disuse, see Schömann de Comit. Ath. 105. Concerning the λαλιά, see Aristoph. Ran. 1069, sqq.; conf. Eq. 1375, sqq.

speeches for money as early as in the time of Antiphon, in the latter part of the Peloponnesian war³⁴. This was perfectly in accordance with the feelings of the people, who loved to judge according to the impression produced by a speech; incapable of weighing over a matter with calmness and deliberation, they required it to be arrayed in a rhetorical garb, and their political perceptions were dull and obtuse until they had been whetted by the tongue of an orator³⁵. At the same time, an almost *naïve* confession of their dependence upon the orators is contained in the law expressly directed against those who cajoled the people³⁶; whilst the malediction pronounced against the corrupt orator, in addition to the legal penalty he incurred³⁷, strongly illustrates the necessity that existed for vigorous checks on their dishonesty.

But now the demagogy lost all its former dignity³⁸. The successors of Pericles, though more equal in their pretensions, struggled amongst themselves for the pre-eminence, and left the direction of state affairs to the caprice of the people³⁹. They moreover sought to ingratiate themselves with the multitude by ministering to their love of gain in the capacity of *Poristæ*⁴⁰, in which they seldom omitted to provide for themselves. But their servile flat-

³⁴ Ps. Plut. Antiph. 9. 308. After that time, such as wrote speeches for money were denominated *λογογράφοι*, Plato, Phædr. 257. C.; compare Heindorf, ad loc.

³⁵ Their loquacity, curiosity, foppery, and folly, are all expressed in the word *χαίνειν*, Aristoph. Eq. 1264: *τῇ Κεχηναίων πόλει*; comp. *κέχηνε*, Av. 754, and *χαυνοπολίτης*, Acharn. 635. On the other hand, the orators were even at this period denominated *δημοκόποι*, *πολιτοκόποι*, *βουλοχοπίδαι*, Bekk. Anecd. 221.

³⁶ Demosth. c. Aristocrat. 659.

³⁷ Demarch. in Aristog. 89.

³⁸ See the bad qualities of the demagogues enumerated in Pollux, 4. 35; 6. 129, sqq.

³⁹ Thucyd. 2. 65.

⁴⁰ Aristoph. Ran. 1505; comp. the example, Equit. 644, sqq.

tery of the people, which caused the appellation of Colaces⁴¹ to be applied to them, was mixed with praises of themselves and calumnies against others. The earlier and more distinguished leaders, such as Pericles⁴², had been frequently obliged to expatiate on their own services in repelling the attacks of calumny; this was imitated by the degenerate demagogues; and the people, so much accustomed to hear men vindicate their own conduct, were unable to distinguish between a noble self-esteem and downright effrontery. The flattery and self-praise employed by the demagogues were combined with backbiting and slander⁴³, and such is the force of envy in petty souls⁴⁴, that these base devices have ever been the main-springs of republican governments, and the same artifices have been employed by those who have deluded the people from Pisistratus down to Robespierre⁴⁵. Suspicion and rage were excited against the friends of legality and order, and the popular mind was kept in constant alarm by allusions to conspiracies and machinations against the stability of their sovereignty⁴⁶. Their credulity was beguiled by the most palpable falsehoods⁴⁷,

⁴¹ Aristoph. Vesp. 1033. This is the title of a piece by Eupolis, Athen. 5. 218. B.

⁴² Thucyd. 2. 60, sqq.; comp. Plutarch de laude sui. 8. 137.

⁴³ See Thucyd. 3. 43, where Cleon plays the part of Mephistopheles. Sext. Empir. (cit. Valckenaer Diatr. 254 e): says very justly, ὁ δημαγωγὸς κακοδιδασκαλεῖ τοὺς πολλοὺς τὰ κεχαρισμένα λέγων καὶ διαβολαῖς αὐτοὺς ἑξαλλοτριοῖ πρὸς τοὺς ἀρίστους. See also Eurip. Supplic. 412, sqq.

⁴⁴ Ælian. V. H. 2. 13: — φύσει φθονεροὺς ὄντας καὶ τοῖς ἀρίστοις βασκαίνειν προσιρουμένους.

⁴⁵ See the delineation of the Syracusan Atheganoras in Thucyd. 6. 36, sqq.

⁴⁶ Aristophanes represents this as the chief vice attendant upon demagogy; Equit. 236, Cleon: — ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ ξυνώμνυτον πάλιν. Comp. 475. 476. 862. 863; Vesp. 483. 488: ὡς ἅπανθ' ἡμῖν τυραννὶς ἐστὶ καὶ ξυνωμόται, κ. τ. λ. Comp. 953.

⁴⁷ Thuc. 3. 82: — καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων, πιστὸς αἰεί, ὁ δ' ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ, ὑποπτος.

and they lived in constant dread of the destruction of their power; the words "dissolution of the demus" (*κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου*) struck consternation into their souls. Those who suffered most from the aspersions of the demagogues and the jealousy of the people, were the legally elected officers of state, and especially the Strategi. The most exaggerated expectations were formed of the abilities and success of a person who undertook an office, and when these were not justified by the event of an enterprise, all the blame was laid upon the conductors of it⁴⁸, who were accordingly persecuted with implacable animosity.

Thus we behold the demagogues and the demus mutually conducting to each other's depravation. The former no longer confined themselves to their legitimate office, which was to preside over the demus according to the spirit of the constitution, but descended from their elevation, and troubled the waters that they might fish in them the more securely⁴⁹. The more degraded the character of the mass, the more remote from elevation and dignity must they have been who mixed with it, and became voluntary partakers of its excesses. They moreover found a wider field for their pernicious exertions, the more the demus appropriated to itself the direct administrative power, thereby removing the legal barrier between the governing and the governed. On the other hand, in moments of reflection, when goaded by want and remorse, the people could

⁴⁸ Thucyd. 3. 43 ; 4. 65 ; 7. 14. 48 ; 8. 1.

⁴⁹ Aristoph. Eq. 866. 867 :

*ὅταν μὲν ἡ λίμνη καταστῇ, λαμβάνουσιν οὐδέν.
ἐὰν δ' ἄνωγε καὶ κάτω τὸν βόρβορον κυκῶσιν,
αἰροῦσι.*

not but be sensible that their counsellors were no less destitute of a respect for the laws, of civil virtue, and of fortitude, than themselves, and that they were, in fact, the servile instruments of their own caprice; but, insensible to the beauty of virtue, and accustomed to have a leader who guided them according to their own turbulent will, they sought the gratification of their caprice in the obsequious society of their flatterers and betrayers⁵⁰; it was too great a humiliation for their vanity to behold others who were more estimable than themselves, whilst they were unwilling to be arrested in their riotous career by any dread of the austere reproaches of truth. Hence, the struggle between the *Kalokagathoi* and the demagogues was a very unequal one; those who plunged deepest into the mire incurred least risk, whereas, those who were too proud to stoop were most exposed to danger. The caustic humour of the people led them to encourage him who had most effrontery, and Impudence became the *Patroness* of the demagogues⁵². The decrees of the people are monuments of their *Dysbulia*⁵³, though a few of them still evince the better feeling of the ancient times and bespeak remorse and indignation against their evil counsellors; as, for instance, that which they passed after condemning the commanders who had conquered at the *Arginusæ*⁵⁴.

⁵⁰ Compare the portrait of the Athenians, Plut. Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 190: *ὅλον ὁ Ἀθηναίων (δῆμος) εὐκίνητός ἐστι πρὸς ὀργήν, εὐμετάθετος πρὸς ἔλεον, μᾶλλον ὀξείως ὑπονοεῖν, ἢ διδάσκεισθαι καθ' ἡσυχίαν βουλόμενος. ὥσπερ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς ἀδόξοις καὶ ταπεινοῖς βοηθεῖν προθυμότερος, οὕτως τῶν λόγων τοὺς παιγνιώδεις καὶ γελοίους ἀσπάζεται καὶ προτιμᾷ· τοῖς μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν αὐτὸν μάλιστα χαίρει, τοῖς δὲ σκώπτουσιν ἥκιστα δυσχεραίνει.*

⁵¹ Aristoph. Pac. 607: — *τὸν αὐτοδᾶξ τρόπον.*

⁵² Aristoph. Eq. 323: — *ἀναίδειαν, ἥπερ μόνη προστατεῖ τῶν ῥητόρων.*

⁵³ Aristoph. Nub. 588; comp. the Schol. on Eupolis.

⁵⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. 1. 7. 39.

THE COURTS OF LAW AND SYCOPHANCY.

These, if possible, still more than the popular assembly, tended to complete the corruption of the national character, and the disorganization of the social system in general; the operation of demagoguery is likewise perceptible here; Cleon raised the salary of the judges⁵⁵; but a most fruitful source of evil was the union of avarice and the love of litigation with the tendency to calumny and intrigue in the Athenian character⁵⁶. The immoderate predilection of the Athenians⁵⁷ for the exercise of judicial functions found constant aliment in the disputes of their citizens and their allies⁵⁸, notwithstanding which their minds still remained impervious to the light of truth and lacked all stability of legal judgment. The character of the Athenian *demus*, and the fact of its sitting in judgment daily, sufficiently explain why law was never reduced to a science in Athens. Unbounded credulity, an almost total incapacity to distinguish between fact, probability, and possibility, and constant vehemence and irascibility⁵⁹, were the most prominent features of the Athenian character⁶⁰. But as the desire to sit in judgment was the mere love of governing in intense operation, the Ecclesiasts in

⁵⁵ Böckh, *Pub. Econ.* 1. 252.

⁵⁶ This is glanced at by Aristoph. *Ran.* 1016: μήτ' ἀγοραίους, μήτε κοβάλους, ὥσπερ νῦν, μηδὲ πανούργους. Herewith comp. *Vesp.* 1424. *πραγματοδίφης*, and 1468 the *στρεψοδικοπανουργία*.

⁵⁷ *Περὶ ὄνου σκιᾶς*, Aristoph. *Vesp.* 191; Xenophon (?) *de Repub. Ath.* 3. 2. 6. 7; comp. *Suidas*, ὑπὲρ ὄνου and ὄνου.

⁵⁸ Xenoph. *de Repub. Ath.* 1. 16. 17.

⁵⁹ *Isocrat. de Permutatione* 545: — τῇ πόλει πολλάκις οὕτως ἤδη μετεμέλησε τῶν κρίσεων τῶν μετ' ὀργῆς καὶ μὴ μετ' ἐλέγχου γενομένων. *ibid. Adv. Callimach.* 651: — πολλά παρὰ γνώμην ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀποβαίνει καὶ ὅτι τύχῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ κρίνεται τὰ παρ' ὑμῖν.

⁶⁰ *Antiph. de cæde. Herod.* 740, says by way of caution, μὴ μετ' ὀργῆς καὶ διαβολῆς. Concerning the ὀργή, see below, § 77.

gratifying the latter lost sight of the true welfare of the state, as much as the Heliasts disregarded the sanctity of personal liberty ; they acknowledged no higher principle of action than the gratification of their own humour. Hence, the sycophants⁶¹ exercised a no less injurious influence upon the administration of justice, than the demagogues did upon the proceedings of the popular assembly. The ancients seem to have regarded the sycophantic tribe as an evil necessarily incident to democracy ; Simonides says, that as every lark has its crest, so every democracy must have its sycophants⁶². Their pernicious agency went hand in hand with that of the demagogues, both not unfrequently being united in the same person, as, for instance, when the tribunals had to decide upon public accusations which concerned the constitution in general, such as the *γραφὴ παρανόμων*.

When the popular assembly and the tribunals were thus corrupted, it may easily be supposed that the higher sanction and gage of law and justice in the divine protection had long lost all influence over the minds of the people. Religion had degenerated into a mere instrument of sensual enjoyment, in which the feeling of devotion had been supplanted by the passion for statues, choral processions and dramas, nay, even by the desire of gratifying still grosser appetites in the distributions of meat which took place at the sacrifices. Hence, the above-mentioned atrocities against the

⁶¹ See Athen. 3. 74. E. sqq. ; Schol. Aristoph. Plut. 31 ; Etym. M. *συκοφαντία*, etc.

⁶² Simonid. ap. Plut. Timol. 37. The names of Phrynondas and Eurybatus are mentioned in Harpocrat. and Suidas as having been proverbial for ring-leaders.

Lesbians, Scionæans, Toronæans, and Melians, were unrestrained by any dread of the divine vengeance. Again, the demagogues and sycophants made use of religion in its combination with politics to inflame the impure passions of the multitude. The prosecution for impiety (*γραφὴ ἀσεβείας*) afforded ample scope for their intrigues and machinations, a revolting example of which is the prosecution of the Hermocopidæ⁶³. But the superstition of the Athenians is eminently conspicuous in their fears, lest the return of Alcibiades should happen to fall together with the Plynteria⁶⁴, as well as in the numerous allusions to their belief in soothsayers and astrologers⁶⁵; in this respect the character of Nicias⁶⁶ presented a direct contrast to that of Pericles.

THE OLD COMEDY⁶⁷.

In the midst of this deep-rooted and wide-spread corruption, when the legal authorities had become powerless, the Sophronistæ and the Areopagus lost all weight and influence, when public opinion had grown contaminated, and the licentious multitude only followed the dictates of their own headstrong will, there arose, in the domain of art, a frank and vigorous censorship, which, in unsparingly castigating the vices and follies of the age, joined poig-

⁶³ See the next section.

⁶⁴ Xenoph. Hell. 1. 4. 12.

⁶⁵ Thuc. 2. 8. 8. 1.

⁶⁶ With what has been advanced in the text compare at large, Xenoph. Repub. Athen., a description it must be owned closely bordering on caricature. Amongst the moderns, see Heyne *Libertatis et Æqualitatis Civilis in Atheniensium Rep. delineatio ex Aristophane*, Opusc. Acad. 4. 392.

⁶⁷ Compare generally: Kanngiesser, *The Ancient Comic Stage in Athens*, 1817, especially first and twelfth chapters: comedy attains its zenith during the Peloponnesian war, etc., p. 114, sqq., and sixth: the destination of the comic drama.

nant ridicule and wit to the deep earnestness of high-minded patriotism.

After Athens had attained the meridian of her power, tragedy and comedy had nearly to an equal extent become the objects of public care and encouragement. But the effects which they respectively exercised upon the public system differed very widely. In tragedy the Athenian beheld the old heroic monarchy in its dependence upon Fate, the nothingness of human pride, and earthly presumption crushed by the wrath of the gods. The Greek tragedy was copiously interspersed with political reflections; these, it is true, in consequence of the vast difference between the present order of things and the ancient regal system, could only be applied⁶⁸ to the Athenian democracy as figurative allusions, or in a larger extent as moral maxims; still the poets occasionally transposed sentiments of the democratic period into the heroic age, as Æschylus has done in the *Danaides*⁶⁹; or, at least, the unlimited power of the monarchy was called into question, as in the incomparable dialogue between Hæmon and Creon in the *Antigone* of Sophocles⁷⁰. Yet, in spite of this, tragedy and real life were separated by a wide gulf, and we may perceive how far it was from the intention of the

⁶⁸ See the collection of passages of this description which occur in Euripides in Valckenaer *Diatr.* 255. C. sqq., and especially on the subject of demagogy, 259. A. sqq.

⁶⁹ e. g. the king, 519:

Πείσω τὸ κοινόν, ὥς ἂν εὖμενες τιθῶ.

Comp. 607:

Πανδημία γὰρ χερσὶ δεξιωνύμοις

Ἐφριξεν αἰθήρ, τόνδε κραινόντων λόγον.

939:

Τοιάδε δημόπρακτος ἐκ πόλεως μία

Ψῆφος κέκρανται, κ. τ. λ.

⁷⁰ *Antig.* 726, sqq. Especially:

Πόλις γὰρ οὐκ ἴσθ' ἤτις ἀνδρός ἴσθ' ἐνός.

Athenians to allow the former to allude to real misfortunes by their infliction of a fine on Phrynichus, because he had represented the destruction of Miletus by the Persians, and thereby painfully affected the Athenians as though the calamity in question had happened to themselves⁷¹.

On the other hand, the *old* comedy sprung from the wantonness and arrogance of the democracy of Megara, whence it was transferred to its lively neighbour, Athens⁷², the public appointing comic poets, who were not only permitted, but expressly enjoined to level their satire against the wealthier classes⁷³; thus comedy became raised into a great political engine—a genial tribunal of public morals—which had grown out of real life, and, mingled with the hues of fancy, was the reflected image of its scenes; or rather, a mirror, in which reality and its image were beheld in rapid alternation and succession, and which, either borrowed the objects it exhibited from the real world, or directed its rays on the world, and so explained the true meaning of what was going forward on the stage. The dim warnings of the mysterious power of Fate in tragedy, were little adapted to produce any deep impression on the popular mind, as none of the spectators found in the crimes or sorrows of the kings and heroes any thing applicable to his own position; but the aim of comedy, as explained by Aristophanes, was to make men better in the state⁷⁴,

⁷¹ Herod. 6. 21.

⁷² See Meineke, *Quæst. Scenic. Spec. Prim.* p. 4. Berol. 1826.

⁷³ See the Schol. Aristoph. ed. Küster, p. 12.

⁷⁴ Aristoph. *Ran.* 1009. 1010:

— ὅτι βελτίους τε ποιοῦμεν
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

to admonish and instruct adults⁷⁵, and, in so doing, it was at liberty to take the boldest flights, not restricted to lampooning individuals⁷⁶. However, the ancient comedy never lost sight of its original destination, which was to ridicule passing occurrences (*ἐξ ἀμάξης σκώμματα*), and this is the real root of the connection between the actors and the spectators.

In order duly to estimate the political importance, as well as the æsthetic character of the old comedy, it must especially be borne in mind, that the plot of the piece by no means formed such an entire and connected whole, as completely to withdraw the attention of the spectators from the real world around, and confine it exclusively to the poetical world upon the stage, as the piece made constant allusions to the real transactions of civil life, to actual personages, events, dangers, virtues and vices, and by gathering its motley groups within some poetical frame, even though a mere piece of buffoonery, it imparted to them dramatic keeping and consistence; hence disturbing the illusion, by mixing up the spectators with the actors, which with us is justly considered a fault, was customary and admired amongst the Athenians. This was effected in three ways:

1. By allusions to, and glosses upon, objects of real life woven into the poetical dialogue.
2. By imitating the personal appearance of living

⁷⁵ Aristoph. Ran. 1054:

— τοῖς μὲν γὰρ παιδαρίοισιν
ἔστι διδάσκαλος, ὅστις φράζει· τοῖς δ' ἡβῶσιν γε ποιηταί.

⁷⁶ Aristoph. Pac. 751. 752:

οὐκ ἰδιώτας ἀνθρωπίσκους κωμῳδῶν, οὐδὲ γυναικας
ἀλλ' Ἡρακλείους ὀργήν τιν' ἔχων τοῖσι μεγίστοις ἐπιχειρεῖ.

Comp. Vesp. 1030.

characters, and sometimes by introducing them into pieces under their real names.

3. And most effectually by the parabasis, an address from the chorus to the spectators, in which the connection with the drama was only kept up by means of the mask, and the poetical character assigned to the chorus in the piece, whilst the latter discoursed on some object of political life⁷⁷, in reference to which it instructed, admonished, or censured the citizens, and thereby endeavoured to perform its vocation, viz., to inculcate principles beneficial to the state⁷⁸. The masterpiece amongst all the parabases extant, is that in the Frogs of Aristophanes⁷⁹, and it is, perhaps, partly owing to this that that piece was represented twice successively⁸⁰.

The preceding characteristics are exhibited in eminent perfection in the old comedy alone, which began before the Peloponnesian war, and continued to flourish some time after it had terminated. The most renowned poets of this period were Cratinus, Eupolis, Plato, Pherecrates, and Aristophanes; Crates, Hermippus, Phrynichus, etc.⁸¹, belonged to the second rank. In consequence of the very scanty fragments of the works of the others which

⁷⁷ Schol. Aristoph. Pac. 733: ὁπότε ἐβούλετο ὁ ποιητὴς διαλεχθῆναί τι ἐξω τῆς ὑποθίσεως ἄνευ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν. The parabasis was likewise attempted in tragedy; Euripides made the chorus in the Danaides speak of himself, and introduced parabases in other pieces, Pollux. 4. 111. On the arrangements of the stage, etc., consult Hermann, Elem. Doctr. Metr. 720, sqq.

⁷⁸ Χρηστὰ τῇ πόλει ξυμπαραινεῖν, Aristoph. Ran. 685; compare in particular Acharn. 656, sqq.

⁷⁹ Aristoph. Ran. 686, sqq.

⁸⁰ Οὕτω δὲ ἐθαυμάσθη διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ παράβασιν—ὥστε καὶ ἀνεδιδάχθη, Dicæarch. in Argum. Ran.

⁸¹ On Cratinus, Crates, Hermippus, Teleclides, Eupolis, see Meineke, Quæstionum Scenicarum Spec. Primum.

have reached us, Aristophanes is almost our only authority. His poetical career began a short time after the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, and lasted till about ten years after its conclusion⁸². His pieces exhibit a just and striking picture of the Athenian people, and the copious scholia amply illustrate particular points.

Our enquiries being particularly directed to the manner in which the comic censorship was exercised, it is not consistent with our object to enter into a consideration of the criticisms on bad poets as such, with which the pieces of Aristophanes abound⁸³; still it may be observed, that as there was an indissoluble connection between the poetical and the political life of the Greeks, so the decline of poetry, viz., the corruption of the lyric poetry by the dithyrambic poets⁸⁴, and of tragedy by Euripides⁸⁵, which Aristophanes so frequently deplores, acted on, and was itself affected by, the moral and political depravation of the age.

When the comic muse levelled her shafts at those whose dress or air was ridiculous, or whose way of life was characterized by profligacy or folly, she did not, it is true, inculcate a direct political

⁸² The first piece, the <i>Δαιτυλεῖς</i>	.	.	Ol. 88. 1. 427. B. C.
— The Babylonians	.	.	- 88. 2. 426. „
— The Acharnians	.	.	- 88. 3. 425. „
— The Knights	.	.	- 88. 4. 424. „
— The Clouds (first)	.	.	- 89. 1. 423. „
— The Wasps and (second) Clouds	.	.	- 89. 2. 422. „
— The Peace	.	.	- 89. 3. 421. „
— The Birds	.	.	- 91. 2. 414. „
— Lysistrata and Thesmophoriasusæ	.	.	- 92. 1. 411. „
— The Frogs	.	.	- 93. 3. 405. „
— Plutus	.	.	- 96. 3. 394. „
— Ecclesiazusæ	.	.	- 97. 1. 392. „

⁸³ See Pac. 803, on the tragedian Morsimus, Vesp. 402; Philocles, Thesmoph. 169; Xenocles, 170; Theognis, etc.

⁸⁴ Nub. 332: *κυκλίων τε χορῶν ἀσματοκάμπτας*.

⁸⁵ Ran. Archarn. Thesmoph.

lesson, the censure in question not being directed against the omission of a public duty or obligation. Still these topics were sometimes touched upon incidentally, as the vices of the persons satirised were seldom found alone. Thus Aristophanes ridicules Epicrates, who prided himself upon his comely beard, and was therefore called the shield-bearer (*σακεσφόρος*)⁸⁶; Amynias the dicer⁸⁷; the dissipated Æschines⁸⁸ and Proxenides⁸⁹; Pisander the coward with the daring aspect⁹⁰; Callias the prodigal⁹¹, whose courage was very suspicious, notwithstanding the lion's-skin which he wore⁹², and who had previously been attacked by Eupolis in the *Flatterers*⁹³; the impoverished spendthrift Megacles the descendant of the proud Coisyra⁹⁴, and a host of infamous drunkards⁹⁵ and debauchees besides⁹⁶. Still more unsparing is the castigation which he inflicts upon the voluptuous and the unchaste. Such were Cleonymus, who, though of heroic presence⁹⁷, had disgraced himself by throwing away his shield⁹⁸, had committed perjury⁹⁹, and cajoled the people¹⁰⁰; the beardless and inconti-

⁸⁶ Eccles. 71. Compare the Scholion. He was a demagogue after the domination of the Thirty. See, concerning him, below, § 71.

⁸⁷ Vesp. 75; comp. 1267. 1278.

⁸⁸ Vesp. 338. 457. 1220.

⁸⁹ Vesp. 338.

⁹⁰ Pac. 395; Av. 1559.

⁹¹ Av. 284. He moults away his goods and chattels like a bird does its feathers, *πτεροόρνει*.

⁹² Ran. 428.

⁹³ Schol. Av. 286.

⁹⁴ Acharn. 614. Comp. Nub. 46. 70. 124.

⁹⁵ Vesp. 1301. 1302.

⁹⁶ Acharn. 839, sqq. Amongst others, the *εὐρυπρωκτος* Prepis, the *περιπόνηρος* Artemon, the *παμπόνηρος* Pauson, and Lysistratus *Χολαργέων δνειδος*, (comp. Vesp. 788.) etc.

⁹⁷ Vesp. 822, *χαλεπὸς ἰδεῖν*,

⁹⁸ Vesp. 19. Conf. Aves, 1481. 1482; Pac. 446. 673; Acharn. 88; Nub. 680.

⁹⁹ Nub. 398.

¹⁰⁰ Vesp. 592, he is called *κολακώνυμος*.

nent Clisthenes¹⁰¹; the grossly lustful Aripkrades¹⁰²; Hieronymus¹⁰³, Philoxenus¹⁰⁴, Amynias¹⁰⁵, Sebinus¹⁰⁶, and a number of other cinædi, whose names may be recognised in the Clouds by their feminine terminations¹⁰⁷. To these may be added the obscene, such as Cinesias¹⁰⁸, at the mention of whose name the people were probably reminded of the lime-plank which, in consequence of his excessive thinness, he was obliged to wear within his girdle to support himself¹⁰⁹; and, lastly, Agyrrius¹¹⁰, who was moreover effeminate¹¹¹ and malignant.

If the comic muse animadverts upon enormities such as these, in accents which sometimes appear to be deficient in modesty and dignity, we must reflect that subjects, the bare mention of which shocks every feeling of delicacy and shame in our nature, were not conceived by the Athenian seriously or in a moral point of view, but merely addressed themselves to his perception of the ridiculous. The same may be urged in vindicating Aristophanes from the charge of cruelty when he

¹⁰¹ Eq. 1374; Acharn. 122; Nub. 354; Ran. 48. 423; Lysis. 1092. He is introduced in the Thesmophoriazusæ, 573, as ambassador to the women; in the Birds, 831, he carries a weaver's shuttle. He and Cleonymus are, as it were, the representatives of effeminacy.

¹⁰² Equit. 1281, sqq. :—

ἔστι δ' οὐ μόνον πονηρός, οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ἂν ὑσθόμην
οὐδὲ παμπόνηρος· ἀλλὰ καὶ προσεξεύρηται τι·
τὴν γὰρ αὐτοῦ γλῶτταν αἰσχροῖς ἡδοναῖς λυμαίνεται
ἐν κασαυρίοισι λείχων τὴν ἀπόπτυστον δρόσον, κ. τ. λ.

No less depraved was the character of Smoios, Eccles. 848 :—τὰ τῶν γυναικῶν διακαθαίρει τρυβλία.

¹⁰³ Nub. 348.

¹⁰⁴ Vesp. 84.

¹⁰⁵ Nub. 689, sqq.

¹⁰⁶ Ran. 430.

¹⁰⁷ Nub. 685 : Λύσιλλα, Φίλινα, Κλειταγόρα, Δημητρία.

¹⁰⁸ Ran. 367 :—κατατιλᾷ τῶν Ἑκαταίων. Comp. the Schol. Ran. 53. 1437; Eccles. 330; Lysis. 855.

¹⁰⁹ Athen. 12. 551, E.

¹¹⁰ Plut. 176 :—Ἀγύρριος—πέρδεται.

¹¹¹ Eccles. 102. 184.

taunts persons with their bodily infirmities ; as, for instance, when he ridicules Archedemus¹¹² and Neobchides¹¹³ for being blear-eyed ; calls Melanthius a leper¹¹⁴ ; jeers Ctesiphon about his fat belly¹¹⁵ ; laughs at Cleigenes for his diminutive monkey figure¹¹⁶ ; and introduces a great number of Athenians under the names of various *birds*, in the comedy of that name, classed according to their personal peculiarities and deformities¹¹⁷. In the same manner Horace reproached Crispinus with being blear-eyed¹¹⁸. This did not shock the feelings of the ancients. Moreover, those whom Aristophanes ridiculed on account of their personal infirmities were, in most instances, likewise conspicuous for moral defects—as, for instance, Melanthius, who was notorious for effeminacy, gluttony, and unnatural lust, on which account he was attacked by Eupolis in the *Flatterers*¹¹⁹ — or had rendered themselves obnoxious to censure by pernicious demagoguery or spurious citizenship, like Cleigenes¹²⁰, so that by holding up their personal blemishes to the laughter of the people, he at the same time reminded them of their moral and political taints. Thus, for instance, a certain Teleas is brought forward in the *Birds*, whose name was sufficient to call up an idea of every thing that was depraved¹²¹. So perfect was the understanding be-

¹¹² Ran. 588.

¹¹³ Eccles. 254.

¹¹⁴ Av. 151.

¹¹⁵ Acharn. 1001.

¹¹⁶ Ran. 709, sqq.

¹¹⁷ Av. 1292, sqq. Chærephon the owl, etc.

¹¹⁸ Sat. i. l. 120, at which Bentley is so indignant that he changes *lippi* into *lippum*, and makes Horace call himself blear-eyed, which indeed he sometimes was. But this is the moral feeling of modern times.

¹¹⁹ Schol. Pac. 800.

¹²⁰ Schol. Ran. 709.

¹²¹ Schol. Av. 167 :—πρὸς γὰρ τῇ κιναιδίᾳ καὶ δειλίᾳ καὶ ὕψοφαγίᾳ καὶ νοσφισμῷ καὶ πονηρίᾳ ὀνειδίζουσι τὸν Τελέαν.

tween the poet and the spectators, that a single word frequently sufficed to propose a comic riddle, and at the same time to furnish its solution.

His allusions to men who had obtained the franchise surreptitiously, and who demeaned themselves as though they had been rightful citizens, are still more severe, and bear the character of serious reprehension; such are his animadversions upon Archedemus, who, though he had held the citizenship seven years, was unable to bring forward a single phrator¹²², the *parvenu* Diitrephes¹²³, Execestides the Carian¹²⁴, Spintharus the Phrygian and Philemon¹²⁵, but especially Cleophon, the son of a Thracian woman, a great talker, who was always prating about war¹²⁶. Moreover, his allusion to sycophants and men of faithless character, such as the smooth-tongued informer Cephisodemus and the false Euathlos¹²⁷, Theorus¹²⁸ the forsworn flatterer of the people, the perjured and rapacious Simon¹²⁹, Euphemius¹³⁰ and Thrasybulus, who, having been bribed, pretended to have a sore throat upon being called upon to speak at a public negociation with the Laconians¹³¹. Nor did perfidious soothsayers like Lampon, Diopithes, Hierocles, etc.¹³², escape the poet's censure.

¹²² Ran. 418.

¹²³ Av. 798 :—

ὥς Διϊτρεφῆς γε πυτιναῖα μόνον ἔχων πτερὰ,
ῥέθη φύλαρχος, εἴθ' ἵππαρχος, εἴτ' ἐξ οὐδενὸς
μεγάλα πράττει.

¹²⁴ Av. 765 and Schol. Comp. 11 and 1530.

¹²⁵ Av. 762, 763.

¹²⁶ Ran. 678, sqq. Θρηκία χελιδών. According to the Scholion, the subject of a piece named after him by the comic poet Plato. See concerning him the following section.

¹²⁷ Acharn. 705. 710. According to the Schol. Vesp. 592, he had also been attacked by Cratinus and Plato.

¹²⁸ Nub. 399; Vesp. 42. 418; Acharn. 134.

¹²⁹ Nub. 351. 399.

¹³⁰ Vesp. 599.

¹³¹ Ecclesias. 203. 356. and Schol.

¹³² Av. 988; Pac. 1044. and Schol. Even the answers of Bacis are mentioned in derision. Eq. 1003.

Persons like these were more or less public characters; but comedy took a bolder range when she assailed the demagogues who guided the helm of state, and sometime held public offices. The comic poets had already attacked Pericles, and with the greater impunity, as he was too conscious of the proud height upon which he stood to grudge the demus a vent for any ill-will it might occasionally bear him. Several satirical allusions to his omnipotence, by Cratinus, one of the eulogists of Cimon¹³³, Teleclides, Hermippus, and Eupolis, are extant; he is apostrophized as Zeus¹³⁴, Aspasia as Here, Omphale, or Deianira, but at the same time as a courtesan¹³⁵; his sons are addressed as simpletons¹³⁶, in addition to which the one by Aspasia is called a bastard¹³⁷; his friends are named Pisis-tratids¹³⁸; the slowness with which the construction of the walls and the Odeum proceeded was also the object of their ridicule¹³⁹; and lastly, the policy of Pericles in avoiding a battle upon the

¹³³ Plut. Cim. 10.

¹³⁴ Cratinus: Μόλ' ὦ Ζεῦ ξένιε καὶ μακάριε. Alluding to the large head of Pericles, he calls him τύραννον, ὃν δὴ κεφαληγερέταν θεοὶ καλοῦσι. See Plut. Pericl. 3. ibid. ὁ σχινοκέφαλος Ζεύς, Plut. 14. The same thought once more recurs in Aristoph. Acharn. 530: — Περικλῆς οὐλύμπιος. See also Schol. and Diodor. 12. 40. Eupolis' confession of the irresistible nature of Pericles' eloquence; from the Δήμοις after the death of Pericles. Comp. Meineke, Quæstionum Scenicarum, p. 48. Teleclides (the contemporary of Aristophanes, Schol. Ran. 1126; Athen. 6. 267. E. sqq.) enumerated to the Athenians in succession the constituents of that power which they had conceded to Pericles:

πόλειων τε φόρους αὐτάς τε πόλεις, τὰς μὲν δεῖν, τὰς δ' ἀναλύνειν,
λαῖνα τείχη, τὰ μὲν οἰκοδομεῖν, τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ πάλιν καταβάλλειν
σπονδάς, δύναμιν, κράτος, εἰρήνην, πλοῦτόν τ' εὐδαιμονίαν τε.

Plut. Pericl. 16. Comp. on the subject of Teleclides, Meineke, Quæst. Scenic. p. 29, sqq.

¹³⁵ Cratinus apud Plut. Pericl. 24:

— Ἦσαν τε οἱ Ἀσπασίαν τίκτει
καὶ καταπυγοσύνην παλλακὴν κυνώπιδα.

Comp. Schol. Platon. Menex. 139. Ruhnck.

¹³⁶ Βλιτομάμας. Schol. Plat. Ruhnck. 73.

¹³⁷ Eupolis ap. Plut. Per. 24; conf. Harpocrat. Ἀσπασία.

¹³⁸ Plut. Per. 16.

¹³⁹ Cratinus ap. Plut. Per. 13.

first irruption of the Peloponnesians into Attica, was bitterly derided ¹⁴⁰.

Aristophanes arose at the commencement of the wild demagogy, which immediately followed the death of Pericles; its excesses never ceased to draw down his indignant reprobation, nor did he shrink from entering the lists with the most powerful of its representatives or supporters. He describes with the convincing energy of truth, especially in the *Knights*, the destructive nature of demagogy in general, the facilities it offered to bad men to rise to power and eminence ¹⁴¹, its duplicity and adulation ¹⁴², the intrigues and cabals it employed to deceive the people ¹⁴³, and above all, its peculations and embezzlements ¹⁴⁴. All this he ¹⁴⁵ contrasts with the time of Myronides, when he asserts that such disgraceful avarice did not exist. Amongst the single demagogues who writhed under the lash of the Aristophanic satire, must, according to their succession in order of time, be now enumerated Eucrates, the vender of flax and tow, and the cattle-dealer Lysicles, neither of whose trades escaped ridicule ¹⁴⁶, but above all, the worthless Cleon.

¹⁴⁰ See Hermipp. *Anapæst.* ap. Plut. *Per.* 33. On Hermippus, conf. Meineke, *ubi sup.* p. 30.

¹⁴¹ *Eq.* 180. 181 :

δι' αὐτὸ γάρ τοι τοῦτο καὶ γίγνεται μέγας,
ὅτι πονηρός, κῆξ ἀγορᾶς εἰ, καὶ θρασύς.

v. 218 : —

τὰ δ' ἄλλα σοι πρόσεστι δημαγωγικά,
φωνή μισρά, γέγονας κακός, ἀγοραῖος εἰ.

¹⁴² *Ran.* 1085 : the town is full of βωμολόχων δημοπεθήκων ἱξαπατώντων τὸν δῆμον αἰεί. Moreover the expressive word δημίζω, to cajole the people, *Vesp.* 697. The subject of the κόλακες of Eupolis were Callias and the parasites about him. See Meineke, *ubi sup.* 59, sqq.

¹⁴³ *Equit.* 865.

¹⁴⁴ *Vesp.* 665 : —

Βδελυκλ. : — καὶ ποῖ τρέπεται δὴ πείρα τὰ χρήματα τᾶλλα ;
Φιλοκλ. : ἐς τούτους τοὺς — Οὐχὶ προδώσω τὸν Ἀθηναίων κολοσυρτόν,
ἀλλὰ μαχοῦμαι περὶ τοῦ πλήθους αἰεί.

¹⁴⁵ *Eccles.* 303.

¹⁴⁶ Concerning the former, see *Equit.* 129. with the Schol. and 254 ; on the latter *Equit.* 132.

The more conscious this man was of his own baseness, the more impatient he was of censure; nevertheless, he was obliged to endure the most humiliating flagellation from the comic muse in the *Babylonians*¹⁴⁷, and afterwards in the *Knights*, his dog-like effrontery, his sycophantic snarling and barking¹⁴⁸, and his greediness for a bribe¹⁴⁹, are held up to the laughter of the people, who are at the same time compelled to witness a mortifying picture of their own folly, in resigning themselves to the guidance of so abandoned a wretch. Even after the representation of the *Knights* Aristophanes repeats his attacks; in the *Clouds* he again brings the god-detested tanner¹⁵⁰ upon the stage; in the *Wasps* he is made to play the part of an all-devouring sea-monster¹⁵¹; after his death his vices are once more chronicled in the *Peace*¹⁵²; and lastly in the *Frogs* he and his worthy compeer, Hyperbolus, are introduced together in Hades¹⁵³. Aristophanes well knew the peril he encountered in entering the arena with this malicious, covetous, and sanguinary idol of the populace, and accordingly speaks of his own services with that absence of reserve which was peculiar to the Greeks in enumerating their own merits¹⁵⁴, and it must be con-

¹⁴⁷ Schol. *Acharn.* 386.

¹⁴⁸ *Equit.* 1022. Cleon says to the demus:

ἐγὼ μὲν εἰμ' ὁ κύων · πρὸ σοῦ γὰρ ἀπύω.

Comp. *Vesp.* 596: ὁ Κλέων ὁ κεκραξιδάμας.

¹⁴⁹ *Eq.* 831, sqq., allusion is made to forty minæ which are said to have been received from Mitylene, but this is mere satire (see Meier, *de Bon. Damn.* p. 115); Cleon had received money from the islanders, that he might reduce their tributes.

¹⁵⁰ *Nub.* 557.

¹⁵¹ *Vesp.* 35: φάλαινα πανδοκεύτρια. Conf. 1030, sqq.

¹⁵² *Pac.* 648, sqq.: πανοῦργος, λάλος, συκοφάντης, κύκηθρον, τάρακτρον.

¹⁵³ *Ran.* 569. 570.

¹⁵⁴ *Nub.* 545: ὅς μ' ἐγὼ μέγιστον ὄντα Κλέων' ἔπαισ' εἰς τὴν γαστέρα. *Vesp.* 1031: θρασέως ξυστάς ἐνθὺς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτῷ τῷ καρχαρόδοντι, κ. τ. λ.

fessed that comedy owed to him the proud height it thus attained as the vehicle of political censure.

In sketching the portrait of Hyperbolus the lampmaker, Aristophanes has employed less force of comic humour, as well as less moral earnestness, and patriotic feeling; still we have a clear notion of the iniquity of his character. In the *Knights* he declares that he deserves hanging¹⁵⁵; in the *Peace* which was represented about the time when Hyperbolus contested the demagogy with Alcibiades, Phæax, and Nicias, and had a party in his favour, he is called a flagitious leader¹⁵⁶, who deserved to be expelled¹⁵⁷, etc. Other comic poets had also attacked Hyperbolus, and Eupolis had written his *Maricas* against him and his drunken mother¹⁵⁸; but Aristophanes speaks in terms of contempt of these attacks, which were for the most part made after Hyperbolus had lost the favour of the people and began to be hunted like a flying beast. A specimen of the sycophantic dialectics of his contemporary and rival Phæax is given in the *Knights*¹⁵⁹. Special mention was made of Nicias in a piece which has perished, called the *Husbandmen*¹⁶⁰, and in the *Birds* his dilatory character is glanced at¹⁶¹.

Alcibiades was more violent than Cleon, and his authority resembled a tyranny still more than that

Comp. *Pac.* 739, sqq. On the merits of Aristophanes, compare Kanngiesser *komische Bühne*, 499, sqq.

¹⁵⁵ *Equit.* 1373.

¹⁵⁶ *Pac.* 684.

¹⁵⁷ *Pac.* 1319.

¹⁵⁸ *Nub.* 549 and *Schol.*; comp. *Schol.* on 587, and the *Plutus*, 1308; *Meineke*, *ubi sup.* 56, sqq.

¹⁵⁹ *Eq.* 1377, sqq.:

ξυνερκτικός γάρ ἐστι, καὶ περαντικός,
καὶ γνωμοτυπικός, καὶ σαφής, καὶ κρουστικός,
καταληπτικός τ' ἄριστα τοῦ θορυβητικοῦ.

¹⁶⁰ See *Citat. Fabric. Bib. Gr. ed. Harl.* 2. 369.

¹⁶¹ *Av.* 639, μελλονικῶν.

of Pericles, and yet Aristophanes did not attack him. Alcibiades is rarely mentioned, and in the *Frogs* the poet appears to speak of him in terms of respect, as a man, a general, and a statesman. We may look upon the words of Æschylus in the *Frogs* ¹⁶²:

'Twere better not to nourish in the state
A lion's whelp—yet should one so be nourish'd
His disposition must be yielded to—

as proceeding from Aristophanes' inmost soul. At that time he well knew that no one could protect the state against the designs of the crafty Lysander so effectually as Alcibiades; though twenty years earlier he had in the *Dætales* ¹⁶³ stigmatized with becoming severity his incontinence, pernicious sophistry, youthful wilfulness and turbulence, aristocratic pride, and passion for horses, whilst the same original may be clearly recognized in the prodigal Phidippides in the *Clouds* ¹⁶⁴.

Nor was the poet idle during the last years of the war, when the cabals of a party had subverted the democracy for a time, and when even after its re-establishment, the stormy passions of the people forbade all hopes of the return of tranquillity and order; to this period belong the *Lysistrata*, *Thesmophoriazusæ*, and the *Frogs*. The *Thesmophoriazusæ* was represented during the Oligarchy ¹⁶⁵,

¹⁶² Ran. 1431. 1432.

¹⁶³ See the *Fragm.* in Seidler, *Brevis Disputatio de Aristophanis Fragmentis*. Hal. 1818; comp. Süvern on the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, Berl. 1826, p. 26, sqq., and *ibid.* on the allusions to the lasciviousness and sexual vigour of Alcibiades *ubi sup.* 63, sqq.

¹⁶⁴ See Süvern on the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, Berl. 1826, p. 33, sqq. Neither is he spoken of in creditable terms in the *Acharn.* 716:

ὅπως ἂν ᾖ

... ..
τοῖς νέοις δ' εὐρύπρωκτος, καὶ λάλος, ὑπὸ Κλεινίου.

¹⁶⁵ Under the archon Callias (*Argum. Lysistr.* et *Schol.* 173); the oli-

and at the very time that the partisans of the democracy were judicially murdered and privately assassinated, Aristophanes ceased not to stigmatize the authors of these calamities; thus he reproaches the Buleutæ before the Oligarchy with having suffered the last to supplant them¹⁶⁶. In the *Frogs* allusion is made to the equivocal and time-serving character of Theramenes¹⁶⁷, and he wishes that the half-citizen Cleophon, alluded to above with his interminable prate about war¹⁶⁸, was in Hades¹⁶⁹; whilst the admiral Adimantus, who soon afterwards acted a very suspicious part in the disastrous battle of Ægos Potamoi, is described as a man whose death every one was bound to pray for¹⁷⁰.

Whilst condemning the destructive proceedings of the demagogues generally, he is especially loud in his complaints of their corruptness and frequent peculations; that is to say, he either openly and expressly accused the demagogues or corrupt officers, or brought characters upon the stage in such situations as sufficiently explained to the Athenians what and whom he meant; concerning these the *Scholia* contain ample information¹⁷¹. In fact, the effrontery with which these men plundered the public treasure was only equalled by the flagrant violation of all morality and decency exhibited in

garchy was overthrown under his successor Theopompus (Ps. Plut. Vit. Decem Orator. Antiph. 9. 313).

¹⁶⁶ *Thesmoph.* 808. The address to Pallas, *Thesmoph.* 1143, is also evidently levelled at the oligarchs:

φάνηθ' ὡς τυράννους
στυγοῦσ', ὥσπερ εἰκός.

¹⁶⁷ *Ran.* 539. 540.

¹⁶⁸ *Ran.* 1504, sqq.

¹⁷⁰ *Ran.* 1513. We are informed in the *Scholia*, that Adimantus likewise suffered from the satire of Eupolis and Plato.

¹⁷¹ *Eccles.* 205:

τὰ δημόσια γὰρ μισθοφοροῦντες χρήματα
ἰδίᾳ σκοπεῖθ' ἕκαστος, ὅ τι τις κερδαίνει.

¹⁶⁹ See n. 126.

their lives. To the delinquents already enumerated, we may add Pisander¹⁷², Pamphilus¹⁷³, Neochides¹⁷⁴; the Eicostologus Thorycion, who furnished stores for the enemy's ships¹⁷⁵; Prytanes who accepted bribes for bringing forward public matters¹⁷⁶, etc.

That the superior officers were not exempt from his censure, is evident from the example of Lamachus, whose love of war when Strategus Aristophanes represents as one of the main obstacles to the restoration of peace¹⁷⁷; he at the same time directs public attention to the amount of his debts¹⁷⁸. However, we must not interpret his satirical attacks upon Lamachus too literally, as the poet undoubtedly esteemed him as a brave soldier¹⁷⁹. He likewise speaks in terms of commendation of the valiant admiral Phormio¹⁸⁰.

But most remarkable, and, at the same time, most important in their results, were the boldness and freedom with which Aristophanes proclaimed the perverseness and corruption of the omnipotent demus. In this spirit he proposed to purify and strengthen the citizenship, by expelling from it all worthless characters, and supplying their places with the more deserving amongst the new citizens¹⁸¹. During the eventful period which immediately preceded the disaster of Ægos Potamoi, he complains of the undue preference shown to the after-comers¹⁸², to the prejudice of the Kalokaga-

¹⁷² Lysistr. 490.

¹⁷³ Plut. 174; conf. Schol.

¹⁷⁴ Plut. 665, with the Schol.

¹⁷⁵ Ran. 363; conf. Schol.

¹⁷⁶ Pac. 907; conf. Thesmoph. 937.

¹⁷⁷ Acharn. 269. 572, sqq.; Pac. 472.

¹⁷⁸ Acharn. 614.

¹⁷⁹ Acharn. 1188; Ran. 1039.

¹⁸⁰ Equit. 562; Lysistr. 804. He is classed with Myronides as a μελάμ-

πυγος.

¹⁸¹ Lysistr. 574, sqq.

¹⁸² Ran. 718, sqq.

thoi; and proposes that those persons should be reinstated in their full rights who had been deprived of them because they had taken part in the Oligarchy¹⁸³. On the other hand, he extols the virtue of the men of Marathon¹⁸⁴, who, he says, were no talkers, and at the same time censures the ready volubility of the subsequent demagogues, and the easy credulity of the demos¹⁸⁵. All this was chiefly confined to the character and sentiments of the multitude; but now the collective people, the popular assembly, as the depository of the supreme power, became the butt of his satire; he deprecates the frequency of its meetings¹⁸⁶, which was a consequence of the measure of Agyrrhius for raising the salary of the ecclesiasts from one to three obols, the foolish manner in which they demeaned themselves¹⁸⁷, and their indulgence in invective and abuse¹⁸⁸. Eupolis had previously ridiculed the Athenian Dysbulia¹⁸⁹, and Aristophanes¹⁹⁰ declares that, according to an ancient saying, the assembly was accustomed to see all its foolish decrees turn out well; at the same time, he blames its love of innovation¹⁹¹, its subservience to the demagogues¹⁹², its avidity for their flattery¹⁹³, and the favour it showed to bad men¹⁹⁴. This is sometimes coupled with the advice, that the peo-

¹⁸³ Ran. 685.

¹⁸⁴ Acharn. 180. 181; Equit. 565, sqq.; Vesp. 1071, sqq.

¹⁸⁵ Vesp. 1094.

¹⁸⁶ Eccles. 183.

¹⁸⁷ See above, n. 36; also, Equit. 651;

οἱ δ' ἀνεκρότησαν καὶ πρὸς ἑμ' ἐκεχύνεσαν.

¹⁸⁸ Eccles. 142;

καὶ λοιδοροῦνται γ' ὥσπερ ἐμπεπωκότες.

¹⁸⁹ See above, n. 46.

¹⁹⁰ Eccles. 473, sqq.

¹⁹¹ Eccles. 456. 580;

μισοῦσι γάρ, ἣν τὰ παλαιὰ πολλάκις θεῶνται.

Conf. 586. 587, and Acharn. 630—ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ταχυβούλοις.

¹⁹² See in particular, Equit. 1097, sqq.

¹⁹³ Acharn. 685.

¹⁹⁴ Ran. 1454, sqq.

ple should choose fresh leaders¹⁹⁵. Athens is reproached by the Acharnians with having occasioned the Peloponnesian war by her brickerings with Megara¹⁹⁶. Innumerable complaints of the military profession and the plan of operations are contained in the Peace, whilst advice as to the best mode of carrying on the war and administering the public revenue, is given in the Frogs¹⁹⁷, and put in satirical contrast with the measures actually adopted. However, he speaks of the Spartans in by no means favourable terms¹⁹⁸; but on the other hand, in one of the wildest flights of comic ridicule, he gives utterance to the exalting thought of a common Grecian nationality¹⁹⁹.

Nor are his strictures less severe on the manner in which the people discharged their judicial duties as Heliasts. This is especially beheld in the Wasps, the object of which was to depict their inordinate love of acting as judges, promoted, as it was, by the covetousness and chicanery of the litigants²⁰⁰, the angry violence of the judges which is admirably represented in the mask of the Wasps²⁰¹; while the Clouds displays a picture of the mischievous power of the sycophants and brawlers, which is embodied in the speech of Adicæologus²⁰², etc.

With these evidences of moral and political

¹⁹⁵ Ran. 1446—1448.

¹⁹⁶ Acharn. 509, sqq.; comp. Pac. 603, sqq.

¹⁹⁷ Pac. 1463—1465.

¹⁹⁸ Pac. 623, αἰσχροκερδεῖς καὶ διειρωνόξενοι; Acharn. 308, οἷσιν οὐτε βωμός, οὐτε πίστις, οὐθ' ὄρκος μένει; Lysistr. 629, οἷσιν οὐδὲν πιστόν, εἰ μή περ λύκῳ κεχηνότι.

¹⁹⁹ Lysistr. 1128, sqq.

²⁰⁰ Equit. 41, κυανοτρῶξ Δῆμος; Av. 40,

— Ἀθηναῖοι δ' ἀεὶ

ἐπὶ τῶν δακῶν ᾄδουσι πάντα τὸν βίον.

²⁰¹ Vesp. 1105, sqq.

πρῶτα μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἡμῶν ζῶον ἡρεθισμένον

μᾶλλον ὀξύθυμόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ δυσκολώτερον, κ. τ. λ.

²⁰² Nub. 1034, sqq. Compare the comprehensive dissertation of Süvern alluded to above.

earnestness of purpose and fearless sincerity before us, can we for a moment question the vast importance of the ancient comedy, as the voluntary auxiliary of the state, in the task of watching over the laws and the public morals, and as a candid and rigorous censorship, which dealt out with an even hand their just measure of censure to high and low. But in considering the extensive power of such an engine, we are naturally led to make the following enquiries :

1. When the comic poet attacked an individual, by falsely accusing him of contravening the laws, were not the people and the authorities provoked to bring the offender to justice ?
2. Did not the powerful demagogues endeavour to revenge themselves on the poets ; or did not the parties whom they had accused, and who hoped to be able to vindicate their conduct, call them to account as calumniators ?
3. Did not the state restrain or abridge the comic license, when it witnessed individuals and the community at large grossly maligned, and even saw that the gods themselves were not exempt from their presumptuous attacks ? or was not the audacious comic poet reprimanded, when the tragedian Phrynichus had been fined for too deeply affecting the feelings of the Athenians ?

The collection of facts for enabling us to answer these questions is very limited, and the statements of some of the ancients have given rise to misapprehension on the subject.

That the denunciations of the comedy were not without effect, would appear to result from the

accounts that the knights compelled Clean to pay a fine of five talents²⁰³, probably shortly after the representation of the Babylonians. But we are not accurately informed what official body instituted proceedings upon the occasion. In forming an estimate of the effects calculated to arise from the accusations of the comic poets, we must reflect; that as there were very few cases in which the Athenian state was entitled to commence legal proceedings against an offender itself, it was necessary to find a citizen who should appear as public prosecutor, but that no immediate steps could be taken by the tribunals, in consequence of any thing that might have fallen from the poet²⁰⁴. Moreover, to many of the persons whom he denounced, punishment had already been awarded in due course of law, to which the flagellation in the comedy was a sort of supplemental process, whilst a number of the charges enumerated above, such as those connected with demagogy—except that, perhaps, termed “betraying the demus²⁰⁵,” did not fall under those classes of offences for which the laws had made determinate provision, as the prosecutor was required to ground his accusation on some distinct and substantive fact. Now it may, indeed, be urged, that such was the alarming height

²⁰³ Aristoph. Acharn. 6. 7, and Schol. This circumstance is also alluded to in the speech of the demus, Equit. 1145;

τηρῷ γὰρ ἐκάστοι' αὐ-
τούς, οὐδὲ δοκῶν ὄραν,
κλέπτοντας· ἔπειτ' ἀναγ-
κάζω πάλιν ἐξεμεῖν
ἄττ' ἂν κεκλόφωσί μου
κημὸν καταμηλῶν.

²⁰⁴ The statement in Plut. Pericl. 32; Ἀσπασία δίκην ἔφευγεν ἀσεβείας, Ἑρμίππου τοῦ κωμωδοποίου διώκοντος, refers to a regular prosecution.

²⁰⁵ Γραφή ἀπατήσεως τοῦ δήμου, related to the ἀδικία πρὸς τὸν δῆμον.

which sycophancy had reached in the time of Aristophanes, that a word was sufficient to supply materials for its rancour and malevolence; but so far was the comedy from affording any support to this hateful system, that it uniformly pursued it with the most relentless severity. However, the fine imposed upon Cleon, compared with what Callias and others were condemned to pay, would appear to have been inflicted by the people more in jest than in earnest.

With regard to the vengeance of those powerful demagogues, whom the comic poets ventured to attack, Cleon is asserted to have insinuated that Aristophanes had spoken disparagingly of the demus²⁰⁶; but there is no evidence that he ever formally accused him of the offence; in the Acharnians, Aristophanes vindicates himself from the calumnious insinuations of Cleon, by declaring, that he had never failed in the respect he owed the demus²⁰⁷. The slanderous aspersion or accusation in question, must have followed close upon the representation of the Babylonians²⁰⁸; for Cleon seems to have remained quiet after the performance of the Knights. It is likewise asserted, that Eupolis was drowned by Alcibiades²⁰⁹, whom he had ridiculed in the Baptæ. Eratosthenes,

²⁰⁶ Aristoph. Acharn. 379.

είσελκύσας γάρ μ' εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον
διέβαλλε, καὶ ψευδῇ κατεγλώττιζέ μου κ. τ. λ.

Conf. 502, in which ξένων παρόντων are the emphatic words.

οὐ γάρ με καὶ νῦν διαβαλεῖ Κλέων, ὅτι
ξένων παρόντων τὴν πόλιν κακῶς λέγω.

Conf. Acharn. 631,

ὥς κωμῶδῃ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν, καὶ τὸν δῆμον καθυβρίζει.

²⁰⁷ Arist. Acharn. 632, sqq.; 655, sqq.

²⁰⁸ Schol. Acharn. 386.

²⁰⁹ See the Citat. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. Harl. 2. 407; Meineke, ubi sup. p. 37; Buttmann on the Colyttia and the Baptæ in Abb. d. Berl. Akad. 1823, 1823, Histor. Philol. Kl. 218.

even in his time, raised doubts as to the credibility of this story²¹⁰; but whether true or false, no general rule can be drawn from the conduct of Alcibiades. Upon the whole, it may be assumed, that as the Athenian was insensible to delicacy and shame in word and mien, so he was deficient in a refined sense of honour; the latter was seldom affected by verbal insults, and the abuses flowing from the right of public prosecution and the ever-watchful malice of the sycophants, had so accustomed the Athenian to accusations of all kinds, that his peace of mind was not likely to be ruffled by the cursory animadversions of comedy.

As to the restraint imposed upon the comic humour by the state in general, we are informed in a Scholium, that it was forbidden to attack the dead²¹¹; but the very passage of Aristophanes, to which this remark is annexed, presents an example of the contrary²¹². Again, Aristophanes accuses Pericles after his death²¹³, and ridicules Euripides in the Frogs. Examples to the same effect might easily be multiplied, and this Scholium²¹⁴, like so many others, is evidently nothing but a corruption of the text itself. A second says that it was forbidden to attack the Archon. But in the Babylonians, Aristophanes had not scrupled to satirize magistrates, as well elective as those appointed by lot²¹⁵. Is it therefore probable that the Archon formed the sole exception? Ameinias is also ridiculed in the Wasps, which was performed during his archonship²¹⁶. If such a law, indeed,

²¹⁰ Cicero, Epist. ad. Att. 6. 1.

²¹² Compare above, n. 146, 147.

²¹⁴ Ad. Nub. 31.

²¹⁶ Vesp. 64. 1267. See Hermann's doubts as to the law in the note on the Schol. Nub. 31.

²¹¹ Schol. Pac. 649.

²¹³ See above, n. 189.

²¹⁵ Schol. Acharn. 386.

existed, it cannot have been very strictly observed. The Areopagus, however, appears to have enjoyed exemption from the comic satire, and upon the same principle the Areopagites were forbidden to write comedies²¹⁷. Finally, it is stated that the exhibition of comedies was prohibited as early as the archonship of Merychides, Ol. 85. 1; 440. B. C., but this law having been repealed soon afterwards, Ol. 85. 4, it was once more forbidden to render individuals the objects of ridicule by name or personal imitation²¹⁸. Antimachus, the rival of Aristophanes, is said to have been the author of this statute, but its date is uncertain. It was remarked above²¹⁹, that Aristophanes did not desist from his attacks, even during the oligarchy; but under the domination of the Thirty, the comic poets were probably held in check through fear, though perhaps unrestrained by any positive law; they subsequently resumed their wonted freedom of speech, of which they do not appear to have been deprived by any express enactment, till at length the parabasis, the soul of the old comedy, was suppressed, and the chorus omitted, in consequence of the poverty which began to pervade all ranks of the community²²⁰. It was not till Athens was occupied by Macedonian garrisons that a final stop was put to the practice of attacking individuals in the dialogue, and exhibiting likenesses of them on the masks²²¹.

In conclusion, it may be observed of the free-

²¹⁷ Plut. de Gloria Athen. 348. B. Frankfort.

²¹⁸ Schol. Aristoph. Acharn. 67 and 1149.

²¹⁹ See note 158.

²²⁰ See Platon. Præf. Aristoph. ed. Küster, p. xi.

²²¹ Ibid. See below, append. IV., where all the accounts on the subject are collected.

dom of comedy upon the whole, that it produced no serious impression whatever upon the minds of the spectators, that it had from its earliest origin enjoyed a sort of privilege and licence to attack individuals under cover of the mask, and that the predilection of the Athenians for this sort of harsh and cutting satire continued undiminished as long as they retained their prosperity and independence; but, as on the one side no serious evils were supposed to result from it, so on the other it could seldom become the effective medium of sound advice or salutary reproof²²². This is the only manner in which it is possible to account for the levity with which the gods are spoken of in the *Frogs*²²³; but it was a very different case with tragedy—when Euripides was prosecuted because he had spoken of the oath with seeming irreverence²²⁴. Still the Athenians were unwilling to experience real emotion by witnessing the representation of recent calamities or the sorrows of Greeks with whom they were upon terms of friendship.

bb. The Demagogues, and the changes which the Athenian Democracy underwent during the Peloponnesian War.

§ 65. To complete the foregoing picture, it is necessary to subjoin a sketch of the character and proceedings of the several popular leaders, who amidst the vicissitudes of peace and war, influ-

²²² I cannot concur in the opinion of Kanngiesser as to the benefits which resulted from the censure of the comic poets, (kom. Bühne, 471, sqq.)

²²³ Comp. Böttiger Aristophan. Deor. Gentil. Impun. Irrisor.

²²⁴ The verse was—

‘Η γλῶσσ’ ὁμώμοχ’, ἥ δὲ φρήν ἀνώμοτος.

See Aristoph. Rhet. 3. 16.

enced the destinies of Athens. Most of the persons who attained distinction a short time before, as well as during and after the war, are known to us from the portraits of them transmitted by the comic poets; some are not of sufficient importance to require special attention, and history is unacquainted with others beyond the particulars respecting them which occur in comedy and its commentators. But before we revert to those who demand a second mention, a few words must be premised concerning those patriotic heroes who, regardless of the machinations of domestic factions, dedicated themselves to the performance of their official duties, as Strategi, and overlooking the unworthiness of those for whom they fought, exposed their lives in defence of their country with the devotedness and intrepidity of martyrs. Their deeds recal the conduct of the high-minded Myronides¹. Such were the brave, skilful, and fortunate naval hero Phormio², who fully deserves the place assigned to him by Aristophanes³ at the side of Myronides; Lamachus, who, notwithstanding the loud and boisterous words in which his martial feeling expressed itself, and his military pomp of armour and crest⁴, was a brave man, and disdained to pervert his office to the object of enriching himself⁵; the enterprising Paches⁶, who, upon being caught in the snares of sycophants upon his return from Mitylene and the neighbouring coast, drew his sword and killed himself in

¹ See § 57. n. 92, sqq.

² See Thucyd. 1. 64, sqq., especially 2. 80, sqq.

³ Aristoph. Pac. 801, sqq.

⁴ Aristoph. Acharn. 566.

⁵ He was so poor that his coat and shoes formed items in the accounts of his disbursements. Plut. Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 272.

⁶ Thucyd. 3. 16.

the presence of his judges⁷; Demosthenes, capable of vast enterprises⁸, formed to gain the hearts of nations⁹, and who, though not formally invested with the command, performed great actions¹⁰; Hippocrates and Eurymedon, his companions in arms, the former commander of the fleet in the expedition to Bœotia¹¹, which ended in the disaster of Delium, and the latter admiral upon several occasions in the Ionian and Sicilian seas¹², and at length commander of the auxiliary fleet to Sicily, and involved in the same destruction with Demosthenes, through the impolitic operations of Nicias¹³; and, lastly, at the conclusion of the war, Conon, whose fidelity and caution presented an honourable contrast to the imbecility or treachery of his fellow-commanders at Ægos Potamoi, whilst his activity after the war was no less conspicuous in his efforts to restore the shattered power of his country.

The history of the demagogues who arose after the death of Pericles¹⁴, exhibits a political division and opposition of parties (*ἀντιπολίτεια*) indeed, but without the substantial difference which once prevailed between aristocrats and democrats; in lieu of this we behold arrayed against each other the friends of legality and order on the one side, and the base flatterers of the populace, the brawlers and disturbers of the public peace, on the other.

⁷ Plat. Nic. 6.

⁸ Thucyd. 3. 91, sqq.

⁹ Concerning the Acharnians see Thucyd. 7. 57.

¹⁰ Thucyd. 4. 2, sqq., the fortification of Pylos.

¹¹ Thucyd. 4. 76, sqq.

¹² Thucyd. 4. 2.

¹³ Thucyd. 7. 42, sqq.

¹⁴ Comp. Ruhnken, Hist. Orat. Græcorum, prefixed to his Rutilius Lupus, and published in Reiske, Orat. Gr. vol. 8; which, however, only contains ample information concerning the period after the Peloponnesian war. See some particulars on the subject in Kortüm, Gesch. d. Hellen. Staatsv. 176—187.

Again, the wealthy class¹⁵, and the luxurious and inquisitive mob, with its rapacious leaders. To these we may add, a newly-constituted oligarchical faction, which arose towards the end of the war and had nothing in common with the partisans of the ancient aristocracy, opposed to the bulk of the people, who were passionate adherents of the democracy;—among the last there were many true and upright patriots.

CLEON AND NICIAS.

After the death of Pericles, Lysicles, the dealer in sheep, who had married Aspasia, and Eucrates the flax-seller¹⁶, became rival candidates for the popular favour; but their short career was not marked by any event of moment. Hereupon Cleon the leather-seller¹⁷, and the wealthy Nicias, became for several years the most prominent characters on the political stage.

Cleon¹⁸ had already exerted himself to stir up the multitude against Pericles in the latter part of that great man's life¹⁹; but after his death he employed all his clamour, turbulence, and audacity²⁰, to inflame the evil passions of the populace, and pursued his rival Nicias and the moderate party with undaunted effrontery²¹, and implacable fero-

¹⁵ Aristoph. *Equit.* 224. 225.

¹⁶ See the preceding section, n. 140.

¹⁷ *Βυρσοδέψης*, Aristoph. *Equit.* 44; *Nub.* 581. *Βυρσοπώλης*, *Equit.* 136. 737. 848.

¹⁸ See Kortüm in the *Philologisch. Beiträgen aus der Schweiz.* 1819, Passow in Wachler's *Philomathie*, v. 1.

¹⁹ Plut. *Pericl.* 33, where see Hermippus' *Anapæsts.* Comp. Himerius, p. 318, Wernsd. ed.

²⁰ *Βορβοροτάραξις*, Aristoph. *Equit.* 309.

²¹ *Βδελυρία* and *τόλμη*, Plut. *Nic.* 2.

city. Less an orator²² than a brawler, he ran backwards and forwards and made the most violent gesticulations during his harangues²³; he was a boaster, a sycophant, and an egotist, and by dint of impetuosity and noise easily drowned the voices of the few judicious persons who attempted to make themselves heard, and obtained such an ascendant over the congenial rabble, that they did homage to the idol they laughed at and despised. All the ancients are unanimous in their accounts of Cleon's baseness and impudence, and in addition to the poetical portrait of Aristophanes, we have the masterly historical sketch of Thucydides. The latter gives an accurate description of the two most important events of Cleon's life, viz., the debate on the punishment of the Mitylenæans²⁴, and his acceptance of the command of the expedition against Sphacteria²⁵. In Thucydides, who has faithfully reported the speeches made upon the occasion²⁶, we perceive the insidious malevolence of Cleon's eloquence, who after having on the preceding day caused a decree to be passed for putting all the males amongst the Mitylenæans to death, and for reducing the women and children to slavery, dared to urge the necessity of imparting stability to the laws, and raising the more ignorant members of the community whom he declared to

²² Cic. Brut. 7, describes him as "turbulentum illum quidem civem, sed tamen eloquentem;" but in Aristophanes, Equit. 36, he is said to have *φάλαινα ἔχουσα φωνήν ἱμπεπρημένης ὕδός*. He is also announced as a Paphlagonian, which word contains an allusion to *παφλάζειν*, to bubble like boiling water. See Schol. Equit. 2.

²³ Plut. Nic. 8 :—*πρῶτος ἐν τῷ δημηγορεῖν ἀνακραγῶν καὶ περισπάσας τὸ ἱμάτιον καὶ τὸν μηρὸν πατάξας καὶ δρόμῳ μετὰ τοῦ λέγειν ἅμα χρησάμενος, κ. τ. λ.* Conf. Schol. Æsch. c. Timarch. 726.

²⁴ Thucyd. 3. 36, sqq.

²⁵ Thucyd. 4. 28.

²⁶ Thucyd. 1. 22.

be better citizens, above those who possessed intelligence and judgment. This time, however, the impression produced by his sanguinary advice was counteracted by the speech of the brave Diotodus, and mercy prevailed in the breasts of the Athenians after the silence of the night had restored them to reason and recollection. Cleon, whose thirst of blood could not be slaked, once more proposed a decree for the extermination of the refractory Scionæans²⁷, which, however, was not carried into effect till after his death²⁸. In the debates on the command of the expedition against Sphacteria, he poured forth all the sycophantic malevolence of his nature. Our chief attention must be directed to the conduct of his rival Nicias, and the disposition of the Athenian demos towards Cleon. Nicias endeavours to shield himself against slander and persecution by resigning the command; Cleon first brags and then fears to be taken at his word, whereupon the people begin to grow merry²⁹. Cleon is laughed at, but such is their levity, that the step, which every one knows to be ridiculous³⁰, is seriously resolved upon, and he is entrusted with the command of the expedition. It must be confessed, that upon this occasion the more judicious had good reason to second the folly of the multitude, as they expected that the demagogue would be unable to perform his promise of bringing the Lacedæmonians, who

²⁷ Thucyd. 4. 122.

²⁸ Thucyd. 5. 32.

²⁹ Thucyd. 4. 28: οἱ δὲ (οἷον ὄχλος φιλεῖ ποιεῖν), ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ὁ Κλέων ὑπέφευγε τὸν πλοῦν καὶ ἐξανεχώρει τὰ εἰρημένα, τόσῳ ἐπεκελεύοντο τῇ Νικίᾳ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ ἐκείνῳ ἐπεβόων πλεῖν.

³⁰ Thucyd. ubi sup.: τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνέπεσι μὲν τι καὶ γέλωτος τῇ κουφολογίᾳ αὐτοῦ, κ. τ. λ.

were besieged in Sphacteria, within twenty days dead or alive to Athens, by which means they hoped to effect his final destruction. The gross levity of this proceeding, and the interchange of low familiarity between Cleon and the Athenian demus probably have no example in history. The people were assembled and awaited the coming of Cleon, who was expected to bring forward a proposition. After a long delay he appeared, with a garland round his head, and requested the assembly to adjourn till the next day, as he had guests in his house, and had sacrificed to the gods. The people laughed³¹, and showed no signs of anger. Until the expedition against Sphacteria, Cleon had remained at home and strenuously advocated the prosecution of the war, because he thought that it afforded him the best opportunity of concealing his own baseness³²; when, however, his prediction had been verified, as though Fate had specially interposed to justify the capricious choice of the Athenians, he began to think himself an able general, and undertook the chief command against Brasidas and the rebellious Chalcidians; but after incurring the contempt and aversion of his soldiers³³, he was at length defeated and killed at Amphipolis. Though poor at the commencement of his career, he left a fortune of fifty talents³⁴.

Nicias, the opponent of Cleon, who had attained eminence during the lifetime of Pericles, with whom he had been associated in the command³⁵, was selected by the upper orders and the more re-

³¹ Plut. Nic. 7.

³² Thucyd. 5. 7.

³³ Plut. Nic. 2.

³⁴ Plut. Nic. 9.

³⁵ Ælian. V. H. 10. 17.

spectable members of the community in general, as the man whose authority and influence would prove the most effectual counterpoise to the overgrown power of Cleon. Like his predecessor Cimon, his policy inclined him towards Sparta³⁶, though this by no means diminished the advantages which his country derived from his courage and military talents. But the confidence which the people reposed in him by so frequently appointing him to the command of their armies, was little calculated to enhance his power as a demagogue. The strategia, unless wielded with the genius and vigour of a Themistocles or a Pericles, did not secure to its holder any considerable influence over the constitution in general; it rather served to withdraw him from public affairs, and to expose him to dangers and difficulties abroad, whilst the demagogue securely swayed the popular mind according to his will and pleasure at home. Now, though Nicias never failed, during his residence in Athens, to use all his efforts to ingratiate himself with the people, he was not possessed of those natural advantages by which he could hope to outstrip his rival Cleon. The main prop of his demagoguery was his wealth³⁷, and whether from genuine liberality or from calculation, instead of drawing on the public money to gratify the love of show and amusement in the people, he defrayed the expenses of spectacles, etc., from his own private fortune³⁸; but his largesses were not supported by brilliant personal endowments—the people looked more to

³⁶ On the subject of his vanity in endeavouring to perpetuate his name by means of a treaty of peace with Sparta, consult Thucyd. 5. 16.

³⁷ Plut. Nic. 3:—οὐσία—προέχων ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἐδημαγώγει.

³⁸ Plut. ubi sup.

the gift than the giver. The talents of Nicias were hardly above mediocrity, and he was signally deficient in activity and self-confidence. Want of natural genius made him slow; he laboured with difficulty in transacting the public business; he endeavoured to atone, by industry and circumspection, for his want of that quickness of conception requisite for devising proper expedients in sudden emergencies³⁹; his friends commended his laborious assiduity, but the people usually judge according to the promptness and decision with which a plan is executed, and they look—and justly too—less to the will than the act. But this want of self-confidence was signally calamitous to Nicias; he asked the advice of soothsayers, in whom he implicitly believed⁴⁰. This crippled his efforts in the field, and eventually involved him and thousands more in one common destruction⁴¹. By passing so much of his time in the retirement of his house or tent, in superstitiously trying to interpret prognostics and signs, he became wholly unfitted for the duties of active life, and lost that decision and reliance upon his own powers, which alone can ensure success. Besides his hesitation and delay, he was remarkable for reserve and a dread of publicity⁴². Pericles, too, had rarely shown himself to the people; but that which had borne the character of greatness and dignity in him, was mere weakness in Nicias; hence Nicias feared the people as much as they feared

³⁹ Plut. Nic. 5.

⁴⁰ Thucyd. 7. 50 :—*θειασμῶ—προσκείμενος*. Comp. Plut. Nic. 4.

⁴¹ Thucyd. 7. 50, sqq.

⁴² Plut. Nic. 11 :—*τῆς διαίτης τὸ μὴ φιλόανθρωπον μηδὲ δημοτικόν, ἀλλ' ἄμικτον καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν*. Comp. 5.

Pericles. Nicias made himself dependent upon the meanest of the multitude, and lavished his treasures upon sycophants in order to purchase exemption from their attacks⁴³. This rendered him irresolute and timorous when he should have evinced most boldness and determination, and induced him to retreat at the very moment he ought to have advanced. He dreaded the impetuosity of the rabble more than the enemy in the field. But unmitigated indignation and contempt are excited by the pusillanimity and hesitation which he displayed when, by a bold and decisive step, he might have brought back to Athens the still considerable remains of the army and fleet from Syracuse. Why, even admitting that he would have been made answerable for the failure⁴⁴, did he not rather sacrifice himself *for* the Athenians than *with* them⁴⁵? This man was no safeguard or protection to his adherents—an evil the more serious in its consequences at a time when parties, instead of strengthening their leaders, looked to them for countenance and support.

ALCIBIADES WITH HIS FRIENDS AND OPPONENTS.

Nicias having obtained a wider scope for his operations through the death of Cleon, was for some years enabled to assert the first place in the state; and though the people did not uniformly adhere to him, and he was not without competitors and opponents through all the variations of popular feeling, no one succeeded in permanently supplant-

⁴³ Plut. Nic. 4.

⁴⁴ See his anxiety on this head, Thucyd. 7. 14.

⁴⁵ Plut. Nic. 22, reminds us of the memorable words of the Byzantine Leon: Βούλομαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ ἡμῶν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν ἀποθανεῖν.

ing him. This is less to be attributed to any increase of his personal influence, than to the utter baseness of the first man who rose up against him.

This was no other than the lamp-maker Hyperbolus⁴⁶, an acknowledged knave, reprobated as an alien⁴⁷, descended from a father who had been branded, and had laboured as a public slave in the mines⁴⁸, and an abandoned mother, whom the comic poets pursued with the most unsparing ridicule⁴⁹; and lastly, convicted of unfair dealings, by mixing up lead with the metal he used for his lamps, etc.⁵⁰. Such was the man who, upon the death of Cleon, in the general dearth of honesty and principle, thrust himself forward, and by dint of effrontery and clamour⁵¹ succeeded for a time in engrossing a large share of public attention⁵². Although perhaps still more depraved than Cleon, he had neither strength of mind nor subtlety enough to be equally mischievous. His cabals against Nicias and Alcibiades or Phæax had nearly secured him the chief authority in the state, when his two opponents combined, and caused him to be expelled by ostracism⁵³. But so flagrant was the iniquity of his character, that the Athenians repented of having expelled him in so honourable a manner, and soon afterwards a decree was passed to the effect that ostracism having been disgraced

⁴⁶ See concerning him the Schol. Aristoph. Pac. 680, and Vesp. 1001.

⁴⁷ This was even indicated by the Barbarian word *marikas*, which formed the title of the comedy of Eupolis. Comp. Meineke, Quæst. Scen. 56.

⁴⁸ Sch. Vesp. ubi sup.

⁴⁹ Aristoph. Nub. 552, sqq., with the Scholia.

⁵⁰ Aristoph. Nub. 1065.

⁵¹ Plut. Alcib. 13.

⁵² 'Εν δὲ διχοσυσσίῳ καὶ ὁ πάγκατος ἔμπορε τιμῆς, supplied by Plut. Nic. 11.

⁵³ Plut. Nic. 11.

by its application to Hyperbolus should from that time forth be abolished ⁵⁴.

Somewhat similar to the relation of Hyperbolus to Cleon, was that of Callias, the son of Hipponicus, to Nicias. Of ample fortune, sprung from a noble family ⁵⁵, but wholly destitute of useful accomplishments, he was notorious for low debauchery; surrounded by parasites whom the extravagance with which he wasted his patrimony had drawn together, he was regarded with contempt by all good men ⁵⁶, without even being respected by the multitude.

To the wealthy class and the party opposed to Hyperbolus belonged Phæax; his birth was noble, and though rather remarkable for loquacity than rhetorical art ⁵⁷, he nevertheless had address enough to extricate himself from several dangerous contests ⁵⁸. His career was short ⁵⁹.

But the man who far outstripped all competitors was Alcibiades, the son of Clinias. In him were united two remarkable characteristics of the times, the arts of the sophists, and the doctrines of Socrates. Alcibiades is the representative of that age in which wisdom strove for the last time to obtain the direction of political affairs, but being worsted in the conflict with a generation nurtured in the artifices of the sophists, withdrew from pub-

⁵⁴ Plut. ubi sup.; Aristid. 7. Conf. Thucyd. 8. 75, where his death during the Samian tumults is related.

⁵⁵ Palmer exercitatt. 754; Clavier, sur la Famille de Callias, in the Mém. de l'Institut. class. d'hist. t. 3; Heindorf, ad Plat. Protag. 409; Böckh, Pub. Econ. 2. 14, sqq., etc.

⁵⁶ See very copious references in Meineke, Quæst. Scen. 51, sqq.

⁵⁷ λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνατώτατος λέγειν. Eupolis ap. Plut. Nic. 13; comp. Arist. Eq. 1377, sqq.

⁵⁸ Schol. Aristoph. Equit. 1388.

⁵⁹ Comp. also on the subject of the relations between Phæax and Andocides, Ruhnken Hist. Orat. Græc. (ante Rut. Lup.) XLVII. seq.

lic life, and retired into the halls of the schools. Socrates, decidedly hostile to that superficial instruction which the sophists communicated to the Athenian youth in lieu of solid knowledge, was, notwithstanding the repeated victories he had gained over them by means of his superiority in their own arts, unable to counteract that influence which they exercised over the minds of the youthful Athenians, who pursued with avidity those outward and specious accomplishments which were calculated to secure them an ascendant over the multitude. By applying their arts to the objects of political life, they gained vast numbers of adherents, and rendered their opinions and principles generally prevalent. Alcibiades and Critias both shook off the irksome discipline of Socrates, the former proving recreant to his master's lessons, and the latter becoming his personal enemy.

Deinomache the mother of Alcibiades was descended from the house of Clisthenes and Megacles the Alcmaeonids⁶⁰; his father Clinias had sent a trireme and two hundred men at his own expense to the battle of Salamis⁶¹; he was killed at Coronea, Ol. 83. 2; 447. B. C.⁶². Alcibiades and Clinias were both very young at the time of his death⁶³. Alcibiades' first appearance in public life cannot exactly be determined; he seems to have given indications of luxury and perverseness when still a youth, and a portrait of his character is supposed to be given in the *Dædaleis* of Ari-

⁶⁰ See the investigation in Böckh, *explic. Pindar.* 302, sqq.

⁶¹ Herod. 8. 17.

⁶² Plato, *Alcib.* 1. 112. B.

⁶³ Plato, *Protag.* 320. A. where see Heindorf. Compare on the year of Alcibiades' birth, Meier v. d. Greifswald. *Lect. Catal.* Summer, 1820.

stophanes⁶⁴; still even at that early period he had distinguished himself at the side of Socrates in the battle of Potidæa⁶⁵; when a young man he is enumerated amongst the εὐρύπρωκτοι and praters in the Acharnians of Aristophanes, Ol. 88. 3; 426. B. C⁶⁶.; he fought with distinction in the battle of Delium, Ol. 89. 1, and preserved the life of Socrates, who had previously saved his at the battle of Potidæa⁶⁷; the first occasion upon which he influenced a popular decree was when the tributes of the allies were raised, a short time before Ol. 89. 3⁶⁸; but we behold him with the full power and influence of a demagogue, Olymp. 90. 1; 420. B. C., in the twelfth year of the war, when he employed all his efforts to bring about an alliance between Athens and Argos, and to annul the peace which Nicias had effected with Sparta⁶⁹.

The relation in which Alcibiades stood to the people, as well as the formation of his political character, must be referred to his boyhood. Even in infancy he attracted universal attention, as the descendant of one of the oldest and most illustrious houses, whose ancient aristocratic qualities the demos still regarded with a sort of veneration⁷⁰, as the heir to immense wealth⁷¹, and, what was not his least distinction in the eyes of the Athenians, as a faultless model of beauty⁷²; Peri-

⁶⁴ Süvern on the Clouds of Aristophanes, 38.

⁶⁵ Plut. Alcibiad. 7; Isocrat. de Bigis, 615.

⁶⁶ Aristoph. Acharn. 716.

⁶⁷ Plut. Alcib. 7; Plat. Sympos. 219. E. sqq.

⁶⁸ Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 431.

⁶⁹ Thucyd. 5. 43, sqq.

⁷⁰ Thucyd. ubi sup.

⁷¹ Ælian. V. H. 3. 28; Plut. Alcib. 11; comp. Böckh, Pub. Econ. 2. 17, sqq.

⁷² Plut. Alcib. 1.

cles his guardian⁷³, and Socrates, strove in vain to eradicate from his mind the baneful germ of evil passions whose growth was but too vigorously promoted by the blind love of the demus⁷⁴; he soon discovered his sensual propensities and his tendency to sophistical subtilty. The latter quality is attested by the discourse which he held with Pericles on the laws⁷⁵, before he was twenty years of age, and the advice which he is reputed to have given that statesman as to passing his accounts⁷⁶. Conscious of possessing distinguished qualities both of body and mind, immense wealth and unbounded popularity, he felt unlimited confidence in his own powers, and in expressing this feeling without any reserve⁷⁷, he merely acted in conformity to the common practice of the Greeks in general, in enumerating their own merits without blushing, but he exhibited a haughtiness of bearing and a love of outrage such as Athens had never before beheld. Though he was pliant and cringing to the people at large, he treated individuals of all ranks of society with unheard of insolence⁷⁸; those whom he insulted seldom ventured to seek redress, lest they should suffer still more from the effects of his vengeance; he is a complete personification of the arrogance and love of outrage which characterized

⁷³ Plato, Protag. 320. A.

⁷⁴ See an admirable delineation of a youth like Alcibiades, though without express mention of his name as well as of the associates who divert his attention from philosophy, Plato, Repub. 6. 494.

⁷⁵ Xenoph. Mem. 1. 2. 40, sqq.

⁷⁶ Plut. Alcib. 7; Pericl. 23; Diod. 12. 38.

⁷⁷ Thucyd. 6. 16, sqq. Amongst other things: οὐδέ γε ἄδικον, ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ μέγα φρονούντα μὴ ἴσον εἶναι. Plato, Alcib. 1. 104. A: οὐδεὶς φῆς ἄνθρωπον ἐνδεῆ εἶναι εἰς οὐδέν.

⁷⁸ Ps. Andoc. adv. Alcib. 119: ἀθρόους μὲν ὑμᾶς κολακεύων, ἵνα δ' ἕκαστον προπηλακίζων. Plato, Symp. 216: αἰσχύνεσθαι δύναται οὐκ, κ. τ. λ. Comp. Thucyd. 6. 115, and examples, Plut. Alcib. 8. 12. 16, etc.

his native city, and in falling in with the tastes and feelings of the multitude, his object was to gain the chief power in the state, not with a view to develope and augment its resources, but that he might break the laws with the greater impunity. Pericles feared shame alone, Alcibiades blushed at nothing; the former endeavoured to render his authority an emblem of the wisdom and strength of the law, the conduct of the latter was one tissue of illegal acts; the aspect of the one expressed the gravity and serenity of the law, the other marked his real profligacy beneath the bland smiles of the demagogue; the one displayed the dignity, confidence, and kindness of a king, the other the intrigue, craft, and cruelty of a tyrant⁷⁹. His largesses were designed to impart lustre to his demagogy; the whole of Greece gazed with admiration at the seven chariots which he sent to the Olympic games⁸⁰, and loudly applauded the munificence of the victor, who feasted all the spectators at his own expense⁸¹. The vigour of his constitution enabled him to indulge without restraint the amorous propensities of his nature, and in drinking and wrestling he found few competitors⁸².

The feelings of the people towards him at the commencement of his career, may be collected from their endeavours to catch a quail which had escaped from him—a proceeding that reminds us of the dissolution of the assembly, on account of the

⁷⁹ Ps. Andoc. adv. Alcib. 126: — τοὺς μὲν λόγους δημαγωγοῦ, τὰ δ' ἔργα τυράννου παρέχων.

⁸⁰ Thucyd. 6. 16; Plut. Alcib. 11.

⁸¹ Athen. 1. 3. E.; *ibid.* 12. 534. B. on the extravagance of Alcibiades upon other occasions.

⁸² Cornel. Nep. Alcib. 11.

⁸³ Plut. Alcib. 10; *ibid.* Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 191.

feast in Cleon's house; their feelings towards the man are very felicitously expressed by Aristophanes⁸⁴.

The wanton excesses of Alcibiades were for a long time looked upon as juvenile errors and human weaknesses⁸⁵; but the number of those whom he had insulted, and who longed for vengeance, increasing daily, the more frequently the people witnessed the injuries it was in his power to commit, the more disposed they became to listen to those who insinuated that he aspired to the tyranny. His authority was solely and exclusively founded in the favour of the people, and the party by which he was supported was by no means equal in numbers to that by which he was opposed; he was the leader of a Hetaireia, it is true⁸⁶, but this consisted more of the companions of his pleasures, than of men bound to him by a community of political feeling; and upon the whole he was more formed to gain friends than to keep them⁸⁷; hence, a change in the popular feeling would of necessity leave him deserted and alone. His opponents did not so much consist of those who held opposite political opinions, as of the vast numbers he had mortified and thrown into the background, and whose envy and malignity he had excited; to these must likewise be added many true friends to their country. This is evident from the prosecution of the Hermocopidæ, in conse-

⁸⁴ Ποθεῖ μὲν, ἐχθαίρει δέ, βούλεται δ' ἔχειν. Ran. 1425.

⁸⁵ Plut. Alcib. 16.

⁸⁶ Isocrat. de Big. 605. Lange; conf. Krüger, Dionys. Halicarn. Historiographica, 363. n. 5; Süvern on the Clouds of Aristophanes, 33. See below, n. 134.

⁸⁷ Justin. 5. 2: in conciliandis amicitiarum studiis melior, quam in retinendis.

quence of which Alcibiades was obliged to quit the country; but this proceeding, which is almost without parallel in the annals of civilization, at the same time exhibits such a tissue of sycophancy, party-spirit, and personal animosity, aggravated by the clamour of political alarmists, and the blindness and fanaticism of the mob, that we indignantly exclaim against this abandoned people, and plainly perceive that they could not long escape the punishment due to their crimes.

The confusion which took possession of the minds of those engaged in the transaction itself, has extended to the accounts of it, some of which are imperfect and others discordant⁸⁸; still, it may not be altogether without advantage to examine them more minutely⁸⁹.

When the Athenian fleet was about to set sail for Sicily, all the Hermæ in the public streets were one morning found mutilated⁹⁰. The superstitious regarded this circumstance as an omen of evil to the armament then about to sail, whilst the suspicious construed it into an indication of a plot against the democracy; it was currently reported that it had been devised by the Syracusans or Corinthians, with the view of deterring the Athenians from the contemplated expedition⁹¹; and the infatuation of the multitude whose weak side had thus been assailed, easily brought this circumstance into connection with treason and conspiracy⁹².

The council met and the people assembled several

⁸⁸ These are, Thucyd. 6. 27: Andocid. de Myster. p. 6, sqq.; Plut. Alcib. 18, sqq.; Diodor. 13. 2; Isocrat. de Big., etc. See Append. v.

⁸⁹ Compare Sluiter, Lektion. Andocidæ, Lugd. Bat. 1804. cap. 3; Schömann de Comit. Athen. 190.

⁹⁰ Thucyd. 6. 27; Plut. Alcib. 18.

⁹¹ Plut. ubi sup.

⁹² Thucyd. 6. 27: καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μείζονως ἐλάμβανον, κ. τ. λ.

times within a few days⁹³, and a reward was offered to him who would denounce the offender⁹⁴. The enemies of Alcibiades now began their operations. Without strictly confining themselves to the affair of the Hermæ, they resolved to accuse him of two grave crimes—high treason and profanation of the mysteries; their hopes of success were chiefly founded in the notorious excitability of the people, and the ease with which one prosecution could in Athens be mixed up with another, and rendered more dangerous. They, moreover, probably anticipated that Alcibiades would be deprived of the command, and that upon the departure of the army, his main support, they would find less difficulty in crushing him. Meanwhile, the preparations being completed, an assembly was convened by the three generals, Nicias, Lamachus, and Alcibiades⁹⁵, in which Pythonicus arose and made an Eisangelia against Alcibiades, charging him with impiety, as he, with his friends and associates, had given mock-celebrations of the mysteries⁹⁶, in confirmation of which he appealed to the testimony of Andromachus, the slave of Alcibiades. The demagogue Androcles⁹⁷, his most inveterate enemy, was especially active in bringing forward witnesses⁹⁸. But nothing respecting the mutilation of the Hermæ was elicited⁹⁹. Alcibiades denied the charge, and offered to abide the event of a trial¹⁰⁰. At this

⁹³ Plut. ubi sup.⁹⁴ Thucyd. ubi sup.⁹⁵ Andoc. 6.⁹⁶ —τὰ μυστήρια ποιοῦντα ἐν οἰκίᾳ μεθ' ἑτέρων. Besides this, Thucyd. 6. 28, εφ' ὕβρει.⁹⁷ Concerning him, see Ruhnken, Hist. or. Gr. 43.⁹⁸ Plut. Alcib. 19. According to Andocides, Pythonicus was the only accuser upon that occasion; but besides Plutarch, Thucydides also says, 6. 28, μηνύεται οὖν ἀπὸ μετοίκων τί τινων καὶ ἀκολούθων.⁹⁹ Thucyd. 6. 28.¹⁰⁰ Andoc. ubi sup.

juncture tumults broke out amongst the soldiers; the auxiliary troops from Argos and Mantinea refused to leave Alcibiades; and his enemies perceiving that their design of separating him from the army was not practicable at this moment, resolved upon prosecuting the matter no further for the present, and hastened the departure of the armament¹⁰¹. Hereupon the council was authorized to investigate the affair further¹⁰², and a series of fresh accusations was soon brought forward. Cimon's son, Thessalus, laid an *Eisangelia*¹⁰³ against Alcibiades and his companions before the council, and Androcles produced witnesses. The demagogues now exclaimed more loudly than before¹⁰⁴, that the desecration of the mysteries was only a preliminary to the overthrow of the democracy. The infuriated multitude were incapable of perceiving the connection between cause and effect; the accusers were believed before any thing was done to test the credibility of their allegations, and one of the persons accused, Polystratus, was immediately put to death, whilst several others, who had effected their escape, were condemned in their absence¹⁰⁵. Hereupon a Metœcus, called Teucer, who had taken refuge in Megara, offered to point out the guilty parties; and upon receiving an assurance of his personal safety, he gave in the names of eighteen citizens whom he accused of having mutilated the Hermaic statues and profaned the mysteries. Some of them fled, whilst others

¹⁰¹ Thucyd. 6. 29; Plut. Alc. 19¹⁰² Andoc. 8.¹⁰³ Plut. Alcib. 19.¹⁰⁴ Isocrat. de Big. 605: οἱ δὲ (the enemies of Alcibiades) τοὺς ῥήτορας ὑφ' αὐτοῖς ποιησάμενοι πάλιν ἤγειρον τὸ πρᾶγμα.¹⁰⁵ Andoc. 7.¹⁰⁶ Andoc. 7. 8.

were put to death ¹⁰⁶. Pisander and Charicles once more exclaimed that the state was in danger, and demanded that the investigation should be continued ¹⁰⁷. Cleonymus moved that a thousand drachmas should be given to the informers, but Pisander proposed ten thousand for Andromachus and a thousand for Teucer ¹⁰⁸. The information now given by a woman called Agariste, and Lydus a slave, seems to have had no immediate consequences, but in a short time still more citizens sought safety in flight ¹⁰⁹. The information of Dioclates was as flagitious in principle as it was pernicious in its results. This man declared that he knew those who had perpetrated the outrage, and that they were three hundred in number; fifty-two of them, whose names he mentioned, were immediately imprisoned. Such was the infatuation of the people, that they did not even perceive the gross delusion which was practised upon them, when one of the accusers asserted that he had seen the conspirators by moonlight, though it was just at the time of new moon ¹¹¹. The council now assembled, and Pisander made the illegal proposal of putting the accused to the rack ¹¹². This was not carried into execution, but the public infatuation now reached the highest pitch. Dioclates was crowned, and drawn in a car to the Prytaneum, where he was hailed as the saviour of the people ¹¹³; all the citizens were in arms, and the council passed the night in the citadel ¹¹⁴. No one now ventured to the market-place, for such was the fanaticism of

¹⁰⁷ Andoc. 18.¹⁰⁸ Andoc. 8.¹¹¹ Plut. 20; Diodor. 13. 2.¹¹³ Andoc. 19.¹⁰⁶ Andoc. 14.¹¹⁰ Andoc. 19, seq.¹¹² Andoc. 22.¹¹⁴ Andoc. 23.

the multitude, that they could no longer distinguish between friends and foes; they assailed those who belonged to their own body and the noblest in the state¹¹⁵ indiscriminately; the dungeons every day received fresh victims, who looked forward to certain death; the preceding murders had excited a thirst for blood in the populace, and they cared not who fell as long as they had victims in plenty.¹¹⁶

Amongst the prisoners was Andocides, the son of Leogoras¹¹⁷, of the family of the Ceryces¹¹⁸, who was as eminent for his qualities as for his rank, and had once been entrusted with the command of twenty triremes, which had been sent to Corcyra¹¹⁹. He was strongly suspected¹²⁰ of being one of the accomplices of Alcibiades. One of those who had been imprisoned with him, Charmides¹²¹ or Timæus¹²², advised him, in case he knew the offenders, to denounce them and save the lives of those who were unjustly accused. Hereupon Andocides confessed that Teucer had disclosed the truth, and he completed his information by naming four other persons who had been concerned in the outrage¹²³. Diocles being summoned to appear, confessed that he had been suborned by the

¹¹⁵ Thucyd. 6. 60; Plut. 20.

¹¹⁶ Thucyd. 6. 60: καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπεδίδουσαν μᾶλλον ἐς τὸ ἀγριώτερόν τε καὶ πλείους ἐπὶ ξυλλαμβάνειν.

¹¹⁷ Concerning him, see Schol. Aristoph. Nub. 110.

¹¹⁸ Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orator. 9. 316.

¹¹⁹ Ps. Plut. ubi sup.

¹²⁰ Thucydides does not mention him, but says, εἰς τῶν δεδεμένων, ὅσπερ ἐδόκει αἰτιώτατος εἶναι, 6. 60.

¹²¹ Thus called by Andoc. 25.

¹²² Plut. Alcib. 21.

¹²³ Andoc. 25; conf. Plut. Alcib. 21; Thucyd. 6. 60. According to Ps. Plut. Andoc. 317, Andocides denounced, amongst others, his own father Leogoras; but at the same time declared, that should his life be spared, he could render important service to the state, whereupon Leogoras made all sorts of false statements. But according to the speech of Andoc. de Myster. 33. and 78, this cannot have been the case.

Phegusian Alcibiades and by Amias¹²⁴. The two last fled; Diocles was killed, and those whom he had accused were set at liberty—Andocides, his father, and several of his relations being amongst the number¹²⁵; but Andocides was punished with *Atimia*¹²⁶; and the remainder of his life was wandering and unsettled¹²⁷.

As many of the persons denounced by Andocides as had not sought safety in flight were killed¹²⁸; but Alcibiades was destined to feel the whole weight of popular indignation, which was increased in consequence of the alarm which the people had experienced. An army of Lacedæmonians happening to march across the Isthmus to Bœotia, just when the consternation occasioned by the informations and the general suspicion had reached the highest pitch, the Athenians expected an attack and passed a whole night under arms. Suspicions were set afloat that the Argives, who were connected by treaties of hospitality with Alcibiades, were preparing the subversion of democracy in Argos, on which account the Athenians surrendered to the demus of that city the hostages of the oligarchical party, who had been delivered over to their custody, and whom they had detained upon the islands, whereupon Argos shared the guilt of Athens by slaughtering them¹²⁹. The Salaminia now put to sea to fetch back Alcibiades, in order that he might

¹²⁴ Andoc. 32. Alcibiades, the cousin of the renowned Alcibiades, and the partner of his flight, Ol. 92. 2. was seized on board a Syracusan ship by Thrasylus, Xenoph. Hell. 1. 2. 13.

¹²⁵ Thucyd. 6. 60; Plut. Alcib. 21; Andoc. 33; compare Andoc. de Redit. suo, 78.

¹²⁶ Andoc. ubi sup. 80; conf. Meier, de Bon. Damn. 118.

¹²⁷ See further particulars in Ps. Plut. and compare Sluiter, Lect. Andoc. 70, sqq.

¹²⁸ Thucyd. 6. 60; Plut. Alcib. 21.

¹²⁹ Thucyd. 6. 61. Compare the uncritical account in Diodor. 13. 5.

be prosecuted for high treason and blasphemy; but he, having effected his escape, sentence of death was passed against him in his absence¹³⁰, whilst the priests and priestesses, according to ancient custom, pronounced the public malediction against him¹³¹.

But it remains to be asked whether he really was guilty of the crimes laid to his charge, or whether he fell a sacrifice to the sycophancy of his enemies? Plutarch says that the testimony of Andocides was altogether false, and solely occasioned by the advice of his fellow-prisoner, who represented to him that that was the only course by which he could save himself and many others from the destruction by which they were threatened¹³². Though the real facts of the case might not have been precisely as stated by Andocides, there is no doubt that his disclosures preserved the lives of many innocent persons¹³³. Moreover, all the other informations seem to have contained the name of Alcibiades¹³⁴. That such a crime was by no means foreign from his character there can be little doubt; nor is at all improbable that he was in the habit of committing acts of this nature in moments of intoxication¹³⁵; but there is every reason to believe that, upon this occasion, the malice of his enemies

¹³⁰ Thucyd. 6. 62.

¹³¹ Plut. Alcib. 22. Concerning this custom, Lysias, c. Andoc. 252: ἱέρειαι καὶ ἱερεῖς στάντες κατηράσαντο πρὸς ἐσπέραν καὶ φοινικίδας ἀνέσισαν κατὰ τὸ νόμιμον τὸ παλαιὸν καὶ ἀρχαῖον. On the part taken in it by the Eumolpids and Ceryces, see Thucyd. 8. 53.

¹³² Plut. Alcib. 21.

¹³³ This is hinted at by Thucydides, 6. 60: οἱ μὲν παθόντες ἀδελον ἦν εἰ ἀδίκως ἐτετιμώρητο· ἡ μὲντοι ἄλλη- πόλις ἐν τῷ παρόντι περιφανῶς ὠφέλητο.

¹³⁴ Thucyd. 6. 61: πανταχόθεν τε περιεστῆκει ὑποψία ἐς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην.

¹³⁵ This was the purport of some of the first informations, Thucyd. 6. 28: Μηνύεται—περὶ μὲν τῶν Ἑρμῶν οὐδέν. ἄλλων δὲ ἀγαλμάτων περικοπαὶ τινες ὑπὸ νεωτέρων μετὰ παιδιᾶς καὶ οἴνου γεγενημέναι.

greatly transcended the measure of his guilt, and that, at this period at least, he had not yet formed the project of subverting the democracy. However, whilst we abandon in despair the attempt to clear up a mystery, which even his contemporary Thucydides pronounced impenetrable¹³⁶, we cannot but deplore the infatuation of a people, whose falsehood and treachery thus infallibly accelerated their own destruction.

THE CABALS OF THE OLIGARCHS DURING THE
THIRD AND LAST DIVISION OF THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

*The Four Hundred and the Five Thousand*¹³⁷.

The disastrous issue of the expedition to Sicily, and the restless hostility of Alcibiades having brought about the dissolution of the Synteleia of Athens, the number of her enemies increased through the defection of her allies, whilst the discouragement of the people emboldened the evil-disposed, and designing amongst her own citizens to plot against the constitution. The expedient adopted by Rome in seasons of difficulty and danger—viz. the nomination of a dictator, was incompatible with the jealous fears of the Athenians; though the democracy had grown powerless and dispirited, no *Æsymnete* was appointed lest that species of authority should degenerate into tyranny; hence, oligarchy was twice established through foreign force and domestic treason. In the inter-

¹³⁶ Thucyd. 6. 60: τὸ δὲ σαφὲς οὐθεὶς οὔτε τότε οὔτε ὕστερον ἔχει εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν δρασάντων τὸ ἔργον.

¹³⁷ Comp. Taylor, *Vita Lys.* 114, sqq. R. ed.; Ruhnken (van Spæn) de Antiphonte, opusc. 244, sqq.; Meier, de Bon. Damn. 3—9; 170, sqq.; Krüger, *Dionysii Halic. Historiographica*, Commentatt. cap. 7. The dissertation of Hinrichs: de Theramenis, Critiæ et Thrasybuli rebus et ingenio, Hamb. 1820.

val between the destruction of the fleet and army in Sicily, and the domination of the Thirty, (Ol. 91. 4 — 93. 4; 413 — 404. B. C.), the oligarchs systematically conspired to overthrow the democracy, and the events of that period must be viewed in connection with their intrigues.

Immediately after the dreadful calamity became known, extraordinary measures were adopted by the people; a number of citizens of advanced age were formed into a deliberative and executive body under the name of Probuli, and empowered to fit out a fleet¹³⁸. Whether this laid the foundation for oligarchical machinations or not, those aged men were unable to bring back men's minds to their former course; the prosecution of the Hermocopidæ had been most mischievous in its results; various secret associations¹³⁹ had sprung up and conspired to reap advantage to themselves from the distress and embarrassment of the state; the indignation caused by the infuriated excesses of the people during that trial, possibly here, as frequently happened in other Grecian states, determined the more respectable members of the community to guard against the recurrence of similar scenes in future, by the establishment of an aristocracy. Lastly, the watchful malice of Alcibiades, who was the implacable enemy of that populace, to whose blind fury he had been sacrificed, baffled all

¹³⁸ Thucyd. 8. 1: ἀρχήν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν, — οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων, ὡς ἂν καιρὸς ᾖ, προβουλεύσωσι, referred the Πρόβουλος, Aristoph. Lysistr. 421; conf. 609: τοῖς προβούλοις.

¹³⁹ Thucyd. 8. 54: — τὰς τε ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγγανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, κ. τ. λ. Ἑταῖροι, τὸ ἐταιρικόν in Thucyd. 8. 48. 65, means nothing more or less than the conspirators, and it is not necessary to seek after allusions to Alcibiades or any other demagogue. Conf. Lysias adv. Eratosth. 412: ὑπὸ τῶν καλουμένων ἐταίρων.

attempts to restore confidence and tranquillity, and there is no doubt that whilst he kept up a correspondence with his partisans at home, he did every thing in his power to increase the perplexity and distress of his native city from without, in order that he might be recalled to provide for its safety and defence. A favourable opportunity for the execution of his plans presented itself in the fifth year of his exile, Ol. 92. 1; 411. B. C.; as he had incurred the suspicion of the Spartans, and stood high in the favour of Tissaphernes, the Athenians thought that his intercession might enable them to obtain assistance from the Persian king. The people in Athens were headed by one of his most inveterate enemies, Androcles¹⁴⁰; and he well knew that all attempts to effect his return would be fruitless, until this man and the other demagogues were removed. Hence Alcibiades entered into negotiations with the commanders of the Athenian fleet at Samos, respecting the establishment of an oligarchical constitution, not from any attachment to that form of government in itself, but solely with the view of promoting his own ends¹⁴¹. Phrynichus and Pisander were equally insincere in their co-operation with Alcibiades. The characters of both these men are branded in history; the former, who had once been a shepherd, afterwards became a sycophant¹⁴²; the

¹⁴⁰ Thucyd. 8. 65; compare above, n. 93.

¹⁴¹ Thucyd. 8. 48: the calculations of Alcibiades were: ὅτῳ τρόπῳ, ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος κόσμου τὴν πόλιν μεταστήσας, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐταίρων παρακληθεὶς, εἰσέλθοι. Taylor's view of the subject is sufficiently accurate, (*Vita Lys.* 114): — Alcibiades arbitrabatur fore, id quod postea accidit, ut, discordia inter ordines civitatis facta, ab altera parte in auxilium vocaretur.

¹⁴² Lysias pro Polyst. 674: — ἐποίμαινεν — ἐσυκοφάντει. His cabals at this period are indicated by the words Φρυνίχου παλαίσμασιν, Aristoph. Ran. 689; Suidas, Φρ. παλ.; conf. Polyæn. 3. 6.

latter was stigmatized as a coward¹⁴³. In the mind of Phrynichus hatred to Alcibiades, and the dread of his vengeance whenever he should effect his return, outweighed the prospect of any advantages he might expect to derive from the introduction of oligarchy, on which account he perfidiously endeavoured to ruin him in the estimation of the Spartans¹⁴⁴. Nor was the conduct of Pisander and others marked by less duplicity; the former had long been hostile to Alcibiades, as his conduct in the affair of the Hermocopidæ sufficiently proves. Their plan was that the latter should reconcile the people to the change in the constitution which he wished to effect, by promising to obtain them the assistance of the great king; but they alone resolved to reap the benefit of his exertions. Pisander took upon himself to manage the Athenian populace¹⁴⁵. It was in truth no slight undertaking to attempt to overthrow a democracy of a hundred and twenty years' standing, and of intense development, but most of the able-bodied citizens were absent with the fleet, whilst such as were still in the city were confounded by the imminence of the danger from without; on the other hand, the prospect of succour from the Persian king doubtless had some weight with them, and they possibly felt some symptoms of returning affection for their former favourite Alcibiades. Nevertheless, Pisander and his accomplices employed craft and perfidy to accomplish their de-

¹⁴³ Schol. Aristoph. Av. 749. 1563; Pac. 397; Suidas employs *δελότερος Πισάνδρου*. Conf. above, § 64. n. 81.

¹⁴⁴ Thucyd. 8. 50.

¹⁴⁵ Thucyd. 8. 53. 54.

signs; the people were not persuaded or convinced, but entrapped into compliance with their measures. Pisander gained over to his purpose the above-named clubs, and induced the people to send him with ten plenipotentiaries to the navy at Samos¹⁴⁶. In the mean time the rest of the conspirators prosecuted the work of remodelling the constitution. The chief of these were:

Antiphon, the Rhamnusian, and son of Sophilus¹⁴⁷, the most eminent amongst them for ability, character, and political energy—he was the Sieyes of his time. Of advanced age¹⁴⁸ he was respected as the founder of a school of oratory¹⁴⁹, which had powerfully contributed to the development of that art; Thucydides had been one of its pupils¹⁵⁰; he moreover was well known as the composer of judicial harangues for others¹⁵¹, and inspired the multitude with respect and awe by the commanding powers of his mind (*δεινότης*)¹⁵².

Theramenes the son of Agnon¹⁵³, and the pupil of Prodicus¹⁵⁴, was desirous of being the first man in the state, but being too weak to effect his own elevation, he was obliged to resort to the aid of a party which he was incapable of securing¹⁵⁵; the perfidious betrayer of his associates¹⁵⁶, his notori-

¹⁴⁶ Thucyd. 8. 54.

¹⁴⁷ He must not be confounded with Antiphon, the son of Lysidonides: Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 310; conf. Ruhnken on Antiphon, 225. 242. sqq.

¹⁴⁸ He was born, Ol. 75. 1.

¹⁴⁹ Ps. Plut. ubi sup.; Plat. Menex. 236. A.

¹⁵⁰ Marcell. Vit. Thucyd. XII. Bipont.

¹⁵¹ Ps. Plut. 308; conf. Ruhnken, 229.

¹⁵² Thucyd. 8. 68: ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος.

¹⁵³ Thucyd. 6. 68.

¹⁵⁴ Schol. Aristoph. Nub. 360.

¹⁵⁵ See in particular, Thucyd. 8. 89.

¹⁵⁶ The picture which Critias draws of him, Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 30. 31, is by no means overcharged; with this must be coupled the grave charges brought against him, Lysias adv. Eratosth. 426.

ous want of faith and his versatility¹⁵⁷, obtained him the *sobriquet* of Cothurnus¹⁵⁸, the shoe that may be worn on either foot; none but the ignorant and undiscerning respected him, and injudicious historians alone have mentioned him in terms of commendation¹⁵⁹.

To these may be added as prominent characters Aristocrates¹⁶⁰, the son of Scellias, Phrynichus, who had now joined the conspirators and was accounted one of their chiefs¹⁶¹, Aristarchus¹⁶², Callaischrus, and his son Critias¹⁶³.

The proceedings of the conspirators now began to assume a more dangerous complexion; Androcles, the boldest of the demagogues, was removed¹⁶⁴, such orators as ventured to speak frankly and openly were thrust aside, and the whole city being filled with terror and consternation by the murder of all who ventured to oppose their designs, the people were compelled to pass a decree empowering ten Syngrapheis or Catalogeis to draw up a new constitution¹⁶⁵. This was chiefly effected

¹⁵⁷ ὁ κομψός, Aristoph. Ran. 967. His character is portrayed in the following verses; conf. 536, sqq.

¹⁵⁸ Plut. Nic. 2; Schol. Aristoph. Nub. 360; Ran. 47. 546; Pollux, 7. 190, etc.; compare Photius, εὐμεταβολώτερος κοθόρνου.

¹⁵⁹ Conf. Diod. 13. 38: ἀνὴρ καὶ τῷ βίῳ κόσμιος καὶ τῇ φρονήσει δοκῶν διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων. Compare his foolish description of Theramenes' refusal to participate in the authority of the Thirty, 14. 3.

¹⁶⁰ Thucyd. 8. 89. Aristophanes alludes to him in his play upon the word ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι, Ran. 125. 126; conf. Schol.

¹⁶¹ Lysias adv. Agor. 495; Aristot. Pol. 5. 5. 4. ¹⁶² Thucyd. 8. 89.

¹⁶³ Lysias adv. Agor. 427; Demosth. adv. Theocrin. 1843.

¹⁶⁴ Thucyd. 8. 65.

¹⁶⁵ Thucyd. 8. 66.

¹⁶⁶ Thucyd. 8. 67; Harpocr. συγγραφ., Photius συγγρ., from Androtion and Philochorus, Etym. M. and Suidas, Bekker, Anecd. 301, etc. Polystatus was one of them. See Lysias pro Polyst. 675. The duty of the Συγγραφεὺς was to frame the laws, that of the Καταλογεὺς to draw up a list of those citizens destined to participate in the supreme power. Both afterwards existed during the domination of the Thirty, on which account Harpocratio has thirty instead of ten. Suidas (in v. Καταλογεὺς) has carried the confusion still further; when the Athenians were desirous of giving up the state to seven thousand citizens. Here the four hundred and the three thousand of the assembly, under the constitution of the Thirty, appear to be taken together.

by Antiphon¹⁶⁷. Having first provided for their security by destroying that palladium of the Solonic constitution¹⁶⁸, the right of bringing actions against the authors of illegal measures (*γραφὴ παρανόμων*); the oligarchists brought forward a proposition to the effect, that the magistrates and paid officers, including the Heliasts, should henceforward be appointed according to a new regulation, and that all salaries should be abolished, the effect of which was, that the poorer citizens were excluded from the administration. The supreme power was vested in Four Hundred citizens, whilst the number of those admitted to a share in the proceedings of government was limited to five thousand, who were compelled to assemble at the discretion of the Four Hundred¹⁶⁹. This proposal was carried without one dissentient voice; the Four Hundred, whose election had been effected under the superintendence of five Proedri¹⁷⁰, repaired to the council-house with a body of armed youths¹⁷¹, and ordered the council of five hundred to dissolve upon receiving their salaries. This, which met with no opposition, took place, Ol. 92. 1; 411. B. C., in the archonship of Callias; the oligarchy subsisted four months in all, the last month falling under the archonship of Theopompus¹⁷². There is no doubt that the

It is not evident whether Lysias adv. Eratosth. 426. by Probuli means those ten Syngrapheis, or the Probuli appointed in 413, (see n. 133); there appears greater probability in the latter assumption, which would confirm what was conjectured above, viz., that that body had been oligarchical.

¹⁶⁷ Thucyd. 8. 68.

¹⁶⁸ Thucyd. 8. 67.

¹⁶⁹ Thucyd. ubi sup.

¹⁷⁰ The five Proedri chose a hundred Buleutæ, and each of the hundred chose three more, which was consequently, in some measure, like the Samnite custom in forming an army, 'ut vir virum legeret,' Liv. 9. 39.

¹⁷¹ Thucyd. 8. 69: "Ἕλληνες νεανίσκοι; the first word is wanting in some of the MS.; but Wasse correctly remarks that it is inserted lest they should be confounded with the Scythians, public servants.

¹⁷² Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 321 and 313; Diod. 13. 34. 38.

majority of the former offices were retained, as were those of the Archons and the Strategi; Theramenes was one of the last ¹⁷³. The Four Hundred probably appointed to them secretly. Nor did any of the other citizens know who belonged to the Five Thousand; the Four Hundred governed without a popular assembly, and even without making known the names of those who were qualified to be members of the Five Thousand, so that friends and foes being alike undistinguishable, the minds of all might continually fluctuate between hope and fear ¹⁷⁴. The exiles were not recalled through fear of Alcibiades: the obnoxious and disaffected were punished with death or imprisonment ¹⁷⁵; emissaries were sent to Agis in Decelea and to Sparta to request peace, in order that the co-operation of the latter might strengthen the oligarchy ¹⁷⁶. During these proceedings of the Four Hundred in Athens, affairs took a very different turn with the fleet and army at Samos.

Samos retained in full vigour, till the twentieth year of the war, the democracy established by Pericles. But after Athens had been humbled, the powerful Geomori here too appear to have formed the project of asserting their independence, and establishing an oligarchy. But the demus, with no less ferocity than was displayed by that of Athens during the trial of the Hermacopidæ, rose

¹⁷³ Thucyd. 8. 92.

¹⁷⁴ Thucyd. 8. 92. ad fin. To this it is necessary to add an observation of Plut. Alcib. 26: — οἱ πεντακισχίλιοι λεγόμενοι, τετρακόσιοι δὲ ὄντες; the Four Hundred is their usual designation in the ancient writers; Plutarch in using the word λεγόμενοι means *nominally* the Four Hundred, not the so-called Four Hundred.

¹⁷⁵ Under this head must apparently be ranged the ἀτιμία κατὰ προστάξεις, mentioned by Andocides, (de Myst. 36). Compare on this point my dissertation de veterum Scriptor. Græcor. levitate, etc. p. 12.

¹⁷⁶ Thucyd. 8. 70.

up, killed two hundred of those whom it suspected, drove out four hundred more, and distributed their lands and houses. The Athenians hereupon proclaimed the *Autonomia* of the Samian democracy, while the *demus* attempted to defend itself against the assaults of the *Geomori* by fortifying the barriers which excluded them; they were accordingly shut out from all participation in the direction of public affairs, and prohibited from intermarrying with the *demus*¹⁷⁷. Meanwhile, Pisander had abolished the democracy of some of the insular confederates of Athens, and assembled a band of three hundred desperadoes in Samos for the purpose of crushing all the rest of the citizens, and amongst them some of the most wealthy descendants of the ancient nobility, upon the plea that they were a *demus*¹⁷⁸, which proceeding must be regarded as one of the most reckless outrages of party animosity. The vile Hyperbolus was slain upon the occasion¹⁷⁹; but the attempt against the democracy miscarried. The conspirators were overpowered, and the victory of the Samian democrats inspired the Athenian army and navy with courage and strength. The crew of the ship *Paralus*, consisting entirely of freemen and citizens, headed by the commanders Thrasybulus, Thrasylus, Leon, and Diomedon, rising in favour of democracy, the Athenians and Samians together swore to maintain it against every assault. Those Athenians who were at the naval station declaring

¹⁷⁷ Thucyd. 8. 21: οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὔτε ἀγαγεῖσθαι παρ' ἐκείνων οὔδ' ἐς ἐκείνους οὐδενὶ ἐστὶ τοῦ δήμου ἐξῆν.

¹⁷⁸ Thucyd. 8. 73:—οἱ γὰρ τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς, καὶ ὄντες δῆμος, μεταβαλλόμενοι αὐτοῖς—ἐγένοντό τε ἐς τριακοσίους ξυνωμόται, καὶ ἐμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς δῆμος ὄντι, ἐπιθήσεσθαι.

¹⁷⁹ Thucyd. ubi sup. Comp. the citations in Krüger, ubi sup. 378. n. 70.

themselves the principal element, and the fleet the chief power of the state¹⁸⁰, recalled Alcibiades, who now put himself at their head. Thus the majority of the Athenian citizens who were capable of bearing arms raised up, beside the oligarchy in Athens, a democracy of unprecedented strength and solidity.

The oligarchs had fallen out amongst themselves; political egotism¹⁸¹ induced one portion of them to seek a reconciliation with the people, and inspired the other with the wish to surrender them into the power of foreign enemies, who engaged to support the oligarchy. At the head of the former was Theramenes; the latter despatched Phrynichus on a mission to Sparta, and in the mean time erected a fortress called Entioneia, at the entrance of the Piræus. This was followed by disturbances in which Phrynichus lost his life, and many suffered from misusage¹⁸². Hereupon the Four Hundred offered to admit the Five Thousand to a share in the government by rotation; but it was too late. The oligarchy, which owed its rise to the dread of democratic excesses, was overthrown in consequence of the terror which took possession of the demos when intelligence of the defection of Eubœa arrived; the people tumultuously deposed the tyrants¹⁸³. Pisander, Aristarchus, etc., fled; the latter on his flight betrayed Oenon into the power of the Bœotians. Antiphon and Ancheptolemus were impeached by Theramenes¹⁸⁴, and executed¹⁸⁵.

¹⁸⁰ Thucyd. 8. 76 :—ὥς οὐ δεῖ ἀθυμεῖν, ὅτι ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἀφίστηκε (!)

¹⁸¹ Thucyd. 8. 89.

¹⁸² Thucyd. 8. 89—92.

¹⁸³ Thucyd. 8. 96. 97.

¹⁸⁴ Lysias adv. Eratosth. 427.

¹⁸⁵ See the discordant accounts of Antiphon's death at the end of his biography in Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. Conf. Ruhken.

THE FIVE THOUSAND.

In the interval between these transactions and the establishment of the Thirty, the Athenians with much difficulty managed to keep up a moderate democracy, based upon the institutions of Clisthenes and Solon; but much is left to conjecture, and no less is involved in impenetrable obscurity. It may, however, safely be asserted, that democracy was not fully restored till after the time of the Thirty, during the archonship of Euclid. Upon the downfall of the Four Hundred the supreme powers of government were vested in five thousand citizens, who bore arms, brought together in haste, partly by chance, and partly by design¹⁸⁶; the former council was revived¹⁸⁷, but it was forbidden, on pain of malediction¹⁸⁸, to accept of remuneration for the discharge of an office. Every thing was made immediately dependent upon the decrees of the Five Thousand, who held several meetings for the purpose of appointing legislators and settling the constitution¹⁸⁹. Theramenes must be regarded as the mainspring of these proceedings. The army seems to have readily acquiesced in all that was done, which must be ascribed to the exertions of Alcibiades, who mainly contributed to restore concord among the citizens. He re-entered

¹⁸⁶ This was the province of the *καταλογεῖς*.

¹⁸⁷ This is evident from Xenoph. Hell. 1. 4. 20; 1. 7. 3. 4. Compare, on the subject of Demophantus' psephism, in the account of which mention is made of *οἱ πεντακόσιοι*, Meier, de Bon. Damn. p. 3 and 10.

¹⁸⁸ Thucyd. 8. 97:—*ἐπάρατον ἐποιήσαντο*.

¹⁸⁹ —*ἐκκλησίαι, ἀφ' ὧν καὶ νομοθέτας καὶ τὰλλα ἐψηφίσαντο ἐς τὴν πολιτείαν*. Thucyd. 8. 97. To this period must apparently be ascribed the above-mentioned psephism of Demophantus respecting high treason, and that of Cannonus for the separate trial of several persons accused together (Xenoph. Hell. 1. 7. 21). The commission of Nicomachus to prepare a copy of the laws, will be spoken of below, under the archonship of Euclid.

his native city amidst the acclamations of the people, and continued to stand at the helm for some time after these events¹⁹⁰. But the fickle people evinced less temperance and reflection than ever, and the adversaries of Alcibiades soon found means to disturb his short-lived popularity. He was opposed by personal enemies, such as Thrasybulus¹⁹¹, as well as by traitors, who still meditated the restoration of oligarchy, like Theramenes; with these conspired the reckless demagogues who regarded it as their peculiar vocation to attack the most eminent persons in the state, and at the head of whom were Cleophon¹⁹² and Philocles. Cleophon the lyre-maker, denounced by the comic writers as a spurious citizen and a chatterer¹⁹³, was a conspicuous character as early as Ol. 92. 1¹⁹⁴. He cannot be charged with dishonesty, and it is probable that he became one of the accusers of Alcibiades¹⁹⁵ because he suspected him of designs prejudicial to the public welfare; his hatred to Sparta and all who were in her interest was founded upon the persuasion that they were enemies to the Athenian democracy, on which account he strenuously resisted all negotiations for a peace with that state¹⁹⁶. Philocles was the author of the enactment, that after a victory the right hand of the prisoners should be cut off¹⁹⁷. Among the opponents of the oligarchs must be enumerated

¹⁹⁰ Plut. Alcib. 32—34.¹⁹¹ Plut. Alcib. 36.¹⁹² Concerning him, see, besides Ruhnken and others, Meier, de Bon. Damn. 218. n. 211.¹⁹³ Aristoph. Ran. 467. See above, § 64. n. 153.¹⁹⁴ Aristoph. Thesmoph. 804.¹⁹⁵ Himerius, 318, Wernsd. ed.¹⁹⁶ As early as 410, when the Spartan Endios endeavoured to bring about a peace. Schol. Eurip. Orest. 770 (from Philochorus).¹⁹⁷ Plut. Lysand. 8.

Cleigenes ¹⁹⁸ and Cleomenes ¹⁹⁹. Alcibiades appears to have been entirely without friends, and conscious that his enemies were endeavouring to effect his destruction, he secretly withdrew from the fleet.

While the demagogues incited the populace to the commission of the wildest excesses, the oligarchs carried on their cabals in secret, so that the rage of the deluded multitude, thus stirred up and inflamed from two sides, broke out into the most sanguinary violence against the victorious generals. The trial of those illustrious victims of sycophantic malevolence and popular infatuation presents details no less revolting to humanity than that of the Hermocopidæ, and it cannot, as upon that occasion, be urged in extenuation of the conduct of the Athenians, that they were actuated by the dread of conspiracies. Crimes like these could not long escape the vengeance of the offended Nemesis, and while we commiserate the sufferings of the people, we are compelled to acknowledge the justice of the punishment which overtook the guilty. Now, as during the trial of the Hermocopidæ, the better sort of citizens were absent on duty with the fleet, and the enormities in question were committed by the dregs of the populace at home ²⁰⁰. Amongst those who were most active in exciting the blood-thirsty rage of the people was Theramenes ²⁰¹, the accuser of his colleagues; and his nefarious efforts were seconded by Archedemus, Timocrates, Callixenus, and Ly-

¹⁹⁸ Aristoph. Ran. and Schol.

¹⁹⁹ Plut. Lysand. 14.

²⁰¹ Xenoph. Hell. 1. 7. 8. 9.

²⁰⁰ Οἱ ἐν οἴκῳ. Xenoph. Hell. 1. 7. 1.

ciscus: The clamorous declaration of the people, "that nothing should deter them from acting as they thought proper²⁰²," involved the height of ochlocratical extravagance, regardless alike of law and of justice. The commission of the crime was very soon followed by remorse, and the fury of the multitude was now turned against those who had urged them to the commission of their guilty excesses. These seem to have been actuated by malevolence and political calculation, rather than by passion. From the time of the oligarchy of the Four Hundred a conspiracy had existed, whose object was to effect the destruction of those stanch friends to their country who steadily opposed the designs of Sparta, and thereby prevented the re-establishment of oligarchy; these had been once more joined by Theramenes²⁰³, and the traitors of Ægos Potamoi, and Adimantus²⁰⁴ and Tydeus²⁰⁵ belonged to them. But they remained behind the curtain while the demagogues, who found it convenient this time to second their intrigues, were the prominent actors in the affair. But Cleophon took no part in their proceedings, and tried to persuade the now-penitent people to call to account the sycophants who had imposed upon their credulity²⁰⁶.

After the destruction of the naval power of Athens at Ægos Potamoi, the oligarchs endeavoured to obtain possession of the government. The Areopagus indeed made an attempt to avert the impending danger, and restored those who had

²⁰² Xenoph. Hell. 1. 7. 12: τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα, δεινὸν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τις μάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν, ὃ αὖ βούληται.

²⁰³ Lysias adv. Eratosth. 427.

²⁰⁵ Pausan. 10. 9. 5.

²⁰⁴ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 1. 32.

²⁰⁶ Xenoph. Hell. 1. 7. 40.

been deprived of the franchise to their rights²⁰⁷. Cleophon kept up the spirits of the people for a time, denounced instant vengeance against any one who should dare to speak of peace²⁰⁸, and stigmatized the members of council as enemies to the people²⁰⁹. Archestratus was thrown into a dungeon for having recommended a capitulation²¹⁰; but the conspirators, the Hetairoi as they were called, obtaining possession of the government, they nominated five Ephors²¹¹, under whose authority the council acted. Cleophon was murdered because he had called this a mere riot, and spoken disparagingly of the council²¹²; he left no fortune²¹³. Theramenes and his accomplices in crime, who now acted in concert with Lysander²¹⁴, reduced the Athenians to the greatest extremities. The first being commissioned to treat with Lysander, purposely remained absent, and in order the more effectually to break the spirit of the people, resigned them for a time to all the horrors of famine²¹⁵; after this the bravest of the generals and officers were imprisoned, and Lysander sailed into the Piræus, to reduce the town, and establish the oligarchy of the Thirty²¹⁶.

²⁰⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 2. 11. Conf. Lysias adv. Eratosth. 428.

²⁰⁸ Æschin. de Falsa Legat. 254.

²⁰⁹ Lysias adv. Nicom. 847: Κλεοφῶν τὴν βουλὴν ἐλοιδορεῖ, φάσκων συνεστάναι καὶ οὐ τὰ βέλτιστα βουλευεῖν τῇ πόλει.

²¹⁰ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 2. 15.

²¹¹ Lysias adv. Eratosth. 412.

²¹² Lysias adv. Nicom. 847—849; adv. Agorat. 452. Conf. Xenoph. Hell. 1. 7. 40.

²¹³ Lysias de Aristoph. Bon. 651.

²¹⁴ Concerning the treachery of Theramenes, see Lysias adv. Eratosth. 429.

²¹⁵ Xenophon, generally unsatisfactory in Grecian history, instead of his usual brevity and baldness, says too much of the famine. Conf. 2. 2. 11: ἐπεὶ δὲ παντελῶς ἤδη ὁ σῖτος ἐπιλελοίπει. It was only then that ambassadors were deputed to go to Agis, and afterwards to Sellasia; upon their return Theramenes was sent. He returned after an absence of four months, whereupon ambassadors are once more sent. Many Athenians died of hunger (2. 2. 21); but according to the introductory sentence of Xenophon, ἐπεὶ δὲ, etc., scarcely one could have survived.

²¹⁶ Lysias adv. Agor. 455—466. Conf. Xenoph. Hell. 2. 2. 22, sqq.

b. SPARTA.

§ 66. The operation of the Lycurgan institutions, combined with extraordinary natural convulsions, and extensive losses in the battles of the Peloponnesian war, had materially reduced the number of the Spartan citizens; it seemed as though the festering disease which preyed upon the vitals of the population had destroyed its generative vigour. Hence, in the second and third divisions of the war, the Spartans began to spare the blood of the ancient citizens. Helots, who had once followed their masters like squires into the field, were sent out in organized bodies under Spartan generals, Brasidas, Gylippus¹, etc.; they were accompanied by new citizens of various denominations, and even these were sent out in very small numbers. Gylippus only took with him an insignificant band, not an army, when he went to Syracuse². Naturalization became more frequent than before; but Sparta did not, like Athens, open its franchise to foreigners of merit, but raised the inferior orders of its own population to the rank of citizens. By this means the several varieties of civil and political rights³ in the extended circle of the citizenship assumed a more determinate character, and gave rise to denominations unknown to the earlier age.

Enfranchised Helots were entitled Neodamodes⁴; and it may be inferred from a passage in Xenophon, that naturalized Perioeci received the name of Hy-

¹ Thucyd. 4. 80; 5. 34; 7. 58.

² Thucyd. 6. 104; 7. 1.

³ See § 60.

⁴ Thucyd. 7. 58: δύναται δὲ τὸ Νεοδαμῶδες, ἐλεύθερον ἤδη εἶναι.

pomeiones⁵. A particular class of enfranchised Helots were those who had accompanied Brasidas into Thrace, and who, in commemoration of his noble qualities, were denominated Brasidæans⁶. Besides these, mention is made of the bastards of the Spartans⁷, who we are almost led to suppose were identical with the Mothones or Mothaces alluded to above. For, as in the earlier age, the Epeunactæ are said to have been regarded in the light of citizens of the half-blood⁸, so the sons of a Spartan by a female Helot, when well-formed and active, appear to have been brought up with the legitimate children. Now, though we are informed that this favour had been shown to the Mothones, who, upon indisputable authority⁹, must be looked upon as the children of Helots, still on account of their humble origin on the mother's side, the so-called bastards might have been regarded as Helots' children. In treating of subjects of this description, the ancients never observe any great nicety of distinction in the terms they employ. This assumption would explain how Gylippus, Callicratidas, and Lysander might be Mothones¹⁰, while the last was a Heraclid and the son of Aristoclitus¹¹. Lastly, the Trophimi were the sons of strangers¹², who, as the name seems to imply, had

⁵ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 3. 6; *αὐτοὶ μέντοι πᾶσιν ἔφασαν συνειδέναι καὶ εἴλωσι καὶ νεοδαμώδεσι, καὶ τοῖς ὑπομείοσι καὶ τοῖς περιοίκοις*. The two substantives of the latter of these clauses seem to bear the same relation to each other as those of the first. In the common editions, it is true, a comma separates the word Pericæci from Hypomeiones; but this is only one of the innumerable instances in which the sense has been manifestly perverted by their insertion.

⁶ Thucyd. 4. 80; 5. 34. 67.

⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 3. 9; *νόθοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, μάλα εὐειδέϊς τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῶν οὐκ ἄπειροι*.

⁸ Vol. i. 324.

⁹ Vol. i. 326. n. 36.

¹⁰ Ælian, V. H. 12. 43; Athen. 6. 271. E.

¹¹ Plut. Lys. 2.

¹² Xenoph. Hell. 5. 3. 9; *ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων*.

been brought to Sparta at an early age, and educated according to the customs of that country. It is doubtful whether they were brought home from their campaigns by the Spartans, or whether the members of foreign states, connected with Sparta by treaties of hospitality, were allowed to send their sons thither to be educated and to take part in public affairs.

The word *Homoioi*, once the designation of those citizens who fulfilled all the demands of the law, and enjoyed the full rights of citizenship which it conferred¹³, was now applied to the ancient citizens, to distinguish them from the new ones mentioned above; the *Isonomia* which it expresses, therefore, only related to a portion of the partakers of civil and political freedom. They are described as the first of the Spartans, though it is improbable that this became their peculiar and permanent appellation¹⁴. Their importance increasing as their number diminished, they arrogated to themselves the character of a nobility with relation to the new citizens, and on the strength of their extraction made claim to privileges which constitutionally pertained to meritorious citizens alone¹⁵. Thus the original aristocracy, which had been raised upon a democratic basis, became converted into oligarchy; the ancient citizens strove by every means in their power to widen the gulf between themselves and the new ones; but no attempt at

¹³ Vol. i. 324.

¹⁴ Thucyd. 5. 15, says of the captives of Sphacteria, *ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ Σπαρτιάται αὐτῶν πρῶτοί τε καὶ ὁμοίως σφίσι ξυγγενεῖς*. Conf. Müll. Dor. 2. 83.

¹⁵ Of an analogous character appear to have been the *Atimia* imposed upon these citizens, and that pronounced against the prisoners of Sphacteria; *ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιάνδε ὥστε μήτε ἀρχειν, μηδὲ πριαμένους τί, ἢ πωλοῦντας, κυρίους εἶναι*, Thucyd. 5. 34.

reconciliation was made, and nothing was done to allay their mutual exasperation¹⁶. The new citizens must have been the more keenly alive to the restrictions thus imposed upon them, as neither positive ordinances nor any want of courage or skill prevented them from aspiring to the ancient Spartan excellence; the state was compelled to confide to them interests of the utmost importance¹⁷, so that they no longer had reason to esteem the duties of the ancient citizens as superior to their own. Thus the narrow-minded policy of the oligarchs gradually undermined the citizenship, whilst the constitution ceased to be respected by these brave men who had risked their property and lives in its defence and had received no reward for their services. Hence, there arose a struggle between those who suffered under civil disabilities and their oppressors, which even extended to the Helots, who, after they were allowed to bear arms, seem to have grown bolder. The strength and resolution of the Helots were considered so formidable in the Peloponnesian war, Ol. 89. 1; 424. B. C., that Sparta had recourse to the revolting expedient of a *crypteia en masse*, by which two thousand of the bravest amongst them were despatched¹⁸. Some time afterwards, in Ol. 93. 3., a body of Helots from Malea fled to arms and took up their position on the headland of Coryphasium, whence

¹⁶ The description of Thucydides may be applied generally, l. 70. 71.

¹⁷ The Periceus Phrynus was sent to Chios in order to reconnoitre, Thucyd. 8. 6. The Periceus Deinedias was entrusted with the command of a fleet, Thucyd. 8. 22. The context forbids us to understand a Chian here, with Götting, ad. Aristot. Pol. p. 465.

¹⁸ Thucyd. 4. 80; οἱ δὲ—ἠφάνισάν τε αὐτούς, καὶ οὐδεὶς ᾔσθετο, ὅτε τρόπῳ ἕκαστος διεφθάρη. Conf. Diodor. 12. 67.

they were afterwards suffered to retire unmolested¹⁹.

It is obvious that under these circumstances a general assembly of old and new citizens could not frequently take place; Thucydides only once expressly mentions such a meeting²⁰; thus the supreme power of the collective people was chiefly of a passive character. On the other hand, the so-called small Ecclesia²¹ met for the purpose of passing supreme decrees, and appears to have been composed of the Ephori and Gerontes, and probably Homoioi (ἐκκληῖται), selected by the former indiscriminately from such as did and such as did not hold offices of state²². According to ancient custom, the Gerusia was still nominally the chief power in the state; but though it may still possibly have maintained its former position in the opinion of the people²³, it is by no means probable that the election of the Gerontes was conducted with the same regard to civil virtue as formerly; the supreme power virtually being wielded by the Ephors, who exercised a sort of tyranny.

The Ephors constituted an authority to which the people, the public officers, and even the kings were compelled to submit²⁴. Most of the measures of government either proceeded directly from them, or obtained force through their assent. In passing decrees on peace and war, both the general and small assembly were governed by the propositions²⁵ of

¹⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 1. 2. 18.

²⁰ Thucyd. 1. 72.

²¹ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 3. 8;—τὴν μικρὰν καλουμένην ἐκκλησίαν.

²² Vol. i. p. 328.

²³ Plut. Ages. 4.

²⁴ Compare the comprehensive exposition of the duties and power of the Ephors in Titmann, gr. Staatsv. 112, sqq., and Müll. Dor. 2. 121, sqq.

²⁵ On the decisive words of Sthenelaidas at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, see Thucyd. 1. 85. 87.

the Ephors, or the latter acted solely upon their own authority, thereby tacitly declaring that they were permanently invested with plenary powers²⁶. Justice was administered either with their co-operation or under their superintendence. But the control they exercised over the official duties of the public functionaries by their suggestions or direct influence, was most important in its consequences. They narrowly watched the proceedings of every person who distinguished himself, and more especially those of the highest in the state. The public officers who were absent, received their injunctions through the medium of the Scytale²⁷, which had already been employed in the orders sent to the traitor Pausanias. But the direction of the proceedings of the public officers, which was at first limited to the right of giving occasional orders, was soon extended into the permanent attendance of counsellors and spies. Even before the Peloponnesian war, king Pleistoanax was accompanied on his expedition to Attica²⁸ by a person appointed to advise him and to inspect his proceedings. Brasidas attended Alcidas in a similar capacity²⁹. Till that time, examples of such a practice only occur occasionally; but when the military operations of king Agis, in his campaign in Argos, had excited such dissatisfaction, that it was proposed to demolish his house and impose a fine of ten thousand drachmas upon him³⁰, a law was made, enacting,

²⁶ In such statements as occur, Thucyd. 5. 36; 8. 12, and Xenoph. Hell. 2. 2. 13. 19, it is doubtful whether we are to understand that they deliberated with the small assembly or not.

²⁷ The chief passages are Plut. Lys. 19; Schol. Thucyd. 1. 131. p. 361, Bipont; Schol. Pind. Olymp. 6. 154; Schol. Aristoph. Av. 1284, and thence Suidas.

²⁸ Plut. Pericl. 22.

²⁹ Thucyd. 3. 76.

³⁰ Thucyd. 5. 63.

that every general should be attended on his march by a council, composed of several persons³¹. The council which went with Agis consisted of ten members. When he afterwards held the command in Decelea, he was less shackled³²; but this was probably owing to the nature of the service he had to perform, which did not involve any enterprise of difficulty or danger, and was confined to devastating and blockading the country with a certain regularity, while there was little or no danger of attack from Athens. Eleven of these counsellors were afterwards assigned to Astyochus³³. But the king was regularly accompanied by two of the Ephors themselves³⁴; according to Aristotle, it was even customary to select for this office persons who were hostile to him³⁵. Finally, amongst the evidences of the jealousy with which the royal power was regarded, not to mention the sentences pronounced against royal offenders, must be counted the practice of never entrusting to a king the chief command at sea³⁶, which became an established rule, after the traitorous conduct of Pausanias.

We must once more enquire upon what constitutional basis the power of the Ephors rested, and how it could increase after the above-described change in the constitution. The Ephors have been compared with the Roman tribunes of the people, and it cannot be denied that the position and operations of the latter, as, for instance, in the bold

³¹ Νόμον δὲ ἔθεντο ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὅς οὕτω πρότερον ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς.

³² Thucyd. 8. 5.

³³ Thucyd. 8. 39, 43.

³⁴ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 4. 36; Respub. Lac. 13. 5.

³⁵ Arist. Pol. 2. 6. 20; διὸ περ ἐξέπεμπον συμπρεσβευτὰς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐνόμιζον τῇ πόλει εἶναι το στασιάζειν τοὺς βασιλεῖς.

³⁶ Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 22; ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν οὐσι στρατηγοῖς αἰδίοις ἡ ναυαρχία σχεδὸν ἑτέρα βασιλεία καθίστηκε.

attitude they assumed with respect to consuls and dictators³⁷, their power of attending generals and going to the camp to investigate their conduct³⁸, etc., were in some respects analogous to those of the Ephors. But this was partly done at the instance of the people, and upon the whole, their position with relation to their respective communities was entirely different. But it is certain that the power of the Ephoralty obtained an undue preponderance, as the oligarchy of the Homoioi became more oppressive, like which it was directed against the hereditary kingship, against the ancient citizens generally, and every distinguished individual in the state. Hence there is no foundation for the assertion, that the Ephors were chosen from a class of citizens endowed with inferior rights³⁹. They must, on the contrary, be considered as a committee composed of ancient citizens, whose sentiments, as an order, they shared, while the order and the official body employed all their jealousy and suspicion to support and strengthen each other. The counterpart of this oligarchical authority is beheld in the Inquisition of Venice, a republic which bore a striking resemblance to Sparta, both in its love of

³⁷ Liv. 9. 8.

³⁸ Ibid. 29. 21. 22.

³⁹ I am very far from underrating the weight of Aristotle's testimony, Pol. 2. 6. 14; *γίνονται δ' ἐκ τοῦ δήμου πάντες*, but there is no proof that this must be interpreted 'new citizens.' Aristotle opposes to each other *καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ* and *δῆμος*, and says that the Gerontes were chosen from the former; he does not regard them as an exclusive class of citizens, but as the more distinguished amongst them. Besides these there was a *demus* of ancient citizens it is true, some of whom were very indigent (*ὥστε πολλάκις ἐμπίπτουσιν ἄνθρωποι σφόδρα πένητες εἰς τὸ ἀρχεῖον* (of the Ephori), *οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀμορίαν ὧνιοι ἦσαν*). There is no difficulty in explaining how these ancient citizens might, as an order, share the sentiments of the wealthier and more respectable members of the state; and it is only in this sense that we can assent to Aristotle's observation concerning the sentiments of the *demus*; *ἡσυχάζει γὰρ ὁ δῆμος διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς μεγίστης ἀρχῆς*. Pol. 2. 6. 15; for the half citizens were dissatisfied with their subordinate position, as the conspiracy of Cinadon plainly proves.

mystery and the jealous and illiberal character of its general policy.

c. THE OTHER INDEPENDENT STATES OF GREECE.

§ 67. Allusion has already been made¹ to the influence exercised upon the political development in the interior of the various republics of Greece by their participation in the war, and the party divisions which resulted from their adherence to one or the other of the two great confederacies; in several communities this division was solely determined by external circumstances, and thereby forced into a peculiar direction. We cannot pursue this subject here, but must confine our attention to those few states in which that influence is not equally perceptible. Unfortunately our information respecting several of them is exceedingly imperfect.

1. ARGOS².

After the peace of Nicias it became involved in the wars of the period, and the political movements in its interior became dependent upon them. After its defeat at Mantinea, Olymp. 90. 3; 418. B. C., upon which occasion the more ancient citizens³, and the five Lochoi, as they were termed, sustained severe losses, while the Thousand or

¹ See § 63.

² Comp. § 59. n. 1.

³ Manso, Sparta. v. 2. 434, looks upon the *πρεσβυτέρους* of Thucydides (5. 72.) as persons of a more elevated rank, and the class from which the Thousand were selected. But they appear merely to be opposed as veterans to the Thousand, the military youth. This was also the case in Elis (Thucyd. 5. 50: *ξὺν ὅπλοις τῶν νεωτέρων*). The intermediate position must be assigned to the *πέντε λόχοι*, as the regular body of male recruits, therefore as the mass of the *demus*.

Logades⁴ of the other wing routed the enemy, the latter, relying upon the assistance of Sparta, raised the oligarchical banner. They succeeded in concluding a treaty with Sparta, and soon after a detachment of Argives in conjunction with some Spartans, marched to Sicyon, and assisted in establishing oligarchy in that city⁵. The government of the people was also overthrown in Argos⁶. But the oligarchy only lasted eight months⁷. Bryas, the chief of the Thousand, violated the chastity of a betrothed virgin whom he had forcibly carried off from her conductors during the nuptial procession; the victim of his lust surprised him in his sleep, put out his eyes, and fled to the people for protection, who hereupon rose in arms and overthrew their tyrants⁸. All who did not seek safety in flight were put to the sword. With the assistance of the Athenians long walls were now constructed, whereby this seat of democracy became connected with the sea. Three hundred men, suspected of oligarchical cabals, were in the following year delivered over to the custody of the Athenians, who distributed them over various islands⁹. The intrigues of Alcibiades had chiefly contributed to inflame the passions of the demus to this violent pitch; nevertheless, during the terror caused by the trial of the Hermocopidæ in Athens, it was reported in Argos that the friends

⁴ Thucyd. 5. 72: οἱ χίλιοι λογάδες; 73: τοὺς χιλίους, afterwards οἱ λογάδες. Plut. Alcib. 15: οἱ Κίλιοι.

⁵ Thucyd. 5. 76—81.

⁶ Thucyd. 5. 81; Diod. 12. 80; Plut. Alcib. 15.

⁷ Diod. ubi sup.

⁸ Pausan. 2. 20. 1; Diod. ubi sup.; Thucyd. 5. 82.

⁹ Thucyd. 5. 84.

of Alcibiades had conspired to overturn the democracy in Argos¹⁰, whereupon Athens sent back the three hundred prisoners for execution¹¹. Argos, as if to requite the favour, helped to dissolve the government of the Four Hundred, and received the ambassadors whom they had destined for Sparta, from the democratic crew of the Paralos, for the purpose of keeping them in safe custody¹².

2. BŒOTIA¹³.

Little or nothing is known of the internal history of Thebes and the other Bœotian communities during the war. Some light is, however, thrown upon the federal relations among the Bœotian towns, and the encroachments of Thebes, by the conduct of the latter towards Plataeæ and Thespiæ; to this must be added the mention of a federal council, and the hint thrown out respecting the devolution of the hegemony to the twelve Bœotarchs by rotation. The former was composed of four assemblies (*βουλαῖς*), invested with sovereign powers¹⁴; the latter was so far from always being the permanent attribute of the Thebans, that when it was vested in the Theban Bœotarch, the rest of the confederates, a short time before the battle of Delium, refused to fight, and it became necessary

¹⁰ Thucyd. 6. 61; Diod. 13. 5. It is not possible entirely to reconcile the account of the frustration of an oligarchical plot in Æneas, Tact. cap. 11, with the other statements; Casaubon, however, correctly refers it to an occurrence which took place between the before-mentioned rise of the demus against the allies of Bryas, and the dreadful massacre after the Peloponnesian war, to which we shall afterwards more particularly allude. This took place at the moment that Sparta was preparing to attack them.

¹¹ See § 65. n. 124.

¹² Thucyd. 8. 86.

¹³ Conf. above, § 60. n. 2.

¹⁴ Thucyd. 5. 38: *ἅπαν τὸ κῆρος ἔχουσι*. Comp. vol. i. 192.

to use persuasion to induce them to do so¹⁵. During the progress of the Peloponnesian war Thebes was as remarkable for its lenity and forbearance towards the towns which adhered to it, as for the cruelty with which, when supported by them, it treated Plataeæ and Thespiæ¹⁶. However, it did not remain altogether exempt from democratic commotions and intrigues, for some of the malcontents of the strictly aristocratic town Orchomenus endeavoured, with the assistance of the Athenians, Demosthenes and Hippocrates, to organize a democracy in Boeotia; but their attempts were frustrated by the victory of the Thebans and their allies at Delium, Ol. 89. 1; 424. B. C. In the eighteenth year of the war no better success attended an insurrection of the Thespian demus, supported by Athens, against the dynasts imposed upon it by Thebes¹⁷.

3. THESSALY.

Though the Thessalian communities were violently agitated by internal distractions¹⁸, these nowhere led to the permanent establishment of democracy. Critias the Athenian, during his residence in Thessaly, endeavoured to excite sedition amongst the Penestæ¹⁹, but at the same time gave the oligarchs advice as to how they might most effectually consolidate their authority²⁰. The Aleuadae in Larissa, and the Scopadae in Crannon and Pharsalus, continued till the conclusion of the

¹⁵ Thucyd. 4. 93.

¹⁶ Thucyd. 4. 76. Conf. Müller, Orchom. 417.

¹⁷ Thucyd. 6. 95.

¹⁸ Comp. § 62. 1. B. b.

¹⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 36, where see Schneider; conf. Memorabil. Socrat. 1. 2. 24.

²⁰ Philostrat. Vit. Soph. p. 502, Olear. ed.

war to be the leading aristocratic houses. To the former belonged Eurylochus, who offered Socrates an asylum²¹, Aristippus, the scholar of Gorgias²², and friend of the younger Cyrus, who sent him four thousand mercenaries to protect him against internal tumults²³, and lastly the Pharsalian Menon adverted to above²⁴. The last was united to the great king²⁵ by a treaty of hospitality which he had inherited from his father, who had joined the expedition of Cyrus against Artaxerxes with fifteen hundred Greeks²⁶. Amongst the Scopadæ we are acquainted with the youngest (the third) Scopas, who was likewise intimate with the younger Cyrus²⁷, and offered Socrates a retreat²⁸. The federal bond which connected the Thessalian towns became gradually relaxed, yet the office of the Tagos had not yet lost its authority, as may be perceived from the influence of Jason in a still later age. A total revolution in the internal condition of the several states, and in the constitution of the league itself, was effected in the last year of the Peloponnesian war. This event marks the commencement of a new era in the history of Thessaly.

4. CORCYRA.

The horrors which were here occasioned by the animosities of contending factions have been already alluded to²⁹. The origin and progress of these dissensions are a melancholy example of the evils which are produced, when domestic selfish-

²¹ Diog. Laert. 2. 25.

²² Xenoph. Anab. 1. 1. 10.

²³ See § 60. n. 3. ad fin.

²⁴ Xenoph. Anab. 1. 2. 6.

²⁵ Diog. Laert. 2. 25.

²² Plato, Menon, init.

²³ Plato, Menon, 78. D.

²⁷ Ælian. V. H. 12. 1.

²⁹ § 63. n. 34.

ness abets the insidious designs of foreign intrigue. At the commencement of hostilities with Corinth Corcyra was democratic. In the sea-fight with the Corinthians, Ol. 86. 4 ; 432. B. C., a number of the principal Corcyræans were taken prisoners³⁰. The captives forgot the hatred which had for two centuries divided the Corcyræans and the Corinthians, in the prospect of the power which they hoped to acquire in their native city through the assistance of Corinth. Upon obtaining their release, they immediately took measures for the introduction of an oligarchy. But whilst fortune smiled upon their undertakings, their conduct was far from being entitled to praise ; in their struggle for power they lost sight of moderation³¹. The licentious demus, prepared for the commission of every excess, made war upon them, and after an obstinate resistance overcame them³². The destruction of the last survivors was dreadful in the extreme. A pure democracy was now introduced, but the horrors of civil warfare are said to have been renewed. Diodorus³³ speaks of a butchery that took place in Ol. 92. 3 ; the silence of Thucydides, who remarks that after the massacre in the seventh year of the war, nothing occurred worthy of particular observation³⁴, makes that account suspicious, but Diodorus adds one more circumstance, viz., that Conon came to Corcyra at that time with some Messenians from Naupactus, who joined

³⁰ Thucyd. 1. 46—55.

³¹ Thucyd. 3. 70, sqq.

³² Diod. 13. 48.

³³ Thucyd. 4. 46—48.

³⁴ Thucyd. 4. 48 : καὶ ἡ στάσις πολλὰ γενομένη ἐτελεύτησεν ἐς τοῦτο, ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἦν ὑπόλοιπον τῶν ἐτέρων ὅ τι καὶ ἀξιόλογον.

in the expulsion or slaughter of the oligarchs. The rest is told in Diodorus' usual vague and insipid manner; slaves are enfranchised; civil rights conferred upon strangers; the friends of the exiles once more resort to arms, the former return, they fight till nightfall, and at length a convention restores peace and tranquillity³⁵. The rise of an oligarchy was impossible during the Peloponnesian war, whilst the squadrons of Athens were scouring the seas in all directions, and Corcyra almost resembled an Athenian camp; even after the disasters of the Athenians in Sicily, and the downfall of their naval power, Corcyra would not submit to the hegemony of Sparta. Through its total dereliction of moral dignity and decorum, the mob-government of Corcyra passed into a proverb³⁶.

5. MEGARA.

The spirit of dissension and intrigue was not idle here, but the people no longer present so revolting a subject of contemplation as formerly, and as they still did in Corcyra; but on the other hand the oligarchs are beheld in all their malignity. Oligarchy was not the immediate consequence of the defection from the Athenian league before the Peloponnesian war, as at the beginning of the war the oligarchical party were in exile at Pagæ and in various parts of the surrounding country³⁷. After the reduction of Plataeæ the Thebans offered it as a residence to the Megarian fugitives for a year³⁸. The Megarians were still

³⁵ Κοινῶς ὥκουσιν τὴν πατρίδα.

³⁶ Ἐλευθέρα Κέρκυρα, χέζ' ὅπου θέλεις. Metr. Prov. ap. Schott. v. 569.

³⁷ Thucyd. 4. 65.

³⁸ Thucyd. 3. 68.

hostile to the Athenians, on account of the two irruptions which they annually made into the Megarian territory ; moreover a Peloponnesian garrison in Nisæa³⁹, and the numerous partisans of the expelled oligarchs were insuperable obstacles to a reconciliation with Athens. When the exiled oligarchists began to harass the Megarian territory with their depredations⁴⁰, some of the people proposed that they should be recalled, a proceeding which formed a very honourable exception to the general practice of the Grecian states ; and their friends now began to bestir themselves in their favour. On the other hand, the leaders of the people, who had effected the expulsion of those oligarchs, thinking to prevent their return and to maintain their own authority by the aid of Athens, sought to attain their object by treachery, and invited a body of Athenian troops to their aid. But all their efforts to betray the town into their power were unavailing. At this juncture the Spartan Brasidas arrived with an army of Peloponnesians, with which he proposed to garrison Megara, and so secure its fidelity, but the Megarians would not admit him into the town. After the departure of the Athenian army and the flight of the popular leaders in the interest of Athens, the deserted people entered into negotiations with the friends of the exiles and allowed them to return. The latter took a solemn oath not to revenge themselves upon their former adversaries, and to consult the good of the state alone. However, upon obtaining possession of the chief offices in the state, they

³⁹ Thucyd. 4. 66.⁴⁰ Χαλεποί ἦσαν ληστεύοντες, Thucyd. ubi sup.

instituted a regular scrutiny, and singling out their enemies to the number of about a hundred, they constrained the people to pass a vote for putting them to death, which was accordingly carried into effect. They now introduced a regular oligarchy⁴¹, and probably repeated upon this occasion that which had taken place at their former forcible return, viz., they conferred offices upon none but those who had continued to fight against the people⁴² from the first moment of their banishment.

6. THE STATES OF THE EASTERN ISLANDS AND COASTS.

The variations which occurred in the constitutions of these states were closely connected with the external position of the chief belligerent powers. For instance, with the help of Peloponnesian fleets, oligarchy was established in Chios⁴³, Thasus, etc., but again overthrown in the latter towards the end of the war, when the Athenian democracy once more became triumphant⁴⁴. Separate mention must be made of Samos, which, as we have before seen in the history of the Four Hundred in Athens⁴⁵, continued to be the voluntary and faithful ally of Athens, and remained staunch to its democratic principles, as well as of Rhodes, on account of the great importance it afterwards attained. In the twentieth year of the war, when the Athenian Synteleia began to suffer from the continued defection of the allies, the chief men of the island called to their assist-

⁴¹ Thucyd. 5. 66—74.

⁴² Aristot. Pol. 4. 12. 10 : ἐκ τῶν συγκατελθόντων καὶ συμμαχεσαμένων πρὸς τὸν δῆμον. Conf. § 59. n. 54. By this co-operation might possibly be meant the predatory excursions mentioned, n. 39.

⁴³ § 62. n. 147.

⁴⁴ § 62. n. 148.

⁴⁵ § 65.

ance the fleet of the Peloponnesians, and then deserted to them⁴⁶. This, however, was effected without the full concurrence of the people. But immediately after, Ol. 92. 2, the noble Dorieus, a descendant of the Diagoridæ, who had formerly been expelled at the instigation of Athens, and who had moreover found refuge and been admitted to the rights of citizenship in Thurii⁴⁷, arrived with thirteen ships from the fleet of Mindarus and allayed the tumult⁴⁸. This, in Ol. 93. 1; 408. B. C., was followed by the union of the three townships of Lindus, Ialysus, and Camirus, which had formerly constituted distinct communities, by the erection of the common capital Rhodes in a commodious situation⁴⁹. This synoikismus therefore was not of a democratic character; still, after numerous convulsions, and when the more ancient Greek states had sunk into utter insignificance, a democracy unfolded itself here whose moderation and dignity reflected honour upon the people.

7. THE SICELIOTS.

The intestine discord in the individual states which we were called upon to consider above⁵⁰, and in which the neighbouring communities participated, continued to prevail till the great expedition of the Athenians compelled most of them to unite with Syracuse and take measures for their common defence. But no salutary fruits sprung from the victory over the Athenians; internal distractions, and conflicts with the barbarian armies of Carthage

⁴⁶ Thucyd. 8. 44.

⁴⁷ Xenoph. 1. 5. 19; Paus. 6. 7. 2.

⁴⁹ Diod. 13. 75.

⁴⁸ Diod. 13. 38. 45.

⁵⁰ § 59. n. 8.

resulted in the destruction of numerous towns, and the subjection of others to the yoke of domestic tyrants.

Leontini was one of the chief seats of intestine strife before the arrival of the Athenians; we have already seen how the oligarchs drove the people out of the town which they themselves then quitted, and took up their residence in Syracuse, where they became citizens. A short time afterwards a portion of them returned to their own deserted city, and some of the scattered demus likewise assembled there ⁵¹. Nevertheless these Leontines do not again appear during the war as a distinct community; by the Leontines as a people, are probably meant those who dwelt in Syracuse ⁵². When some Agrigentan fugitives, Ol. 93. 3; 406. B. C., sought refuge in Syracuse, Leontini was assigned to them for a residence ⁵³; but soon afterwards, Olymp. 94. 1, the Leontines who resided in Syracuse threw off the yoke of the tyrant Dionysius and marched back to their own city ⁵⁴, which hereupon became a distinct and independent state, though it did not long retain that character ⁵⁵.

In Syracuse, a short time before the Athenian expedition, the two great parties were headed by Athenagoras and Hermocrates; the former a violent demagogue, the latter stigmatized by his rival as the chief of an oligarchical faction ⁵⁶. But Hermocrates, whose intervention had upon a former occasion restored concord amongst the Sice-

⁵¹ Thucyd. 5. 4; 6. 48; conf. Diod. 12. 54.

⁵² e. g. Thucyd. 6. 50; and, as it would seem also, Diod. 13. 18.

⁵³ Diod. 13. 89.

⁵⁴ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 5.

⁵⁵ Diod. 14. 14.

⁵⁶ Thucyd. 6. 38, sqq.

liots⁵⁷, once more became the saviour of his country at a time when its total incapacity to take measures for its own security threatened to render it an easy prey to the Athenians. He quelled a conspiracy amongst the slaves⁵⁸, and prevailed upon the people to choose three strategi instead of fifteen as formerly, and to entrust them with unlimited powers⁵⁹. After the discomfiture of the Athenians, the party feuds broke out afresh. Aristotle's remark, alluded to above⁶⁰, that democracy now, and not till now, supplanted the mixed constitution, which he denominates Politeia, may be explained from the fact, that Hermocrates and his adherents had till that time successfully withstood the tumultuous demagoguery of Athenagoras. But now Hermocrates was opposed by a new antagonist, the talented but impetuous Diocles. Their differences dated from the time of the deliberations as to the course to be pursued with the Athenian captives and their confederates. In the description of Diodorus⁶¹, which it must be confessed cannot altogether be depended upon, Diocles is represented as an implacable and barbarous enemy to the prisoners. The cause of humanity is pleaded by Nicolaus, a venerable old man, who had lost two sons during the siege⁶². No great faith can be reposed in a narrative of proceedings which Diodorus has thought proper to set forth with rhetorical decorations; but there is no doubt that Syracuse tarnished the glory of its victory by barbarity to the captives⁶³.

⁵⁷ § 62. n. 125.⁵⁸ Polyæn. 1. 43. 1.⁵⁹ Thucyd. 6. 73; comp. Plut. Nic. 16.⁶⁰ Aristot. Pol. 5. 3. 6.⁶¹ Diod. 13. 19.⁶² Diod. 13. 20, seqq.⁶³ § 63. n. 17.

Whilst Hermocrates led a squadron into the eastern seas against the Athenians⁶⁴, Diocles remained at home and persuaded the people to pass a decree against him and his partisans⁶⁵. Diocles now became the legislator of Syracuse. His laws remained in vigour⁶⁶ for several centuries, and even down to the time of the Romans, while he himself received heroic honours⁶⁷. Diodorus has attempted to describe the distinctive features of his legislation, and directs notice to his intentional minuteness on the subject, to which he asserts that his predecessor had not devoted sufficient attention⁶⁸. But unfortunately his attempts to delineate the peculiarities of this code exhibit the same want of discrimination as his military descriptions, in which he is unable to seize the real points of difference between one battle and another. In narrating a particular fact, he thought it was sufficient to describe what generally took place under similar circumstances, and this was afterwards decked out with rhetorical bombast. This accounts for the marked family likeness which all his pictures bear, and which must not so much be ascribed to the natural sameness of the subjects he delineates, as to the vague and unmeaning phrases with which he uniformly garnishes his descriptions. He commences his history of the legislation of Diocles⁶⁹ by narrating that he drew his sword and stabbed himself, because he had broken his own law by ap-

⁶⁴ Thucyd. 8. 26.⁶⁵ Xenoph. Hell. 1. 1. 27.⁶⁶ In the time of Timoleon and Hiero a more intelligible language was substituted for the obsolete idiom in which they were written. Diod. 13. 35.⁶⁷ Diod. ubi sup.⁶⁸ Diod. ubi sup.⁶⁹ Diod. 13. 33.

pearing in the market-place armed, though circumstances had compelled him to do so. But, in spite of this, he goes on to relate that he was afterwards banished. This story alone savours of a 'transference from Charondas'⁷⁰. Further on he says⁷¹, that Diocles made a proposition for electing the magistrates by lot, and at the same time for choosing legislators, who were to draw up a constitution and laws; and that he himself was one of the persons chosen. His criminal laws were very severe; but at the same time he appointed rewards for merit, and specified the fines to be imposed both in private suits and public actions. Thus far extends the account of Diodorus. Athenæus⁷² subjoins from Phylarchus that Diocles forbade the wives of citizens to indulge in immoderate luxury in dress, which he only allowed to women of loose character. This is also found amongst the enactments of one of the Italiot legislators⁷³. The fault of this confusion, however, does not lie with the historians alone, for it is most probable, that in compiling his laws, Diocles took the codes of Zaleucus, Charondas, and even Pythagoras for his models.

The legislation of Diocles did not restore tranquillity to Syracuse, and even the attacks of foreign enemies failed to call up a spirit of unanimity. Egesta having, by its solicitations, prevailed upon the Carthaginians to send an armament against its hated rival Selinus⁷⁴, Syracuse determined upon assisting the latter, and Diocles was nominated to

⁷⁰ Diod. 12. 19. Valer. Max. 6. 5. 4.

⁷¹ Diod. 13. 34.

⁷² Athen. 12. 521. B.

⁷³ See Append. vi.

⁷⁴ See below, and § 75. n. 6, sqq.

the command in the war with the Carthaginians⁷⁵. In the mean time Hermocrates had returned to Sicily⁷⁶. He had at first borne his exile with noble resignation⁷⁷; but the desire of returning to his country soon awoke within him. Nevertheless he remained true to his principles, and far from engaging in any undertaking against his native city, he levied soldiers and led them against the Carthaginians, whereupon the Syracusans, dazzled by the accounts of his victories over their ancient enemies of Carthage, soon experienced a reaction of feeling in his favour. Hermocrates now sought to overthrow Diocles; but though he succeeded in his attempt, and caused him to be banished, he himself was not recalled, as it was feared that his power might lead to tyranny. His friends, however, still holding out inducements to him, he marched to Syracuse at the head of three thousand men, but upon venturing into the town with too small a retinue was slain. Amongst his companions was Dionysius, the subsequent tyrant of Syracuse, who upon this occasion was severely wounded, and narrowly escaped being killed⁷⁸. The continuance of the war with Carthage enabled him to obtain the favour of the people, so that before the end of the Peloponnesian war he was in possession of the tyranny.

During these events Agrigentum, the rival of Syracuse, possessed an abundant population⁷⁹, and

⁷⁵ Diod. 13. 59.

⁷⁶ Diod. 13. 63.

⁷⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 1. 1. 28, sqq.

⁷⁸ Diod. 13. 75.

⁷⁹ Diod. 13. 84. reckons 20,000 citizens, and 200,000 inhabitants in all; in Diog. Laert. 8. 63. the number is stated at 800,000 (if the reading is correct) upon the authority of Potamilla. "*Ignotissima autem mihi omnium seminarum hæc femina.*" Menag.

enjoyed uninterrupted prosperity, and though not entirely exempt from party feuds⁸⁰, it was still politic and circumspect enough to remain neuter in the war against Athens⁸¹; but in Ol. 93. 3; 406. B. C., it was taken by the Carthaginians and razed to the ground⁸².

⁸⁰ Thucyd. 7. 46.

⁸² Diod. 13. 90; Xenoph. Hell. 1. 5. 21.

⁸¹ Thucyd. 7. 33.

THE PREDOMINANCE AND DECLINE OF OLIGARCHY WITH THE HEGEMONY OF SPARTA; THE NEW DEMOCRACY AND THE TYRANNY.

FROM THE END OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR TILL THE
TIME OF PHILIP OF MACEDON.

A. Zenith of the Oligarchical System under the Hegemony of Sparta.

I. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF GREECE TILL THE LIBERATION OF THEBES FROM THE SPARTAN YOKE.

§ 68. The variations which occurred in the internal condition of the Grecian states, during the space of time above marked out for consideration, cannot be conveniently treated according to the historical succession of periods, and the changes which took place in the external relations of the states to each other, inasmuch as the principal phenomena presented to our notice, viz., the hegemony of Sparta and the supremacy of the elder Dionysius in the external, and oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny in the internal political system were rather contemporary than successive. But considered with reference to the greater or less degree of influence which they respectively exercised, they undoubtedly present themselves to our notice in successive stages of development, wherefore, the history of Sparta's hegemony must begin with the oligarchy; after the rise of Thebes, the democratic

principle predominates; and the tyranny requires separate consideration, and must be accompanied by an account of the Greek states in the west.

Though the hegemony of Sparta was more extensive than that of Athens had been, it was far from being universal; not only the west was never included under it, but several of the provinces of the Grecian continent itself refused to acknowledge the Spartan sway. Moreover, in defining the empire of Sparta, we are called upon to consider two distinct periods. 1. That of the hegemony by sea, which lasted from the victory over Athens till the battle of Naxos. 2. That of the hegemony by land in its greatest extent, which commenced with the peace of Antalcidas, and attained its zenith with the occupation of the Cadmea and the expedition to Olynthus. During the former, Sparta commanded all the eastern dependencies of Greece, but in Greece Proper, her authority extended very little beyond the confines of the Peloponnesus. During the latter, her empire by land included Bœotia and reached as far as Thrace, while she scarcely retained any portion of her hegemony in the east and among the maritime states.

After their thirst of vengeance was satisfied, few of the Greeks had much cause to congratulate themselves upon the issue of the conflict with Athens, the professed object of which had been to obtain freedom and independence for the second-rate states; and many amongst them, who had made great sacrifices for Sparta, now began to feel sorrow and repentance. Amongst the voluntary confederates of Athens, the powerful Samos had been reduced by Lysander, immediately after the capi-

tulation of Athens¹. The Messenians of Naupactus were expelled in Olymp. 94. 4; 401. B. C.; their city was filled with Achæans², the unhappy Messenians themselves were dispersed, and wandered to Sicily, Rhegium, and Cyrene³. Sparta, desirous of entirely restoring the Peloponnesian Symmachia, and of executing her long-deferred scheme of vengeance against Elis for having persisted in its neutrality, commanded it in the same year, viz., 401. B. C., to enfranchise its Perioeci, that in case of a refusal she might have a pretext for reducing it by force. The event corresponded with her calculations; Elis, unequal to the conflict in which it became involved, was constrained to yield in the third year of the war, emancipated the Perioeci⁴, pulled down its walls, surrendered its ships, and renewed its alliance with Sparta⁵. The desire of Sparta to extend her empire over the east and west, as Athens had formerly done, induced her to evince extraordinary activity in her foreign relations. When the proper moment for declaring her despotic intentions was not arrived, she tried the effect of negociation, and did not even disdain to have recourse to treachery when her interest required it. Syracuse, to whose devoted co-operation she had such deep obligations, groaned under the yoke of Dionysius, whilst Sparta sent Aristus there, with instructions to consult appearances as much as possible, but at the same time to do every thing in his power to strengthen the tyranny⁶;

¹ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 6.

² Diodor. 13. 34; conf. 15. 75, and Xenoph. Hell. 4. 6. 14.

³ Diodor. ubi sup. and Pausan. 4. 26. 2.

⁴ On this point see § 69. n. 3.

⁵ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 2. 21, sqq.; Diodor. 14. 17. 34; Pausan. 3. 8. 2. 3.

⁶ Diodor. 14. 10. says, *διὰ δὲ τῆς πράξεως ταύτης ἀσχημονεῖν ἐποίησεν*

and afterwards in Olymp. 96. 1., Pharacidas, the Spartan, was sent with a fleet to assist Dionysius in putting down an insurrection⁷. All this was done with a view to secure the alliance of the tyrant. Still more culpable was the policy of Sparta in reference to the Asiatic Greeks and the Persians, for Dionysius was at least a Greek, and made head against the Carthaginians. In the course of the war, immediately that the Spartans set foot again on the shores of Asia Minor, Sparta declared, that if the great king would assist her, she was ready to betray into his hands all the Greeks in that quarter, many of whom had thrown themselves into her arms with generous confidence⁸. The personal friendship of Lysander and the younger Cyrus, rendered such contracts unnecessary, it is true; but would the latter ever have resigned his authority over the coasts of Asia, or would Sparta have taken measures to compel him to do so? After Sparta, indeed, had succeeded in subduing Athens, by means of a formidable armada, fitted out with Persian gold, she appropriated to herself all the contributions which the latter had exacted from her dependencies, and enjoyed the fruits of victory in the abundant tribute which flowed into her coffers. Cyrus being occupied with preparations for the expedition against his brother, and above all, standing in need of assist-

αὐτὸν ἅμα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, and in this instance even he is a satisfactory authority.

⁷ Diodor. 14. 70.

⁸ See § 62. n. 147. That the dissatisfaction of Lichas with the first and second conventions, in which, through an accidental ambiguity of expression, all the islands, Thessaly, Locris as far as Boeotia, in other words, all that his father or his ancestors had ever possessed (Thucyd. 8. 18. 37. 43), had been abandoned to the barbarians, did not spring from any concern for the fate of the Asiatic Greeks, is evident from the third convention (Thucyd. 8, 84), notwithstanding his endeavour to gild the pill by means of a *ἕως ἂν τὸν πόλεμον εὖ θῶνται*.

ance from the Greeks, offered no opposition to this proceeding.

Whilst Sparta was thus endeavouring to extend her sovereignty over two seas, her position in Greece itself daily grew more precarious. Thebes had made reiterated and fruitless applications to her for a share of the spoils taken in the war, and began to harbour feelings of animosity against her⁹. These manifested themselves during the government of the Thirty in Athens. Their protector, Lysander, seems to have issued a proclamation to the effect, that every person who neglected to deliver up Athenian fugitives, should be fined five talents¹⁰. But Thebes declared, that if any one of her citizens should fail to afford the fugitives from Athens all the assistance in his power¹¹, he should be fined one talent, and went so far as to allow Athenian troops to march through her territory¹², whilst Ismenias the Theban furnished Thrasybulus with considerable succours¹³. The Argives ordered the envoys who demanded the extradition of the Athenian refugees, to quit their town before sunset¹⁴. Meanwhile, Athens having shaken off the yoke of the Thirty, Lysander sent the most urgent messages to Sparta for assistance; the Ten, by whom the Thirty were succeeded, having obtained

⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 5. 5; Plut. Lys. 27. According to Justin, 5. 10, also Corinth.

¹⁰ Diodor. 14. 6: ἐψηφίσαντο γὰρ τοὺς Ἀθηναίων φυγάδας ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀγωγίμους τοῖς τριάκοντα εἶναι, κ. τ. λ. Conf. Lysias, c. Eratosth. 444: πανταχόθεν ἐκκηρυττόμενοι.

¹¹ Diodor. 14. 6; Plut. Lys. 27.

¹² Plut. ubi sup. He says, ἂν δέ τις Ἀθήναζε διὰ τῆς Βαιωτίας ἐπὶ τοὺς τυράννους ὅπλα κομίζῃ, μήτε ὁρᾶν τινα Θηβαίων μήτε ἀκούειν. Conf. Pelop. 6, and Dinarch. in Demosth. 19, where there is μὴ περιορᾶν.

¹³ Justin, 5. 9.

¹⁴ Demosth. de Lib. Rhod. 197. 7. 8: ἐψηφίσαντο, ἰὰν μὴ πρὸ ἡλίου δύοντος ἀπαλλάττωνται, πολεμίους κρίνειν. Conf. Diodor. 14. 6.

a loan of a hundred talents¹⁵, Lysander advanced with a fleet, and king Pausanias marched at the head of a Peloponnesian army against the Athenian fugitives who had occupied the Piræus¹⁶; but fear of Argos and Thebes, combined with the suspicion with which the king and the Ephors regarded Lysander, and the good nature of the first, appear to have induced Sparta to consent to the re-establishment of democracy in Athens¹⁷. But gratitude failed to render the last faithful to her league with Sparta.

A considerable change had been wrought in the political position of Sparta with regard to Asia, since the death of the younger Cyrus. It was not a mere band of wandering mercenaries which the Spartan Clearchus had under his command when he accompanied that prince; Sparta had ordered him to join the expedition, through the medium of the Scytale¹⁸, and the voyage of the Grecian fleet to Cilicia to support the operations of the land-army¹⁹, bears still stronger marks of having been undertaken in pursuance of the commands of the state. Upon the failure of the expedition, Tissaphernes lost no time in renewing those claims to the dominion of the western coast of Asia²⁰, which had acquired such force from the former concessions of Sparta. But the latter refused to relinquish the sovereignty of these coasts and the treasures which she derived from it; therefore, when the Ionians,

¹⁵ Lysias adv. Eratosth. 422.

¹⁶ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 4. 27—30.

¹⁷ Ibid. 2. 4. 30, sqq.; conf. Lysias adv. Pol. 604. 606.

¹⁸ Plut. Attax. 6: ὑπηρεῖν Κύρῳ πάντα κελεύοντες.

¹⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 1. 1; Diodor. 14. 19.

²⁰ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 1. 3: εὐθὺς ἤξιον τὰς Ἰωνικὰς πόλεις ἀπάσας ταυτῷ ὑπηκόους εἶναι.

Olymp. 95. 1 ; 399. B. C., applied to her for assistance, an army, furnished by the Grecian cities in alliance with Sparta, was sent to their aid, the rude and dissipated Thimbron²¹ being appointed to the command ; he was, in the following year, succeeded by the crafty Dercyllidas²². The number of troops was inconsiderable, and there were almost as many officers as Spartans ; it was intended that the Asiatic Greeks themselves should bear arms against the Persians. But how were courage and perseverance to be instilled into these degenerate voluptuaries ? Xenophon, indeed, is lavish of his commendations to Agesilaus, and lays great stress upon the important effects which resulted from his exertions in military affairs, and the love he gained in Asia²³ ; but he cannot disguise the fact, that at the beginning of the war the Asiatic Greeks displayed cowardice and a reluctance to fight under the banners of Sparta²⁴. Even the brilliant qualities of Agesilaus himself failed to inspire them with ardour and confidence ; for when he allowed them to send substitutes to the army, they eagerly availed themselves of the permission²⁵. Still even Dercyllidas carried on the war with success, and there appeared some prospect of securing the towns of Lesser Asia against the assaults of the Persians, and even of wholly delivering them from their yoke. He was succeeded in the command by Agesilaus, Olymp. 95. 4 ; 396. B. C. He sent forth a summons to the Greeks of the mother-country to join the expedition against

²¹ Aristid. 2. 176. ed. Jebb : μέθυσον καὶ ἀκόλαστον.

²² Xenoph. Hell. 3. 1. 5, sqq.

²³ Xenoph. Hell. 4. 2. 1.

²⁴ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 2. 17.

²⁵ Ibid. 3. 4. 15 : ὥσπερ ἂν τις τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἀποθανοῦμενον προθύμως ζητοίη.

the barbarians, in the same manner as in a national war²⁶. But Argos was not even summoned, whilst Corinth was deterred from joining the expedition by an evil omen²⁷, which reminds us of the oracle which Crete alleged in extenuation of its inactivity upon the approach of Xerxes. Athens excused herself upon the plea of exhaustion²⁸. The horsemen who had served the dynasts had been sent out under Thimbron, and their departure was pronounced a benefit to the constitution²⁹; besides, Athens had already received information that Conon was carrying on negotiations with Pharnabazus³⁰. Thebes not only refused to furnish troops, but when Agesilaus, in his towering pride, wished to imitate the example of Agamemnon by sacrificing in Aulis, some Theban horsemen suddenly appeared and disturbed the ceremony³¹. Hence this cannot be accounted a general hegemony; and the assertion of Xenophon, that all the states of Greece obeyed when a Lacedæmonian commanded³², is by far too unqualified. We cannot here follow up the military operations of Agesilaus. He did every thing that it was possible to effect with an army composed of such various and ill-assorted materials, though the state of discipline into which he had brought it was excellent; but attacks like these, without native strength and national feeling in the

²⁶ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 4. 3 : Pausan. 3. 9. 1.

²⁷ According to Pausan. ubi sup. they were reluctantly compelled to remain at home : but this is somewhat inconsistent with their defection from Sparta a short time afterwards. We must not overlook the party division for and against Sparta in Corinth at the time. ²⁸ Pausan. ubi sup.

²⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 1. 4 : κέρδος τῷ δήμῳ, εἰ ἐναποδημοῖεν καὶ ἐναπόλοιγτο. ³⁰ Pausan. ubi sup.

³¹ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 4. 3. 4 ; Plut. Ages. ap. Pausan. 3. 9. 2.

³² Xenoph. Hell. 3. 1. 5. The observation applies to the time when Thimbron set out on his march, and more immediately refers to Asia Minor.

background, might rouse indeed, but could not destroy, the Persian colossus³³.

Whilst the temper above described prevailed amongst the chief states of the Grecian mother-country, it scarcely required the aid of Persian gold to prevail upon them to rise against Sparta. The assertion that Agesilaus' jest³⁴ explains the origin and course of the divisions which ensued, is a mere piece of rhetorical deception. Agesilaus was upon the point of overturning the Persian throne, when ten thousand Darics changed the posture of affairs! It cannot, however, be denied, that when Timocrates the Rhodian was sent by Tithraustes to Greece with about fifty talents of silver³⁵, the demagogues of Athens, Corinth, Thebes³⁶, etc., stretched out a willing hand to receive his largesses. But it cannot be proved that Corinth, Argos, and Thebes, had simultaneously acquiesced in the subjugation of the Asiatic Greeks; in Menexenus³⁷ this assertion also seems to involve a mere rhetorical antithesis, implying that Athens had not done so. A confederacy was now formed against Sparta by Argos, Corinth, Athens, Thebes, whose authority at that time extended over all Bœotia, with the exception of Orchomenus, Lysander having induced it to

³³ Plutarch, Ages. 15, gives loose to his imagination, when he says that Agesilaus τὸν πόλεμον διάρας ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς θαλάττης, περὶ τοῦ σωματος βασιλεῖ καὶ τῆς ἐν Ἐκβατάνοις καὶ Σούσοις εὐδαιμονίας διαμάχεσθαι, κ. τ. λ. Isocrat. Paneg. 40, more reasonably observes, μικροῦ δεῖν τῆς ἐντὸς Ἑλλάνος χώρας ἐκράτησιν.

³⁴ Plut. Ages. 15: — ἀναζευγνύων ἔφη μυρίοις τοξόταις ὑπὸ βασιλείᾳ ἐξελαύνεσθαι τῆς Ἀσίας. Conf. Lacon. Apophth. 6. 793.

³⁵ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 5. 1; Paus. 3. 9. 4; Plut. Artax. 21, where the Rhodian is called Hermocrates.

³⁶ For the names of those who received bribes, consult Pausan. ubi sup. and Xenoph. 3. 5. 2. The latter says that no Athenians accepted money, but Pausanias names Cephalus and Epicrates.

³⁷ Plat. Menex. 245. B.

throw off its allegiance to Eubœa³⁸, which owing to the bridge near Chalcis was dependent upon Boœtia; the Opuntian and Ozolian Locrians, and after the death of Lysander, the Malians and Acarnanians³⁹. The inhabitants of Pharsalus, Larissa, etc., were hostile to Agesilaus⁴⁰, if they did not march out themselves. The allies of Sparta were Tegea, Mantinea, to which must be added Orchomenus and the smaller townships of Arcadia, though their names are not expressly mentioned⁴¹, Elis, apart from which must be reckoned its former Pericœci, Sicyon, Epidaurus, Hermione, Trœzen, Halieis⁴², and Achaia⁴³. Phlius, harassed by intestine quarrels, did not furnish its quota of men⁴⁴. Megara and Ægina, to which the remnant of its former inhabitants had now returned⁴⁵, sided with Sparta; the former on account of its oligarchy, the latter out of exasperation against Athens, which was so violent that it had passed a law, declaring that every Athenian who set foot on the island should be punished with death⁴⁶. The allies of Sparta in the north were Phocis and the Boœ-

³⁸ Xenoph. 4. 2. 17; conf. 3. 5. 6.

³⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 4. 2. 17, where we must, however, read *'Ακαρνᾶνες* instead of *Αἰνιᾶνες* (conf. § 72. n. 50); the latter are enumerated together with the Malians, 3. 5. 6, when they both performed military service under Lysander; 4. 3. 15, the *Αἰνιᾶνες* are included in the allied army against Agesilaus. But the Acarnians are also afterwards mentioned as allies of Thebes and Athens, Xenoph. Hell. 4. 6. 1, sqq. Thus the confusion may the more easily be accounted for.

⁴⁰ Xenoph. Hell. 4. 3. 3; Plut. Ages. 16.

⁴¹ To these in particular applies the charge which the Acanthian Cleigenes brings against the Arcadians: *'Αρκάδες, ὅταν μεθ' ὑμῶν (the Spartans) ἴωσι, τὰ τε αὐτῶν σώζουσι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἀπράζουσι.* Xenoph. Hell. 5. 2. 19.

⁴² Xenoph. Hell. 4. 2. 17.

⁴³ Xenophon's list of the members of the two leagues is very inaccurate. He does not mention the Achæans till 4. 2. 18.

⁴⁴ Xenoph. Hell. 4. 2. 17: *ἐκχειρίαν γὰρ ἔφασαν ἔχειν* can only allude to an *ἱερομηνία*, not to an armistice with the enemies of Sparta.

⁴⁵ Plut. Lysan. 14.

⁴⁶ Diog. Laert. 3. 19. According to Plut. Dion. 9, the Psephism only denounced the penalty of slavery, and this was carried into effect in the case of Plato, when he arrived in Ægina from Sicily.

tian Orchomenus. The Corinthian (or first Bœotian) war ⁴⁷ broke out in the spring, Olymp. 96. 2, in 394. B. C. Lysander was killed at Haliartus, at the very beginning of the war ⁴⁸. Sparta maintained the field in the war by land, but not without sustaining severe losses. The Peltasts of Iphicrates effected a marked change in the operations of the war; they cut down a whole Spartan mora ⁴⁹, and upon the whole the Hoplitæ of Sparta no longer inspired the same terror as formerly. But with the fleet fitted out at the expense of Pharnabazus and the king ⁵⁰, Conon gave a heavy blow to the naval power of Sparta by the victory of Cnidos, Olymp. 96. 3; 394. B. C ⁵¹. Chios, Mytilene, Cos, Nisyrus, Teos, Erythræ, and Ephesus ⁵², weary of the yoke of their new masters, and attracted by the alluring promises of Autonomia held out to them by Lysander, revolted from Sparta. In the mean time Athens gradually recovered her independence and resumed her political importance by rebuilding her long walls, which she was enabled to accomplish through the exertions of Conon ⁵³. Still Sparta did not wholly retire from the sea; the naval power of Athens herself was still inconsiderable, though Thrasybulus ⁵⁴ did every thing in his power to exercise and promote her reviving strength. With the further progress of the war, both states were reduced to great straits in

⁴⁷ The war is entitled *Corinthian*, Isocrat. Plat. 523; Paus. 3. 9. 6; *Bœotian*, Diod. 14. 81; Ps. Demosth. in Neær. 1357: ὁ ὕστερος πόλεμος against Sparta.

⁴⁸ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 5. 18. 19.

⁴⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 4. 5. 11—28.

⁵⁰ Diod. 14. 39; conf. 81; Paus. 1. 3. 1; Isocrat. Paneg. 39; Plat. Menex. 245. A.; Corn. Nep. Con. 4; Justin, 5. 10.

⁵¹ Xenoph. Hell. 4. 3. 10—14; Diod. 14. 83; Corn. Nep. Con. 4; Justin, 6. 3.

⁵² Diod. 14. 84; Xenoph. Hell. 4. 8. 2.

⁵³ Xenoph. Hell. 4. 8. 9; Corn. Nep. ubi sup.

⁵⁴ Xenoph. 4. 8. 25, sqq.

consequence of exhausted treasuries, and were forced to apply to Persia for subsidies. Conon had too notoriously applied the monies entrusted to him by Persia, to the exigencies of his native city, and perished in attempting to render the assistance of the barbarians subservient to the object of raising it from its prostration, though he probably intended to break off all connection with them, as soon as he could do so without danger. His imprisonment and subsequent flight or assassination⁵⁵, had the effect of complicating relations for some time afterwards, both parties becoming hostile to Persia, though without uniting against the common enemy. This explains the strange circumstance that Te-leutias, admiral of the Spartan fleet, though an enemy to Persia, took the fleet which the Athenians, who were also hostile to the Persians, had sent, to the assistance of Evagoras in Cyprus⁵⁶. But a second Lysander now arose in Sparta.

Antalcidas crafty, skilful, and as regardless of the means by which he accomplished his designs, as he was indifferent to the honour of Sparta and the maintenance of Grecian nationality against the barbarians⁵⁷, was appointed to the command of the fleet⁵⁸. The political relation of Sparta to Persia had hitherto been chiefly determined by the sentiments and policy of Lysander and Agesilaus. The former seems to have been somewhat lukewarm in defending the coasts of Asia Minor; the latter on the contrary had not only prosecuted that object with ardour, but dwelt with peculiar pride and complacency on the resemblance which

⁵⁵ Xenoph. 4. 8. 16 (his imprisonment); Isocrat. Paneg. 41 (assassination); Lys. de Aristoph. Bon. 638 and 640 (his flight to Cyprus and natural death). Conf. Corn. Nep. Con. 5.

⁵⁶ Xenoph. 4. 8. 24.
Ages. 21. 22.

⁵⁷ For a description of his character, see Plut. Ages. 21. 22.
⁵⁸ Xenoph. 5. 1. 6.

he imagined there was between Agamemnon and himself, who, as the monarch of European nations, went forth to chastise the insolence of an Asiatic despot. Antalcidas, who was the personal enemy of Agesilaus⁵⁹, endeavoured to conciliate the barbarians, and was sent to Tiribazus with instructions to declare the readiness of Sparta to sacrifice the Greeks of the western coast of Asia Minor to the Persians, on condition that they would assist her in subjugating the states of the Grecian continent. He offered to cede those towns to the king, and in return required his assistance in restoring by force of arms the peace of the Grecian continent, and vindicating the Autonomia of all the states of Greece both great and small, with the exception of those above specified. Whether the barbarians perceived the true drift of this last point, the *divide ac impera*, it is impossible to say. Now, it is true, Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, sent envoys to the Persian court; but they indignantly refused to subscribe to the preliminary conditions drawn up by Antalcidas⁶⁰. But he had effectually gained the confidence of the barbarians, brought back money with him to defray the expenses of the war, and in a short time had a fleet of eighty galleys afloat⁶¹. Tiribazus, Ol. 98. 2; 387. B. C., now issued a proclamation directing all who chose to accept the peace offered by the king, to assemble for that purpose; and the majority of the Grecian states immediately declared their assent to it⁶².

These conditions⁶³ remind us of the former

⁵⁹ Plut. Ages. 23.

⁶⁰ Xenoph. Hell. 4. 8. 13—15.

⁶¹ Xenoph. 5. 1. 28.

⁶² Xenoph. 5. 1. 30: *ταχέως πάντες παρεγένοντο* — to learn from Tiribazus the terms of the peace. The addition of *ταχέως* is bitter

⁶³ Xenoph. 5. 1. 31.

negociations of Tissaphernes with Sparta, and the peace itself must be considered a most disgraceful result, after the brilliant hopes which had been raised by the successes of Agesilaus. They were as follows :

1. The king was to receive the Grecian towns on the continent of Asia Minor, and the islands of Clazomenæ⁶⁴ and Cyprus⁶⁵; all of which were declared subject to his sovereign will and pleasure⁶⁶.
2. The Autonomia of all the other Grecian states, whether great or small, was to be respected; Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scyros, alone remaining subject to Athens.
3. Persia and the states desirous of ratifying the peace, were to make war upon such as refused their assent to it⁶⁷.

The columns on which the treaty was engraved were placed in the common sanctuaries⁶⁸.

The policy of Sparta upon this occasion is manifest. By granting Autonomia to the inferior states, she hoped to dissolve the alliance among towns of the same district, and particularly to break the power of Thebes, while she herself would still retain her authority over the Perioeci and Helots of her own territory, which was confirmed

⁶⁴ On its situation, see Thucyd. 8. 14.

⁶⁵ Plut. Artax. 21, erroneously has : νήσους, ὅσαι προσκυροῦσιν Ἀσίᾳ.

⁶⁶ As early as in the third of the former treaties, Thucyd. 8. 58, the words καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεύς, ὅπως βούλεται are used. Concerning the peace of Antalcidas, consult Isocrat. Paneg. cap. 39 : διαβρῆδην γράψαντες, χρῆσθαι τούτῳ ὅ, τι αὐτὸς βούληται. Confl. cap. 37 : — ὥστε τὰς μὲν αὐτῶν κατασκάπτειν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκροπόλεσιν ἐντειχίζειν.

⁶⁷ Xenoph. 5. 1. 31 : — καὶ πεζῇ, καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, καὶ ναυσί, καὶ χρήμασιν.

⁶⁸ Isocrat. Paneg. 48 : — καὶ ταύτας ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκασεν (ὁ βάρβαρος) ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις ἀναγράψαντας ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀναθεῖναι, κ. τ. λ.

by ancient prescription: and finally, by the confusion that would inevitably result from this severance of all previous bands, and the nominal independence of communities incapable of asserting it in the long run, she hoped to get them into her power⁶⁹. The calculations of Athens, that is to say, if she calculated at all, and was not compelled by the entire prostration of her power to bow to a necessity which she could not control⁷⁰, were probably that she would obtain many of the maritime states on which Autonomia had been conferred, as soon as Sparta should no longer have a powerful fleet at sea; moreover, it is not impossible that she reckoned upon gaining influence in the Peloponnesus and on the mainland through the above-described confusion which she foresaw would inevitably result from the arrangements. Finally, Thebes was the last of the other states to give its assent to the peace, being unwilling to relinquish its hegemony in Bœotia.

We must do the Greeks the justice to acknowledge that there is every reason to suppose that public opinion was decidedly adverse to this peace. Plutarch in a later age stigmatizes with patriotic indignation the conduct of Sparta as a piece of flagitious treachery⁷¹, denies the name of a peace to this act of perfidy and insult to the whole of Greece, and declares that no war ever entailed more humiliating consequences upon the vanquished⁷².

⁶⁹ Plut. Ages. 23; Polybius, 6. 49. 5, takes a partial view of the subject, and regards the money only; the Spartans, he says, abandoned the Grecian towns in Asia to their fate, *χάριν τοῦ χρημάτων εὐπορῆσαι πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων δυναστείαν*. The opinion of Diodor. 15. 5, that Sparta's spirit of aggrandisement was not aroused till after the peace, is obviously absurd.

⁷⁰ Xenoph. 5. 1. 29.

⁷¹ Plut. Ages. 23.

⁷² Plut. Artax. 21.

Isocrates, the contemporary of Antalcidas, denounces it no less emphatically⁷³. Will any one after this attach any importance to the assertion of the prejudiced Xenophon, that the Spartans acquired fresh glory by the peace⁷⁴? Its author received a just reward. After the battle of Leuctra he once more repaired to the Persian court, but being there slighted as the representative of a people who had been conquered in a pitched battle, he became disgusted with the world, and starved himself to death⁷⁵.

From this time the Grecian states on the west coast of Asia Minor disappear from our view. Some of them, it is true, afterwards acquired riches, prosperity, and renown, like Ephesus, which when Lysander made it his residence, seemed to have received new life; but they no longer retained their genuine Grecian nationality, and their freedom was irrecoverably gone; their political system ceased to be rooted in congenial soil; some of them were governed by tyrants as Persian satraps, and though we find the titles of numerous magistrates there down to the Roman times, they seem to have been of no importance in a constitutional point of view⁷⁶. The liberty which was repeatedly guaranteed to them in the treaties of their more powerful neighbours, the last of which was that of the Romans after their victory over Antiochus⁷⁷, was little more than a change of

⁷³ Isocrat. Paneg. 47. 48.

⁷⁴ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 1. 36: πολλοὶ ἐπικυδίστεροι ἐγένοντο ἐκ τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδος εἰρήνης καλουμένης.

⁷⁵ Plut. Artax. 23.

⁷⁶ This may chiefly be collected from inscriptions and coins. See the exhaustive accounts of Tittmann, Griech. Staatsv. 420—476. Amongst the older writers Van Dale is sufficiently copious, Diss. de Antiquitatib. et Marmorib. Rom. et Græc. Amstel. 1702.

⁷⁷ Liv. 33. 32. 34.

even Corinth again evinced its ancient zeal in their favour. The principal obligation enjoined by the act of confederation was that of performing military service⁸⁴. Sparta demanded levies of troops, by means of the Scytale⁸⁵, and these appear to have been collected by Xenagi⁸⁶; any member of the confederacy that refused to furnish its quota when required incurred a fine⁸⁷. All contentions between allied towns during the absence of the confederate army were strictly forbidden⁸⁸. The assemblies of the ambassadors from the various states of the league were held in Sparta⁸⁹. There was also a federal tribunal, in which Sparta presided; its authority was appealed to by some Phliasian fugitives who had been expelled in intestine warfare⁹⁰. However, the trial of the Theban Ismenias, after the occupation of the Cadmea⁹¹, is not a very creditable example of its agency; upon this occasion the court consisted of three judges from Sparta, and one from each of the other states of the league indiscriminately; this proceeding reminds us of the treatment of the Platæans in the Peloponnesian war⁹².

It is not improbable that the Peloponnesus bore, without repining, a yoke to which it had been so long accustomed; but the ambition of Sparta demanded the same degree of obedience from the other provinces of Greece. Her imperious pretensions were unceasingly stimulated and encouraged

⁸⁴ Xenoph. 6. 3. 7.⁸⁵ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 2. 37.⁸⁶ Xenoph. 3. 5. 7.⁸⁷ Xenoph. 5. 2. 21.⁸⁸ At least this was the case in the single instance adduced by Xenoph. 5. 4. 37.⁸⁹ Xenoph. 5. 2. 11. 20; 5. 4. 60.⁹⁰ Xenoph. 5. 3. 10.⁹¹ Xenoph. 5. 2. 35.⁹² Comp. at large Müller, Dor. 1. 178, sqq.

by Agesilaus, who seems to have been born to accelerate the destruction of his own country and of Greece in general. Such a line of policy was, it must be confessed, not unsupported by inducements from without ; remote towns at variance with their neighbours, or dreading their encroachments, requested Sparta to protect their Autonomia, and such applications met ready attention. Thus the embassy of the Chalcidian-Thracian towns, Acanthus and Apollonia, which complained of Olynthus, was favourably received.

Olynthus⁹³ had, a short time after its foundation⁹⁴, become powerful enough to shake off its dependence upon Macedonia, and soon afterwards, at a time when Athens and Sparta had no leisure to vindicate their claims to Chalcidice, it endeavoured either by force or treaty, to bring all the adjacent places into alliance with itself. These attempts were resisted by the two towns already mentioned. Sparta readily availed herself of a pretext to send an expedition to the Thracian coast, Ol. 99. 2 ; 382. B. C., where Brasidas had once performed such brilliant achievements, and where important advantages were still to be obtained. But Olynthus was not reduced till after a destructive war of nearly three years in duration, in which the Spartans lost a valiant king ; nor was it even certain how long that city would continue to feel the effects of the humiliation it had sustained⁹⁵.

But still more pernicious than this domineering

⁹³ See § 62. n. 77, sqq.

⁹⁴ Thucyd. 1. 58.

⁹⁵ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 2. 11—24. 37, sqq. ; 5. 3. 1—9. 18—20. The words of Demosth. de Falsa Legat. 425. 18 : οὕτω (at the time of the war with Sparta) Χαλκιδίων πάντων εἰς ἐν συμφκισμένων—would lead us to suppose that the prosperity of Olynthus increased after the war.

disposition in itself was the rooted hatred which Agesilaus bore to Thebes. The origin of this appears to have been the refusal of the Thebans to send troops to Asia, and their interruption of the sacrificial rites at Aulis. The attack upon the Cadmea of Thebes ⁹⁶ by Phœbidas, though perhaps not made in express obedience to the instructions of Agesilaus ⁹⁷, was, after it had been sanctioned by success, so far from being ungrateful to that monarch, that he wholly forgot what was due to the good faith and honour of the state ⁹⁸, and persuaded the Spartans to appropriate to themselves the fruits of this act of treachery ⁹⁹. He afterwards evinced a similar feeling upon the occasion of Sphodrias' attempt upon the Piræus ¹⁰⁰.

Thus Sparta had attained what had been her real object at the peace of Antalcidas. Her once haughty rival, Thebes, was held in check by a garrison and the despotism of its oligarchs; Argos and Athens were separated, whilst the latter was not hostile to Sparta, the former impoverished and powerless; Mantinea and Elis scarcely retained the semblance of independent communities; and lastly, Sparta had entered into an alliance with the king of Persia in the east, and with the tyrant Dionysius in the west.

The spirit by which Sparta was guided in her foreign policy is reflected in her actions. Her

⁹⁶ Xenoph. 5. 2. 25—30.

⁹⁷ Plut. Ages. 24: Ἦν μὲν οὖν εὐθὺς ἐκ τούτων ὑπόνοια, Φοιβίδου μὲν ἔργον εἶναι, βούλευμα δ' Ἀγησιλάου τὸ πεπραγμένον.

⁹⁸ This is even felt and avowed by Xenophon, Hell. 5. 4. 1.

⁹⁹ Plut. Ages. 23.

¹⁰⁰ Plut. Ages. 25; Xenoph. 5. 4. 25, sqq. Here, too, Xenophon observes, Hell. 5. 4. 24: καὶ πολλοῖς ἔδοξε αὕτη δὴ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀδικώτατα δίκη κριθῆναι.

ruling passion was the desire of governing, and her main object¹⁰¹ the extension of her empire: violence, whenever it could be exercised with impunity, and treachery, were the means by which she compassed her ends, while the possession of power was merely subservient to the gratification of her arrogance, and the still further indulgence of her rapacity¹⁰². In Sparta itself it is not altogether impossible that the endeavour to retain the form after the substance had departed, was to a certain degree still successful; but when the Lacedæmonian quitted his own country, and ceased to occupy himself with military concerns, he was no longer in his congenial element; and the numerous Spartans who were engaged on foreign service in garrisons, as Harmosts, etc., were detested by the rest of the Greeks on account of their insolence and brutality¹⁰³, and the exactions which they exercised both on their own score and for the state. The outrages of Pausanias were frequently repeated in after times, and it was as common to see his likeness in a Clearchus or a Thimbron, as it was rare to find such men as Callicratidas. Dignity had departed from the austere Lycurgan discipline, but the Spartan character had remained insensible to

¹⁰¹ Plut. Ages. 37: Λακεδαιμόνιοι—οὔτε μανθάνουσιν οὔτ' ἐπίστανται δίκαιον ἄλλο, πλὴν ὃ τὴν Σπάρτην αὐξέειν νομίζουσιν, may be taken in its worst sense. Iphicrates said very truly of the Spartans: ὅτι πίστιν ἀν οἶεται γενέσθαι μόνην, εἰ δείξειαν, ὅπως, ἀν ἀδικεῖν βούλωνται, μὴ δυνήσονται· ἐπεὶ, ὅτι γ' ἀεὶ βουλήσονται, εὖ εἰδέναι. Demosth. in Aristocr. 659.

¹⁰² Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 22:—ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν, μηδὲ ἡσκηκῆναι μηδεμίαν ἄσκησιν ἑτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς.

¹⁰³ Frequent mention is made of the βακτηρία, with which Eurybiades threatened Themistocles (Plut. Them. 11). Astyochus also made use of the same threat towards the noble Dorieus, Thucyd. 8. 84; Callibius, towards the Athenian Autolycus, Plut. Lys. 15; Mnasiippus on Corcyra, Xenoph. Hell. 6. 2. 19. etc.

the humanizing influence of civilization. Hence, the despotism of Sparta was no less censured than that of Athens had formerly been ¹⁰⁴. This will be made manifest by a careful examination of the conduct she pursued in establishing constitutions in the states subject to her authority. Almost the only instance of her political generosity on record was the acquittal of the Byzantine Anaxilaus, who had surrendered the city to Alcibiades ¹⁰⁵.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONS ESTABLISHED BY SPARTA.

§ 69. Even during the Peloponnesian war we have seen that Sparta employed her whole influence to disseminate oligarchical institutions; in proof of which, it is only necessary to refer to Heraclea, Trachinia, Sicyon, Argos, etc. The efforts by which she sought to accomplish this object, assumed a new character when Lysander appeared upon the political stage, and for some time became entirely dependent upon his measures. Lysander was the Alcibiades of Sparta. An accomplished party leader, he was peculiarly fitted to undermine the laws, customs, and establishments of a community, to stir up factions, and to render them dependent upon himself; while, by means of simulated friendship and false oaths, with which he ordered men to cheat, as he did boys with dice, he first lulled his adversaries into security, and

¹⁰⁴ The comic poet Theopompus compared the Spartans with the cheating cupbearers, as they had first offered the sweetest beverage, viz., liberty, and then poured vinegar into it. Plut. Lys. 13. However, it is possible that amongst the numerous calumnies must be included the statement of the Theban envoys in Athens, viz., that even Helots had been appointed Harmosta. Xenoph. Hell. 3. 5. 12.

¹⁰⁵ Plut. Alcib. 31.

then betrayed and destroyed them¹. Though he far outstripped his fellow-citizens in rapacity and violence, he found every disposition on their part to abet his designs, nor were they less ready to appropriate to themselves the fruits of his acts when he himself had become obnoxious to them. But in the states whose constitutions he regulated, his plans were promoted by the restless egotism and vindictive malice of their inhabitants. Under the name of a Decarchia², headed by a Spartan Harmost, he introduced into most of these towns an institution pregnant with all the rancour of party animosity. He began this nefarious system at Ephesus, his head-quarters in the campaign against Alcibiades, whither he summoned the ring-leaders³ of the populace from the surrounding places, and thus stirred up the fury of civil discord. The subversion of the democracies which the hegemony of Athens had till then maintained, was not effected without the usual horrors, and Lysander left neither craft nor force unemployed to augment them. At his instigation a large body of the oligarchists were cruelly butchered in Miletus⁴; a like atrocity was perpetrated in Thasus⁵; the whole of the demus was driven out of Samos, and the restored oligarchs composed the whole body

¹ Plut. Lys. 8.

² On this word and the δεκαδρχία (presidency of a Decuria), occasionally confounded with it (e. g. Harpocr. δεκαδρχία; conf. Vales. *ibid.*), see Schneider ad Aristot. Pol. 2. 146. 147.

³ Plut. Lys. 5:—οὗς ἰώρα μάλιστα ταῖς τε τόλμαις καὶ τοῖς φρονήμασιν ὑπὲρ τοὺς πολλοὺς ὄντας. Comp. Lys. 13: οὔτε γὰρ ἀριστίνδην οὔτε πλουτίνδην ἀπεδείκνυε τοὺς ἀρχοντας, ἀλλ' ἐταιρίαις καὶ ξενίαις χαριζόμενος τὰ πράγματα καὶ κυρίους ποιῶν τιμῆς τε καὶ κολάσεως, κ. τ. λ. Conf. cap. 19. Diodorus misconceives the subject altogether, when he says of Lysander, 14. 13: ἐν αἷς μὲν δεκαρχίας, ἐν αἷς δὲ ὀλιγαρχίας καταστήσας.

⁴ Plut. Lys. 8. 19; Diod. 13. 104.

⁵ Polyæn. 1. 45. 4. Comp. Wessel. ad Diod. 13. 104.

of the citizens⁶. Other towns witnessed similar horrors, and Lysander was present in person during many a scene of blood⁷. The situation of the exiles was the more deplorable, as the widely-extended empire of Sparta rendered escape almost impossible, while Lysander had numerous and willing instruments of his outrages in the Decarchs, who, if possible, were still more barbarous and malignant than himself⁸.

As soon as the Spartans withdrew their confidence from Lysander, they proceeded to depose the Decarchs who remained faithful to him, with the view of weakening his influence. They not only removed the dynasts from Athens, where this was brought about by a particular combination of circumstances, but also from the towns on the west coast of Asia, in which Lysander's adherents were most numerous⁹. But Xenophon's assertion, that democracies were not introduced into those cities, and that peace and prosperity were not restored¹⁰, is even disproved by his own narration¹¹. At least the democrats who had fled from Chios and established themselves in Atarneus, were not brought back by fair means, but subdued by force¹². It is possible that expulsion and massacres did not take place under Agesilaus; but even he cannot be absolved from the charge of partizanship and favouritism¹³. Spartan Harmosts lastly, during the hege-

⁶ Plut. Lys. 14; Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 6.

⁷ Plut. Lys. 13.

⁸ Isocrat. Panath. 407, says of the Decarchs: ὧν ἐπιχειρήσας ἂν τις κατηγορεῖν τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας ἡμέρας συνεχῶς, οὐδὲν ἂν μέρος εἰρηκίναί δοξείε τῶν ἐκείνοις ἡμαρτημένων.

⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 4. 2.

¹⁰ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 2. 9.

¹¹ Compare below § 73. n. 1.

¹² Xenoph. Hell. 3. 2. 11.

¹³ Plut. Ages. 5. 13; Isocr. 9. 764.

mony of Sparta, impeded the free operation of the political system in the towns of Asia.

Amongst the states of the mother-country, whose constitutions were remodelled under the influence of Sparta, the following require separate consideration.

1. ATHENS. THE ANARCHY¹⁴.

The appointment of the Thirty¹⁵, their protection by Lysander, and their acts, sufficiently illustrate the character of the constitutions set up by the Spartan chief. It is here necessary to revert to the machinations of Theramenes, and the intelligence between him and Lysander¹⁶. Whilst the latter was still at Athens, consequently in the spring of the year 404. B. C., Ol. 93. 4, Theramenes publicly proposed to delegate the supreme power to thirty men¹⁷, who were to set down such of the Spartan laws as were destined for the future regulation of the state¹⁸. These, therefore, constituted an autocratic Trigintavirate, like the Decemvirate in Rome, in conformity to the notion of the ancients before alluded to¹⁹, viz., that it was necessary for a public body, charged with legislative duties, to possess sovereign power for the time

¹⁴ Because there was no Archon that year, Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 1. Pythodorus should have followed, Olymp. 94. 1. Concerning these dates, see Taylor, Vit. Lys. 6. 138. 139.

¹⁵ The ancients of the good time call them as above, and not the Thirty tyrants. Diod. 15. 63, etc., cannot be regarded as an authority. Their appropriate name in the political vocabulary of the time would be *dynasts*, Aristot. Pol. 4. 5. 1; conf. 5. 5. 8. and 12. But Xenoph. Hell. 5. 4. 13, calls the dynasts in Thebes, *tyrants*.

¹⁶ Conf. § 65. ad fin.

¹⁷ Lysias adv. Eratosth. 430; conf. Diod. 14. 3, who, however, says "the Athenians (!) fetched Lysander to give them a constitution;" and represents Theramenes as a democrat.

¹⁸ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 2: — οἱ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους ξυγγράψουσι καθ' οὓς πολιτεύσουσι.

¹⁹ See vol. i. p. 304.

being. But the decree to that effect, which was drawn up by Dracontides²⁰, was only extorted from the people through fear of the hostile soldiery²¹ by whom they were surrounded. Theramenes had urged the institution of an oligarchy, in the hope that he himself might obtain the chief place under it; but he was wholly deficient in the enterprising spirit and extensive genius requisite for the effective leader of a party; and though it was by party that he sought to rule, it neither raised him, nor could he gain an ascendant over it; he was always trying fresh expedients and failed in all.

The most distinguished amongst the Thirty after Theramenes, whom he soon eclipsed, was Critias, the son of Callaischrus, and related to the house of Solon²². Like Alcibiades, he had once been the pupil of Socrates²³, by whom he had been instructed in the wisdom and arts of political life; and, like Alcibiades, he had soon renounced the principles of his master²⁴. Hence he was characteristically denominated the layman amongst philosophers, and the philosopher amongst laymen²⁵. He possessed various polite accomplishments; he could play on the flute²⁶, was by no means a contemptible poet²⁷,

²⁰ Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 157.

²¹ This is the construction I put upon the phrase, *ἔδοξε τῷ δήμῳ*, Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 2.

²² Concerning his family, see Schol. Plat. Tim. Ruhnck. 201. See a correction of the pedigree in Ast, v. Plat. Leb. u. Schrift. p. 17: conf. Heindorf, ad Plat. Charmid. § 3, and Schleiermacher, Plat. 2. 394. In the Charmid. 154. E. and 155. A. speaking of the family of Charmides, the nephew and ward of Critias, (Charmid. 153. A. 154. A.) he says, *πόρρωθεν τὸ καλὸν ὑμῖν ὑπάρχει ἀπὸ τῆς Σόλωνος συγγενείας*, conf. 157. E.

²³ Xenoph. Memorabil. 1. 2. 16.

²⁴ Diog. Laert. 2. 19; Ælian. V. H. 4. 15.

²⁵ Schol. Plat. Tim. 200, Ruhnck.: *ἐκαλεῖτο ἰδιώτης μὲν ἐν φιλοσόφοις, φιλόσοφος δὲ ἐν ἰδιώταις*. Conf. Philostr. Vit. Soph. 501, Olear. In Plut. de Superstit. 6. 654, he is coupled with Diagoras as an Atheist.

²⁶ Athen. 4. 184. D.

²⁷ See specimens of his poetry, Plut. Alcib. 33; Cim. 10; Athen. 10. 432.

and was moreover an author, having written a work on the ordinances of Sparta²⁸; he created a number of new words, many of which maintained themselves in subsequent use²⁹. He commenced his political career under the auspices of his father Callaischrus. It is not improbable that he had been one of the associates of Alcibiades, and his flight from Athens seems to have occurred during the trial of the Hermocopidæ³⁰. His talent and predilection for political intrigue are attested by his conduct during his residence in Thessaly, where he sought to inveigle the Penestæ to revolt and to set up a democracy³¹, whilst he did every thing in his power to confirm the oligarchical sentiments of the dynasts, by systematically inveighing against democratic institutions in the sophistical orations which he delivered there in the manner of Gorgias³². He appears to have returned to Athens soon after the fall of the Four Hundred, for he wrote the psephism for the recall of Alcibiades³³. In the exercise of his power he was the most avaricious, violent, and sanguinary of the Thirty³⁴, destroying, without distinction or remorse, all who stood in the way of his selfish designs³⁵, whether friends, benefactors,

D. sqq. I have not yet had an opportunity of availing myself of Bach's Dissertation on the Life and Writings of Critias.

²⁸ Athen. 11. 463. F. 483. B. 486. E. Is it, perhaps, from thence that the statement in Plut. Cim. 16, is borrowed, that Critias said Cimon had postponed the interests of his own country to those of Sparta?

²⁹ Pollux, 6. 31. 38. 153; 7. 177; 8. 25; 9. 17.

³⁰ Xenoph. Hell. 1. 2. 24.

³¹ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 36.

³² Philostr. 502.

³³ Plut. Alcib. 33.

³⁴ Xenoph. Mem. 1. 2. 12: *κλεπτίστατος τε καὶ βιαιότατος*.

³⁵ Philostratus, 501, goes so far as to say, *βουλευμάτων τε ἀτόπου τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐννελάμβανεν, ὥς μηλόβοτος ἡ Ἀττικὴ ἀποφανθείη, τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀγέλης ἰκκενωθεῖσα*. According to this, he must, like Theramenes, have had an understanding with the Spartans even before the capitulation of Athens. That is certain; but that proposal did not emanate from Sparta, but from the Theban Erianthus, Plut. Lys. 15. (Erianthus ap. Schol. Demosth. de Falsa Legat. 157); conf. Isocr. Plat. 524; Xenoph. Hell.

or kindred. Through his efforts, and those of Lysander, Alcibiades fell a sacrifice to oligarchical suspicion, and the relentless hatred of that state which he himself had furnished with arms against his native city, but which he had caused more fatal injury than any of his predecessors³⁶. Critias effected the destruction of Theramenes and persecuted Socrates. The most distinguished of the Thirty, after Critias and Theramenes, were Charicles, whom Aristotle denominates their chief³⁷, Theognis, a composer of frigid tragedies³⁸, Eratosthenes, against whom the yet-extant speech of Lysias was directed, Sophocles, Dracontides³⁹, etc.

The constitution of the Thirty did not abolish all the former authorities. A council was chosen, according to the discretion of the Thirty⁴⁰, chiefly from members of the oligarchy of the Four Hundred⁴¹. Ten Archons were appointed at the Piræus and ten officers in the town⁴², to whom were confided the duties hitherto performed by the officers of police; it appears probable that these

3. 5. 8. Sparta opposed it (Justin, 5. 18) as well as Phocis (Demosth. de Falsa Legat. 361); but it is very certain that Lysander outstripped his native city in iniquity, for he brought forward a proposition in the council of the confederates for the total extinction of the Athenian state. Pausan. 3. 8. 3, says of him and Agis, *κατὰ σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὶ καὶ οὐ μετὰ Σπαρτιατῶν τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ βούλευμα ἐς τοὺς συμμάχους ἐξήνεγκαν, ἐκκόψαι προῤῥίζοντας τὰς Ἀθήνας*. Plut. Lys. 15, it is stated that Lysander made a proposition, *ὑπὲρ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ*. Critias finally can have concurred in neither of them, for he was desirous of governing in his native city, and that, at least, required that it should continue to subsist.

³⁶ Plut. Alcib. 38. The truth of the statement here contained, that Critias had instigated the Spartans to send a Scytale to Lysander, commanding him to effect the destruction of Alcibiades, cannot, in the face of the conflicting assertion of Ephorus, ap. Diodor. 14. 11, that Pharnabazus was the author of his death, be substantiated by such testimony as that of Isocrates de Big. 618. 619, it is true; but there is considerable internal evidence in its favour.

³⁷ Aristot. Pol. 5. 4. 4.

³⁸ Schol. Aristoph. Acrh. 11.

³⁹ See the whole list in Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 2.

⁴⁰ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 12.

⁴¹ Lysias adv. Agorat. 495.

⁴² Pa. Plat. Ep. 7. 324. D; Xenoph. Hell. 2. 4. 38 and 19, with Schneider's note; conf. Plut. Lysand. 15; Bekker, Anecd. 235.

replaced the former Eleven, who no longer constituted a distinct official body⁴³. Amongst the former were Molpis⁴⁴, and Charmides⁴⁵ the son of Glaucon. They now declared their resolution to expel all persons of dishonest character, and to endeavour to lead back the citizens to justice and virtue⁴⁶, whereupon a number of sycophants were put to death⁴⁷. A list of three thousand was drawn up from the whole body of citizens⁴⁸, and these alone were permitted to carry arms; all the rest (*οἱ ἔξω καταλόγου*) were disarmed, the munitions of war were deposited in the citadel⁴⁹, and they themselves forbidden to reside in the city⁵⁰. No one of these three thousand could be punished with death, except by a decree of the council; the Thirty alone were entitled to pronounce sentence on the remainder⁵¹. Lysander sent a garrison, under the Harmost Callibius, to protect the Thirty, besides which a troop of horse was formed from the Athenian youth, who were to receive regular pay⁵². It is in the nature of all tyrannies to make the enslaved people support the garrisons by which they are held in subjection, and this was the case here. The exactions which flowed from this state of things were soon combined with murder and de-

⁴³ Comp. Ullrich; *Four Dialogues of Plato*, second edit. Berl. 1821, p. 259. 260. n.

⁴⁴ Harpocr. Μόλπις.

⁴⁵ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 4. 19. Concerning the confusion between these Ten and the Ten who succeeded the Thirty, see below, § 71. n. 7.

⁴⁶ Lysias adv. Eratosth. 385: *χρῆναι τῶν ἀδίκων καθάραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πολίτας ἐπ' ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην τραπέσθαι.*

⁴⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 12; comp. Diodor. 14. 4.

⁴⁸ Isocrates adv. Callim. 655, and adv. Euthynus, 701, somewhat singularly says, *εἰς τὸν μετὰ Πεισάνδρου κατάλογον*, in contradistinction to the *καταλογος* of the Thirty; but these words are designed to mark the connection between the lists of the two oligarchies, and the nullity of the *καταλογος* of the restored democracy in the opinion of the Thirty.

⁴⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 20.

⁵⁰ Lysias de Philon. Dokimas, 873.

⁵¹ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 52.

⁵² Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 13.

struction. The rich Metœci were first marked out for slaughter; upon the motion of Pison and Theognis, each of the Thirty selected one for execution⁵³. It was not long before the exterminating sword was raised against the citizens themselves; "men's lives were held at nought—to amass riches was the chief object"⁵⁴. The proceedings were no less remarkable for informality⁵⁵ than injustice; Batrachus and Æschylides are recorded amongst the wicked and bloodstained accusers of the time⁵⁶. Persons were even forbidden to follow the corpses of their murdered relatives⁵⁷. The whole number of those who were executed is stated at fourteen hundred, but the amount is probably exaggerated⁵⁸; amongst them were numerous persons of distinction, as Niceratus the son of Nicias, doubtless because he was wealthy; Antiphon, who had kept two triremes; Leon the Salaminian⁵⁹, etc. The more effectually to crush the spirit of the democracy, they resolved to destroy its two principal levers, navigation and oratory. The dockyards, which had been constructed at an expense of eleven thousand talents, were sold for three⁶⁰, or rather, that was the price agreed upon for their demolition. At the proposal of Critias and Charicles, all instruction in oratory was prohibited⁶¹, not so much on account of Critias' enmity to Socrates, as in compliance with the invariable practice of oligarchy; the orators' pulpit on the Pnyx, which

⁵³ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 21. 40; Lysias adv. Eratosth. 386; Diodor. 14. 5, has sixty.

⁵⁴ Lysias adv. Eratosth. 387.

⁵⁵ Lysias adv. Agor. 387.

⁵⁶ Lysias adv. Andoc. 242; adv. Eratosth. 415.

⁵⁷ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 628.

⁵⁸ Diog. Laert. 7. 5.

⁵⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 38—40. Concerning this Antiphon, the son of Lysidones, not the Rhamnusian, see § 65. n. 143.

⁶⁰ Isocrat. Areop. 239.

⁶¹ Xenoph. Memorab. 1. 2. 31.

had commanded a view of the sea, was now turned towards the land-side, in order that that inspiring spectacle might no longer call up democratic emotions⁶².

Whilst the number of the fugitives increased, and they were preparing to effect their return by force of arms, the dynasts fell out amongst themselves. Theramenes felt that, in Critias, he had to contend with an antagonist who was an overmatch for him, and willing to try the effect of a change of character, began, as amongst the Four Hundred, to intrigue with the demus. But Critias boldly and steadily advanced upon his path of blood, and found little difficulty in effecting the destruction of his adversary. The fortitude with which the latter met death⁶³, cannot reconcile us to the iniquities of his life; though it is on that account that he was overrated by the ancients, who held that species of fortitude in peculiar honour, and therefore themselves so frequently defied the terrors of death by suicide; this is perceptible in the remarks of Aristotle⁶⁴ and Cicero⁶⁵, of whom the latter offers a cruel insult to the memory of Socrates, when he couples his name with that of Theramenes⁶⁶.

The history of the manner in which the chief power passed from the Thirty to the Ten must be reserved for the following chapter⁶⁷.

⁶² Plut. Themist. 19.

⁶³ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 56.

⁶⁴ Plut. Nic. 2: — τρεῖς ἐγένοντο βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν, κ. τ. λ., viz. Nicias, Thucydides, the son of Miliesias, and Theramenes.

⁶⁵ Qu. Tuscul. 1. 40: Quam me delectat Theramenes, etc.

⁶⁶ Tuscul. 1. 42: Sed quid ego Socratem, aut Theramenem, præstantes viros virtutis et sapientiæ gloria, commemoro, etc.

⁶⁷ See § 71.

2. ELIS⁶⁸.

The defection from the Spartan confederacy during the Peloponnesian war, had put an end to the ancient aristocracy. But upon the rupture with Sparta, Ol. 94. 3; 401. B. C., the citizens of distinction, headed by Xenias the guest of the latter state, endeavoured, in the second year of the war, to overthrow the democracy⁶⁹, but were overpowered by the demus, under the command of Thrasydæus. Meanwhile the Lepreatians, who had joined the ranks of Sparta during the Peloponnesian war⁷⁰, and had some Brasidæans and Neodamodes quartered upon them as a garrison or as Epœci⁷¹, besides Macistians, and afterwards other tributaries of the Spartans, had gone over to the enemy. The chief of their perfidious demands was for the emancipation of the towns of the Perioeci, by which we are to understand the tributary places in Triphylia, as well as the dependent townships in Pisatis, consequently without the limits of Elis proper (κοιλή). Elis was constrained to purchase peace by granting freedom to the greater part of those towns it had hitherto held in subjection, such as those of Triphylia, the most considerable of which were Lepreum and Macistus, whilst Lasion was claimed by the Arcadians, Cyllene in Elis, Phrixa, Acrorea, Amphidoli, Marganeis, Epitalium, Leprina, and Epeum in Pisatis⁷². Nevertheless Pisa, which was divided into villages, and Olympia

⁶⁸ Conf. above, § 59. n. 3.⁶⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 2. 27; Paus. 3. 8. 2: — ἐπανίστη τῷ δήμῳ σὺν τοῖς τὰ χρήματα ἔχουσι. Xenias was very rich according to Xenophon, ubi sup.⁷⁰ See above, § 62. n. 96.⁷¹ Thucyd. 5. 34.⁷² Xenoph. Hell. 3. 2. 30.

SPARTAN CONSTITUTIONS. PHLIUS. § 69. 323
 remained subject to Elis⁷³, after Olymp. 50. 1;
 580. B. C. At the same time, as is proved by
 subsequent events, the oligarchical party obtained
 the reins of power. To the band of the Three
 Hundred⁷⁴ that of the Four Hundred⁷⁵, which was
 probably identical with the knights⁷⁶, seems to
 have been added about this time.

3. MANTINEA.

The Dioikismus⁷⁷ in Olymp. 98. 3; 386. B. C.,
 was immediately followed by the introduction of
 oligarchical institutions; the villages into which
 the common capital had been resolved, received
 chief magistrates belonging to the oligarchical and
 Spartan faction, and, in the words of Xenophon,
 rejoiced in the new order of things by which the
 chief power was secured to the best in the state,
 (βέλτιστοι)⁷⁸!

4. PHLIUS.

The oligarchs were driven out during the
 Corinthian war; on which account Phlius did
 not fight under the banners of Sparta⁷⁹. The
 refugees applied to Sparta, but she did not as-
 sist in effecting their return; even when Phlius,
 dreading the invasion of Iphicrates, opened its
 gates to the Spartans, they left the constitution
 and laws as they found them, and quitted the town

⁷³ Xenoph. 3. 2. 31. Sparta declared the Pisatans, as χωρίας, unfit to
 preside at the Olympic festival.

⁷⁴ These are mentioned by Thucydides — ἐκ τῆς κοίλης Ἡλίδος τριακο-
 σίους λογάδας, 2. 25.

⁷⁵ Xenoph. Hell. 7. 4. 13. 16.

⁷⁶ See below, § 73. n. 46.

⁷⁷ See § 68. n. 83.

⁷⁸ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 2. 7: — ἡδοντο τοῖς πεπραγμένοις — ξυνεστρα-
 τεύοντο δ' ἐκ τῶν κωμῶν πολὺ προθυμότερον, ἢ ὅτε ἰδημοκρατοῦντο.

⁷⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 4. 4. 15; 4. 2. 16.

without molesting the inhabitants⁸⁰. But after the dismemberment of Mantinea the Ephors commanded the Phliasians to suffer the fugitives to return without obstruction. These not only complied with the injunction, but also promised to restore to them their estates, and to indemnify out of the public treasury the persons by whom they had been purchased, and to refer all disputes to legal adjudication⁸¹. But these attempts at reconciliation proved abortive; the refugees insisted upon having their demands investigated by an impartial tribunal, whilst the demus claimed the right of deciding upon them itself⁸². This led to fresh complaints on the part of the fugitives in Sparta, and to the infliction of further fines; at length when the Cadmea was in the power of Sparta, Agesilaus led an army of Spartans against Phlius, and had every reason to be satisfied with the results of his expedition⁸³. The Phliasians made a desperate resistance: the demagogue, Delphion, resolutely defended the place amidst the horrors of famine, till it was at length compelled to surrender in Ol. 100. 2; 379. B. C.; Agesilaus left a garrison there until a hundred men, partly fugitives, and partly such as had remained in the town, and were invested with sovereign powers, should have pronounced sentence of life and death upon the inhabitants, and completed their task of framing new laws⁸⁴. As might naturally be expected, oligarchy was now introduced, and was maintained during the Boeotian war.

⁸⁰ Xenoph. Hell. 4. 4. 15. 16.⁸¹ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 3. 10.⁸² Xenoph. Hell. 5. 3. 21—25.⁸³ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 2. 8—10.⁸⁴ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 3. 11—17.

5. CORINTH.

After the peace of Nicias had re-established a friendly feeling between Sparta and Corinth, the latter was governed by the Spartan party; this was not merely a consequence of its political system, by which the reciprocal dependence between the more extended commerce of the rich, and the trades and crafts of the inferior members of the state, prevented the usual marked distinctions between the orders and the animosities they engendered, but also arose, in a great measure, from the hatred it bore to Athens; however, there is no doubt that even here oligarchy greatly preponderated over democracy⁸⁵. After the Peloponnesian war there arose a counter-party, which brought about a defection from Sparta. Its leaders were Timolaus and Polyantes⁸⁶. From that time a decided democracy, the chief support of which was Argos⁸⁷, existed in Corinth. After the victory of Agesilaus, and his arrival in the Peloponnesus, the Lacinistæ⁸⁸ held occasional meetings, and aroused the suspicion of the adverse party, who formed the horrible project of murdering them. On the last day of the festival Eucleia, they were surprised and slaughtered, no quarter was granted, not even those who had taken refuge in the sanc-

⁸⁵ This is evident from Xenoph. Hell. 4. 4. 6.

⁸⁶ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 5. 1.

⁸⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 4. 4. 6, says of the oligarchs: αἰσθόμενοι ἀφανιζομένην τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ καὶ ὄρους (towards Argos) ἀνασπᾶσθαι καὶ Ἀργὸς ἀντὶ Κορίνθου τὴν πατρίδα αὐτῶν ὀνομάζεσθαι καὶ πολιτείας μὲν ἀναγκαζόμενοι τῆς ἐν Ἀργεὶ μετέχειν, κ. τ. λ.

⁸⁸ In Xenoph. 4. 4. 3, they are again called οἱ βέλτιστοι as well as οἱ πλείστοι (?). Xenophon's narrative of their cabals is a remarkable example of the manner in which history becomes distorted, when viewed through the medium of party feelings.

tuary being spared; a hundred and twenty perished in this butchery⁸⁹, five hundred escaped, and with the assistance of the Spartans made war upon their native city⁹⁰, which was defended by a garrison composed of Argives and other allies, and by the mercenary soldiers of Iphicrates; Lechæum was surprised and betrayed into the hands of the enemy⁹¹, who also temporarily occupied the Corinthian towns Crommyon, Epieicia, and Sidus, so that the territory of Corinth was now almost confined to the city itself. But the peace of Antalcidas does not seem to have secured Autonomia to these places, and it is probable that, through the aid of Sparta, the oligarchs again placed themselves at the helm, whilst the Argive garrison of Acro-Corinth was sent back to its own country.

6. THEBES.

Party feuds arose here immediately after the Peloponnesian war. The democrats were headed by Ismenias, the friend of Thrasybulus⁹², and by Androclides, who were afterwards joined by Pelopidas⁹³. The hostility of the Thebans to Athens subsided, and hatred to Sparta supplied its place. At the beginning of the Corinthian war, which had been promoted by the efforts of the above-mentioned chiefs⁹⁴, the ascendant of the democrats

⁸⁹ With Xenoph. ubi sup., conf. Diod. 14. 86, whose account, though shorter, is more satisfactory.

⁹⁰ Xenoph. Hell. 4. 4. 5, sqq.; 4. 5. 19.

⁹¹ Xenoph. Hell. 4. 4. 7. Still more explicitly Diod. 14. 86. To this refers ἐν Λεχαιῶν προδοσίᾳ. Plat. Menex. 245, E., Andoc. de Pac. cum Spar. 98.

⁹² See § 68. n. 15. Compare Schleiermacher, Plat. 2. 1. 537, and Socher (üb Platon's Schr.) on the Menon.

⁹³ Plut. Pelop. 5. Plutarch says ἐταιρείαν—φιλελεύθερον ἄμα καὶ δημοτικὴν εἶναι δοκοῦσαν.

⁹⁴ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 5. 1; Paus. 3. 9. 5; Plut. Lys. 27.

became firmly established. The constitution itself, which had always been adapted to a democracy, and which the dynasts alone had prevented from expanding into life and vigour, underwent no change. The dynasts found a suitable instrument for their designs in the Spartan Phœbidas, and the capture of the Cadmea was followed by the downfall of the democracy; Ismenias was executed⁹⁶, and Archias, Leontiades, Philip, and Hypates⁹⁶ now became the heads of the oligarchical government. Their character and proceedings were like those of the Thirty in Athens—despotic, lawless, avaricious, and cruel. Nor do the forms of the constitution seem to have been altered even now, as the regular offices of state, particularly that of Polemarch⁹⁷, were administered by the dynasts; but civil life and civil liberty were extinct in Thebes.

Sparta likewise set up dynasties⁹⁸ in those places, which the provisions of the peace of Antalcidas had separated from Thebes, e. g., Thespiæ, etc. The constitution of Orchomenus seems to have been remarkable for oligarchical stability.

Of the other states which were dependent upon Sparta, Hermione, Trœzen, and Halieis maintained their hereditary and firmly-rooted aristocracy, whilst Sicyon and Achaia adhered to the oligarchy introduced by Sparta. No exact particulars are known of Tegea and Phocis.

But in all the states on which oligarchy had been forcibly obtruded, the despots acknowledged no

⁹⁶ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 2. 25. 36.

⁹⁸ Plut. Pelop. 5. 11; Xenoph. 5. 4. 2; 7. 3. 7.

⁹⁷ Leontiades was already Polemarch when Phœbidas took the Cadmea. Xenoph. 5. 2. 30. Archias and Philip held the office afterwards. Plut. Pelop. 7.

⁹⁸ Xenoph. 5. 4. 46.

other law than that of force, while Sparta afforded her countenance and support to the outrages they committed⁹⁹. Hence, the warmest lovers of liberty among the citizens and demagogues sought safety in flight, whilst the refugees assembled in large numbers, and looked forward with impatience to the moment for assailing their domestic tyrants and Sparta; many towns were deserted by more than half their citizens. It was natural that despotisms such as these should fall, immediately they were attacked.

III. THE INTERIOR OF SPARTA.

§ 70. The passage of Thucydides cited above¹, furnishes us with an appropriate motto for the ensuing exposition: "Permanent usages are suited to a peaceful state, but those which are compelled to engage in vast undertakings, require a corresponding degree of inventive power." Now Sparta had quitted the beaten path of ancient custom, and entered upon a more extensive field of enterprise, to which she had been stimulated by Alcibiades the stranger, and in which success could only be ensured by qualities like his, not by the ancient Spartan virtues; moreover, the inevitable result of the novel and untried experiment of a naval hegemony was the destruction of the old Spartan supremacy.

The above remark is the more applicable to Sparta as the intrinsic essence and substance of the citizenship rapidly and alarmingly declined,

⁹⁹ The Athenian Autocles, Xenophon. *Hell.* 6. 3. 8:—τούτων τῶν ἀρχόντων ἐπιμελίσθαι οὐχ ὅπως νομίμως ἀρχωσιν, ἀλλ' ὅπως δύνωνται βίῃ κατέχειν τὰς πόλεις. Conf. Diodor. 15. 5.

¹ Thuc. 1. 71. See above, § 55. n. 5.

while every assault from without shook to their centre, those forced and unnatural relations which existed in her internal system, and which the lapse of centuries had been unable to consolidate. An attempt was indeed made to supply the deficiency in the ranks of the citizens, by raising inferior classes of inhabitants to the enjoyment of superior rights; but, as was observed, in treating of the nature of the various classes of persons chosen for that purpose², these were not endowed with the full and entire rights of citizenship, which alone formed the basis of the institutions of Lycurgus, and by which alone he intended that they should be represented and maintained. As the citizens of ancient extraction decreased, the regulations affecting landed property, which had constituted one of the main props of the Lycurgan citizenship, fell into disuse. The law concerning heiresses gave rise to a very unequal distribution of property; the estates of the ancient citizens who had been swept off by war were not bestowed upon new citizens, in accordance with the ancient principles of the constitution, and through a mean-spirited jealousy of the naturalized citizens, the state would not act up to the spirit of the law, by taking the surplus property into its own hands, and redistributing it amongst deserving individuals. Hence, the accumulation of private property was encouraged to a degree before unknown; a great part of it came into the hands of females³, who grew more licentious, noisy, and importunate as their wealth increased⁴, whilst the neglect of female continence with which

² See § 66.

³ Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 11.

⁴ Ibid. 2. 6. 7. Conf. Xenoph. Hell. 6. 5. 28; Plut. Ages. 31.

Lycurgus appears to have been unjustly charged⁵, gained ground with the disregard of legal enactments. But in the time of Agesilaus an incurable wound was inflicted upon the laws for the regulation of property by the enactment of the Ephor Epitadeus, by which persons were authorized to make a donation of their landed property to whomsoever they pleased⁶, whereby the state was wholly deprived of the little power it had still retained of rewarding the merits of new citizens by grants of land, and property entirely diverted from its legitimate objects. This stood in close connection with the equally injurious permission to introduce the precious metals⁷ in any quantity, which an oracle declared to be the most destructive of all the evils that befel Sparta⁸. After Sparta had assumed the maritime supremacy once possessed by Athens she levied the contributions which had been exacted by that state, and which brought her in an annual revenue of upwards of a thousand talents⁹. Lysander and Agesilaus brought home abundance of treasure which they had acquired in war; the latter dedicated a hundred talents to the Delphic Apollo, as the tenth part of his Asiatic spoil¹⁰. This impaired the manhood and courage of individuals, the confidence they inspired, and the moral force of the law,

⁵ Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 5.

⁶ Plut. Agis. 5: *ἐξεῖναι τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν κλῆρον, ᾧ τις ἐθέλοι, καὶ ζῶντα δοῦναι, καὶ καταλιπεῖν διατιθέμενον*. Conf. on this law Manso, Sparta, 1. 2. 152; 3. 1. 263, sqq.; Tittmann, Griech. Staatsv. 660. n. 94; Müller, Dor. 2. 194, sqq.

⁷ Plut. Lysand. 17. But it must be observed, that there were gold and silver in Sparta before Lysander brought home the treasure he had collected in war.

⁸ Schol. Aristoph. Pac. 623: *ἡ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν δλεῖ, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδέν*.

⁹ Diod. 14. 10.

¹⁰ Xenoph. Hell. 4. 3. 21.

without increasing the effective power of the state. It did not even furnish it with the means of purchasing the services of strangers; for in spite of its large revenue the public treasury was by no means well filled¹¹, which must be chiefly attributed to the inability of the public officers to adapt the financial system to the new order of things, and above all to the total absence of public honesty. Gylippus was the first who sullied the lustre of his exploits by his notorious peculations¹². What availed the law forbidding private individuals to possess the precious metals¹³? At first, those who possessed silver or gold, through fear of punishment, deposited their treasures in foreign countries, and particularly in Arcadia¹⁴; the state itself was not long before it sanctioned their possession by imposing heavy fines, for instance, no less a sum than a hundred thousand drachmas on Phcebidas¹⁵. The love of gain was accompanied by an increased passion for pleasure and dissipation. This operated upon the public discipline still more injuriously than the general avarice itself, and sapped the very foundations of the citizenship. During a protracted residence in foreign countries the warrior had ample opportunities of indulging in illicit pleasures; whilst the restrictions caused by the necessity of outwardly observing the laws, gradually estranged the minds of the citizens from their true spirit; the effect of this was, that while they securely revelled in luxury abroad, they pur-

¹¹ Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 23, who indeed might affirm this with still more truth of his age.

¹² Plut. Lys. 16; Diod. 13. 106.

¹³ Plut. Lys. 16.

¹⁴ Athen. 233, F.

¹⁵ Plut. Pelop. 6; conf. Müller, Dor. 2. 210. 211.

sued it with equal avidity in secret at home ¹⁶. Add to this that the laws gradually lost their security and sanction, the relation of political life to religion became powerless, and faith and confidence were extinguished. The Spartans deliberated at a meeting at Delphi concerning a peace, without consulting the oracle ¹⁷. Agesilaus, the favourite hero of the pious Xenophon, did not neglect to consult appearances it is true, but he made his devotion yield to his policy ¹⁸, and his policy to his passions.

Amidst this general decline of morality and national feeling, it was natural that the discordances which had arisen in the legal position of the various members of the commonwealth, should produce constantly-increasing exasperation and animosity. The remnant of the ancient citizens still continued to engross all political power, and to assert the most arrogant pretensions. The Ephors stretched out their Briarean arms, crushed every attempt at independent agency in a functionary, and suppressed all freedom of opinion and speech, on the abuses by which the public system was disgraced. Ephors themselves or their deputies, accompanied the general to the field, or went thither to examine his conduct as before ¹⁹. But notwithstanding the power they possessed, they did nothing to fill up the chasm which divided the conflicting elements

¹⁶ Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 16. It is impossible not to recognize an allusion to the change in the condition of Sparta in Plat. de Repub. 8. 547. 548.

¹⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 7. 1. 27 :—*τῷ μὲν θεῷ οὐδὲν ἐκοινώσαντο—αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐβουλεύοντο.*

¹⁸ Agesilaus had received just such a response as he desired from the oracle in Olympia ; the Ephors ordered him to consult that in Delphi too ; he asked whether the son considered advisable what the father did. Plut. Apophth. 6. 773.

¹⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 4. 2. *ubi sup.*

of the state, and to bring worth, services, and civil rights, into just harmony and proportion. Hence, the indignation of such as had been oppressed and shut out from preferment became ungovernable; Cinadon declared that they detested the Homoioi to such a degree, that they could devour them raw²⁰. Resistance was made in various quarters to the encroachments of these degenerate representatives of the privileged orders. First and foremost by those brave men who had worked their way from an humble station by their talents and courage, and had not been endowed by the state with rights proportioned to the important services they had rendered it, on which account they were eager to break down the barriers which excluded them from rank and privilege. Secondly, by the original chiefs of the government, the kings, whose power was entirely broken, and who were subjected to frequent and bitter mortifications from the overbearing insolence of the Ephors, who even went so far as to try them for their lives²¹. Nevertheless, the third Agis was the first king who attempted a restoration of the ancient constitution. Amongst the first class above described we may number Brasidas, though he had neither the inclination to plot against the constitution, nor the same causes for dissatisfaction as the new citizens; the same may be observed of Dercyllidas, who was as crafty and scheming²²

²⁰ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 3. 20 : — οὐδένα δύνασθαι κρύπτειν τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἡδέως ἀν καὶ ὤμων ἐσθίειν αὐτῶν.

²¹ The attacks upon the kingly power began before the Persian war; and they derived strength from the cabals of the kings and the royalists. Hence the long lists of insulted princes: Demaratus obliged to fly, Leutychidas in exile at Tegea, Olymp. 77. 4, Pleistoanax banished, Olymp. 83. 4, his son Pausanias condemned to death and forced to fly to Tegea, Olymp. 96. 2.

²² Ephor. ap. Ath. 11. 500. C.: ἦν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ τρόπῳ Λακωνικὸν οὐδ' ἀπλοῦν ἔχων, ἀλλὰ πολὺ τὸ πανούργον, κ. τ. λ.

as the other was bold and energetic. A more decided hostility to existing institutions was displayed by Lysander, who had nothing of the Spartan character, but its abstinence from sensual pleasures and its perfidy²³, and whilst he followed the steps of Alcibiades in his attempts to accustom the Spartans to the sea, he introduced all sorts of dangerous innovations, and corrupted the minds of the people who confided in him, as long as they needed his assistance. Pausanias justly declares, that with all his victories he rather injured than benefited his country²⁴. Formed by nature to be the flatterer of the great²⁵, he prevailed upon the youthful Cyrus to grant him considerable subsidies: but Sparta degraded herself; and the noble indignation of Callicratidas at the haughtiness with which that prince (a Barbarian) treated him (a Greek) the commander-in-chief and representative of his nation²⁶, shows how low Sparta had sunk. Besides this, after their necessities were supplied, they began to feel a rapacious craving for riches, which all the treasures of Persia were not able to satisfy. Still, in spite of the corruption of the people, and the benefits he had conferred upon his countrymen by enabling them to maintain their hegemony, Lysander could not succeed in removing those constitutional impediments by which he was excluded from the chief direction of affairs at home; they accepted his gifts, contented themselves with the old establishments, and soon grew weary

²³ Theopomp. ap. Ath. 12. 543. B. Manso, Sparta, 3. 2. 44, sqq.

²⁴ Pausan. 9. 33. 6.

²⁵ Plut. Lys. 2: θεραπευτικὸς τῶν δυνατῶν.

²⁶ See the admirable description in Plut. Lys. 6; conf. Xenoph. 1. 6. 6. 7, who, indeed, only mentions the order of Cyrus, that Callicratidas should wait two days, but this is sufficient.

of the presumption of the haughty donor. Hence resulted collisions between the chiefs of the state and Lysander; his endeavours were counteracted by king Pausanias²⁷, and with still greater effect by Agesilaus, who with the galling ridicule and insolence which a Spartan so well knew how to employ, subjected him to various mortifications, and reduced him to the level of a common citizen²⁸. Lysander is said hereupon to have conceived the design of subverting the constitution²⁹, or at any rate of facilitating access to the kingly office. On the other hand, Cinadon an ancient Spartan in virtue and courage, was inspired by loftier aims than Lysander; he strove to obtain for himself and his companions the full rights of citizenship, and resolved not to occupy a lower position in the political scale than those who had not performed more than himself. But he had the misfortune not to belong to the Homoioi. Wherefore leaguings with those who laboured under like disabilities with himself, he determined to extort by force that which was unjustly withheld; but, before the plot was ripe was for execution, Cinadon and his companions were discovered and condemned to die an ignominious death³⁰, Olymp. 95. 4; 397. B. C.

These two were opposed by Agesilaus, at that time the apparent champion of the constitution, and for more than a quarter of a century the main-spring of the political system. Trained up in the ancient Spartan discipline, he rigidly adhered to the

²⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 4. 29.

²⁸ Plut. Lys. 23; Ages. 8. Agesilaus made him his κρεωδαίτης.

²⁹ Plut. Lys. 24. 25. 31; Ages. 20; Lacon. Apopth. 5. 796. 797; Diod. 14. 3.

³⁰ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 5. 11 : *μαστιγούμενος καὶ κεντούμενος αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν περιήγοντο.*

external observances enjoined by the laws³¹; which, added to his personal bravery, military talents, affability to inferiors, and a prudent pliancy towards the Ephors³², gained him the favour and attachment of all ranks of the community. In less than a year after his accession he quelled the conspiracy of Cinadon, and then began to counteract the designs of Lysander. Lysander's staunchest adherents were without Sparta amongst the Decarchs, some of whom had gone so far as to raise altars and offer up sacrifices to him³³, and so long as Sparta thought fit to assert the more extended circle of her hegemony, she could not dispense with the aid of Lysander and his creatures. But Agesilaus ought to have endeavoured to replace the Spartan system upon its former secure basis; instead of this, he opposed the schemes of Lysander in the hope of being able to occupy that place which the personal qualities of the latter enabled him to fill, on which account he strove to maintain the foreign empire of the state, and even went beyond Lysander in his efforts to extend it.

The calamities which resulted to Sparta from the measures of Agesilaus, were but ill-disguised beneath the tinsel and glare of his victories. The chief effect of his military virtues, which blinded the judgment of Xenophon, was to tempt a state in need of internal reform and invigoration to embark in enterprises, which could only end in total exhaustion. To gratify his passion for war, his thirst of fame, and above all, his hatred to Thebes, he

³¹ Plut. Ages. 3. 19.

³² Plut. Ages. 4.

³³ Plut. Lys. 18 from Duris. This must merely be referred to heroic worship, like that of a *κρίστης*, as in the case of Brasidas, and the *πρόμα* — *ἐκείνῳ* — *ὡς θεῷ* must be limited accordingly.

conducted Sparta, who now began to quit the substance for the shadow, and had grown insensible to the importance of fortifying herself by the virtues of her citizens at home—by a path of blood and treachery, to a height where the ground sunk from beneath his feet. His conduct at home was by no means free from reproach, and he differed from Agis at a later period, who firmly resisted all encroachments upon the royal dignity. He truckled to the Ephors, in order to deter them from throwing obstacles in his way³⁴, and he was punished by them for courting the favour of the citizens³⁵. Nevertheless, popular opinion was so entirely with him, that contrary to all precedent, he was entrusted with the command of the fleet³⁶. That he had a party against him, may be collected from various passages in the ancient writers³⁷. Upon the occasion of his campaign to compel the Phliasians to receive back the oligarchs they had expelled, many persons declared that it was impolitic to make war upon a city containing five thousand inhabitants, for the sake of a few refugees³⁸. Antalcidas likewise judiciously observed, when Agesilaus had been wounded in an engagement with the Thebans, that he now reaped the fruits of the instructions, which he had given them in the art of war by his campaigns³⁹. Nevertheless, he had the multitude on his side, and was supported by the spirit of his age. Thus by entangling

³⁴ Aristotle probably refers to him when he says, Pol. 2. 6. 14, *δημαγωγεῖν αὐτοὺς* (the Ephors) *ἢ αναγκάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς*.

³⁵ Plut. Ages. 4. 28.

³⁶ Xenoph. Hell. 3. 4. 27; Plut. Ages. 10.

³⁷ See at large Plut. Ages. 26.

³⁸ Xenoph. 5. 3. 16.

³⁹ Plut. Ages. 26: *Ἡ καλὰ διδασκάλια παρὰ Θηβαίων ἀπολαμβάνεις, μὴ βουλομένους αὐτοῦς μὴδ' ἐπισταμένους μάχεσθαι διδάξας*. Conf. Lacon. Apophth. 6. 801.

Sparta in quarrels and rash enterprises, he exposed her to a series of violent shocks, which at length so enfeebled her, that after having beheld the downfall of her foreign despotism, she began to tremble for the existence of her power at home. And yet this very Agesilaus declined the command of the army after the liberation of the Cadmea, lest it should be said that he had involved the state in disputes, by assisting the dynasts ⁴⁰!

B. The victory of Democracy over the Hegemony and Oligarchical system of Sparta.

I. THE NEW DEMOCRACY OF ATHENS FROM ITS RESTORATION TO THE TIME OF PHILIP.

§ 71. We left Athens under the tyranny of the Thirty. The refugees and exiles having assembled in large numbers, the boldest amongst them, under the command of Thrasybulus, attacked and defeated the soldiers of the Thirty, took up their position in the Piræus, repulsed the assaults of the enemy, and killed Critias and others of their chiefs ¹. This disheartened the tyrants and restored courage to the people, who now openly revolted. The Thirty, with the exception of Phidon and Eratosthenes ², escaped to Eleusis, from whence, and from Salamis, three hundred of the most independent inhabitants had been led out and put to death ³. Democracy, however, was not immediately restored, but on account of the numerous parti-

⁴⁰ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 4. 13 :—εὐ εἰδώς, ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λείπειαν οἱ πολῖται, ὥς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσει τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα τῇ πόλει παρέχει.

¹ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 4. 1—19.

² Lysias adv. Eratosth. 420.

³ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 4. 8—10; Diodor. 14. 32; Lysias adv. Eratosth. 418; adv. Agorat. 450.

sans of the oligarchs and the apprehensions entertained of Sparta, the supreme power was confided to ten men, called Decaduchi⁴, who had been chosen from the ten Phylæ⁵, and in this respect might be compared with Strategi or other officers of the former democracy, and who moreover called themselves the sworn enemies of Critias; these, however, very soon proved that they were resolved to form a decarchy, upon the same principle as those of Lysander. One of them, Phidon, had belonged to the Thirty⁶. They did not, it is true, carry on a correspondence with that body in Eleusis, but applied to Sparta and to Lysander for assistance. It has been already stated, that king Pausanias and the Ephors who accompanied him, felt no inclination to maintain the adherents of that chief, instead of which, they interposed and brought about a reconciliation, between those in the Piræus and those in the city. None were considered enemies of the state but the Thirty in Eleusis, together with the Eleven and the Ten from the Piræus, who appear to have followed them⁷. The Thirty now armed, but their leaders soon fell into the hands of the Athenians, who put them to death⁸.

⁴ Harpocr. δέκα, from Androtion and Lysias.

⁵ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 2. 24.

⁶ Lysias adv. Eratosth. 420.

⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 4. 38. The ten Decaduchi, and the ten officers in the Piræus during the government of the Thirty, are confounded with each other. Corn. Nep. Thrasyb. 3, says,—ne qui præter triginta tyrannos et decem, qui postea prætores creati superioris more crudelitatis erant nisi, afficerentur exilio, etc. But against this we have the authority of Xenoph. Hell. 2. 4. 38:—ἀπὸ τῶν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκδοτοῦς, πλὴν τῶν τριάκοντα, καὶ τῶν ἑνδεκά, καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ ἀρχόντων δέκα. Amongst the grammarians Harpocraton is in error in v. Μόλπης—ὁ τῶν ἐν Πειραιεῖ οἱ δ' ἄρα μετὰ τοὺς τριάκοντα δέκα ἄρχοντες ἦρχον ἐν Πειραιεῖ, κ. τ. λ., as well as Phœbus in v. Μόλπης, conf. Bekk. Anecd. 235, in which passages the real sense requires κατὰ, for after the Thirty there were no decemvirs in the democratic Piræus, see Xenoph. Hell. 2. 4. 25, sqq. The error is pointed out by Taylor, Vit. Lys. 136. 137; Morus ad Xenoph. Hell. 2. 4. 1; Wytténb. ad Eclog. Hist. 410, sqq.

⁸ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 4. 43.

Through the exertions of Thrasybulus⁹ and his counsellor Archimus¹⁰, an amnesty was now proclaimed, from which none were excluded but the persons above mentioned, and those only in case they refused to give an account of their conduct¹¹; that the Athenians were capable of exercising such command over themselves, considering the exasperation of the numerous victims of the oppressions and misuse of the dynasts, and the vindictive character of the Greeks generally¹², is, indeed, a circumstance calculated to call forth all the surprise and admiration which the ancients testify in narrating it¹³. A very honourable feature in the conduct of the victors was, that the amnesty was extended to the children of the Thirty, who were, accordingly, permitted to remain in the town¹⁴. It was then enacted that the Bule should refuse to receive any endeixis or apagoge relating to past events; a clause to this effect was appended to the oath of the Buleutæ¹⁵. The judges took a similar oath¹⁶. Those who had served in the cavalry of the Thirty were compelled to refund their pay¹⁷, and tables containing their names were publicly exhibited¹⁸. The demus afterwards considered it a gain to send them to the army in

⁹ Corn. Nep. Thrasyb. 3.

¹⁰ Taylor, Vit. Lys. 6. 141. 142.

¹¹ Andoc. de Myst. 43, has the ὅρκος: Καὶ οὐ μνησικακήσω τῶν πολλῶν οὐδενί, πλὴν τῶν τριάκοντα καὶ τῶν ἑνδεκα (Xenoph. Hell. 2. 4. 38, has the δέκα besides, see above, and this must be added; conf. Ullrich. Four Dialogues of Plato, 260). οὐδὲ τούτων, ὅς ἂν ἐθέλοι εὐθύναι τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἧς ἤρξεν.

¹² Critias, ap. Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 32, declares, Καὶ εἰσὶ μὲν δήπου πᾶσαι ἐταβολαὶ πολιτειῶν θανατηφόροι.

¹³ See the passages in Taylor, Vit. Lys. 143. n. 11.

¹⁴ Demosth. adv. Boeot. de Dot. 1018. 4. 5;—οὐδὲ τοὺς τῶν τριάκοντα υἱῶν φνυγαδεῦσαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἡξιώσατε.

¹⁵ Andoc. de Myst. 44.

¹⁶ Andoc. ubi sup.; καὶ οὐ μνησικακήσω οἷδὲ ἄλλῳ (c. conij. Reisk.) πείσομαι· ψηφιοῦμαι δὲ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους.

¹⁷ Lysias adv. Mantith. 574; conf. Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 269.

¹⁸ Lysias de Evand. Dokimas, 795.

Asia¹⁹. In order to prevent sycophancy from defeating the provisions of the amnesty, Archinus had caused a resolution to be passed, which secured to the accused peculiar advantages in conducting his defence²⁰; but this could not subdue the passion of the Athenians for litigation; a number of lawsuits soon proclaimed the inefficacy of the amnesty; prosecutors even appeared against the former Four Hundred²¹, and it was one of the charges against Socrates, that he had been the instructor of Critias²².

THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY.

*The Archonship of Euclid*²³.

Even before the total overthrow of the oligarchs and the declaration of the amnesty, Archons had been chosen²⁴, Euclid being Eponymus, Ol. 94. 2; 403. B. C. The archonship of Euclid forms a most important epoch in the civil annals of the Athenians, as its effects were perceptible in every object of public life, from the constitution and laws down to the very alphabet; every thing bears the impress of regeneration, and whatever was not stamped afresh fell into disuse. The order of things before Euclid, and that which subsisted after him, are contrasted as the old and new time²⁵.

¹⁹ See § 68. n. 29.

²⁰ Isocrat. adv. Callim. 618; νόμον ἰθισθε, ἂν τις δικάζεται παρὰ τοὺς ὄρκους, ξεῖναι τῷ φεύγοντι παραγράψασθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας περὶ τούτου πρῶτον εἰσάγειν, λέγειν δὲ πρότερον τὸν παραγραφάμενον, κ. τ. λ.

²¹ Lysias adv. Nicom. 844.

²² Æschin. in Timocr. 169.

²³ Compare at large Taylor, Vit. Lys. 140, sqq.

²⁴ Xenoph. Hell. 2. 4. 43. The final reconciliation appears to have been effected in the month Boedromion; see Plut. de Gloria Ath. ap. Taylor, Vit. Lys. 139.

²⁵ 'Απ' Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος, Demosth. in Macart. 1067. 14, sqq., required, in strictness, to be added to every law. On the period before Euclid as the

The oligarchs had disorganized the whole social system, and the re-establishment of the democracy was a task by no means easy of accomplishment; the adherents of the oligarchy were still numerous, and sought to preserve as many of the oligarchical institutions as they possibly could, in order to avert the dangers they apprehended from democratic commotions. Hence Phormisius proposed, that none but landholders should be admitted to a share in the government. This measure, which would have excluded five thousand citizens from participation in the administration, was rejected²⁶. On the other hand, the psephism proposed by Tisamenus, for appointing twenty men, invested with provisional authority, to determine upon the plan of administration²⁷, was adopted; a Bule was then selected, and five hundred Nomothetæ appointed to restore, or, in case of need, to remodel the constitution and laws of Solon. These ordinances were hereupon revived with all the democratic additions which had been made to them by Cleisthenes and other legislators. The psephism of Demophantus was designed to strengthen the democracy, by awarding the punishment of death to any one who should be declared guilty of aspiring to tyranny²⁸; and this was rendered still more solemn and emphatic by the oath of the Phyletæ and Demotæ to kill the culprit²⁹; it was also

old time, see *Æschin.* in *Tim.* 65; *καὶ ἔστω ταῦτα ἄκυρα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα, ἢ τὰ πρὸς Εὐκλείδου.* Conf. *Demosth.* in *Timocr.* 741. 29; *τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς Εὐκλείδου ἄρκοντος ἔω, καὶ τοὺς σφόδρα παλαιούς.*

²⁶ *Dionys. Halicarn.* de *Lys.* § 32. p. 271. Tauchn. Lysias wrote a speech against it. At the same time a distribution of land was possibly made to those who had been compelled to fly, to indemnify them for the loss of their estates which had been confiscated by the dynasts. *Isocrat.* de *Big.* 620.

²⁷ *Andoc.* de *Myst.* 89. 40; conf. *Poll.* 8. 112; *οἱ Εἰκοσι.*

²⁸ *Andoc.* ubi sup. 47; conf. 13.

²⁹ *Andoc.* ubi sup. 47. 48.

declared capital to retain possession of any office beyond the appointed term³⁰. On the other hand, to guard the laws against the effects of popular caprice, it was enacted, that no unwritten ordinance should be used, and that no psephism of the council or the body of the people should be paramount to the law³¹. To the same head must be referred the protection afforded to personal liberty by the statute, enacting, that no decree against a private individual should have force, until it had received the assent of six thousand citizens, who were to vote secretly³², which, in some measure, operated as a revival of ostracism. But the chief of these restorative laws was that of Diocles, which appears to have been passed the year after the archonship of Euclid³³, declaring that all the laws antecedent to the time of Euclid, which had not been framed by the oligarchs, and in the next place, those of the archonship of Euclid, should have effect without exception; but that those passed subsequently to that period were only to commence operation from the day of their enactment, unless a particular day should have been specified for that purpose³⁴. However, the orators no less frequently call all the ordinances of the new democracy Solon's laws, than they omit the words "from the archonship of Euclid."

Nicomachus, who had already been a kind of archive-keeper before the government of the Thirty³⁵, was appointed Antigrapheus of the Solonic,

³⁰ Andoc. 47; conf. Lycurg. in Leocr. 225.

³¹ Andoc. ubi sup. 42.

³² Andoc. ubi sup.

³³ Petit y. d. Att. Ges. p. 196. ed. Wessel.

³⁴ Demosth. in Timocr. 713; conf. Meier de Bon. Damn. 71. n. 233.

³⁵ Lysias adv. Nicomach. 847.

344. PREDOMINANCE & DECLINE OF OLIGARCHY.

Dracomic, and other laws of the new democracy.³⁶ He was also instructed by the state formally to introduce the Ionian alphabet³⁷, which it was proposed to render general, by using it in drawing up the laws. Nicomachus was allowed four months to perform his task, but took six years to complete it³⁸, and was accused of various falsifications, particularly by inserting several expensive holidays³⁹ in the table of festivals.

What effect these organic changes, in which the foundations of the constitution had been laid anew, produced upon the public system in Athens during the ensuing period, cannot, from the defectiveness of our sources, be stated with any degree of accuracy. Lysias and Andocides only stand, as it were, upon the threshold. Xenophon, in treating of Grecian history, was not disposed to say much of the interior of Athens; the treatise on the republic of the Athenians relates to this period of history, it is true, but its contents are still more suspicious than the name of its author; whilst the insipid Diodorus had neither perspicacity nor vigour enough to delineate a political system. The state of public affairs till the commencement of Philip's career, during which interval Athens did not, even in its external relations, occupy a prominent position, may be characterized upon the whole as fluctuating between good and evil; the revival of democracy did not restore the purity and strength of the national character; the few noble-minded citizens who had escaped the corruption of the age and

³⁶ Lysias ubi sup. 837, sqq.

³⁷ See citat. ap. Taylor, Vit. Lys. p. 141; besides which, compare Suidas, Σαμίωv ὁ δῆμος.

³⁸ Lys. adv. Nicom. 864.

³⁹ Lys. adv. Nicom. 839. 864.

rose superior to the vices of the multitude, endeavoured to arrest the career of demoralization, but in vain, and, at the beginning of Philip's age, we behold Athens fast sinking into moral and political extinction. Exact particulars of this interval can only be collected from the actual changes which were effected in the constitution; but the following period presents ampler materials for a survey of political life in all its bearings.

PERSONAL RANK.

In the course of the Peloponnesian war a variety of base ingredients had been mixed up with the citizenship. One of the earliest laws during the archonship of Euclid, was that proposed by Aristophon, the Azenian, whereby all persons not born of a female citizen⁴⁰ were declared illegitimate, in pursuance of which Aristophon himself was afterwards prosecuted as the father of spurious citizens. It is probable that the genuine citizens were not very numerous; but there is no doubt that the pride of Autochthony was common to all whose families had held the citizenship for three generations (*ἐκ τριγώνων*). One description of new citizens were still called Plataeans⁴¹. This is certain, that the inhabitants of the demolished Plataeæ, for some time after the Peloponnesian war, resided in Athens, whither they had probably fled upon the capture of their own city by Scione, or after their fruitless attempts to rebuild it. The speech of Lysias against Pancleon contains several particulars, which enable us to form a notion of the

⁴⁰ Athen. 13. 577. B.; conf. Meier de Bon. Damn. 72.

⁴¹ Conf. § 64. n. 16.

footing upon which the Plataeans in Athens stood⁴². After the peace of Antalcidas, when they had rebuilt and repeopled their city, they doubtless continued in the relation of Isopoliteia until their second expulsion took place, when they once more found a refuge and citizenship in Athens⁴³. This relation afterwards caused the words, "a citizenship like that of the Plataeans," to be used in a larger, and, at the same time, in an inaccurate sense, somewhat in the same manner as the position of the Cærites in Rome gave rise to Cæritic law in a more general sense. Anaxandrides, a poet of the middle comedy⁴⁴, complains that slaves still continued to obtain the citizenship surreptitiously. Cleruchiaë still subsisted⁴⁵, but for a short time only, as upon the new alliance between the sea-states and Athens, Ol. 100. 4; 377. B. C., it was expressly stipulated, that no Athenian should till land without Attica⁴⁶ (that is to say, in the capacity of a Cleruchus); still the inhabitants of Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scyros, continued to be looked upon as Athenian citizens; this was also the case at the peace of Antalcidas.

With regard to the higher orders, it is scarcely necessary to state, that after the bitter experience which the demus had had of the tyranny of the oligarchs; a feeling of jealousy was harboured against all, who were distinguished by birth, property, or military honour, whilst the safety of the last imperatively demanded that they should remove all cause for suspicion, by placing themselves as nearly as possible upon a

⁴² Lys. 728—738. The Plataeans assembled on the first of every month by the *green cheese*, p. 731.

⁴³ Diodorus inaccurately says, 15. 46, τῆς ἰσοπολιτείας ἔτυχον; conf. Meier de Bon. n. 165. 166.

⁴⁴ Athen. 6. 263. C.

⁴⁵ Diodor. 15. 23.

⁴⁶ —μηδὲνα τῶν Ἀθηναίων γεωργεῖν ἐκτὸς τῆς Ἀττικῆς, Diodor. 18. 29.

level with the bulk of the people. Hence examples of cabals on the part of the oligarchs, and disturbances proceeding from the jealousy of the multitude, are much rarer than before. The privileges of the family-nobility continued to be annexed to the priesthoods till the latest ages of the republic. But in civil life, no other distinction of classes was recognised than that, which was based upon the principle of the census. The loss of the sovereignty of the sea was followed by general poverty, and the above-mentioned proposal of Phormisius proves, that not only many thousands of citizens were wholly destitute of landed property, but that most of their other resources were also exhausted. The valuation of Solon, which must have become inoperative as soon as a period of prosperity, power, and opulence arrived; could not be revived upon the return of poverty and indigence, for the necessities and demands of the age, and the relative value of money, had become widely different; under the archonship of Euclid, though not expressly abolished, his valuation does not appear to have been restored, but his distribution of the classes was not suppressed⁴⁷. A new valuation was introduced by Nausinicus, Ol. 100. 3; 378. B. C., who, at the same time, appointed Symmoriæ⁴⁸. But its chief operation seems to have been confined to fiscal matters; its influence on civil rank was probably very slight. The lower orders still retained the right of eligibility to the archonship⁴⁹, which had been conceded to them by Aristides, and the notion of freedom and equality constantly assumed greater latitude of

⁴⁷ Conf. Böckh, Pub. Econ. 2. 42, sqq.

⁴⁸ See Böckh, 2. 50, sqq.

⁴⁹ Lys. de Impot. 749.

meaning. But in proportion as the distinctions which birth and the census had formerly conferred fell into neglect, extraordinary testimonies of respect, crowns, statues⁵⁰, etc., grew more frequent; on the other hand, Atimia became more common.

The condition of the Metœci, Isoteles, and slaves, seems to have undergone no change. The insolence of the last is censured by the author of the work on the Republic of the Athenians⁵¹.

THE DEMUS AS THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER.

The pay for attending the popular assembly was raised by Agyrrhius to three obols⁵² in Olymp. 96. 3; 394. B. C., a sure pledge that the meetings would neither be rare nor thinly attended. But this neither served to ennoble the hearts nor to expand the minds of the citizens. The assembly had ceased to be the stage on which the most enlightened and the bravest men in the state sought to display their virtues and their wisdom; the turmoil of the crowd grew irksome to many of them, who satisfied their political cravings in the retirement of private life, by soaring into the regions of speculation, by meditating on states and laws, and dedicating themselves to the development of abstract theories; or who quitted the land of their fathers, pursued the stirring career of arms, and found a home among the mingled hordes of the camp. This accelerated the corruption of

⁵⁰ See above, § 56. n. 38. On the presentation with a crown, see in particular Taylor's *Introduct. to Demosthenes de Corona*.

⁵¹ Xenoph. (?) l. 10.

⁵² Böckh, *Pub. Econ.* l. 247; Schömann, *de Comit.* 65, 499.

the multitude. Whilst it is the object of wisdom to impart stability to civil and domestic life, and the law of the state must be pronounced her noblest monument, the antagonist principle is beheld in the restless, ever-varying spirit of popular caprice. The latter predominated in Athens. The checks upon its excesses provided by the laws were too weak; the operations of the Bule were greatly restricted, the probuleuma often being altogether omitted⁵³; and though the psephism of Tisamenus empowered the Areopagus to watch over the laws⁵⁴, that body seems rarely to have intervened with energy and effect⁵⁵. The regulation for the annual Nomothesia still remained in force⁵⁶, and that formality was seldom dispensed with in the enactment of regular laws; but the psephisms of the popular assembly multiplied to such an extent as to endanger the laws, and through the accumulation of ordinances it became more difficult to inspect them, and this alone sufficed to promote the decline of the annual Nomothesia⁵⁷. That the tribunals still laboured under their old defects may be gathered from occasional hints⁵⁸, but in the age of Philip there is positive evidence that such was the fact. The business of the law courts had assumed a new aspect, owing to the loss of revenue caused by the dismemberment of the naval empire, and the diminution of litiga-

⁵³ Comp. Tittmann, Griech. Staatsv. 144. 177. 178.

⁵⁴ Andoc. de Myster. 40.

⁵⁵ Conf. Schömann, de Comit. 268, sqq. In the age of Philip these abuses had attained their acme.

⁵⁶ Andoc. de Myster. 40, and Demosth. in Timocr. 708.

⁵⁷ Schömann, de Comit. 272, thinks that extraordinary Nomothetæ were likewise chosen. There is no positive evidence either for or against this opinion.

⁵⁸ Aristoph. Plut. 1166, animadverts upon the fraudulent conduct of a man, who obtained letters for several courts.

tion, which was a consequence of it. This, however, did not lessen the inclination of the Athenians for acting in the capacity of judges, to which they continued to devote the same assiduity as before. But having no interests of magnitude and importance to engage their attention, their love of intrigue and chicanery manifested itself in a narrower sphere, viz., in cabals against their fellow-citizens, quarrels with their neighbours, etc.; while with a dereliction of all greatness and dignity they occupied themselves in investigating the most worthless and insignificant matters⁵⁹. But their cruelty was as great as ever; judicial murders were frequent, and the execution of Socrates shows the avidity of the Athenians for capital prosecutions. And yet this resulted less from the moral depravation of the *demos* and its estrangement from the principles of law and justice, than from the pernicious influence of the sycophants. After the death of Socrates, the Athenians felt the bitterest remorse for their conduct; the *Palæstras* and *Gymnasia* were closed; several of his accusers expelled, and Meletus put to death⁶⁰.

THE MAGISTRATES.

Those magistracies were restored which had existed under the last democracy; the offices of the *Hellenotamiæ*, *Episcopi*, and others which had been connected with the maintenance of the naval empire⁶¹ ceased. The influence of the magistrates became daily more confined in con-

⁵⁹ Conf. § 64. n. 53.

⁶⁰ Diog. Laert. 2. 43.

⁶¹ *Πρόμαρχος*, the commandant of the Athenian garrison, Inscript. ap. Böckh, Thes. p. 110.

sequence of the inclination of the people at large to interfere in every branch of the administration, their jealous watch over the proceedings of their superiors, and the ingratitude with which they repaid their services. The observation of Nicias⁶², that when an enterprise miscarried the blame was laid upon the few, but when it succeeded the people claimed all the merit⁶³, is still more adapted to this period than to the age in which it was made. Ostracism was no longer customary, but the sycophancy of the law courts increased to a fearful extent. The demos turned its rage against itself, and successively deprived itself of every prop and support; envy was more powerful than the sense of favours received⁶⁴; and the Athenians, in the words of Isocrates, were more willing to hear praise bestowed on persons with whose very names they were unacquainted, than upon such as had done them real benefits⁶⁵. Hence, notwithstanding the demos upon the whole was still capable of choosing able men to fill public offices, and especially that of Strategus, we find that many of those whom it had chosen, and who were well qualified for the posts they held, such as Iphicrates, Timotheus, and Chabrias, were afterwards prosecuted criminally. Upon the same principle the Rhetors, at the very commencement of Philip's career, succeeded in ridding themselves of Timotheus and Iphicrates. This period likewise presents examples of outrages perpetrated against commanders under the form of law, similar to that which took place after the battle off the Arginusæ;

⁶² Thucyd. 7. 14.

⁶⁴ Demosth. Epist. 1481.

⁶³ Xenoph. Repub. Ath. 2. 17.

⁶⁵ Isocrat. Evag. 306.

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the Athenians beginning to grow jealous of Thebes and afraid of Sparta, the generals who had marched to the assistance of the former with the concurrence and consent of the people were publicly impeached, when one of them was put to death and the other banished⁶⁶; but the conduct of Iphicrates in bringing soldiers into the court who significantly put their hands to their swords, would not have passed unpunished in an earlier age⁶⁷.

THE DEMAGOGY.

The opposition alluded to above⁶⁸ between the legally constituted magistrates and those non-official and irregular agents who wrought in the midst of the people existed as before, while the line of distinction from day to day grew broader, between the brave men who wielded their swords in defence of their country abroad, as Strategi, and the heroes of those bloodless battles in which words were the weapons of warfare, so that civil administration (*πολιτεύεσθαι*) and military command (*στρατηγεῖν*) were formally opposed to each other. That there were some exceptions may easily be supposed. Some of the distinguished Strategi were not deficient in the talents of the demagogue; a portion of these issued from the schools of the philosophers, as Chabrias and Phocion from the Academy⁶⁹; Timotheus from the school of Isocrates⁷⁰, etc. Iphicrates, too, who ordered Lysias to write a speech for him⁷¹, and

⁶⁶ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 4. 19.

⁶⁷ Polyæn. 3. 9. 15 ; 3. 9. 29.

⁶⁸ See section 64.

⁶⁹ Plut. Colot. 10. 629. Concerning the aptness of Timotheus for the doctrines of the Academy, conf. Ælian, V. H. 2. 10. 18 ; Plut. Symp. 8. 734 ; Athen. 10. 419, C.

⁷⁰ Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orator. 9. 330.

⁷¹ Ps. Plut. ubi sup. 326.

was ridiculed for practising oratory⁷², frequently made pointed and witty remarks, and was not destitute of a certain vigorous energy of expression⁷³. But none of the great commanders swayed the internal affairs of the state, as Themistocles and Cimon had once done; the latter obtained riches by their victories, and as long as there was a prospect of gain, the people readily lent themselves to their purposes; but though they had ceased to be warlike, they were as avaricious as before. None of the generals of this age succeeded in replenishing the exhausted coffers of the state, and from this fact alone, we may infer that their interference in the civil administration was not of much importance. Iphicrates would almost appear to have been jesting, when he recommended a tax to be levied on those persons, whose houses projected too far into the streets⁷⁴. But the influence of the Poristæ, who obtained riches for the demus, prevailed over that of the military commanders, who required money to defray the expenses of war, and very rarely, like Timotheus⁷⁵, understood or practised the art of carrying on war by means of war itself, without entailing expenses upon the state. When the insolence and profligacy of the demus had at length exceeded all bounds, a noisy declaimer like Chares had more influence than well-tried heroes like Iphicrates, etc.

The demagogy presents no trace of that opposition of political principles and opinions which had existed in the earlier age, or of an aristocratic

⁷² Plut. Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 238.

⁷³ Ibid. 9. 199; Demosth. in Timoth. 1287. 6. Conf. Wytténb. ad Plut. 1093; Ruhnck. H. Or. Gr. LVII.

⁷⁴ Polyzén. 3. 9. 30.

⁷⁵ See Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 316.

and democratic party; nor are there any grounds for the opinion, that because Iphicrates was of humble origin, he was therefore the opponent of Conon's son Timotheus⁷⁶. The so-called Laconistæ indeed still existed, but they were mere fashionable coxcombs⁷⁷. The efforts of Athens to maintain her position as the third power of Greece, prepared to decide between Sparta and Thebes by her mediation or active co-operation, and her jealousy of Thebes induced her several times to ally herself with Sparta; but this was very far from being attended by the introduction of Spartan manners or discipline. But though there was no longer any division of parties as before, every thing was effected by riotous assemblages of the people. The mob obeyed the call of the demagogues and sycophants, and then denounced all who were opposed to them as oligarchs and Laconistæ⁷⁸. Less injurious, though not less depraved, were the associations which may be compared to the clubs of the present day, and which transferred the frivolous jests and raileries of Bacchus and Comus into the serious business of political life. Finally, it has already been observed that the Rhetors did not form an exclusive body⁷⁹, nor was it in a joint capacity that they attained their actual importance; but vicious indeed must have been that state of society, in which oratory had power enough to cause those who possessed it, to be looked upon as a separate and distinct order of citizens.

⁷⁶ Demosth. in Timoth. 1187. 5.

⁷⁷ See, concerning them, above, § 64. n. 25; Plut. Gorg. 515, E.; Protag. 342, and Heindorf, *ibid.*; Demosth. de Coronâ, 1267; Plut. Phoc. 10; Schol. Aristoph. Plut. 84.

⁷⁸ Isocrat. de Antidos, 600.

⁷⁹ Vol. i. 374, 375..

THE DEMAGOGUES SINGLY.

The depravation of the people and that of their leaders did not keep pace with one another; the former by far outstripped the latter. There is no truth in the assertion that the demagogues grew more corrupt with every generation⁸⁰; the period under consideration presents some triumphant examples of the contrary.

Thrasybulus and Archinus were pre-eminently the restorers of democracy by boldly making head against the oligarchs. The conduct of the former, both before and after the archonship of Euclid, was far from being irreproachable⁸¹; but his demagoguery, upon the restoration of the democracy, commands unqualified admiration. He afterwards dedicated his life to the career of arms, rendered important service to his country in the naval wars⁸², revived democracy in Thasus⁸³, Byzantium⁸⁴, etc., and lost his life at Aspendus in Cilicia, Olymp. 97. 3; 390. B. C.⁸⁵. The merits of Archinus, in the re-establishment of the popular government, were eclipsed by those of Thrasybulus; he was by no means deficient in military talents, but was more exclusively connected with the internal administration than Thrasybulus⁸⁶. Numerous accounts in the ancient writers attest his activity and influence. The proposition for the amnesty emanated

⁸⁰ e. g. Heyne, Opusc. 4. 402 : *deteriores in dies deterioribus loco cedere.*

⁸¹ Lysias adv. Ergocl. 819, sqq.

⁸² Xenoph. Hell. 4. 8. 25—30.

⁸³ Demosth. in Lept. 474. 26; Aristid. Panath. 112, ed. Jebb.

⁸⁴ Xenoph. ubi sup.

⁸⁵ Xenoph. ubi sup.

⁸⁶ Demosth. in Timocr. 742. 25, sqq. : *Μυρωνίδης, ὁ Ἀρχίνου υἱός, τοῦ καταλαβόντος φυλὴν καὶ μετὰ γε τοὺς θεοὺς αἰτιωτάτου ὄντος τῆς καθόδου τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ πεπολιτευμένου καὶ ἐστραγηκότος πολλάκις.* Conf. Dinarch. in Demosth. 54.

no less from him than from Thrasybulus⁸⁷; he caused the introduction of the Ionian alphabet⁸⁸; and much of the Panegyric of Isocrates is said to have been borrowed from a funeral oration delivered by him⁸⁹. When Thrasybulus infringed the law, by proposing to crown one of his companions, he was accused by Archinus⁹⁰.

We may also class together Aristophon, the Azenian (*Ἀζηνιεύς*), and Cephalus, the old (*ὁ παλαιός*)⁹¹ or Colyttian⁹², who at the end of their active career contested the palm of merit⁹³. The character of Aristophon, however, would not bear comparison with that of his rival. In the restless and unceasing activity of a political life of nearly seventy years in duration⁹⁴, he was perhaps his superior, but his activity lacked the integrity of real patriotism. When one of the Four Hundred he had been sent by that body as their envoy to Sparta⁹⁵; and upon the restoration of the democratic government, he introduced the law respecting spurious citizens, the provisions of which he himself infringed; in his contest with Cephalus he boasted that he had been prosecuted seventy-five times for unconstitutional measures⁹⁶; and the fact that his authority sustained no diminution in consequence of these numerous accusations, leads us to conclude, that he must have employed his tongue with great

⁸⁷ Æschin. de Fals. Legat. 338.

⁸⁸ Suid., Σαμίων ὁ δῆμος.

⁸⁹ Phot. Myriobl. Cod. CCXL. Comp. Plat. Menex. 234.

⁹⁰ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 584.

⁹¹ Æschin. ubi sup. 583: ὁ παλαιὸς ἐκεῖνος, ὁ δοκῶν δημοτικώτατος γεγονέναι. Neither Cephalus, the father of Lysias, nor Lysias himself was a citizen. Concerning this Cephalus, as well as the one mentioned above, conf. Taylor, Vit. Lys. 103, sqq.

⁹² Dinarch. in Demosth. 54.

⁹³ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 583.

⁹⁴ His embassy to Sparta falls in the year 411, his impeachment of Timotheus about the year 354.

⁹⁵ Thucyd. 8. 86.

⁹⁶ Æschin. ubi sup.

ingenuity and skill to extricate himself from so many dilemmas; at a very advanced age, Olymp. 106. 8; 354. B. C., he and Chares accused Iphicrates and Timotheus⁹⁷, and caused the latter to retire from his native city which was, indeed, unworthy of him. He supported the motion of Leptines⁹⁸. In his foreign policy he belonged to the Boeotian party⁹⁹. A second Aristophon, the Colyttian (*Κολυττεύς*)¹⁰⁰, was partly contemporary with him and partly with Philip of Macedon; he was likewise an influential demagogue, and is not always accurately distinguished from the other by the ancient writers¹⁰¹. Cephælus, an eminent rhetorician, said to have been the first composer of proœmia and epilogues¹⁰², was by far more renowned than Aristophon; all writers are unanimous in his praise; but perhaps the most honourable testimony to his character is, that in his contest with Aristophon, he could with truth affirm that he had never once been prosecuted for illegal measures¹⁰³. He likewise belonged

⁹⁷ Dinarch. in Philocl. 100; Isocrat. de Antidos. 75. Orelli; conf. Diod. 16. 21; Corn. Nep. Tim. 3; Polyæn. 3. 9. 29. Timotheus said to him: *ἡλικίῳ μὲν οὐδὲν, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ γε αἰσχρὸν οὐδέν.* Ælian. V. H. 14. 3.

⁹⁸ Demosth. in Lept. 501. 24.

⁹⁹ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 532: *πλεῖστον χρόνον τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύου ἐποῶ μείνας αἰτίαν.*

¹⁰⁰ He is only thus designated once, Demosth. de Coron. 250. 18; Heitsch in the Ind. Hist. entertains doubts on the subject, because he is called Proedres in the prytany of Hippothoontis, but as a Colyttian, belonged to Aiantis. But that difficulty is removed by the discovery which has since been made of the difference between the Proedri contribules and non contribules. See Schöm. Comit. 83, sqq.; conf. Böckh, Thes. Inscr. p. 130. 143. In the inscription, *ibid.* p. 129, perhaps the Colyttian himself is referred to.

¹⁰¹ Æschines seems to have been his clerk, (Vit. Anon.) Æsch. p. 10. But the passage, Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orator. 9. 358: *Ἀριστοφῶντος δ' ἔφη τὴν προστασίαν διὰ γῆρας καταλιπόντος καὶ χορηγὸς ἐγένετο (ὁ Δημοσθένης),* must be referred to the Azenian, not (with Ruhnken, Hist. Or. Gr. XLIV.) to the Colyttian. Hyperides said of his power (Schol. Plat. apud Ruhnken, Hist. Or. Gr. XLVI.): *οἶδε γὰρ αὐτῷ δεδομένην ἄδειαν καὶ πράττειν καὶ γράφειν ὃ τι αὐτῷ ἐμβραχὺ βούληται.* See the passages of the orators Append. viii.

¹⁰² Suid. Κέφαλος.

¹⁰³ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 563; conf. Demosth. de Coron. Dinarch. in Demosth. 30.

to the Boeotian party; in Olymp. 100. 2; 879. B. C., he drew up the psephism for sending succours to Thebes¹⁰⁴; and appeared as the enemy of Sparta as early as Olymp. 96. 1; 965. B. C., when he was bribed by the Persians¹⁰⁵.

Amongst the democratic refugees at the time of the Thirty was Epicrates¹⁰⁶, whose character both in youth and age was tainted with dishonesty. When Sakesphorus he is mentioned amongst the fops of that age¹⁰⁷; as an Antilacon he received some of the Persian money of Timocrates¹⁰⁸, and obtained a still richer harvest on his embassy to the great king¹⁰⁹; correspondent to his readiness to receive a bribe was the effrontery, with which he boasted to the people of the advantages attending such missions; notwithstanding the favourable manner in which they received his proposition¹¹⁰ for appointing poor citizens, instead of the Archons, ambassadors to the great king, he could not pass his accounts, and fearing to be condemned to death for peculation during his embassy, he was obliged to fly, and died in exile¹¹¹. Still more dishonest was the successor of Thrasybulus in the command of the navy¹¹², the Poristes Agyrrhius¹¹³, of whom not a single praiseworthy action has been recorded¹¹⁴.

¹⁰⁴ Dinarch. in Demosth. 31. See a proposition which he made respecting the Parian Phanocritus, who had contributed to the victory at Naxos, Ol. 101. 1, in the Inscript. Böckh, Thes. Inscript. p. 123.

¹⁰⁵ Pausan. 3. 9. 5; comp. above, § 68. n. 39.

¹⁰⁶ Demosth. de Fals. Legat. 430. 4. 5: ἀνὴρ — σπουδαῖος καὶ πολλὰ χρήσιμος τῇ πόλει, καὶ τῶν ἐκ Πειραιῶς καταγαγόντων τὸν δῆμον, καὶ ἄλλως δημοτικός.

¹⁰⁷ See above, § 64. n. 84.

¹⁰⁸ Pausan. 3. 9. 5.

¹⁰⁹ Plut. Pelop. 30; conf. Hegesander ap. Ath. 6. 251. B.

¹¹⁰ Plut. ubi sup.: ἐγέλασεν ὁ δῆμος.

¹¹¹ Demosth. de Fals. Legat. 430. 2. 3.

¹¹² Xenoph. Hell. 4. 8. 31; Diod. 14. 99.

¹¹³ See concerning him, Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 246.

¹¹⁴ The praise of Demosth. in Timocr. 742. 17. 18: — ἄνδρα χρηστὸν καὶ δημοτικὸν καὶ περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον πολλὰ σπουδάζαντα—is not wholly impartial.

The most celebrated amongst the orators of that age was Callistratus, the son of Calligrates of Aphidna¹¹⁵, joint commander with Timotheus and Chabrias, Olymp. 100. 4; 377. B. C.¹¹⁶, and Archon, Olymp. 106. 2; 355. B. C.; he was afterwards twice condemned to death¹¹⁷ and each time escaped, but returning at length without permission he was executed¹¹⁸. He was the friend of Iphicrates¹¹⁹, and appeared with him as the accuser of Timotheus¹²⁰. His attentions was more particularly directed to the external relations of the state; he recommended the occupation of Thasus¹²¹, and a short time before the battle of Leuctra, endeavoured to bring about a peace with Sparta¹²², whither he went as ambassador himself¹²³. It was at his suggestion that troops were sent to the Peloponnesus, who afterwards fought in the battle of Mantinea¹²⁴. His pacific dispositions towards the Thebans are attested by the speech which he made, when, Olymp. 103. 3; 366. B. C., Oropus had been wrested from the Athenians by the Euboean Themison with the co-operation of Thebes¹²⁵, and which produced a deep impression on the youthful mind of Demosthenes¹²⁶.

Less renowned than the preceding, and some of whom are only known to us by name, were: Melanopus, an unworthy antagonist of Callistratus¹²⁷,

¹¹⁵ See Ruhnck. Hist. Or. Gr. LVIII.; Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 246.

¹¹⁶ Diod. 15. 29.

¹¹⁷ Demosth. in Polycl. 1221. 18.

¹¹⁸ Lycurg. in Leocr. 198.

¹¹⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 2. 39.

¹²⁰ Demosth. in Timoth. 1187. 7.

¹²¹ Zenob. Prov. 4. 34.

¹²² Xenoph. 6. 3. 10; conf. Ps. Demosth. in Near. 1353. 19.

¹²³ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 3. 3. 10. Concerning his meeting with Epaminondas there, see Dodwell, Ann. Xenoph. a. XXXIX. and Plut. Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 231.

¹²⁴ Ps. Demosth. in Near. 1353.

¹²⁵ Diod. 15. 76; Xenoph. Hell. 7. 4. 1, where see Schneid.

¹²⁶ Plut. Demosth. 5; Gellius, Noct. Att. 3. 13.

¹²⁷ Plut. Dem. 13.

from whom, however, he had the meanness repeatedly to accept money¹²⁸; Leodamas, the Acharnian, the accuser of Callistratus¹²⁹, as well as of Chabrias¹³⁰; and himself accused by Thrasybulus; a pupil of Isocrates¹³¹, and according to the judgment of Æschines, upon which, however, we cannot place implicit reliance, a more powerful orator than Demosthenes, to whom he upon the whole preferred him, and likewise in the Theban interest¹³²; Androtion, the scholar of Isocrates¹³³, who was already of advanced age when Diodorus accused him in the speech of Demosthenes¹³⁴. Autocles¹³⁵, Cephisodotus, Archedemus, Callias the Daduchus, Thrasybulus the Colyttian¹³⁶, Demosttratus, the son of Aristophon, Aristocles, Lycanthis and Deinias, (Ἐρχιεύς), are, for the most part, mentioned as having belonged to the embassy which was sent to Sparta to conclude peace¹³⁷; Autocles had the reputation of possessing great tact and skill¹³⁸; Cephisodotus afterwards drew up the terms of the confederacy between Athens and Sparta¹³⁹, and is, Ol. 106. 2, recorded as Syndicus at the proposal of laws¹⁴⁰; Deinias supported the law proposed by Leptines, together with the Azenian Aristophon, Leodamas and Cephisodotus¹⁴¹.

¹²⁸ Plut. ubi sup.

¹²⁹ Aristot. Rhet. 136. ed. Schwick.

¹³⁰ Demosth. in Lept. 501.

¹³¹ Ps. Plut. Vit. Deo. Orator. 330.

¹³² Æsch. in Ctesiph. 531.

¹³³ Suid. Ἄνδρον.

¹³⁴ Demosth. in Androt. 613. 24.

¹³⁵ Autocles has a fleet under his command, Olymp. 103. 1, see Diod. 15. 71.

¹³⁶ Dem. in Timocr. 742. 12; Æschin. in Ctesiph. 531.

¹³⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 3. 2.

¹³⁸ Xenoph. ubi sup. 6. 3. 7 : μάλα δοκῶν ἐπιστροφῆς εἶναι ῥήτωρ.

¹³⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 7. 1. 12.

¹⁴⁰ Dem. in Lept. 501. 24. See the proposal of Cephisodotus, for showing some mark of respect to Straton king of Sidon, in return for a present, Inscript. Böckh, 101—103; Thes. p. 126; (Bipont, 101—103.)

¹⁴¹ Demosth. in Lept. 501. 25.

2. THE DEMOCRACY OF THEBES AND ITS CONTEST WITH SPARTA.

§ 72. Xenophon, in accordance with his Spartan predilections, entitles the government of Sparta, after the subjugation of Thebes, well-constituted and secure¹; and yet, according to his own showing, seven men managed to overturn it². The capture of the Cadmea, through its consequences to Sparta, became, according to the Greek proverb, a Cadmean victory. Theban fugitives filled the surrounding towns and villages, which were no less ready to receive them, than to expel their own inhabitants. Athens especially displayed her hospitality which was so inexhaustible a theme of panegyric to the orators, and Pelopidas and his friends in Athens formed the project of liberating Thebes from the yoke of the oligarchs and of Sparta³. Pelopidas was descended from one of the noblest families in Thebes⁴; but his motives, in the glorious conspiracy which he headed, were free from all taint of aristocratic pride or party-spirit. Having in the silence of the night attacked and overpowered the profligate Archias, the violent Leontiades, Hypates and Philip, Ol. 100. 2; 379. B. C., he was joined by vast numbers of associates, who were inspired by the noblest feelings of courage and patriotism; the townsmen assisted him in driving the Spartans from the Cadmea,

¹ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 3. 27 : παντάπασιν ἤδη καλῶς καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ἡ ἀρχὴ ἰδόκει αὐτοῖς κατασκευάσθαι.

² Xenoph. Hell. 5. 4. 1. However, there were forty-eight conspirators in all. Plut. Pelop. 9.

³ See in general, besides Xenophon, Diodor. and Corn. Nep., Plut. Pelop. and de Gen. Socr.

⁴ Plut. Pelop. 8.

and supplies came from the neighbouring places in Boeotia⁵. In Athens, Cephalus was the author of the decree for sending succours to the patriots⁶. Some Theban horsemen intercepted and put to flight a body of Plataeans, who were marching to the relief of the citadel⁷. The garrison of the Cadmea was chiefly composed of the allies of Sparta, who felt no inclination to expose themselves to danger to maintain her supremacy, and evacuated the citadel without waiting till they were vigorously attacked⁸. Flushed with success, the conquerors in the first moment of victory sacrificed numerous victims to their vengeance; not even the children of the Laconistæ were spared⁹, and an amnesty was not upon the whole so formally declared as in Athens. The oligarchs took refuge in Orchomenus, whence they made several fruitless efforts to effect their return¹⁰.

No organic changes appear to have been effected in the constitution of Thebes after the downfall of the oligarchy. Certain permanent forms, which had not even been abolished by the oligarchs, who had endeavoured to incorporate their own authority into them, now resumed all their former importance, such as the office of Polemarch¹¹, etc.; but the democratic character, from that time forth, decidedly predominated. The liberators, says Xenophon, strove to satisfy the *demus*, and determined to die for the constitution, rather than again be expelled¹². But the personal authority of those high-minded men,

⁵ Diod. 15. 26.

⁶ Din. adv. Demosth. 31.

⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 4. 10.

⁸ Ibid. 5. 4. 11; Plat. Pelop. 13.

⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 4. 12.

¹⁰ Diod. 15. 79.

¹¹ See § 69. n. 95.

¹² Xenoph. Hell. 6. 4. 6.

Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Gorgidas, Pammenes (to whose superintendence Philip of Macedon was afterwards entrusted¹³), Ismenias, Mellon, Charon, etc., by no means superseded the constitution; but they infused into it another spirit, the body politic became animated by a new soul, and this chiefly contributed to regenerate Thebes¹⁴. Military institutions, as before, formed the basis of the public system; and, as in Athens, the chief dignity connected with them, viz. that of Polemarch, or what was at that time the same thing—the Bœotarchy¹⁵, greatly preponderated in the internal administration. The sacred band (*ιερός λόχος*) formed by Gorgidas¹⁶, consisted of three hundred chosen citizens, and was supported by the community at large¹⁷ as the garrison of the citadel; they who composed it were united by patriotism, and like the men of Sparta in former times, by the love which indissolubly connected individuals¹⁸. They maintained in full vigour the virtues and glory of Thebes, till the battle of Chæronea. Nothing certain is known concerning their relation to the constitution. There can be little doubt that they were chiefly attached to Gorgidas, Epaminondas, Pelopidas, etc.; and their patriotism may be inferred from the circumstance, that notwithstanding the Cadmea was in their power, they never at-

¹³ Plut. Pelop. 26. On the other hand, Diod. 16. 2, names Epaminondas.

¹⁴ Had Lysis, the Pythagorean of Tarentum, the master of Epaminondas (Corn. Nep. Ep. 2), a great share in the political elevation of Thebes?

¹⁵ Schneid. ad Xenoph. Hell. 5. 4. 2, from Dodwell. Ἀρχοντες occur, Xenoph. 7. 3. 5, besides the βουλή.

¹⁶ Plut. Pelop. 18. 19; Polyæn. 25. 1; Xenoph. 7. 1. 19, seems to refer to them when he uses the word ἐπιλέκτοις.

¹⁷ Plut. Pelop. 18: — ἡ πόλις οἰκῆσιν καὶ διατταν ἐν τῇ Καδμείᾳ στρατοπεδευόμενοις παρείχε, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ἐκ πόλεως λόχος ἐκαλούντο.

¹⁸ Plut. Pelop. 18.

tempted to establish a dynasty.¹⁹ Nor was this powerful body exempt from the control of the laws; there was also a party against them headed by Meneclidas, who himself plotted against the constitution²⁰. These, possibly, instigated the proceedings against Epaminondas²¹; the issue of which, however, reminds us of the triumph of the elder Scipio over the unworthy party-cabals of Cato²². But we are informed that upon another occasion, in order to mortify Epaminondas, he was compelled to accept the mean office of a *Tel-march*²³. A Theban legislator called Diagondas (Pagondas?) abolished all nocturnal festivals²⁴; did this occur at this period?

The rest of the Boeotian towns had become independent of Thebes, by the stipulations of the peace of Antaloidas. Orchomenus, where an equestrian order had maintained itself²⁵, now supported the cause of oligarchy against the democratic Thebes: it was garrisoned by two Spartan moras²⁶. Plataeae had been rebuilt; its aversion to the oligarchy imposed upon it by Sparta was, in all probability, no less powerful than its hereditary hostility to Thebes; but when the increased prosperity of the last had widened the breach between that state and Athens, Plataeae again attached itself to Athens, in consequence of which;

¹⁹ Plut. Pelop. 25.

²⁰ Corn. Nep. Ep. 8. See the other Citat. Wyttenh. ad Plut. Apophth. 1114.

²¹ Liv. 38. 50.

²² Plut. Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 232: φθόνῳ καὶ πρὸς ὕβριν ἀποδεχθεὶς τελευάρχος, where we must probably read τελευάρχος, from τέλμα a puddle, for Plut. describes the τελευρχία as περι τοὺς στενωποὺς ἐκβολῆς κοπρίων καὶ βουμάτων ἀποτροπῆς ἐπιτελείαν τινα.

²³ Cicero de Legg. 2. 15.

²⁴ Diod. 15. 79: τοὺς γὰρ Ὀρχομενίων ἱππεῖς ὄντας τριακοσίους seems to refer to a limited number, as in Elis, Argos, etc.

²⁵ Plut. Pelop. 16.

three years before, the battle of Leuctra, Oly. 101; 41; 373. B. C.²⁶, it was once more destroyed by the Thebans; whereupon the citizens again found an asylum in Athens.²⁷ Thespiae had likewise been governed by dynasts under the protectorate of Sparta, and had risen in arms upon the fall of the dynasty in Thebes²⁷; its aversion to that state led to the dissolution of the community, as in Plataea.²⁸ Orchomenus was compelled to yield; it was taken in Olymp. 104. 1; 364. B. C., when the men were slaughtered and the women and children reduced to slavery²⁹. Thus Thebes ruled over Boeotia more despotically than ever.

During the long and severe struggle which Thebes was obliged to sustain against Sparta for her independence, when she was compelled to proclaim democracy for the purpose of forming a confederacy, the nations of Greece did not, as formerly, divide themselves into two opposite parties, as the respective supporters of oligarchy and democracy; but Athens was induced to raise the democratic banner, in the hope, as Sparta had ceased to be formidable, of securing herself against Thebes, and maintaining such a position as would enable her, either by compact or by force, to decide the conflict between the other two in any manner that might be most conducive to her own

²⁶ Pausan. 9. 1, ad fin. Diod. 15. 46, who fixes this under the archonship of Socratides, Olymp. 101. 3; Xenoph. Hell. 6. 3. 1.

²⁷ Plut. de Gen. Socrat. 8. 318, where it is stated as having happened three days earlier.

²⁸ Diod. 15. 46. Ælian, V. H. 11. 6, relates a story of an adulterer who was led bound over the market-place, when his friends rescued him, and many lives were lost. Was that one of the outrages committed by the dynasts of the time?

²⁹ Diod. 15. 79. Paus. 4. 27. 5; 9. 15. 2, where it is asserted that this transaction took place during the absence of Epaminondas, who was excessively indignant upon learning it; 9. 35. 3. Comp. Müll. Orchom. 419--421.

interest. Sparta long remained insensible to the advantages, which were to be derived from a sincere reconciliation with Athens, and her conduct was marked by perfidy and deceit; the ill-concerted stratagem of Sphodrias for obtaining possession of the Piræus miscarried³⁰; and occasioned a temporary renewal of the alliance between Athens and Thebes, Ol. 100. 3; 378. B.C. A short time afterwards, Ol. 100. 4, the former succeeded in inducing the maritime states to enter into a new confederacy. This object was chiefly promoted by Timotheus. Even before the attempt of Sphodrias upon the Piræus, Chios, Mytilene, Byzantium, and Rhodes, which were subject to the Spartan-Persian hegemony, and were unable to obtain the liberty and independence guaranteed to them by the peace of Antalcidas³¹, had entered into a league with Athens³²; in a short time the confederate states amounted to seventy-five³³. It was stipulated that the Autonomia of all should be respected, the Athenians possessing the hegemony; that the Synedrion should be held in Athens, and that all the states, whether great or small, should have equal votes³⁴. To provide against the establishment of Athenian Oleruchia, the federal law above alluded to was enacted, whereby every Athenian was forbidden to hold land without the limits of Attica³⁵.

The allies of Sparta, at the beginning of the great Boeotian war, were the Arcadians, Eleans, Achæans, Sicyonians, Phliasians, the towns of the

³⁰ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 4. 20. 21.

³¹ Hence this is described as a defection from Sparta by Diod. 15. 28.

³² Diod. ubi sup.

³³ Æschin. de Fals. Legat. 247; Diod. 15. 33.

³⁴ Diod. 15. 28. ³⁵ Diod. 16. 29.

Actæ (Heræione, &c.), the Corinthians, Iægeans, Ambraciots, Zacynthians, Megarians, Phocians, Locrians, Acarnanians, and Olynthians.³⁶ Amongst these Corinth, Leucas, Ambracia, Elin, Zacynthus, and Achaia, furnished ships.³⁷ It is obvious that the despotism of Sparta, or the oligarchical constitutions which it had introduced and maintained, had the chief share in securing the co-operation of several of the above states. The victory obtained by the Athenian fleet under Charibæus at Naxos, Olymp. 101. 1; 376. B. C.³⁸, may be compared to that gained by Conon at Cnidus; it once more destroyed the naval power of Sparta, and this time, without the co-operation of the barbarians. This confirmed Athens in her policy of forming the third state. The antipathy she had borne to Sparta had been succeeded by jealousy of Thebes, whom she knew to be no longer in want of her assistance, and perhaps even suspected of being an over-match for her. She was moreover exasperated by the conduct of Thebes towards Plataeæ and Thespiae; but before she could recover sufficient strength to oppose any effectual obstacle to the progress of her rival, she required an interval of peace. A treaty concluded between Athens and Sparta, Olymp. 101. 3; 374. B. C., was but of short duration³⁹; the negotiations of Athens and the other states were renewed in Sparta, Olymp. 102. 1; 371. B. C.⁴⁰ The terms offered by Athens provided, amongst other things, that Autonomia should be restored to the Greek

³⁶ Diod. 15. 31.

³⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 2. 3.

³⁸ Diod. 15. 34; Demosth. de. Syntax. 172. 27; in Lept. 480. 5, sqq.; Æschin. in Ctesiph. 635; Plat. Phoc. ap. Polyæn. 3. 11. 11.

³⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 2. 1, sqq.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 6. 3. 1, sqq.

states, and the Spartan Harmosts recalled ⁴¹. The pertinacity of Epaminondas, in insisting that Thebes should exercise the same rights over Bœotia as Sparta did over Messenia, and the angry vehemence of Agesilaus towards Epaminondas ⁴², frustrated the well-meant advice of the pacific Spartan Prothous, relative to the establishment of genuine *Autonomia* ⁴³; in consequence of which the battle of Leuctra was fought, only twenty days after the peace had been ratified by the other states ⁴⁴. The defeat Sparta then sustained effectually humbled her; she was now incapable of offering further opposition to the *Autonomia* stipulated by the peace of Antalcidas, and there were abundant means of checking any attempts on her part to recover the ascendant she had lost. Greece at length hoped to taste the long-desired blessings of peace; but the angry passions which had been aroused could not be allayed: victory did not lead to reconciliation, but was followed by spoliation and revenge; and the ill-fated Greeks were destined to enjoy no respite from the fatal calamities which assailed them.

In recounting the struggle of Thebes to obtain the hegemony, we have sustained an irreparable loss in Plutarch's biography of Epaminondas. Xenophon's partiality to Sparta led him to speak of the exploits of that great man with extreme brevity, not so much as even naming him at the battle of Leuctra, and keeping him in the back ground as much as he possibly could, upon every other occa-

⁴¹ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 3. 18. 19.

⁴² Plut. Ages. 27. 28.

⁴³ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 4. 2: ἡ δ' ἐκκλησία ἀκούσασα ταῦτα ἐκείνον μὲν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσατο· ἥδη γάρ, ὥς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἦγεν.

⁴⁴ Plut. Agesil. 28.

sion. Epaminondas, great as he was as a citizen, ranks still higher as a general. He must have been one of the chief promoters of the measures of Thebes against Sparta and her Symmachia; but it is upon this part of his public conduct that the mind dwells with least satisfaction. Pelopidas was the worthy fellow-soldier of Epaminondas, and no less distinguished as a citizen. In their operations connected with the external policy of the state, they pursued opposite directions; Pelopidas turned his views towards the north; Epaminondas towards the south. The great qualities of these two men served for a time to gloss over some of the most notorious of the faults by which the Thebans had signalized themselves. It is by no means probable, however, that their character, even during this period, inspired attachment and respect; but there is no doubt that the hatred of the Athenians exaggerated their defects. The policy of Thebes reveals occasional glimpses of a nobler feeling; as for instance, when Pelopidas, conscious that he was fighting in a good cause, marched against Alexander, the tyrant of Pheræ, at a time when he was in alliance with Athens, and Sparta sent succours to Dionysius of Syracuse⁴⁵. Thebes must not be blamed for following up her successes after the battle of Leuctra. Was she to remain inactive until Sparta should renew her attacks? From Agesilaus' love of war, and his implacable animosity, no dependence could be placed upon the continuance of peace. After the battle of Leuctra, Thebes was, indeed, said to have transferred to the Achæans the power of arbitrating in the internal

⁴⁵ Plut. Pelop. 31.

wars of the Greek states⁴⁶; but the statement is too vague to be depended upon. We may safely assume, that after the battle of Leuctra, military enthusiasm became predominant in the minds of the Thebans⁴⁷. But no sooner did Thebes stretch out her athletic arms over the surrounding country, than her lust of territorial aggrandizement displayed itself in various acts of aggression and violence, and in a total estrangement from the spirit of wisdom and moderation.

Sparta suffered more from internal exhaustion than from any apparent want of external support⁴⁸; but neither neighbours, kindred states, nor those which were rendered dependent upon her authority by the nature of their constitutions, testified steady and faithful attachment to her interests; the Peloponnesian confederacy, her natural bulwark and defence, was shaken to its centre, and her allies now only consisted of those whom the hopes or fears, inspired by the fluctuating politics of the day, induced to espouse her cause; such were Dionysius and his son, who were most desirous of establishing an influence in the mother-country, and who several times sent her bodies of Celts and Iberians⁴⁹. The design of Athens in remaining neuter till the moment arrived for turning the scale of victory in favour of either of the combatants it might suit her purposes to support, was not ill-judged in itself, it is true; but she could not devise or follow up any

⁴⁶ Strab. 8. 384: μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκ Λεύκτροις μάχην ἐπέτρεψαν Θηβαῖοι τοῦτοις τὴν δίκαιαν περὶ τῶν ἀντιλεγόμενων ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς ἀλλήλας.

⁴⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 5. 23:—καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ ἐγυμνάζοντο πάντες περὶ τὰ ὄπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ.

⁴⁸ See in Xenoph. 6. 4. 17. 18, the imperfect list of the confederates who furnished quotas of men for the continuation of the war. Conf. on Epidaurus, 7. 1. 25, and others, 7. 2. 2.

⁴⁹ Diodor. 15. 70; Xenoph. 7. 1. 20. 28; 7. 4. 12.

regular or consistent course of policy for the attainment of her object. For instance, if Xenophon is to be believed, Athens, after the battle of Leuctra, in order still more effectually to weaken Sparta⁵⁰, made an attempt to dissolve the confederacy of the Peloponnesus, and to draw over its members to her own; with this view she sent a message to those states, inviting them to carry out the provisions of the peace of Antalcidas, by asserting their Autonomia and entering into the Athenian confederacy. According to Xenophon, all (??) the states, except Elis, whose Autonomia the Margareis, the Scilluntians, and the Triphylians refused to recognise, subscribed to the Athenian confederacy⁵¹. But Athens reaped very little advantage from their co-operation; the relations of the Peloponnesus were shortly destined to undergo a total revolution, in consequence of the important part which one section of its inhabitants was about to perform, as well as from the effects of foreign invasions.

The renown of Sparta, as well as the terrors of her name, and the attachment she had inspired amongst her neighbours and ancient allies, had long ceased, and the Arcadians felt the will and the power to follow the example of Thebes. The townships of which Mantinea had once been composed, and which had hitherto been annexed to

⁵⁰ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 5. 1:—ἐνθυμηθέντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι—οὕτως διακρίντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διέθεσαν—that was no longer the policy of Athens, who already began to fear Thebes; hence it would not have suited her purpose now to revenge herself on Sparta.

⁵¹ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 5. 3. According to Diodor. 15. 62, after the establishment of the Arcadian league by this confederacy, in conjunction with Argos and Elis, ambassadors were sent to Athens to propose an alliance, but she declined the offer. Both statements may be true.

Sparta by the bands of her oligarchical supremacy⁵², shook off the detested yoke and rebuilt the walls of the common capital, Elis contributing three talents to the expenses of the undertaking⁵³. Disturbances now broke out in Tegea; Callibius and Proxenus, in concert with Mantinea, proposed to establish an Arcadian league⁵⁴, which was opposed by the Lacon Stasippus; a tumult ensued, in which the Laconistæ were overpowered with the help of the Mantineans, and a great number of them slain, while the remainder, to the number of eight hundred, escaped to Sparta⁵⁵. The project of a state which should comprise the whole of the Arcadians was resumed, and, with the aid of Thebes, there seemed a probability of carrying it into effect. The noble Mantinean, Lycomedes⁵⁶, now directed all his energies to the realization of this object. The Arcadians hereupon coalesced with the Thebans, to whom a way was now opened into the Peloponnesus.

At this juncture, Jason of Pheræ, Tagus of the Thessalians, came from the north with a numerous army, similar to that which Gelon had once commanded, but chiefly composed of mercenaries, in the hope of acquiring power in Greece; his premature death relieved the Greeks from any apprehensions from that quarter, though his tyranny⁵⁷

⁵² See § 69. n. 76, even after the battle of Leuctra: ἐπρωμένως—ἐκ τῶν κομῶν συνεστρατεύοντο· ἀριστοκρατούμενοι γὰρ ἐτύγχανον. Xenoph. Hell. 6. 4. 18.

⁵³ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 5. 4. 5. According to Pausan. 8. 14. 2, it was accomplished by Epaminondas;—ἐς τὴν ἀρχαίαν συνήγαγεν αὐθις πόλιν. This only means by his encouragement and advice.

⁵⁴ According to Pausanias, *ubi sup.* this was likewise done at the suggestion of Epaminondas.

⁵⁵ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 5. 6—10.

⁵⁶ Xenoph. Hell. 7. 1. 23; Pausan. 8. 27. 2. Diodor. 15. 62, who before, 15. 59, inadvertently makes Lycomedes a Tegean.

⁵⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 4. 27—32.

was probably never very oppressive. But this did not prevent the warlike races of the north from marching under the banners of Thebes into the Peloponnesus, which was now overrun by the northern tribes in the same manner as at the time of the Doric migration. But destitute of the creative power which had been exhibited by their predecessors, they did not, as they had done, expand, quicken, and invigorate the energies of Grecian life; revolution and destruction now marked their desolating progress.

The Thebans were accompanied on their expedition to the Peloponnesus by the Phocians, who served by compulsion⁵⁸, the Locrians of both districts, Malians, Acarnanians, (probably more correctly Ænians)⁵⁹, Thessalians, Heracleotæ⁶⁰, and Eubœans; on their arrival in the Peloponnesus they were joined by the Argives, Arcadians, and Eleans. The first two irruptions into the Peloponnesus, Olymp. 102. 3; 370. B. C., and Olymp. 102. 4., had highly important effects upon its whole political constitution.

1. The Arcadians, who, according to Diodorus, had already been united before the arrival of Epaminondas in the Peloponnesus⁶¹, now formed a closely cemented military confederacy (*κοινόν, τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν*.) In spite of the collisions which arose during their deliberations, and the actual hostilities

⁵⁸ Xenoph. 6. 5. 23: ὑπήκοοί γεγεννημένοι.

⁵⁹ In this case too we may apply to Xenoph. Hell. 6. 5. 23, what was remarked above, § 68. n. 39. The Acarnanians had concluded peace with Sparta, Olymp. 97. 2; 390. B. C., Xenoph. Hell. 4. 7. 1. Diodor. 15. 31, reckons them amongst her confederates.

⁶⁰ According to Diodor. 15. 57, Jason of Pheræ destroyed the town of Heraclea in the year in which the battle of Leuctra was fought. According to Xenoph. Hell. 6. 4. 27, he only razed the walls; the community continued to subsist.

⁶¹ Diodor. 15. 59.

carried on by Orchomenus and Heræa against Mantinea⁶², they succeeded in appointing a general council. The deliberative and executive assembly of the collective Arcadians⁶³ was henceforward composed by the Murioi, whose name does not express the precise number of its members, but merely indicates the bulk of warriors contained in it. Before the close of the year in which the battle of Leuctra was fought, the want of a fortified capital becoming apparent, they began to build⁶⁴ Megalopolis, and a thousand chosen Thebans, commanded by Pammenes⁶⁵, kept guard during its erection⁶⁶; its fortifications were not completed till after the *tearless battle*, Olymp. 103. 1; 367. B. C. Several tribes were now transplanted thither; force was employed towards some of them who had, till then, enjoyed but a very inconsiderable degree of independence, such as the Mænalians, Eutrasiens, Æpytians, Parrhasians, and Cynurians. Amongst the townships which were either entirely or partially dissolved at the time, we may name Pallantium (?), Eutæa, Tricoloni, Lycæum, Aliphera, Gortys, Alea, Orestasium⁶⁷, Dipæa, Parorea, Acaesium, Methydrium, and Tripolis⁶⁸. The inhabitants of Trapezus refusing to quit their ancient seats, some of them fell victims to the exasperation of the Arcadians, while the remainder escaped from the Peloponnesus to the town of the same name

⁶² Xenoph. Hell. 6. 5. 11; Diodor. 15. 62.

⁶³ According to Diodor. 15. 59, they were to ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν περὶ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης βουλευέσθαι.

⁶⁴ Pausan. 8. 27. 2.

⁶⁵ Pausan. 8. 27. 6.

⁶⁶ This is the construction which must probably be put upon Diodor. 15. 72, who places the erection in Olymp. 103. 1.

⁶⁷ One half of the town was called Ὀρεστιάς, the citizens Ὀρέστιοι, Steph. Byz. Μεγάλη.

⁶⁸ Pausan. 8. 27. 3; comp. Müller, Dor. 2. 448, sqq.

on the Pontus⁶⁹. Lycosura, whose citizens likewise resisted the attempt to transplant them, was spared, in consideration of the sanctuary of Demeter and Despoina⁷⁰. But the Pallantians also occur as a distinct community in the year of the battle of Mantinea⁷¹. It may, upon the whole, be observed of the erection of this common capital, that it by no means abolished the separate and distinct interests of the several communities, and least of all, those of Tegea and Mantinea. Orchomenus, from which several communities, such as Thisoa, Methydrium and Teuthis, detached themselves, in order to remove to Megalopolis⁷², seems to have still subsisted, and to have continued hostile to Mantinea. This was likewise the case with Heræa⁷³, which, till a short time before the battle of Leuctra, had consisted of several villages, whose inhabitants were then collected into a city by Cleombrotus, king of Sparta⁷⁴. The magistrates of Megalopolis appear to have been of a twofold description: those for the community as such, and those for the armed confederacy; the latter composed a federal council, wherein a majority of votes decided⁷⁵, and which may be compared to the Hellanodicæ of Elis, but certainly did not consist exclusively of Megalopolitans. Megalopolis, upon the whole, rather seems to have borne the character of a place dependent upon Tegea and Mantinea, than to have possessed the honour and

⁶⁹ Pausan. 8. 27. 4.

⁷¹ Xenoph. Hell. 7. 5. 5.

⁷² Xenoph. 6. 5. 22.

⁷⁴ Strab. 8. 232; conf. Böckh on the inscription, Thes. Inscr. p. 27.

⁷⁵ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 5. 6;—ὅτι μικρὴ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, ταῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν πόλεων. Xenoph. 7. 4. 33, the chiefs of the confederacy are named ἄρχοντες, the magistrates in Mantinea πρόσταται.

⁷⁰ Pausan. ubi sup.

⁷² Pausan. 6. 27. 3.

authority appertaining to the chief town of a district or confederacy. Its particular constitution will form the subject of our consideration in the following chapter. Distinct from the *Murioi* as a collective body, and the *Megalopolitans* as an individual community, were the *Epariti*⁷⁶, a federal force⁷⁷, which was paid by the confederate towns⁷⁸, and comprised five thousand soldiers, whose headquarters were, however, probably in *Megalopolis*. As belonging to the league, they might, when necessary, be employed against any single state included in it⁷⁹. It may not be superfluous to remark, that this body of men received pay⁸⁰; for few *Arcadians* were able to maintain themselves, even during a campaign; their pay was for some time defrayed out of the Olympic spoil; but when *Mantineia* felt remorse at this appropriation of the holy treasures, and forbade it for the future, such of the *Epariti* as could not afford to serve without pay, deserted, whereupon high-minded *Arcadians* entered the band, and thereby strengthened it and secured its fidelity⁸¹. Besides these *Epariti*, there were doubtless bodies of soldiery in the several townships, who probably stood in the same relation to them, as local militia do to troops of the line in modern times. The first efforts of the *Murioi* were marked by uncommon energy and determi-

⁷⁶ The dissertation of Bejot, sur les *Eparoetes* in the *Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscip.* p. 32, has not obviated the necessity for a new and comprehensive investigation of this subject, which is merely glanced at in the text.

⁷⁷ *Hesych.* Ἐπαρόητοι—τάγμα Ἀρκαδικὸν μαχιμώτατον· καὶ οἱ παρὰ Ἀρκάσι δημόσιοι φύλακες, which must be considered identical. *Steph. Byz.* Ἐπαρίται speaks of an ἔθνος, whose city could not be discovered!

⁷⁸ *Diodor.* 15. 62. 67. He calls them τοὺς καλουμένους ἐπαλίκτους; they were so, it is true, but they were not called so.

⁷⁹ e. g. *Xenoph. Hell.* 7. 4. 33.

⁸⁰ *Xenoph. Hell.* ubi sup.

⁸¹ *Xenoph. Hell.* 7. 4. 34: ὅπως μὴ αὐτοὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι ἐπὶ σφίσιν εἴεν.

nation; their exploits⁸² remind us of the heroic victories of the men of Appenzell on the Speicher, the Stoss and the Wolfshalde.

2. Messenia was restored⁸³, Ol. 102. 3; 370—69. B. C., in the two hundred and eighty-seventh year after the fall of Eira. Immediately after the battle of Leuctra, Epaminondas had summoned the Messenians, who were scattered over Italy, Sicily, Cyrene, etc., to return to the Peloponnesus⁸⁴. Messene was erected and made the capital of the country. This was a heavy blow to Sparta, from which the originally Arcadian district of Sciritis was at the same time disjoined⁸⁵.

Amidst so many disasters that enfeebled state could not hope for lasting benefit or support from external aid, which could only keep off for a time the inroads of its impetuous assailants. Athens, however, now entered into a league with Sparta, on condition that they should assume by turns the command by land and sea⁸⁶. Selfishness and perfidy now began to actuate the policy of Thebes, who scrupled not to employ the most unworthy means to augment her power, and with this view turned her eyes towards Persia. Ambassadors were sent to the great king to remind him of their ancient friendship, and to crave his assistance⁸⁷. These were soon followed by Arcadian, Argive, Athenian, and Elean ambassadors, amongst whom Pelopidas and Ismenias refused to disgrace

⁸² Xenoph. Hell. 7. 1. 25: ὅπου δὲ βουλευθεῖεν ἐξελθεῖν, οὐ νύξ, οὐ χειμῶν, οὐ μῆκος ὁδοῦ, οὐκ ὄρη δύσβατα ἀπεκώλυεν αὐτούς· ὥστε ἐν γε τῷ χρόνῳ ἐκείνῳ πολλὰ ᾤοντο κράτιστοι εἶναι.

⁸³ Diodor. 15. 66: Pausan. 4. 27. 5, sqq.

⁸⁴ Pausan. 4. 26. 4.

⁸⁵ The Sciritæ are mentioned together with Sparta, Xenoph. Hell. 5. 2. 24; 5. 4. 52. After the Theban invasion, Sciritis is treated by Sparta as a hostile country, Xenoph. Hell. 7. 4. 21.

⁸⁶ Xenoph. Hell. 7. 1. 1—14; Diod. 15. 67. ⁸⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 7. 1. 33. 34.

the Grecian character by humiliating themselves before the barbarian despot⁸⁸; and the bold Arcadian Antiochus gratifies us by his blunt patriotism and decision of character. The king, he reported to the Myrioi, had bakers, cooks, cup-bearers, and porters, in abundance, but no men who could fight with Greeks; that moreover great delusion existed as to his vast riches; for the far-renowned golden *platanus* was not large enough to give shadow to a cricket⁸⁹. But, on the other hand, one of the Athenian envoys, Timagoras, suffered himself to be bribed in the most flagrant manner, in consequence of which he was, on his return, put to death⁹⁰. Thebes trod in Sparta's footsteps; she published the contents of a letter from the great king, which declared that Sparta should renounce all claim to Messenia, and ordered Athens to dismantle her navy⁹¹. Thus his commands were still more peremptory than at the peace of Antalcidas. But Thebes was not formed to intimidate her adversaries, nor could she so far ingratiate herself with her neighbours as to attain the rank of chief town of the district; the answers to this summons were unsatisfactory⁹². The third incursion of the Thebans into the Peloponnesian territory was deficient in alacrity and spirit, but it was nevertheless followed by the establishment of democracy in Achaia, and the consequent acquisition of that province, as well as by a peace with Corinth and Phlius⁹³. Nor was Thebes able to obtain a firmer footing in the north, which she so ardently desired

⁸⁸ Plut. Pelop. 30; Artax. 22.

⁸⁹ Xenoph. 7. 1. 38.

⁹¹ Xenoph. 7. 1. 36.

⁹³ Xenoph. 7. 4. 4—12.

⁹⁰ Plut. Artax. 22.

⁹² Xenoph. 7. 1. 38, sqq.

to add to her dominions. Phœræ was the capital of Thessaly, and its tyrant Alexander was in alliance with Athens. Thebes united to her dominions Larissa, etc. In the expedition which she undertook against the treacherous and cowardly Alexander⁹⁴, the Thebans lost their brave hero Pelopidas, for which the league they eventually concluded with the tyrant was but a poor compensation; nor, indeed, did Thebes derive any solid advantage from it, as the sequel abundantly proves.

Whilst the three chief states of Greece, Athens, Thebes, and—after the Perioeci and Helots, who had revolted when Epaminondas invaded Laconia, had been again reduced to obedience⁹⁵—Sparta, present the spectacle of unity, most of the other states, which took part in the wars between the former, were harassed by intestine distractions, which more especially applies to Arcadia and Elis. This added to the rancour and exasperation of the general war. Some Arcadian refugees having taken from the Eleans the frontier town Lasium⁹⁶, a war broke out between Arcadia and Elis; an Arcadian party in Elis took possession of the citadel of that place, whilst an Arcadian army invaded Pisatis, and plundered the sanctuary of the Olympic Zeus⁹⁷. This once more disengaged the Eleans from their confederacy with Thebes⁹⁸, and reunited them with Sparta. At the same time the Arcadian league became divided into two conflicting portions, one composed of such as felt remorse

⁹⁴ Diod. 15. 67, sqq.; Plut. Pelop. 26, sqq.; Paus. 9. 15. 1.

⁹⁵ All the inhabitants of Caryæ were put to the sword. Xenoph. 7. 1. 28.

⁹⁶ Diod. 15. 77; Xenoph. 7. 4. 12—18.

⁹⁷ Diod. 15. 82. Conf. Xenoph. 7. 4. 19, sqq.

⁹⁸ Xenoph. 6. 5. 3; 7. 1. 18; 7. 5. 1.

for this act of impiety and sacrilege, and wished to make atonement for it by restoring the plunder; the other, of those who refused to surrender any part of it. The Mantineans belonged to the former, and the Tegeans to the latter⁹⁹. The Theban commander in Tegea having soon afterwards detained for some time in custody the ambassadors of the better-disposed Arcadians¹⁰⁰, Epaminondas, little to his honour it must be confessed, opposed the proposal for their liberation, and at the same time uttered menaces against the Mantineans and their friends¹⁰¹. This renewed the exasperation of the Peloponnesians. Mantinea, Elis, and Achaia entered into an alliance with Sparta and Athens¹⁰². Thus Epaminondas, upon his fourth expedition to the Peloponnesus, only had the Argives, Megalopolitans, Aseatians, Pallantians, Tegeans, and Messenians¹⁰³ on his side. Amongst the northern states Phocis had refused to perform military service. The battle of Mantinea, Olymp. 104. 2; 362. B. C., which was not decided in the field, could not unravel the confusion in which the political relations of Greece were involved. From the question which Epaminondas, a few minutes before he expired, addressed to those around him, viz., whether Iollidas and Daiphantus had fallen or not, and from the advice which he gave them upon being informed that they had, namely, that they should immediately make peace¹⁰⁴, we may perceive how entirely Thebes was indebted for her aggrandizement to a few distinguished individuals, and how

⁹⁹ Xenoph. 7. 4. 33, sqq.¹⁰⁰ Xenoph. 7. 4. 36, sqq.¹⁰¹ Xenoph. 7. 4. 40.¹⁰² Xenoph. 7. 5. 1—3.¹⁰³ Xenoph. 7. 5. 5.¹⁰⁴ Plut. Apoph. 6. 733; Ælian, V. II. 12. 3.

little she owed to the people at large. The extinction of Grecian independence was fast approaching; the glory of the Grecian arms descended with Epaminondas into the grave; and with the battle of Mantinea¹⁰⁵ the historians Xenophon, Philistus, and Anaximenes, significantly close their labours.

3. THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE OTHER STATES WHICH TOOK PART IN THE STRUGGLE.

§ 73. The variations in the public system of those states which took part in the conflict between Sparta and her foes, were for the most part modified and determined by that conflict itself. But at the same time the political fermentation within was marked by increasing virulence and bitterness; revolutions followed each other more rapidly, and were more impetuous; factions became wilder and less conscious of an aim; their denominations no longer corresponded with their intrinsic essence and nature. Oligarchy, however, still universally bore the character of an unnatural form of government, and during the hegemony of Sparta was looked upon as a despotism solely kept up by external force; the notion of *Politeia* became perverted from its original signification and narrowed into a designation for democracy¹; while the *demus* itself, in consequence of the vast number of its members who had raised themselves to the rank of dynasts, had become disorganized and utterly careless of legal order and civil prosperity.

¹⁰⁵ Diod. 15. 89.

¹ Demosth. de Rhod. Libert. 195. 20; comp. Meier, de Bon. n. 1. This, it must be confessed, is not its meaning in the philosophical vocabulary of Aristotle.

Hence, in its reckless excesses, it was continually split into new divisions and new factions, which were alternately victorious and vanquished.

Even before Athens once more took the field in the Corinthian war, and before the naval operations of Conon were attended by such important results, the Decarchs of Lysander had been deposed in many of the towns, but democracy was not formally re-established after their expulsion². Conon's fleet no sooner appeared than Rhodes fell off from Sparta, Olymp. 96. 1; 395. B. C.³, whereupon a democratic constitution was established there⁴. The defeat which the Spartan fleet sustained at Cnidos was followed by the defection of several maritime states from Sparta, and by the subversion of their oligarchies. Thus democracy arose in Cos⁵ and Chios⁶, and, though they are not expressly enumerated, most probably in Mytilene, Erythræ, Teos, etc. It was apparently at this period that the Chian Onomademus gave to his countrymen the prudent and philanthropic advice not to expel the whole of their adversaries, lest dissensions should break out amongst friends⁷. Isocrates⁸ is said to have regulated the constitution and magistracy in Chios upon the model of those of Athens, but whether at this period, or during the new naval league, it does not appear. Thrasybulus, supported by a popular party headed by Ecphantus, set up demo-

² Xenoph. Hell. 3. 4. 7: ἄτε συντεταραγμένων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν πολι-
τειῶν καὶ οὕτε δημοκρατίας ἐτι οὐσης, ὥσπερ ἐπ' Ἀθηναίων, οὕτε δεκαρ-
χίας, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Λυσάνδρου. Comp. § 69. n. 11. 12.

³ Diod. 14. 79.

⁴ Xenoph. 4. 8. 20.

⁵ Aristot. Pol. 5. 4. 1.

⁶ Aristot. Pol. 5. 5. 11, seems to speak of the dissolution of the oligarchy of that period.

⁷ Plut. de capiend. ex Host. util. 6. 342; Ælian, V. H. 4. 25.

⁸ Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 329.

eracy in Thasos⁹ and Byzantium¹⁰, Ol. 97. 3; 390. B. C. But it was in Byzantium only, where Archebius and Heraclides were the leaders of the people¹¹, that it became permanently established; in Rhodes the demus only maintained itself till Olymp. 97. 2; 390. B. C.¹²; the demagogy there was of the most vicious character; salaries were given to those who attended the popular assembly(?), persons were exposed to unjust and vexatious prosecutions, etc¹³. Immediately after their fall the dynasts had sent to request assistance of Sparta¹⁴; in the same year they succeeded in overpowering the demus and expelling its chiefs. A similar spectacle was presented in Cos¹⁵.

Thessaly, like Athens and Argos, signalized itself amongst the states of the main-land by democratic commotions. Its political relations underwent a thorough change after the victory of Lycophron at Pheræ over the Larissæans, Ol. 94. 1; 404. B. C.¹⁶. The demus of the Thessalian states had for some time been refractory against the dynasts; after that victory the power of the latter in Larissa, Pharsalus, Crannon and Scotussa, consequently that of the Aleuadae and Scopadae, appears to have been broken. When Agesilaus came from Asia to the Corinthian war, the inhabitants of these towns, with the exception of the refugees, were hostile

⁹ Demosth. in Lept. 474. 26; Aristid. Panath. 112. ed. Jebb.

¹⁰ Demosth. ubi sup. 475. 3; Xenoph. Hell. 4. 8. 27.

¹¹ Demosth. ubi sup.

¹² Diod. 14. 97.

¹³ Aristot. Pol. 5. 4. 2: μισθοφοράν τε γὰρ οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἐπὶ ὀρίζον, καὶ ἐκώλυον ἀποδιδόναι τὰ ὀφειλόμενα τοῖς τριηράρχοις. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας ἤναγκάσθησαν σῆσταντες καταλύσαι τὸν δῆμον. Conf. 5. 2. 5. 6.

¹⁴ Xenoph. 4. 8. 20. 24.

¹⁵ Aristot. Pol. 5. 4. 1: — ἡ δημοκρατία μετέβαλε πονηρῶν ἐγγενομένων δημαγωγῶν.

¹⁶ Xenoph. 2. 3. 4.

to him¹⁷. Amongst these fugitives was probably Hellenocrates of Larissa, who had some time before sought refuge¹⁸ with Archelaus of Macedonia, (reigned 413—400. B. C.) whom he had probably instigated to endeavour to establish an influence in Thessaly¹⁹. It was possibly about this time that Larissa appointed Demiurgi as magistrates, who were so liberal in dispensing the franchise, that Gorgias called them *manufacturers of Larissæans*²⁰. Other towns, which, much to their honour, felt a desire for reconciliation, elected a mediatory archon (*ἄρχων μεσίδιος*)²¹, a transcript of the ancient Æsymnete. Such, probably, was Lycophron of Pheræ. There was in Larissa, Ol. 96. 2, a dynast called Medius, who waged war against Lycophron²²; was this, perhaps, the mediatory archon, who was chosen by the Aleuads to settle their disputes in the party-divisions of Simos, and who, having obtained the government²³, conquered Pharsalus, which was occupied by a Spartan garrison²⁴? Pharsalus, which had endured severe calamities, appointed to this post Polydamas, who had administered the public revenue with zeal and integrity; he governed, Ol. 101. 1; 376. B. C.²⁵, citizens being chosen to deliberate with him²⁶.

¹⁷ Xenoph. 4. 3. 3.¹⁸ Aristot. Pol. 5. 8. 12.¹⁹ To this head must be referred a passage in a speech of the sophist Thrasy-machus, preserved in Clem. Alex. Strom. 6. 624. C.: 'Ἀρχελάῳ δούλευσεν, Ἕλληνας ὅντας βαρβάρῳ.²⁰ Aristot. Pol. 3. 1. 9. Gorgias was still living in Jason's time. Paus. 6. 17. 5.²¹ Aristot. Pol. 5. 5. 9.²² Diod. 14. 82.²³ Aristot. Pol. 5. 5. 9.²⁴ Diod. 14. 82. The mercenaries of Medius were afterwards slain in Pharsalus, and Aristotle says (Hist. An. 9. 31), that the ravens even came there from Attica and the Peloponnesus to feed upon their corpses. Herewith commences the new constitution of Pharsalus, which must be referred to Polydamas.²⁵ Xenoph. 6. 1. 2.²⁶ Sisypus, 367.

But the Thessalian demus was not destined to attain political liberty or moral dignity, and Thessaly soon became one of the most luxuriant hotbeds of tyranny²⁷.

The peace of Antalcidas, as was above remarked, renewed the preponderance of oligarchy; this species of authority was now likewise forced upon states which had not accepted it after the fall of Athens. Revolutions became more frequent after the deliverance of Thebes, and particularly after the battle of Leuctra. Thebes was no sooner delivered from her tyrants, than she made the diffusion of democratic constitutions one of the main objects of her external policy. Her efforts to obtain the hegemony alarmed the jealousy of Athens, and disposed that state to make common cause with Sparta, whereupon all previous connections were dissolved, parties were deprived of their customary rallying-points and supports, and the impetuosity of Thebes increased the general disorder. The vicious and tyrannical nature of her interference in the constitutions of the surrounding states is proved by her ruthless proclamation commanding the extradition of all fugitives²⁸, a proceeding which she adopted in imitation of Sparta²⁹. All the worst errors and vices of the Grecian policy, in seeking the support of barbarians, framing the peace of Antalcidas, etc., were destined to be renewed, while bad examples were everywhere eagerly followed. Euphron the tyrant of Sicyon, not exactly one of the worst among

²⁷ See § 75.

²⁸ —τοὺς φυγάδας ἀγωγίμους εἶναι ἐκ πασῶν τῶν συμμαχίδων. Xenoph. 7. 8. 11.

²⁹ § 68. n. 14.

them, was also supported by Thebes²⁰. However, it is obvious from the league between Athens and Sparta that the parties for or against Thebes and Sparta could not always be found in conjunction with the particular constitutions represented by these states; in some of them the animosities which broke out were solely occasioned by the difference of opinion as to their external point of support; as, for example, in Eubœa for Thebes or Athens²¹. Xenophon, indeed, takes pleasure in designating the Laconistæ the best, as in Sicyon²² and Elis. Nevertheless Athens still continued to be the main pillar of democracy, which she had exhausted to the very dregs in its successive gradations through which her constitution had passed; and Demosthenes²³ still in his day asserted that her policy required her to support democratic institutions; but she had lost the influence she had once possessed over the internal condition of her confederates, and her authority was not now, as formerly, necessarily followed by the overthrow of democracy. From this total absence of solidity and fixity in the interior of communities, it must not excite surprise if, in enumerating those states in which revolutions took place, we can no longer continue to observe the division which was adopted above, namely, into oligarchical and democratic states, and if their classification should henceforward appear to be almost arbitrary.

After the subversion of oligarchy in the Peloponnesian war, Argos continued strictly democratic;

²⁰ Xenoph. 7. 1. 44; 7. 3. 1, seq.

²² Xenoph. 7. 3. 4.

²¹ Diod. 16. 7.

²³ Dem. de Syntax. 168.

at the time of the peace of Antalcidas, it was the retreat of the expelled partisans of democracy in the neighbouring states³⁴. The licentiousness and aggressions of the demagogy now rose to such a pitch that they roused the wealthier orders to plot against the democracy; but the conspiracy being discovered, the rage of the multitude broke out into the most brutal and infuriated excesses, during which they massacred twelve hundred of the rich and their adherents; this butchery was entitled the Scytalismus (fustuarium)³⁵. Horror-struck at this appalling outrage, which seemed to surpass in enormity every thing that had gone before, the Athenians caused their market-place to be consecrated³⁶, lest they should share with their guilty allies the vengeance of the offended Nemesis. But even after this massacre the troubles among the Argive demus did not subside; however, we are only acquainted with the turbulence of its general character³⁷: the particulars of its excesses are not recorded³⁸.

Corinth beheld the blood of its citizens twice flow in the feuds of the oligarchs and the exasperated multitude. The massacre which took place on the eve of the festival Eucleia, Olymp. 96. 3; 393. B. C., has already been alluded to³⁹. It does not appear whether the Laconistæ, who returned at the peace of Antalcidas, expelled their antagonists or not; but during the great Boeotian war, Olymp. 101. 2; 375. B. C., whilst Corinth

³⁴ Diod. 15. 40.

³⁵ Diod. 15. 57. 58.

³⁶ Plat. Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 243.

³⁷ Ἀργεῖα φορὰ, Diogen. Prov. 2. 79. Conf. Müller, Dor. 2. 146.

³⁸ Diod. 15. 58, concludes his narrative of the Scytalismus with the words—
εἰς τὴν προὔπαρχονσαν ἐβροίαν ἀποκατέστη (1).

³⁹ § 69. n. 6.

was the faithful adherent of Sparta, some Corinthian fugitives endeavoured from Argos to obtain possession of Corinth, but being frustrated in their attempt they killed themselves in despair⁴⁰. These must have been Antilacones, and in all probability democrats, for Corinth was governed by an oligarchy at the time, which, however, like the former, appears to have been of a very moderate character⁴¹. Corinth could shortly afterwards boast of possessing among its citizens the purest republican of that age, Timoleon, whose rigid virtue did not even spare his own brother Timophanes, who, with the help of four hundred mercenaries, Olymp. 103. 3 ; 366. B. C., had seized upon the government⁴².

In Sicyon the constitution introduced by Sparta during the Peloponnesian war maintained itself till the great Boeotian war; Olymp. 101. 2 ; 375. B. C., an anti-Spartan and democratic party made an attempt to subvert it⁴³, but being overpowered they were put to death. These dissensions, however, still continuing with unabated violence, one of the dynasts called Euphron, soon afterwards overthrew the oligarchy, and made himself tyrant⁴⁴.

Elis. The oligarchy, which was forced upon this state by Sparta, began to totter after the Theban invasion of the Peloponnesus. A democratic party tampered with the Arcadians, and en-

⁴⁰ Diod. 15. 40.

⁴¹ Plut. Dion. 53 :—τοὺς Κορινθίους ὀλιγαρχικώτερόν τε πολιτευομένους καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ πράττοντας. Add to this, that the criminal proceedings against Timoleon were conducted in the council (Diod. 16. 65.), and that Timoleon was afterwards sent by the council to Syracuse (Diod. 16. 81.)

⁴² Plut. Timol. 5. Conf. Aristot. Pol. 5. 5. 7 ; Diod. 16. 65.

⁴³ Diod. 15. 40, who, it is true, in this chapter only speaks of oligarchical intrigues, but erroneously reckons the Sicyonian amongst the number.

⁴⁴ Xenoph. 7. 1. 44 ; 7. 3. 4.

deavoured to obtain possession of the citadel of Elis; but this scheme was frustrated by the Three Hundred and the Knights (who were probably identical with the before-named⁴⁵ Four Hundred), and these were then backed by the Achæans of Pellene. The Pisatans now revolted, and laid claim to the presidency at the Olympic games, but the Eleans also succeeded in resisting their pretensions⁴⁶. Plato's scholar Phormio is reported to have limited the democratic council (afterwards?)⁴⁷.

After the beginning of the great Bœotian war troubles broke out in Achaia. It is not improbable that the fugitives who were dragged from the temple of Poseidon in Helice⁴⁸, belonged to a democratic party. It has already been stated that Helice and Bura were soon afterwards destroyed by an inundation and earthquake⁴⁹. One of the objects of Epaminondas' third campaign was to reduce Pellene, the strong-hold of the Spartan faction, which he accordingly effected; he at first made no change in the constitution, but soon afterwards established a democracy there⁵⁰, which not being properly supported, Pellene, if not the whole of Achaia, shortly afterwards assisted the dynasts in Elis⁵¹.

Messenia enjoyed but for a short time the democratic constitution which Thebes had assisted

⁴⁵ See § 59. n. 3.

⁴⁶ Xenoph. 7. 4. 15, sqq.

⁴⁷ Plut. adv. Colot. 10. 629; Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 213.

⁴⁸ Paus. 7. 24. 5.

⁴⁹ Vol. i. p. 3. n. 17, with which must be compared Paus. ubi sup.

⁵⁰ Xenoph. 7. 1. 41—43. In Fabric. Bibl. Gr. Harl. ed. 2. 36, Pagondas is enumerated amongst the Grecian legislators, and described as having made laws for Achaia (from Theodoret. Curat. Græc. Eff. IX.): the name is Bœotian (Thuc. 4. 91). Must we refer him and his labours to this period?

⁵¹ Xenoph. 7. 4. 17.

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in establishing it, its chief magistrates were Timuchi⁵².
 Phlius. The restoration of the oligarchical party which, as we have seen, was effected by Sparta⁵³, notwithstanding the moderation which attended the establishment of the new constitution, was followed by emigrations. Some Phliasian fugitives assembled in a fortress⁵⁴, hired mercenary soldiers, gained a victory over the townsmen, and killed three hundred of them; but afterwards, through the treachery of their guards, they were surprised, more than six hundred of them were put to the sword, and the survivors escaped to Argos⁵⁵. Phlius, though constantly assailed from Argos, Sicyon, and Arcadia, remained staunch to the Spartan interest⁵⁷ till the third invasion of Epaminondas⁵⁸; this proves that the fugitives in question belonged to the anti-oligarchical party.

Arcadia. Even before the battle of Leuctra there had been a democracy in Phigalia; Olymp. 101. 2; 375. B. C. the Laconistæ, who had occupied the fortress Heræa, suddenly fell upon the people who were assembled in the theatre, slaughtered them, and escaped to Sparta⁵⁹. From the time of its defection from Sparta and the formation of the confederacy, it may be assumed that democratic institutions were general, except

⁵² Polyb. 7. 10.

⁵³ Suid. Ἐπικούροϛ.

⁵⁴ § 69. n. 5.

⁵⁵ Diod. 15. 40 :—ἐπὶ τῇς χώρας φρούριον ὀχυρόν, can be no other than Tricaranon; Xenoph. Hell. 7. 4. 11.

⁵⁶ Diod. ubi sup.

⁵⁷ Concerning the peace with Thebes see Xenoph. 7. 4. 9. 10.

⁵⁸ Xenoph. 7. 2—a chapter written in praise of Phlius on that account.

⁵⁹ Diod. 15. 40.

in Oreomenus. Tyronidas and Pyrias⁶⁰ are recorded as law-givers in Tegea; do they belong to this period? The Platonist Aristonymus is said to have been the legislator of the Arcadians⁶¹; Cercidas of Megalopolis is also renowned for the excellence of his enactments⁶²; but the accounts are inaccurate and suspicious; the last is probably identical with the partisan of Philip, who will be mentioned hereafter.

Megara. Diodorus narrates⁶³, that in Olymp. 101. 2; 375. B. C., some oligarchists made an ineffectual attempt to overthrow the democracy. The democratic institutions of that place must still have been in their infancy; for they certainly were not in existence before the liberation of Thebes, and even at the period of Agesilaus' campaign to Bœotia, Olymp. 100. 3; 378. B. C., Megara still paid obedience to Sparta⁶⁴. Isocrates speaks in favourable terms of the subsequent condition of Megara⁶⁵. The Three Hundred, as they were called, are described as a superior court of justice⁶⁶.

Eubœa. The benefits resulting from its defection from Athens were but short-lived, and there is reason to suppose that oligarchies were introduced under the hegemony of Sparta. Upon the liberation of Thebes, Sparta lost her influence in Eubœa, about which time it is probable that Heracleodorus set up democracy in Oreos (Histiaea)⁶⁷. Other towns of Eubœa, particularly Eretria, were soon afterwards under the domination of tyrants.

⁶⁰ Paus. 8. 48. 1. Conf. vol. i. p. 180.

⁶¹ Plut. Colot. 10. 629.

⁶² Steph. Byz. Μεγάλη. Conf. Phot. Cod. CXC.

⁶³ Diodor. 15. 40.

⁶⁴ Xenoph. Hell. 5. 4. 41.

⁶⁵ Isocrat. Panegy. 292. 293.

⁶⁶ Demosth. de Fals. Legat. 435. 29: Περίλαος ἐκρίνετο—ἐν τοῖς τριακοσίοις.

⁶⁷ Aristot. Pol. 5. 2. 9.

Corcyra. In the great Boeotian war, Olymp. 101. 3; 374. B. C., an oligarchical party applied to Sparta for assistance⁶⁸; hereupon the Spartan Mnasippus appeared with a fleet, and the town made an obstinate resistance until it was relieved by an auxiliary squadron from Athens⁶⁹. But in Olymp. 104. 4, Chares arrived with an Athenian fleet under his command, by the aid of which the wealthier class possessed themselves of the government⁷⁰.

Zacynthus was during the same period agitated by political disturbances. The Laconistæ expelled the adverse faction, probably the partisans of democracy, who had plucked up courage upon the appearance of an Athenian fleet in those seas; the latter obtained assistance from Timotheus⁷¹.

Among the eastern islands Samos and Corinthus were doubtless democratic; Menedemus is said to have been appointed by Plato to legislate for Pyrrha in Lesbos⁷²; in the time of Isocrates a tyrant called Cleommis ruled in Methymna⁷³. Oligarchy was not precipitated in Cnidos till a little before Aristotle's time⁷⁴, when a new constitution was framed by the great Eudoxus⁷⁵; in Rhodes the oligarchy was maintained by the Carian dynast Mausolus, and by Artemisia, who succeeded him⁷⁶; a common capital, upon the model of Rhodes, was erected in Cos⁷⁷, Olymp. 103. 3; 366. B. C., after which the community became rich and powerful,

⁶⁸ Diod. 15. 46. Xenoph. 6. 2. 4, sqq., in narrating the expedition of Mnasippus makes no mention of factions in Corcyra.

⁶⁹ Xenoph. 6. 2. 10, sqq.

⁷⁰ Diod. 15. 95; Æn. Poliorc. 11.

⁷¹ Diod. 15. 45; Xenoph. 6. 2. 2. 3.

⁷² Plut. Colot. 10. 629.

⁷³ Isocrat. Ep. 7. 748.

⁷⁴ Aristot. 5. 5. 3. 11.

⁷⁵ Plut. Colot. 10. 629; Diog. Laert. 8. 89.

⁷⁶ Argum. Dem. de Libert. Rhod.

⁷⁷ Diod. 15. 76.

but we are not informed whether the spirit in which the *συνδικισμός* was effected was democratic or not.

4. THE NATIONALITY OF THE GREEKS IN GENERAL AFTER THE END OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

§ 74. Those master-passions of the Grecian mind, selfishness, avarice, and lust, contentiousness, cruelty, and revenge, which found such abundant aliment during the Peloponnesian war, lost none of their baneful force during the period by which it was succeeded, as even in peace the pernicious interference of Sparta in the internal regulations of the states dependent upon her authority, banished from them all internal concord, civil order, and stability, while they were exposed to violent and uninterrupted shocks from without. The ethico-religious basis of political and international law can no longer be recognised in the spirit and the customs of the Greeks¹; the education of youth was neglected, the paternal and the hereditary were disregarded, native ordinances and institutions lost their most effectual foundation and support; citizens ceased to be shielded by the laws—fugitives to find protection in the sanctuaries—the defenceless to inspire pity and respect. Hence resulted two remarkable characteristics of the age, viz. expulsion and emigration. The former, with very

¹ *Ἡ ἐν Δελφοῖς σκιά* became proverbial. Demosth. de Pac. 63. 25. The story in Died. 15. 78, that in the war between the Eleans and the Arcadians, the Eleans and Pisatans fought for the presidency of the Olympic games, whilst the other Greeks, crowned with garlands, looked on and applauded, sounds rather improbable.

few exceptions, was a consequence of every victory²; even when a reconciliation did take place it was seldom permanent or sincere, and when the first outburst of passion passed over without violence or outrage, it was not long before fresh disturbances arose, as was the case in Phlius, or hostile factions sought a vent for their animosity in the machinations of sycophancy. Without compulsion, however, emigration was a natural consequence of the growing indifference of the citizens towards their impoverished and joyless country, and prohibitory laws either did not exist at all, or had become inoperative; selfishness and avarice found it to their advantage to have as few citizens as possible, by which means those who maintained their ground could the better consult their own profit and convenience. States were insensible to the importance of keeping together and concentrating their energies. From these two causes of expatriation flowed two fresh phenomena. The fugitives (*φυγάδες*)³, who had been expelled by force, or had fled in consequence of misusage or oppression, arrayed themselves against their respective cities, with the firm resolution of leaving neither violence nor stratagem unemployed to effect their return. They mostly took up their position in a town or village near their native city, fortified

² As in the case of Timotheus in Corcyra: οὐ μίντοι ἡνδραποδίσατο οὐδὲ ἄνδρας ἐφυγάδευσεν, οὐδὲ νόμους μετέστησεν. Xenoph. Hell. 5. 4. 64.

³ The words *φυγάδες*, *φεύγοντες*, from the constant recurrence of the transactions to which they relate, attained a sort of technical impost in the political vocabulary, and were often employed for the sake of convenience, instead of more determinate expressions, the political conflicts of the age being seldom unattended by expulsion and flight; e. g. Xenoph. Hell. 7. 4. 1: ὁ Ὀρωπὸς ὑπὸ τῶν φευγόντων κατελήφθη; more accurately, Diod. 15. 76. says, Themison the tyrant of Eretria, who was probably accompanied by fugitives. There are objections against assuming with Schneider that Xenophon refers to a second capture.

some place of strength in its vicinity, and from thence made war upon it. Such were Thrasybulus, Pelopidas, the fugitives of Chios, Phlius, Phigalia, Corinth, etc. Those, however, composed a very different class who, having no inclination for the tranquil pursuits of citizenship, grew weary of their country, and quitting their homes, sought to gratify their roaming disposition in the excitement of adventure abroad. But instead of evincing any inclination for civil life and permanent settlements, by attempting to found colonies, they wandered about from place to place acknowledging neither country nor kindred. Now very few of them devoted themselves to the itinerant arts of peace; but beside the calm duties of civil life at home, there arose a new political vocation, viz., the performance of military service for hire, which thousands of the Greeks embraced with eagerness, in consequence of its inherent strength and boldness, whilst the other was in a great measure supplanted by it. This constitutes a main branch of our enquiry here, not, however, in a military point of view, but solely in its relation to citizens and citizenship.

Cretans⁴, Carians⁵, and Arcadians, had fought for pay in the earliest ages. The first had become gradually estranged from the political system of Greece, and were moreover of barbarian original. The Cretans were connected with the other two almost entirely in their character of mercenaries; the Arcadians were Greeks by extraction, took part in the political quarrels of the mother-country,

⁴ Vol. i. p. 41. n. 9.

⁵ Vol. i. p. 188. n. 10.

and were induced by their natural predilection for the career of arms and by the ruggedness and sterility of their native mountains, to forsake peaceful occupations and embrace the profession of mercenaries. This gave rise to the proverbial expression, (*Ἀρκάδας μιμούμενοι*)⁶. We read with regret that a body of Arcadians went to Xerxes and offered to serve for hire⁷. The mercenary soldiers in the pay of the tyrants, Pisistratus and his sons Polycrates, Gelon⁸, etc., do not appear to have been genuine Greeks; it is probable that the greater part of them were barbarians. After the great Persian war it became usual to pay the civic force; and when during the Peloponnesian war one state allowed its own troops to serve another for pay, it must not be supposed that these were always genuine mercenaries, as they were frequently furnished in conformity to the provisions of a confederacy; the essential mark of which species of obligation was that the force designed to serve for pay was furnished by the state, and continued dependent upon the same. In this light must probably be regarded the Peloponnesians in the Corinthian pay⁹, as well as those who followed Brasidas¹⁰. Auxiliary forces of this nature, supplied conformably to the conditions of a confederacy, were first designated by the word *Ἐπικούροι*: the same name was afterwards applied to auxiliaries who received pay, and at last to real mercenaries¹¹.

⁶ Vol. i. p. 91. n. 11, on which compare, Diogen. Prov. 1. 29.

⁷ Herod. 8. 26.

⁸ Thucyd. 6. 55; Herod. 3. 39; Diod. 11. 67. 72, etc.

⁹ Thucyd. 1. 60.

¹⁰ Thucyd. 4. 80.

¹¹ Herod. 5. 63: *οἱ Πεισιστρατίδαι — ἐπεκαλέοντο ἐκ Θεσσαλίας ἐπικουρίην: ἐπεποίητο γὰρ σφί συμμαχίῃ πρὸς αὐτούς.* Hence must be explained the word in the passage, 1. 64: — *Πεισίστρατος — ἐρρίζωσι τὴν τυραννίδα*

But during the Peloponnesian war we likewise find that individuals served as mercenaries, without the concurrence or participation of the states to which they belonged; e. g. some Arcadians were in the pay of Tissaphernes¹². Some Orchomenian fugitives hired the services of Peloponnesian (Arcadian?) mercenaries¹³; strangers served for pay on board the Athenian fleet¹⁴, as did also a body of Cretan archers¹⁵. This practice was doubtless greatly promoted by the conduct of Athens in disarming the Nesiote, as she was thereby obliged to take other troops into her pay to supply their place, whilst the young islanders were compelled to seek employment in foreign service on their own account. Towards the end of the Peloponnesian war the mercenary system had gained ground to such an extent as to endanger the very existence of citizenship; the prospect of an obol more, was sufficient to induce whole ships' crews to desert from one fleet to another. The band of mercenaries which the younger Cyrus succeeded in assembling, affords a signal proof of the fearful degree of corruption at which the Grecian political system had arrived;

ἐπικούροισι τε πολλοῖσι, κ. τ. λ. The notion of serving for pay was not necessarily implied by the word; Herod. 3. 45. says, ἐπικούροι μισθοῖται. It seems as if they were desirous of retaining the old word even after the degradation of the practice itself, and we are almost induced to believe that the mercenary called himself ἐπικουρος and not μισθοφόρος. Thucydides, 2. 70, uses it of the foreign garrison in Potidea, which must probably be considered an auxiliary force from the Peloponnesus; again, 3. 34: ἐπικούρους Ἀρκάδων τε καὶ βαρβάρων, where both are meant; in the same manner, 2. 80, the Acarnanian Euarchus ἐπικούρους τινὰς προσημισθώσατο; the Mytilenian fugitives' hire ἐκ τε Πελοποννήσου ἐπικουρικόν, καὶ αὐτόθεν ξυναγείραντες. Tissaphernes has, Thucyd. 8. 25, a ξενικὸν ἐπικουρικόν. Lycomedes is praised by Xenoph. Hell. 7. 1. 23: ὥς, ἐπικούρων ὅποτε δεηθεῖεν τινες, οὐδένας ἠροῦντο ἀντ' Ἀρκάδων. Hermipp. ap. Athen. 1. 27. F. mentions amongst the peculiar productions of the Grecian provinces ἀπὸ δ' Ἀρκადίας ἐπικούρος. The word ξένοι was frequently used instead of μισθοφοροῦντες, and ξενιτεύομαι contains a significant allusion to the severance of the ties between the mercenary and his country. See Harpocr. ξενιτευομένους.

¹² Thucyd. 3. 34.

¹⁴ Thucyd. 1. 121.

¹³ Thucyd. 4. 76.

¹⁵ Thucyd. 6. 25.

and it must chiefly be ascribed to the pernicious influence of the Peloponnesian war that they were so numerous. But the assertion of Isocrates¹⁶, that they quitted their country because of their depravity, has no foundation in truth; his Grecian pride endeavours to palliate the fact that so many thousand able-bodied Greeks had resigned themselves to the will of a barbarian, instead of which he ought to have taken into consideration the spirit of adventure by which they were actuated. Agesilaus too, like the Athenians before him, encouraged this practice when he allowed the Greeks of Asia Minor to provide substitutes¹⁷. Soon afterwards the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta used to furnish money instead of troops for expeditions which were distant, and particularly for those beyond the sea¹⁸. Conon engaged corps of mercenaries with Persian money, and these have attracted the particular attention of the ancients. This arose from the astonishment which so considerable a body of men must at that time have excited upon the continent of Greece, as well as from the noble bearing, admirable discipline and brilliant achievements by which the peltasts now signalized themselves. They first attract attention at the beginning of the Corinthian war, and being generally stationed at Corinth, were usually denominated the Xenicon in Corinth¹⁹. Iphicrates and Chabrias were their most noted commanders²⁰. In the same war Agesilaus brought with him on his

¹⁶ Isocrat. Panegy. 40: — οἱ διὰ φανλότητ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν οὐχ οἷοι' ἦσαν ζῆν.

¹⁷ Xenoph. 3. 4. 15.

¹⁸ Xenoph. 5. 2. 21; 6. 2. 7.

¹⁹ Ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ, Aristoph. Plut. 173 and Schol.; Harpocr. Phot. Demosth. Phil. 1. 46. 19.

²⁰ Harpocr. Phot. Ξενικόν.

return from Asia, a body of mercenaries under the command of Herippidas²¹. After the first ardour had subsided, the war was carried on more by means of mercenaries than by armies composed of natives of the belligerent states²².

At a time when the mercenary system prevailed to such an extent as to absorb all the strength and substance of the Grecian states, and the native military rapidly decreased, our attention is attracted to a new feature in the age; namely, the organization of select bands of citizens, to whom were pre-eminently confided the career of arms and the highest duties connected with the same. This acted in some measure as a revival of the military order of the olden time. As early as the Peloponnesian war such bodies had been formed in Argos, Elis, and Athens, and as equestrian rank was once essential to aristocracy, so these institutions were generally combined with oligarchy. But we afterwards occasionally find that the military character exclusively predominated without any reference to the notion of an order. The sacred legion in Thebes, the Epariti in Arcadia, and the Epilecti in Phlius²³, were chosen bands of this description.

Besides these bands, the militia composed of the citizens of Sparta, Thebes, etc., still displayed the ancient Grecian valour, it is true, but this was the last glare of the expiring taper; the effects of the mercenary system, which attained its zenith in the time of Philip, began to be sensibly felt in many states, and particularly in Athens. The

²¹ Xenoph. 4. 3. 15.

²² Xenoph. 4. 4. 15: στρατιαὶ μὲν μεγάλαι ἀκατέρων διεπίπαινον — μισθοφόρους γὰρ μὴν ἑκάτεροι ἔχοντες διὰ τούτων ἰσχυρόμενος ἐπολέμουν.

²³ Xenoph. 7. 2. 10. On the φρουροὶ in Thurii, see below, § 75. n. 72.

number of citizens who bore arms perceptibly decreased, they daily grew more remiss in serving for the common cause, and the calculations of profit as much injured the military operations of the Greeks themselves²⁴ as they promoted the custom of serving for pay; a portion of the best strength of the Grecian states came into the hands of their hereditary foes, the wealthy barbarians. To this must be added the real privation caused by the increasing impoverishment of their native country²⁵, while life was as much exposed to danger in civil feuds, and from the intrigues and snares of sycophants at home, as in the field of battle, where men could at least wield their swords in their own defence. Hence the disposition to enlist in this species of service daily gained ground even among the better and more respectable members of the community; large bodies of mercenaries were easily assembled²⁶, and able commanders placed themselves at their head. These felt little inclination to have native troops under their command; the more dissimilar the ingredients of which their armies were composed, the more likely they were to be attached to the camp and the general, and to devote themselves singly and exclusively to the career of arms. It was natural that armies thus constituted should be indifferent to the cause they fought for²⁷, and thus the pledges for the

²⁴ Isocrates complains, *Areopag.* 246: τῶν δὲ περὶ πόλεμον οὕτω καταμῆσαμεν, ὥστε οὐδ' εἰς ἐξέτασις εἶναι τολμῶμεν, ἢν μὴ λαμβάνωμεν ἀργύριον.

²⁵ Isocrat. *ubi sup.* Comp. Demosth. de Symmor. 186. 25—29. Concerning Argos, see Aristoph. *Plut.* 601 and Schol.

²⁶ Isocrat. *Ep.* 9. 762: — μείζους καὶ κρείττους συντάξεις στρατοπέδων γιγνομένης ἐκ τῶν πλανωμένων ἢ τῶν πολιτευομένων.

²⁷ On the subject of the mercenaries who served for and against Persia, see *Diod.* 16. 42. 44.

freedom, independence, and security of a state, existing in the patriotism and affection of its citizens, were gradually destroyed, while their strength was measured by the wavering standard of riches alone²⁸. At the same time it was a very slight mitigation of the evil, that certain states, like Athens, endeavoured to secure the zeal and fidelity of the mercenary hordes in their pay, by appointing native warriors to command them. Iphicrates, though assuredly a virtuous citizen, introduced the custom of inscribing the name of the general upon the spoil, instead of that of the state only as before²⁹. Moreover, the services of various distinguished generals, who commanded legions of mercenaries, were not dedicated to their native cities only; Chabrias and Iphicrates took mercenaries to Egypt on their own score³⁰. Again, examples are not wanting to prove that the commanders of these itinerant bands sometimes made attempts to attain sovereign power³¹. Lastly, this venal soldiery, as may easily be supposed, did not fail to commit frequent outrages on the peaceful inhabitants of the places where they resided³².

While the effects of emigration and flight conspired with the increasing degeneracy of those who remained in their own country to promote the general and rapid decay of citizenship, public economy, and constitutions, and to render them incapable of renewing themselves from within, and from their own roots, as it were, certain lofty spirits

²⁸ Demosth. in Phil. 4. 139. 17, sqq.

²⁹ Suidas, 'Ιφικράτης.

³⁰ Plut. Ages. 32; Diod. 15. 41.

³¹ Dem. in Aristocr. 665. 25. On Abydos, see Aristot. Pol. 5. 5. 9; Isocrat. Ep. 2. 724.

³² Isocrat. Paneg. cap. 33; Ep. 9. 762.

soared into the regions of speculation, and endeavoured to discover an antithesis to the corruption of the real world in the ideal theory of a perfect state. Coincident in order of time with the diffusion of the mercenary profession, were the development of political theories in the schools of the philosophers and the commencement of political authorship. It cannot, indeed, be affirmed, that this retirement from the duties of public life deprived Greece of the mental aid and co-operation of those thinkers, in the same proportion as the mercenary system exhausted her physical substance and support; but while the ancient sages had held public offices, occupied themselves with the active duties of the administration, and directed and applied their principles to existing institutions, the present philosophers busied themselves with speculations concerning the best state abstractedly considered, and neither shared in the public administration themselves³³, nor immediately deduced their political principles from any actual system. The sophists in an inferior sphere had formed the transition from the political wisdom of a Thales, Solon, Demonax, Damon, to that of the present schools; they had inculcated general political maxims, which were, however, for the most part borrowed from institutions in actual being, and had aimed at little more than imparting dexterity in the arts of political life, and especially in eloquence, the most influential of them all; they rarely devoted any attention to the cultivation of political feeling, the investigation of the nature of law,

³³ Aristot. Pol. 2. 5. 1: 'Ἰππόδαμος—Μιλήσιος—πρῶτος τῶν μὴ πολιτευομένων ἐνεχέσθαι τι περὶ πολιτείας αἰεὶν τῆς ἀρίστης.

public education, etc. This was, on the contrary, the course pursued by their antagonist Socrates, who, superior to them in their own arts and subtleties, and utterly regardless of preferment or reward, rose up as the instructor of his fellow-citizens. But he differed from the ancient sages, inasmuch as he never held any post in which he could create original institutions, and abstained from all personal participation in the regulation of the Athenian constitution. Still he did not withdraw himself from the world like a mere teacher of the wisdom of the schools, but embraced every opportunity of acting upon public life by practically instructing those around him. His influence was, however, exclusively directed to individuals; he strove to meliorate the state through the citizens. So far the school of Pythagoras was revived in the circle of his associates. Nor did the agency of his pupils altogether differ in direction and tendency from that of the Pythagoreans. But rational speculation was too far advanced, ideal theories and reality had become separated by too wide a gulf, and circumstances upon the whole were too unfavourable for the modern political theories to be realized by the mere personal agency and sway of those who occupied state offices, as had been the case with the Pythagoreans. Hence, the universal principles of political science were conceived abstractedly, and put in contrast, as it were, with what was in actual existence, the only effect of which was, it must be confessed, to exhibit in a stronger light the difference between things as they were and as they ought to have been. But the pupils of Socrates by no means

despaired of carrying their theories into practice, as may be perceived from the conduct of Plato and Aristotle. Both formed the conception of a perfect political society, and both endeavoured to realize their conceptions. Xenophon deemed the perfection of the state to consist in the supremacy of a virtuous prince; his principles are embodied in the *Cyropædia*; in the real world the Spartan state came nearest to his standard of perfection; and as he was not at liberty in this field to draw from the stores of his own mind, he became the eulogist of the Spartan constitution, and fought at the side of the Spartan heroes. Plato³⁴, like Xenophon, judged that the supreme felicity of a society depended upon the government and personal influence of a beneficent king, trained up to virtue, and deeply imbued with its spirit: such he endeavoured to render Dionysius the younger; but his hopes were as delusive as they were ardent. His exertions were attended with better success in the education of his confidential associates and pupils; Dion, the Syracusan, is one of the loftiest specimens of his school. The fame of Plato's political doctrines was widely diffused; the Cyrenæans requested him to make laws for them³⁵; his scholars, Phormio, Aristonymus, and Menedemus have already been mentioned as legislators. But we are informed that some of them attempted to make themselves tyrants, as Euagon in Lampsacus, Chæron in Pellene, and Timæus in Cyzicus³⁶. Aristotle, however, was most successful in the

³⁴ On the youth's predilection for the military profession, see *Ælian*, V. H. 3. 27.

³⁵ *Plutarch ad Princip. inerudit.* 9. 117.

³⁶ *Athen.* 11. 508. E. sqq.

performance of a task requiring a rare conjunction of wisdom and activity, and afforded a triumphant example of the education of a prince by a philosopher³⁷; compared with which, his legislation in his native town Stagira scarcely deserves mention³⁸.

C. The new Tyranny, together with the Republics in the West.

§ 75. After the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ the leading states of the Grecian continent remained exempt from tyrants; Sicily was liberated from their domination later, and fell under their yoke again sooner than the mother-country. This new tyranny, which exceeded the ancient both in rigour and extent of power, swayed the Grecian political system in the west, and was not without important influence upon the fortunes of the mother-country. The Sicilian tyranny was the first to be revived. Nearly at the same time, in the extreme north, Panticapæum and the adjacent states on the Cimmerian Bosphorus, were under the dominion of tyrants who are commonly enumerated as kings; in Greece itself tyranny first reappeared in Thessaly. In the provinces in question, as well as in those of less importance, it arose now, as it had done before, from the dissatisfaction of the citizens with the existing order of things, and the animosity of contending factions; but their dissensions were no longer founded on the former substantial opposition between nobles and demus, which had been exclusively determined from within;

³⁷ Whether any of the legislators enumerated by Fabric. Bibl. Gr. 2. 28, sqq., ed. Harl., besides those named above, are to be referred to this period, as, for instance, Archias in Cnidos, I am not prepared to determine.

³⁸ Plut. Col. 10. 513. 629.

at the same time the latter had long lost their ancient attachment to kingly authority. Popular government had been established in almost every state except Sparta, and where it had been subverted by force, or restricted, there existed the most ardent desire to restore it. Public opinion was decidedly hostile to the tyranny, and not one of the later tyrants of purely Grecian states was looked upon as a king. But though the tyranny no longer possessed the affections of the *demos* in the same degree as formerly, it was effectually supported by the prevalence of party feuds, and by the help of mercenaries; at the same time no counterpoise could be easily opposed to its power, in consequence of the distractions and convulsions which had arisen in the ranks and orders of citizenship; add to this, that the political calculations of one state led it to contract alliances with the tyrants of others, so that through intercourse or treaty Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, by turns offered them an external point of support. By an analogous line of policy states did not scruple to solicit the favour and assistance of the barbarians, whom all despised and all courted. Whilst Sparta bestowed her favours upon the elder Dionysius, Lysias protested against the admission of his *Theoroi* at Olympia¹, and yet Athens afterwards erected a brazen statue to Alexander of Pheræ, as a public benefactor². This could not fail to influence the intrinsic nature of the new tyranny. The ancient tyrants, in consequence of the strength and solidity which still characterized the citizenship, and more especially through the favour of the *demos*,

¹ Diod. 14. 109; Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 326.

² Plut. Pelop. 31.

had not disdained to seek support amongst the citizens themselves, whence it happened that so many of them evinced paternal sentiments towards the communities which they governed; but the new tyranny partook of the corruption of its age. Having in many instances proceeded from the mercenary profession, and being unable to forget the wide gulf between this and the peaceful occupations of the citizen, it could not govern according to the established laws and customs of a country, and did nothing to encourage the arts of peace. The state was now looked upon as a mere camp; the mercenaries, who were by far more numerous than under the ancient tyrants, formed a state within a state; and their maintenance became an object of solicitude to the ruler, and a source of oppression to the people. Hence, then, the tyranny in many respects exhibited the last degree of that atrocity which drew upon it the indignant reprobation of the Greeks and Romans. Its general lineaments are found united in the character of the elder Dionysius, though he was far from being the most ruthless amongst them; Alexander of Pheræ, and Apollodorus of Cassandreia³, in the Macedonian times, though less violent were more bloody-minded.

I. THE TWO DIONYSII AND THE REPUBLICS IN THE WEST.

The account of this tyranny includes a survey of the surrounding republics of the Siceliots and

³ Dion, Chrys. l. 100, classes Phalaris and Apollodorus together. Suidas' βίαιοι ranges under the same category: Phalaris, Dionysius, Echetus, (Apollodorus) the tyrant of Cassandreia, and—Lingis, the founder of Ilius (?).

Italians, which, though not all subject to it, were nevertheless within the range of its influence, or formed the objects of its policy; some of these were hostile to it, whilst others, by their friendship and support, conduced to its solidity and strength. Besides Syracuse, Rhegium and Tarentum demand particular attention. In reviewing the political system of the west we behold those hereditary foes of the Greeks, the Carthaginians, destroying flourishing communities by force of arms, and indirectly promoting the evils incident to their political revolutions. Whilst domestic tyrants and foreign foes thus conspired to accelerate the downfall of the Grecian states, their object was forwarded by the national degeneracy of the Sicelians and Italians themselves: the tree was withering at the root, whilst the storm was shattering its branches. The corruption of Syracuse had, it must be confessed, been promoted by the repeated mixture of the inhabitants. Genuine and united citizenship could not expand into maturity after the expulsion of the Gamorians. The same spectacle is, with little variation, presented by the other cities⁴; discord prevailed in the greater part of them, and lost none of its force, because their inhabitants were enervated by licentious pleasures.

After the destruction of the Athenian force before Syracuse, as already stated⁵, Egesta craved assistance from Carthage, Olymp. 92. 3; 410. B. C., and Selinus applied to Syracuse⁶. The towns of Selinus⁷ and Himera⁸ were in the same

⁴ Plut. Timol. 1.

⁵ Diod. 13. 48, sqq.

⁶ Diod. 13. 61, sqq.

⁷ § 67, sub. fin.

⁸ Diod. 13. 57.

year destroyed⁹ by the barbarians, in conjunction with the Siculians from the interior of the island¹⁰. A similar fate befel the fair and flourishing Agrigentum, which was betrayed into the hands of the Spartan Dexippus by the leader of its mercenary bands. The Grecian population rapidly decreased; those who escaped death knew not where to seek shelter and protection, and the few states which took compassion on them, could not render them quiet and orderly citizens. At this juncture Dionysius the elder first attracts attention. The endeavours of Syracuse to relieve the above-named towns had been frustrated by intestine discord, the expulsion of Hermocrates¹¹, etc.; but now its own safety was threatened, and Gela and Camarina were but feeble bulwarks against the invaders.

Dionysius, the son of Hermocrates¹², a man of eminent endowments, and a tried and approved warrior¹³, commenced the career of demagogy, like so many before him, by maligning the character of the public officers. He accused the generals who had been unsuccessful in their engagement with the Carthaginian army; upon being chosen general himself he continued the prosecution against his colleagues, became commander-in-chief with unlimited powers, and by means of a guard, and the assistance of fugitives and mercenaries, eventually established a tyranny¹⁴. To purchase

⁹ Diod. 13. 60. Comp. at large Xenoph. Hell. 1. 2. 37; 1. 5. 21.

¹⁰ Diod. 13. 91.

¹¹ See above, § 67. ad fin.

¹² Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 24, but without stating whether he was the renowned Hermocrates or not. He was probably a different person; but Dionysius certainly accompanied the former (see above, § 67. n. 76.), and when tyrant married his daughter, Plut. Dionys. 3.

¹³ According to Demosth. in Lept. 506. 21, he had once been a γραμματεὺς.

¹⁴ Diod. 13. 92—96.

a peace with Carthage; which was by no means unlike that of Antalcidas, and to induce her to recognise his tyranny, he abandoned to her many of the Grecian states¹⁵, and having thus secured his authority externally, had ample leisure to provide for its safety within¹⁶. Amongst those who co-operated in the foundation of the tyranny, the first place belongs to Philistus, its subsequent historian¹⁷ and panegyrist¹⁸; in the mother-country Sparta was the chief ally of Dionysius¹⁹. In his treatment of the neighbouring towns, he adopted the policy of Gelon; he had already transplanted the inhabitants of Gela and Camarina to Syracuse in the year before the peace with Carthage²⁰; he afterwards seized Catana and Naxos, reduced the inhabitants to slavery, laid the latter in ruins, and filled the former with mercenary soldiers²¹; Leontini, whither its former citizens, who had been settled in Syracuse, had returned, and which at a still earlier period had become the retreat of Agrigentan, Geloan, and Camarinæan refugees²², was reduced to submission, and received ten thousand mercenaries as inhabitants²³. Some fugitives from Naxos and Siculians now founded the town of Tauromenium²⁴. All this was accomplished in the first five years of the tyranny, Olymp.

¹⁵ Diod. 13. 114: the Carthaginians recovered Selinus, Agrigentum, and Himera; Gela and Camarina were to remain unfortified, and pay them tribute; Autonomia was secured to Leontini, Messana, and the Siculians; and the Syracusans were declared subject to Dionysius.

¹⁶ Diod. 13. 91; 14. 8.

¹⁷ Diod. 13. 103.

¹⁸ Plut. Pelop. 34.

¹⁹ See above, § 68. n. 7. On the subject of the succours sent by Dionysius, see Xenoph. 5. 1. 26; 6. 2. 33; 7. 1. 20. 28: Diod. 15. 69. On the attempt of Athens to affect a disjunction between Dionysius and the Spartans consult Lysias, de Aristoph. Bon. 625.

²⁰ Diod. 13. 111.

²¹ Diod. 14. 4.

²² Comp. § 68. n. 53.

²³ Diod. 14. 15. 78.

²⁴ Diod. 16. 7.

93. 3; 406. B. C.—Olymp. 94. 3²⁵. The whole of the subsequent career of Dionysius is marked by unceasing activity; the restlessness of his character²⁶ impelled him to create opportunities for exertion and enterprise when they did not offer of themselves. But Syracuse, from the very first, was far from bearing the tyrant's yoke with patience, and broke out into open rebellion—first with the aid of some fugitives, and again when he was threatened by the squadrons and armies of Carthage²⁷. Philistus and the Spartans Aristus and Pharacidas, the former sent to his assistance by Sparta, the latter the commander of a detachment of mercenaries, assisted him in suppressing them²⁸. Some horsemen who had fled from Syracuse had occupied the town of Ætna, which was, however, speedily reduced²⁹. In Sicily Messina was the only place that was not in the hands of the tyrant; allied with Messina was Rhegium, which had granted a retreat to the fugitives from Syracuse³⁰, and disdainfully rejected Dionysius' application for the hand of one of its daughters³¹. Messina soon fell into the power of the tyrant³², who assailed the Italiots at the same moment that they were attacked by the Lucani; the Italiots³³ now formed

²⁵ The town of Adranus, near Mount Ætna, was founded by Dionysius I. Olymp. 105. 1, Diod. 14. 37.

²⁶ Διονύσιος—πρὸς τὸν πυθόμενον, εἰ σχολάζει, μηδέποτε, εἶπεν, ἐμοὶ τοῦτο συμβαίη. Plut. an Seni. etc. 9. 165. Comp. the judgment of the great Scipio, Polyb. 15. 35.

²⁷ Diod. 14. 7. 8. 65, sqq.

²⁸ Diod. 14. 8. 10. 71.

²⁹ Diod. 14. 4.

³⁰ Diod. 14. 40.

³¹ Diod. 14. 107; Strab. 6. 258.

³² Diod. 14. 78. But according to 14. 57, it had previously been taken by the Carthaginians.

³³ According to Diod. 14. 91. 101. 102, all the Italiots (?). The alliance was immediately directed against the Lucani; in case a Grecian town should be attacked by these, the rest were to hasten to its assistance, and in the event of their army not being in marching order, the generals were to be punished with death. Diod. 14. 101. Concerning the more ancient panegyris at the temple of

a confederacy against him, Olymp. 96. 4; 393. B. C., whereupon he concluded a league with the Lucani³⁴. But the Italiots could not agree upon the measures to be adopted; Locri sided with Dionysius³⁵; the Lucani were victorious, Olymp. 97. 3; 390. B. C.; Dionysius conquered Caulon, Hipponium, and at length the strongly-fortified Rhegium³⁶, Olymp. 98. 2; 387. B. C., whereupon the inhabitants of Caulon were removed to Syracuse. The citadel of Crotona having been taken by stratagem³⁷, a part of its territory was given to the Locrians, but Dionysius' project of building a wall from the Scylletic to the Hipponiat gulf was defeated by the march of the other Italiots³⁸, whilst a storm at sea³⁹ frustrated his contemplated expedition against Thurii. Dionysius, now extending his views beyond the territories of the Italiots, formed the design of establishing settlements in the gulf of the Ionian sea, where he built Lissus⁴⁰, and concluded a treaty with the Illyrians in that quarter. Lastly, though his wars with Carthage brought him no certain advantages, and he is said to have been dissuaded by an oracle from prosecuting them with vigour

Here Lacinia, see vol. i. p. 158. After the accommodation which followed the persecution of the Pythagoreans a separate confederacy was entered into by Croton, Sybaris, and Caulon, (? but Sybaris was destroyed, and Thurii not yet built; and the previous rebuilding of Sybaris by Thessalus falls Olymp. 81. 4. See Heyne. Op. 2. 138; is Συλλήτιον, which lay between Croton and Caulon, perhaps meant here?) near a sanctuary of Zeus Homarios, the same who was worshipped in Achaia (vol. i. 171. n. 27). Polyb. 2. 39. A war between the Tarentines and the Thurians was prevented by the erection of Heraclea on the Siris, Olymp. 86. 4; 433. B. C.; this town afterwards became the seat of a federal assembly (Strab. 6. 280), probably of the league which was formed against the Lucani and Dionysius.

³⁴ Diod. 14. 91.

³⁵ Diod. 14. 107; Strab. 6. 261.

³⁶ Diod. 14. 106. 107. 110. 112.

³⁷ Strab. 6. 261.

³⁸ Liv. 24. 3.

³⁹ Ælian, V. II. 12. 61.

⁴⁰ Diod. 15. 13. The Etym. M. in v. Ἀδρία makes mention of a town called Adrias, which Dionysius was said to have founded on the Ionian sea.

and alacrity⁴¹, they increased the sufferings and the misery of the Grecian population of Sicily to a dreadful extent. His internal government was characterized by all the vices for which tyrannies have ever been notorious. In the debasement and systematic discouragement of citizenship he was second to none of the tyrants of Greece. At the beginning of his reign he emancipated the slaves, who were thereupon denominated Neopolitæ, granted lands to his adherents, as well foreigners as natives, gave dwellings to the populace⁴², and bestowed upon the Neopolitæ the daughters of ancient citizens in marriage⁴³. The removal of the inhabitants from town to town increased the mixture; the Syracusans could no longer recognise one another; no feeling of union could be kept up in the minds of the ancient citizens, dispersed as they were among strange and ill-assorted masses: many of the new citizens enjoyed special privileges and immunities; e. g. the Caulonians were exempted from the payment of taxes for five years⁴⁴. Still the tyrant did not mingle with the townsmen; mercenaries, forts⁴⁵, and the stores and implements of war surrounded him; the mercenaries consisted of a mixture of Grecian and barbarian nations, Lacedæmonians⁴⁶, Campanians⁴⁷, Iberians⁴⁸, and Celts⁴⁹; his suspicion⁵⁰ and distrust became proverbial; the Otacoustæ and Potagogides, from the time of Hiero⁵¹, were not sufficient for

⁴¹ Diod. 15. 74.

⁴² Polyæn. 5. 2. 20.

⁴³ Dionysius made extensive alterations in Syracuse by fortifying of Nasos, building the wall of Epipolæ, etc. Conf. Göller, *de Situ et Orig. Urb. Syracusar.* 1818.

⁴⁴ Diod. 14. 9. 15.

⁴⁵ Xenoph. Hell. 7. 1. 20.

⁴⁶ Aristot. Pol. 5. 9. 3. Conf. *προσάγωγε*, Plut. Dion. 2 and 28.

⁴⁷ Diod. 14. 7.

⁴⁸ Diod. 14. 106.

⁴⁹ Diod. 14. 58.

⁵⁰ Diod. 14. 75.

⁵¹ See Plut. Dion. 9, etc.

the system of *espionage* which he carried on; there was a popular tradition that he himself listened at the opening in the acoustically-constructed dungeon called "the ear"⁵². His brother Leptines fell a sacrifice to his suspicion⁵³; his object in habituating his son to the most degrading occupations, and unfitting him for all elevation of thought, was to render him incapable of thwarting his purposes⁵⁴. No less notorious are his artifices, exactions, and cruelties; in the space of five years he obtained possession of all the property of the Greeks in his dominions⁵⁵; he plundered temples without remorse⁵⁶. His cruelty, however, rather resulted from the desire of intimidating those whom he feared, than from any natural pleasure at the sight of tortures; but his kindness, too, was solely the offspring of calculation. Finally, he shared with Nero the wish to be considered an artist; but this, instead of ministering to the gratification of those around him, was a source of torture to them; the poet Philoxenus was condemned to the *Latomiae* for criticising the tyrant's bad verses⁵⁷.

Dionysius the younger succeeded his father, Ol. 103. 1; 367. B. C.⁵⁸. The lapse of thirty-eight years had firmly cemented the throne, and numerous bands of mercenaries kept watch around it⁵⁹; innumerable parasites awaited an abundant harvest from the continuance of the tyranny, and at the

⁵² Conf. D'Orville, *Sicula*, p. 180—182. and 194.

⁵³ *Ælian*, V. H. 13. 45.

⁵⁴ *Plut. Dion*, 9.

⁵⁵ *Aristot. Pol.* 5. 9. 3.

⁵⁶ *Ælian*, V. H. 1. 20.

⁵⁷ His *ἀπαγε* is well known. See *Suidas*, *Φιλοξ. γραμμ.*

⁵⁸ *Diodor.* 13. 75.

Plut. Dion. 14; *Diodor.* 16. 9; *Ælian*, V. H. 6. 12.

death of the elder tyrant no bold and ingenuous patriot raised his voice in the cause of freedom. Though the mind of the younger Dionysius had been neglected, it was not depraved⁶⁰; virtue and vice struggled within him for mastery: the latter was encouraged by the parasites, who had obtained an ascendant over him, and incited him to the most reckless dissipation⁶¹, to which number belonged Philistus⁶². Dion, brother of the Syracusan consort of the elder Dionysius, Aristomache (one of whose daughters, Sophrosyne, was married to the younger Dionysius, and the other, Arete, to Dion,) endeavoured to expand the seeds of virtue in his breast. Plato was summoned to impart to the young ruler the moral instruction which was to render him a good king⁶³. Plato, whose hopes of success in the task he had undertaken were most sanguine⁶⁴, was received with princely splendour and with cordial affection, and Dionysius immediately commenced his studies⁶⁵. But it was not long before Dion was banished; the love of the tyrant for Plato amounted to a species of enthusiasm, and the ruling passion of his soul was the jealousy with which he regarded Plato's attachment to Dion⁶⁶; never was the pernicious efficacy of courtiers and parasites, in corrupting the character of a ruler, more strikingly exemplified than in the case of Dionysius⁶⁷. The

⁶⁰ Ps. Plat. Ep. 7. 338. D.: ὁ δὲ οὐτε ἄλλως ἴσθιν ἀφύης πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μαυθάνειν δύναμιν φιλότιμός τε θαυμαστῶς.

⁶¹ The younger tyrant passed ninety successive days in drinking, Plut. Dion. 7.

⁶² Plut. Dion. 11. Διονυσιοκόλακες Athen. 6. 249. F.: 10. 436. E.

⁶³ Plut. Dion. 10. 12.

⁶⁴ Ps. Plat. Ep. 7. 434; Plut. Dion. 11.

⁶⁵ Plut. Dion. 13, sqq.; Ælian, V. H. 4. 18; Plin. Hist. Nat. 7. 30.

⁶⁶ Plut. Dion. 16.

⁶⁷ Ps. Plat. Ep. 7. 445.

precepts of Plato⁶⁸, and the connection which he brought about between the Pythagoreans⁶⁹ and the tyrant, were all in vain. On his second visit to Syracuse, he narrowly escaped misusage⁷⁰. Meanwhile, the tyranny began to totter; Dion arose to deliver his country from the yoke under which it groaned, and the revolution was accomplished about the same time that violent commotions arose in the mother-country.

We are but imperfectly acquainted with the constitutions of the Italiot states during the reign of the two Dionysii, but it may be assumed that democracy had universally attained maturity. The party-feeling in favour of Sparta probably lasted no longer than the Peloponnesian war. Under the democracy in Tarentum⁷¹, as under all the democracies of that age, Strategi were the chief officers⁷²; and the same state is celebrated for having, seven times, confided the office of Strategus to its noblest citizen, the Pythagorean Archytas, the friend of Plato⁷³. He was also chosen generalissimo of the combined Italiots⁷⁴. In Thurii⁷⁵ there was a law which provided that the same citizen could only be reappointed Strategus at intervals of five years⁷⁶. At the same time, it appears that a number of citizens had been especially selected for

⁶⁸ Ps. Plat. Ep. 3. 410.

⁶⁹ Ps. Plat. Ep. 7. 454; Plut. Dion. 16.

⁷⁰ Ps. Plat. Ep. 7. 476; Plut. Dion. 19, relates that Aristippus likewise went to his court and opposed the efforts of Plato.

⁷¹ See § 59. n. 17.

⁷² Demosth. Erot. 1415. 9, describes Archytas (most probably in his capacity of Strategus) as τὴν Ταραντίνων πόλιν—καλῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως διοικήσαντα.

⁷³ Diog. Laert. 8. 79; Æl. V. H. 7. 14; Strab. 6. 280.

⁷⁴ Suidas, Ἀρχ.

⁷⁵ See § 59. n. 12.

⁷⁶ Arist. Pol. 5. 6. 8.

military service, and denominated guards (*φρουροί*)⁷⁷. Some enterprising young men belonging to powerful families, ingratiated themselves with these, trampled on the laws, and by repeatedly obtaining the Strategia, eventually established a dynasty⁷⁸. Hereupon all the magistrates were appointed according to a valuation, at the same time that nearly all the landed property was in the hands of the leading families. Nevertheless, the people, who were inspired with confidence by the remembrance of what they had achieved, succeeded in overthrowing the dynasty and making a more equal distribution of property⁷⁹. In consequence of injudicious attempts to impart extreme exactness to the laws, they are said to have become insecure and wavering⁸⁰. Crotona retained its Achæan institutions⁸¹. In Rhegium, after the termination of the dissensions which had prevailed there, it is probable that the constitution of Charondas was revived, as was that of Zaleucus in Locri. In Heraclea, on the Siris and Metapontum we are only acquainted with the names of magistrates belonging to a later period⁸². Equally scanty is our information respecting Cuma, Paleopolis and Neapolis, and Massilia. The former already began to be threatened by the Samnites and the Romans. It is probable that in the latter, the government of noble houses, whose oppressive effects were felt in

⁷⁷ Arist. ubi sup. These can hardly have been mercenaries.

⁷⁸ Arist. ubi sup.

⁷⁹ Arist. Pol. 5. 6. 6. Conf. Heyne, Op. 2. 148, who justly regards the fact narrated by Aristot. Pol. 5. 6. 6, as a consequence of that mentioned, 5. 6. 8. The observations of Schneider on 5. 6. 6, are less pertinent.

⁸⁰ Strab. 6. 260, from Ephorus.

⁸¹ Polyb. 2. 39.

⁸² The Tab. Heracleens. has an *ἀλία*, Ephors, a Polianomos, etc. A tyrant of Heraclea is mentioned in Parthen. Erot. 7. (from Phanias the Etesian.)

later times, was at this period in full vigour⁸³. On Lipara finally, there was a brave and virtuous Strategus, called Timasitheus⁸⁴, when the Romans sent a votive offering to Delphi after the conquest of Veii; but the island had once before fallen under the power of the Carthaginians, Olymp. 96. 1; 396. B. C⁸⁵.

The nationality of the Siceliots and Italiots, which had shown evidences of debasement before the time of the Dionysii, became still more corrupted by their influence, though not every where in the same degree. The Syracusans are especially stigmatized for immorality, gluttony, and lust⁸⁶; Tarentum was probably not much better, and afterwards sunk still lower; it was remarkable for its drunkenness, gluttony, luxury in dress⁸⁷, etc. Lastly, the daughters of the once moral Locri were notoriously venal⁸⁸.

THE TYRANTS OF PHERÆ.

Pheræ, of little importance before the end of the Peloponnesian war, raised itself by means of its tyranny above all the Thessalian states. This tyranny appears to have grown out of the powers of the mediatory Archon⁸⁹. Perhaps Lycophron him-

⁸³ Cic. de Repub. 74, Stuttg. where see Mago.

⁸⁴ Liv. 5. 28; Diodor. 14. 93; Plut. Camill. 8.

⁸⁵ Diodor. 14. 57.

⁸⁶ Σικελική τραπέζα, Athen. 12. 518. C. 527. C.; conf. Plat. de Repub. 3. 404; Epist. 7. 353. E. sqq. On the culinary art of Mithæcus, see Gorgias, 518. B.

⁸⁷ See Plat. de Legg. 1. 637; Theopomp. apud Athen. 4. 166. D. sqq.; Clearchus, apud eund. 12. 522. D.; Strab. 6. 280; Ælian. V. H. 12. 30; Plut. Pyrrh. 16: conf. Heyne, Opusc. 2. 224, sqq.; Heindorf, ad. Hor. Sat. 2. 4. 34. The number of barbarian words in use amongst the Tarentines is very remarkable (in Hesych. in A alone there are nearly thirty); from this we may infer that the Oscans and other adjacent nations were admitted in considerable numbers.

⁸⁸ Athen. 12. 516. A.

⁸⁹ Conf. §. 73. n. 21.

self was a tyrant. Jason, his son⁹⁰, the scholar of Gorgias⁹¹, and a brave soldier, succeeded him. He soon raised Pheræ above all the other Thessalian states⁹², and having concluded a treaty with Polydamas of Pharsalus, became Tagus of all Thessaly⁹³. This imparted the outward stamp of legitimacy to his power, in the exercise of which he displayed vigour and prudence, but was at the same time mild and humane⁹⁴. His authority extended beyond the limits of Thessaly; Alcetas acknowledged his sway in Epirus⁹⁵, and he entered into a treaty with Amyntas the Macedonian⁹⁶. He planned and executed his undertakings with surprising rapidity and decision⁹⁷. The mercenaries were the main support of the tyranny: Jason, as a soldier, set a higher value upon their services than upon those of the native troops⁹⁸, and he knew how to treat them⁹⁹; but he was totally regardless of the interests of citizens and citizenship. Still he was far from mixing the population in the same manner as the elder Dionysius had done; he regulated the tribute of the Periœci according to the scale established by Scopas, and the Penestæ continued upon the same footing as before¹⁰⁰. To govern was as necessary to him as his daily food¹⁰¹; he considered it lawful to commit injustice upon slight occasions, that he might be just in more important matters¹⁰², and even his own mother is said to have suffered from his exactions¹⁰³. In

⁹⁰ This may be inferred from Xenoph. Hell. 6. 4. 24, and from the fact, that one of Jason's sons was called Lycophron.

⁹¹ Paus. 6. 17. 5

⁹² Xenoph. 6. 1. 6.

⁹³ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 1. 4.

⁹⁴ Xenoph. 6. 4. 21.

⁹⁵ Ibid. ubi sup.

⁹⁶ Aristot. Pol. 3. 2. 6: 'Ιάσων ἔφη πεινῆν ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ.

⁹⁷ Plut. de Tuenda Sanitate Præcepta. 6. 514.

⁹⁸ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 1. 3.

⁹⁹ Diodor. 15. 60.

¹⁰⁰ Diodor. 15. 60.

¹⁰¹ Xenoph. 6. 1. 4.

¹⁰² Ibid. ubi sup.

¹⁰³ Polyæn. 6. 1.

sensual indulgences he was moderate¹⁰⁴. He was murdered by seven young men belonging to the cavalry of the country, Olymp. 102. 3; 970. B. C¹⁰⁵.

After his death his brothers¹⁰⁶, Polydorus and Polyphron, became tyrants of Pheræ and Tagi of Thessaly; the former was murdered by the latter after the lapse of a year, whereupon the Tageia assumed a more despotic character; the brave Polydamas in Larissa was killed, and many of the inhabitants expelled¹⁰⁷. Still greater atrocities were committed by Alexander, Polyphron's nephew¹⁰⁸ and murderer, who oppressed his own country and committed constant aggressions upon his neighbours for the space of eleven years¹⁰⁹. The Aleuads of Thessaly applied to Alexander of Macedon to assist them in repulsing him, after which he for some time possessed Larissa and Crannon¹¹⁰; they next had recourse to the Thebans¹¹¹; but it was not till these had marched at the head of a powerful army into Thessaly, to avenge the death of Pelopidas, that the tyrant was confined within the precincts of Pheræ, and his garrisons compelled to evacuate the territories of the Phthiotan Achæans and Magnesians¹¹². He ordered the inhabitants of the towns Scotussa and Melibæa to be sabred¹¹³; he caused his victims to be put to death amidst the most dreadful tortures¹¹⁴; he felt ashamed of the emotion which he

¹⁰⁴ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 1. 4.

¹⁰⁵ Xenoph. 6. 4. 31. 32. The account of Diodor. 15. 60. is less accurate.

¹⁰⁶ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 4. 38.

¹⁰⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 4. 34.

¹⁰⁸ Plut. Pelop. 29.

¹⁰⁹ Diod. 15. 61.

¹¹⁰ Diod. ubi sup.

¹¹¹ Plut. Pelop. 26, sqq.

¹¹² Diod. 15. 80; Plut. Pelop. 35.

¹¹³ Plut. Pelop. 29; Diod. 15. 75; Paus. 6. 5. 2.

¹¹⁴ Plut. Pelop. 29: ζῶντας μὲν ἀνθρώπους κατέρυτταν, ἑτέροις δὲ δειρματα συνῶν ἀγρίων καὶ ἀρκτων περιτιθεὶς καὶ τοὺς θηρευτικοὺς ἐπάγων κύνας δίσπα, κ. τ. λ.

had testified at the representation of a tragedy ¹¹⁵; and looked upon every one with suspicion and distrust ¹¹⁶. He was killed by his wife, the daughter of Jason ¹¹⁷, in concert with her brothers, Olymp. 105. 4; 357. B. C. ¹¹⁸. The last, Tisiphonus, Pitholaus, and Lycophron ¹¹⁹, possessed themselves of the government, Pitholaus as the eldest reigning first ¹²⁰; the names of Lycophron and Pitholaus occur during the holy war ¹²¹. No exact particulars have been transmitted respecting a tyrant of Crannon, called Denius, who had raised himself to despotic power from the condition of a fowler ¹²².

3. THE TYRANTS ON THE PONTUS.

After the power of Miletus had been broken by domestic tyranny and Persian domination, its political influence amongst the colonies on the Pontus ceased; it is probable that tyrants soon arose in several of these states; their nationality was no longer purely Grecian, and democracy was nowhere sufficiently solid and matured. Hence, in this quarter the tyranny still retained the character of the kingship. On the Cimmerian Bosphorus, the dynasty of the Archæanactids subsisted forty-two years, from Olymp. 75. 1—85. 3; 480—438. B. C ¹²³., in Panticapæum, Phanagoria, etc. A

¹¹⁵ Plut. ubi sup.

¹¹⁶ Cic. de Off. 2. 7.

¹¹⁷ Plut. Pelop. 28.

¹¹⁸ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 4. 35, sqq.; Plut. Pelop. 35; Diod. 16. 14.

¹¹⁹ Plut. Pelop. ubi sup. The reading here is Πυθολάου, Diod. 16. 39; conf. 16. 52; Diodor. 16. 39 has Πειθολάου, conf. 16. 52.

¹²⁰ Xenoph. 6. 4. 37.

¹²¹ Diod. 16. 39; conf. below, § 78.

¹²² Polyæn. 2. 34.

¹²³ Diod. 12. 31. See at large, Boze, in Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscript. t. ix.; Souciet's Dissertat. Par. 1736. Cary, Hist. des Rois de Thrace et de ceux du Bosph. Cimm. Par. 1752. Raoul-Rochette, Antiquités Grecques du

modern race, whose fame was recent, began with Spartocos¹²⁴, who governed from Olymp. 86. 4; 433. B. C¹²⁵.; he was succeeded by Seleucus¹²⁶, who reigned till Olymp. 87. 4. There is a blank¹²⁷ till the accession of Satyrus, who held the government from Olymp. 93. 2—96. 4; 407—393. B. C¹²⁸., and who, like his father (Spartacus 2. ?) favoured the Athenians¹²⁹. His son and successor Leucon, who ruled from Ol. 106. 3; 354. B. C¹³⁰., is known to us as the commercial ally and citizen of Athens¹³¹, and as the founder of Theodosia¹³²; besides which he is said to have been warlike¹³³ and generous¹³⁴; yet even he¹³⁵ was surrounded by mercenaries¹³⁶ and flatterers¹³⁷, and committed exactions. His successors do not come within the scope of our enquiries.

In Sinope there was, in the age of Pericles, a tyrant called Timesileus. The inhabitants deposed him in Olymp. 83. 4; 445. with the help of some Athenian Cleruchi¹³⁸.

Heraclea, which had from its first foundation been distracted by the feuds between the upper order and the demus¹³⁹, in Olymp. 104. 1; 364.

Bosphore Cimmérien. Par. 1822, with the critiques of P. v. Köppen (*Alterth. am Nordgestade des Pontus*. Wien, 1823) and v. Köhler.

¹²⁴ That this, and not Spartacus, is the proper orthography of the word is proved by inscriptions. See Böckh, *Thesaur. Inscr.* p. 147.

¹²⁵ Diod. 12. 31.

¹²⁶ Diod. 12. 36.

¹²⁷ Boze inserts Spartacus here, whose reign lasted twenty years.

¹²⁸ Diod. 14. 93; Lysias *pro Mantith.* 571.

¹²⁹ Isocrat. *Trapezit.* 646.

¹³⁰ Diod. 16. 31.

¹³¹ Demosth. in *Lept.* 466. 467.

¹³² Demosth. *ubi sup.*; Strab. 7. 309.

¹³³ Polyæn. 6. 9. 3. 4.

¹³⁴ Plut. *de Stoicor. repugn.* 10. 314.

¹³⁵ Æneas, *Pol.* 5. Concerning the Scythians, see Polyæn. 6. 9. 4.

¹³⁶ He said to a person of this description who had committed some crime: ἀπέκτεινα ἄν σε νῆ τοῦς θεοῦς, εἰ μὴ πονηρῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ τυραννὶς ἔδειτο. *Athen.* 6. 257. D.

¹³⁷ Polyæn. 6. 9. 1.

¹³⁸ Plut. *Pericl.* 20.

¹³⁹ Vol. i. p. 268. n. 77. See at large, Memnon, ap. Phot. *Cod.* 224, and the statements of other ancient writers in Orelli's edition of Memnon, pp. 119—124.

B. C., fell under the tyranny of Clearchus ¹⁴⁰, a pupil of Socrates ¹⁴¹, who had been appointed to the command of a body of mercenaries after the citizens had delivered themselves from the power of a faction ¹⁴². The little value which he set upon the lives of others ¹⁴³ corresponded with the suspicious solicitude with which he guarded his own ¹⁴⁴; but in spite of his precautions he was assassinated, Olymp. 106. 4; 353. B. C ¹⁴⁵. His brother Sabyrus maintained the tyranny, as the guardian of his nephews. Timotheus died in the year of the battle of Chæronea; after a reign of fifteen years he was succeeded by Dionysius who ruled thirty-two years ¹⁴⁶.

4. LESS POWERFUL TYRANTS.

After the first invasion of the Peloponnesus by Epaminondas, Sicyon was distracted by the quarrels of the partisans and opponents of Sparta and Thebes; in Olymp. 103. 2; 366. B. C., Euphron, by means of the demus and some mercenaries, effected a junction between Sicyon and Thebes, expelled forty Lacones (in Xenophon *βελτιστοι*), and made himself tyrant ¹⁴⁷. But he was unable to maintain his position: the expelled citizens occupied the harbour and the town, whilst a Theban garrison was in possession of the citadel ¹⁴⁸. Euphron went to fetch mercenaries from Athens, and

¹⁴⁰ Diod. 15. 81.

¹⁴¹ Isocrat. Ep. 7. 749.

¹⁴² Polyæn. 2. 30. 1; conf. Æn. Pol. 12.

¹⁴³ Theopomp. ap. Athen. 3. 85. A. B.

¹⁴⁴ Plut. ad Princip. inerudit. 9. 125: *εἰς κίβωτον ἐνδυόμενος ὥσπερ ὄφις ἐκάθειδε*.

¹⁴⁵ Diod. 16. 86.

¹⁴⁶ Diod. 16. 88. On his gluttony and corpulence, see Athen. 12. 549. A. B. His wife, Amastris, founded the city of the same name, Strab. 12. 544.

¹⁴⁷ Xenoph. Hell. 7. 1. 43—46; 7. 3. 8; Diod. 15. 70.

¹⁴⁸ Xenoph. 7. 3. 4.

then repaired in search of assistance to Thebes, where he was murdered by some of his adversaries from Sicyon¹⁴⁹. The demus honoured his memory¹⁵⁰. In Corinth Timophanes was enabled by means of his mercenaries to obtain the tyranny, Olymp. 103. 3; 366. B. C.¹⁵¹. Timoleon, his brother became the liberator of his native city. In Oeanthe, a town of the Ozolian Locrians, there was a tyrant called Phricodemus¹⁵², about Ol. 101. 4; 373. B. C. In Eubœa, Eretria and Oreus (Histiaea) were more especially the seats of tyranny; to the period which intervened before the island and its political system became dependent upon Philip, belong: Neogenes tyrant of Creas¹⁵³, Themison of Eretria who occupied Oropus, Olymp. 103. 3; 366. B. C.¹⁵⁴. Plutarch, in whose time the influence of Philip began to predominate¹⁵⁵, will be mentioned hereafter. There were also tyrants in Lesbos, but probably not before Philip's time, though they do not appear to have stood in any connection with his political operations; to these belonged Cleommes or Cleomenes in Methymna, of whom Isocrates speaks in terms of commendation¹⁵⁶; he, like Periander, ordered that all prostitutes should be drowned¹⁵⁷. Cammes reigned in Mytilene at the time of Demosthenes¹⁵⁸. It was afterwards governed by tyrants

¹⁴⁹ Xenoph. Hell. 7. 3. 4. 5.

¹⁵⁰ Xenoph. 7. 3. 12.

¹⁵¹ Twenty years before Timoleon's expedition to Sicily, Plut. Timol. 7. Hence must be corrected, Diod. 16. 65.

¹⁵² Polyæn. 8. 46. This story, however, has rather a mythical air.

¹⁵³ Diodor. 15. 30, where Oropus is also erroneously stated to belong to him.

¹⁵⁴ Diodor. 15. 76. Conf. Wessel. and above, § 71. n. 119. Demosthenes de Coronâ, 259. 10, also alludes to the circumstance, but besides Themison mentions a Theodorus.

¹⁵⁵ Plut. Phoc. 11.

¹⁵⁶ Isocrat. Epist. ad Timoth. 748 (written after Olymp. 107. 1).

¹⁵⁷ Theop. ap. Ath. 10. 442. F.

¹⁵⁸ Demosth. adv. Bœot. de Dot. 1019.

who were dependent upon Persia¹⁵⁹. Such were probably Hecatomnus, Mausolus, Artemisia, Idrieus and Ada in Halicarnassus¹⁶⁰. Evagoras and Nicoles in Salamis on the island of Cyprus, must be excepted from the number of those tyrants who belonged to the state-system of Greece. In Cyrene, lastly, Ariston was, in Olymp. 94. 4; 401. B. C., at the head of a numerous party¹⁶¹; some Messenians arriving there from Naupactus an engagement took place between the hostile factions, after which a reconciliation was effected. Cyrene was governed by tyrants in the time of the Ptolemies, such as Magas, etc.

¹⁵⁹ Arrhian. 2. 1.

¹⁶⁰ Concerning this dynasty, see Sainte-Croix in the *Mém de l'Institut. class. d'Hist. t. ii.*

¹⁶¹ Diod. 14. 54.

COMPLETION OF THE INTERNAL CORRUPTION, AND SUBVERSION OF THE EXTERNAL LIBERTIES OF GREECE.

THE AGE OF PHILIP OF MACEDON.

I. INTERNAL CONDITION AND EXTERNAL POLI- TICAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL.

§ 76. The history of this, like that of the preceding period, presents no union of a more intimate nature between the states of the mother-country and those of the west and the remote east. The first, whose connection was merely local, obstinately adhered to their former state of separation, and the more sensibly they felt the oppressive effects of those despotisms by which they had already been united, the more averse they became from forming larger and more general associations. The Grecian states of this period are too various in their character and policy to admit of that classification which historical investigation requires, whilst our chief attention is engrossed by the operations of Philip, their enemy and destroyer. Their interior, however, exhibits an equal degree of corruption in the gradual extinction of patriotism, strength, and virtue; on which account the states, whose political condition was not determined by the measures of Philip, must also be included in the ensuing survey.

When Philip of Macedon arose, Olymp. 105. 1; 360. B. C., the ethical and political ties of the Grecian states had grown relaxed, and they had lost

the nourishing and preserving strength of true citizenship. Military service for hire, debauchery, and venal treachery were the characteristics of the age. Though the military courage of the Greeks was by no means extinct, states had lost the power of assembling the great body of the citizens for their defence, while individuals had grown indifferent to the obligation of fighting for their country. Many thousand warriors had long been in the pay of the Syracusan tyrants, the great king, and his satraps; and after the battle of Mantinea, large bodies of the still-remaining soldiery dispersed in various directions. From the beginning of the holy war, Phocis had been one of their principal rendezvous. In Olymp. 106. 4; 353. B. C., Pammenes the Theban, led five thousand able-bodied soldiers to Artabazus, the Persian satrap¹, who was in rebellion against the great king. Agesilaus, Ol. 104. 3; 361. B. C., accompanied by thirty Spartan Symbuli, led a body of mercenaries to the assistance of the insurgent Tachus in Egypt². His example was followed by Chabrias³. Mentor the Rhodian quitted Egypt and joined the rebellious Phœnicians with four thousand Greeks, Ol. 107. 2; 351. B. C.⁴. On the other side, Artaxerxes Ochus was assisted in his expedition against Cyprus by Greek auxiliaries under Phocion⁵, a detachment of Thebans under Lacrates⁶, and a body of Argives under the Herculean warrior Nicostratus⁷. Even the Carthaginians

¹ Diodor. 16. 34.

² Plut. Ages. 36, where the disgraceful character of this expedition is well described. Conf. Diodor. 15. 92.

³ Plut. ubi sup. 37.

⁴ Diodor. 16. 42.

⁵ Diodor. ubi sup. 16. 43, and Wessel.

⁶ Diodor. 16. 44.

⁷ Ibid. ubi sup. 16. 48. Compare on the number of the Greeks who had quitted their own country, and were ready to sell their services to the various captains, see above, § 74. n. 24.

had Grecian soldiers in their pay⁸. By this means military honour departed from the civic banners; the number of citizens at musters⁹ and on marches (*πολιτικαὶ δυνάμεις*)¹⁰ had dwindled almost to nothing, whilst that of the mercenaries daily increased¹¹; it became more and more the policy of states to purchase the services of mercenaries for money; and the fact that a considerable portion of the public revenue passed into the hands of foreigners, operated alike injuriously to the public economy and to private interests. The craving for pleasure in the citizens was not a little promoted by the luxurious lives of the mercenaries, who, unlike men who fought for their own hearths and altars, and had a stake in the welfare of their country, spent the wages of blood in the purchase of present gratifications, not knowing how much time might be left them for enjoyment¹². The less capable the citizens became of wielding the sword in their own defence, the more deeply did they sink into the vortex of dissipation. The Athenians attained the most disgraceful celebrity by the manner in which they squandered the public revenue on festivals, pageants, and banquets¹³; but still more notorious for their gluttony and debauchery were the inhabitants of Byzantium, Chalcedon¹⁴, Zacynthus¹⁵, Syracuse, Tarentum¹⁶, etc.

⁸ Plut. Tim. 30.

⁹ See above, § 74. n. 22.

¹⁰ Æsch. in Ctesiph. 488. 537.

¹¹ Concerning Athens, see Isocrat. Symmach. 267; Æschin. de Falsa Legat. 249. 250.

¹² On the degeneracy of the Spartan king, Archidamus, in Tarentum, see Theopomp. ap. Ath. 12. 536. C.

¹³ Isocrat. Areop. 224. 225; Demosth. Phil. 1. 50. de Synt. 169; Athen. 4. 166. E.; Justin. 6. 9; Plut. Quæst. Symp. 8. 896. The subject is treated at length by Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 232, sqq.

¹⁴ Athen. 12. 526. E. from Theopomp.

¹⁵ Agatharcides apud. Athen. 12. 528. A.

¹⁶ See above, § 75. n. 81, sqq.

This indulgence in luxury and revelry, as unmanly and enervating as it was, did not, however, diminish their insolence or allay their animosity; the general extravagance and the poverty that resulted from it, made men reckless as to the means they employed to gratify their love of pleasure¹⁷; and amongst the most disgraceful, and, at the same time, the most calamitous of its effects, was their eagerness to betray their country into the hands of the dynasts, in order to obtain the gold they so liberally dispensed. Numerous lists of traitors have been handed down to posterity¹⁸. These were not like the contending factions of former days, impelled by the implacable spirit of political partisanship: they cared nothing for the state and its interests, and only thought of their own advantage. It was of little avail that individual states made occasional attempts to repress the evil, as for example, Corinth, when she interdicted her subjects from accepting the gold of the dynasts¹⁹. The few citizens who still retained the better spirit of the olden time, had lost all courage, and despaired of beholding the political system of their country renewed and invigorated from within. Isocrates, who looked with a jealous eye upon the growing power of Persia, was of opinion, that the only hope of salvation for his

¹⁷ Crates considered their feasting as a main source of discord, Plut. de Sanitat. tuend. 6. 478. These accounts remind us of the quarrels which arise out of the dancing, drinking, and gaming of modern times. But one of Pandora's gifts was still wanting, namely, the duel, by way of a "réparation d'honneur."

¹⁸ Demosth. Phil. 3. 125. 11; 126. 17. 28; de Corona, 241, sqq. 324; conf. Harpocraton, Μύρτις; Diodor. 10. 53. 54; comp. Himerius, 34, Wernsd.: τὸ Μακεδόνων χρυσίον καὶ τὴν Φιλίππου φιλίαν νόμους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ πολιτείαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τιμιώτατα νομίζουσι. The extenuation offered by Polybius (17. 14) is partial.

¹⁹ Plut. Apophth. 6. 672.

country was in the supremacy of a native prince; and such he considered Philip to be. And it must be confessed that that monarch not only knew how to purchase the services of corrupt citizens and venal declaimers, but also possessed so many brilliant qualities, that he might well inspire even upright and patriotic Greeks with confidence and hope, and the rather as they had wholly ceased to place any dependence upon themselves.

In such a posture of affairs it was impossible that the intercourse of the various states could be marked by amity or good faith. This was another source of advantage to Philip. The relative position of the belligerents after the battle of Mantinea became complicated and confused; but though the victory had remained undecided, it was self-evident, that no one of the states which had taken part in that engagement could henceforward attempt to assert a military supremacy over the rest²⁰. Though neither Sparta, Athens, nor Thebes evinced any desire to prolong the contest, with the view of obtaining a general hegemony, they had no sooner recovered from the effects of the great Bœotian war, than they severally began to exhibit their lust of power in a narrower sphere. Sparta once more endeavoured to establish a confederacy among the Peloponnesians under her own protectorate, and then assailed her old enemy Argos. Upon the defeat of the Argives at Orneæ²¹, Olymp. 106. 4;

²⁰ The reason which Ephorus assigns for the decay of the Theban power (ap. Strab. 9. 401.) is: τὸ λόγων καὶ ὁμιλίας τῆς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὀλιγορῆσαι, μόνης δ' ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῆς κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρετῆς. On which Strabo remarks: τοῦτο (i. e. what the Thebans neglected) πρὸς Ἕλληνας μάλιστα χρήσιμόν ἐστι, ἐπεὶ πρὸς γε τοὺς βαρβάρους βία λόγου κρείττων ἐστὶ.

²¹ Diod. 16. 34.

353. B. C., the Megalopolitans, Sicyonians, Messenians, and Thebans entered into a league with Argos²³, which soon after concluded a truce with Sparta. The last, either impelled by her love of war, or by the hope of renewing those ties of affinity which had grown relaxed, still persisted in wasting her strength in the quarrels of the transmarine states; Gaisylus was despatched to Syracuse in order that, like Gylippus, he might assume the command, but was rejected by Dion²⁴; a detachment of auxiliaries was sent to Lyotus in Crete²⁵; at a subsequent period king Archidamus himself went to Italy and fell fighting for Tarentum against its barbarous neighbours on the same day, that the liberties of the mother-country received their death-blow at Chæronea²⁶. The influence of Athens having prevailed over that of Thebes in the quarrels of the Eubœans²⁶, the former effected a new league amongst the maritime states, and soon began to pervert her power to the purposes of oppression and exaction. Cleruchiæ had been established in the Chersonese, Olymp. 106. 4; 353. B. C., and on Samos in Olymp. 107. 1, (if not as early as Olymp. 104. 4; 361. B. C.)²⁷; but the man whose oppressions and misuse chiefly served to make the name of Athens detested in all the islands and maritime districts was the broad-shouldered debauchee Chares²⁸, who possessed no single excellence becoming a commander, and whom Timotheus declared fit for no other

²³ Diod. 16. 39.²⁴ Plut. Dion. 49.²⁵ Diod. 16. 62.²⁶ Diod. 16. 88.²⁶ Diod. 16. 7. Böckh, Pub. Econ. 2. 88.²⁷ See Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 460.²⁸ Diod. 15. 95.

purpose than to carry the general's baggage²⁹. He was accompanied by several others as worthless as himself³⁰. The confederates put themselves in a posture of defence upon the approach of another general, Phocion³¹. The war which now broke out, Olymp. 105. 3.—106. 1; 357—355. B. C., is known by the name of the social war, and its result once more annihilated the Athenian power at sea. The towns of the Chersonese fell into the hands of the Thracian Cotys³². Thebes strove to extend her dominion over the adjacent states in the north, west, and east, but she could not succeed in subjecting to her authority either Euboea or Thessaly; the wretched artifice of representing her allies the Locrians and the mountain-nations around Thessaly as Amphictyons, and thence endeavouring to borrow political importance, was one of the causes which led to the eruption of the (third) holy war, during which Bœotia itself was visited with severe calamities.

Thus no inconsiderable number of states were in possession of the independence guaranteed to them by the peace of Antaleidas; Messenia was free from the control of Sparta, Pellene severed from Achaia³³, the Periceci of Elis were enfranchised, the naval league of Athens dissolved, the supremacy of Thebes in Bœotia on the wane, Pheræ no longer possessed an undue preponder-

²⁹ Plut. an Seni Respub., etc. 9. 151; ἀκμάζοντα τῷ σώματι καὶ ῥωμύλειον, κ. τ. λ. Diod. 16. 85: οὐδὲν δέφερε τῶν τυχόντων ἰδιωτῶν κατὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ στρατηγεῖν ἐνέργειαν καὶ βουλήν. Conf. Theopomp. ap. Ath. 12. 532. C. D. Against this the observation of Dem. Ep. 1481. 6, that Chares was δημοτικός, has little or no weight.

³⁰ Æschin. de Fals. Legat. 250.

³¹ Plut. Phoc. 11.

³² Demosth. in Aristocr. 668. 8, sqq. See the continuation of these quarrels under Cotys' sons, Carobleptes, Amadocus, and Berisades, Demosth. in Aristocr. 623. 17, sqq.; and 676. 24, sqq.

³³ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 553.

ance in Thessaly, etc.; but whilst the mutual indifference of the nations, and the favour of circumstances in general had conduced to keep up separation and independence in the early age, and the various communities of Greece, though unwilling to coalesce, had formed so many compact and consistent wholes, Greece now resembled a body torn into many conflicting parts, which, incapable of subsisting singly, and unwilling to unite, exhausted their still remaining strength in attacks upon each other. States were less occupied with the task of ameliorating their own condition, than in devising plans for injuring one another, and animosity and discord universally prevailed³⁴. A disposition to revive ancient national associations is perceived in the efforts of Corinth alone, to recover the friendship and attachment of its colonies³⁵; and the interest which it testified in the fate of Syracuse was honourable to its feelings; but on the other hand, this division of the strength of the mother-country during the perilous stand she made against Philip was ill-timed and injudicious, and, as might have been expected, it produced no salutary fruits. Hellas was ripe for a foreign yoke. The relation in which she stood to Persia had long been wavering and unfixed through the effects of the mercenary system. This exempted the Persian monarch from the necessity of entering into regular treaties with states, and even when he did so, his object was merely to obtain permission from them to levy soldiers within their

³⁴ Demosth. de Coron. 231. 8:—ἀλλά τις ἦν ἀκριτος—παρὰ—ἅπαν
"Ἕλλησιν ἔρις καὶ ταραχή.

³⁵ Plutarch, Timol. 3. 23. 24. 53.

territories; but similar advantages were granted to rebellious satraps³⁶, so that the relation between Philip and the states of Greece was constantly fluctuating between friendship and enmity, like that which existed between Switzerland and France in the time of the emperor Maximilian; upon the whole, however, Thebes may be said to have been most closely connected with the great king³⁷, who afterwards entered into a coalition with Athens against Philip.

Philip of Macedon³⁸, whose lineage was accounted Grecian from Alexander, Philellen downwards³⁹, had been trained up in the manners and customs of Greece, and resided long enough in Thebes to know that the political condition of that country was past all cure. He ascended the Macedonian throne, Ol. 105. 1; 360. B. C., and having, in a short but severe struggle, established his authority over his paternal dominions and the adjacent provinces, he endeavoured to subject all Greece to his power by a series of attacks from without, and by skilfully availing himself of her corruption within. Few princes in history have exhibited that inflexible perseverance and unwavering fixedness of purpose which he did. As it is not my purpose, however, to make his policy in itself the principal object of inquiry,

³⁶ See above, n. 1, sqq.

³⁷ Thebes received subsidies for the Phocian war, Diod. 16. 40.

³⁸ Conf. Olivier, Hist. de Phil. 1740: 2. 8; Leland's History of Phil. 1761, A.; Valckenaer, Orat. de Phil. in the Opusc.; Weiske de Hyperbole Errorum in Hist. Phil. Commissor. Genitrice, 1818.

³⁹ —ἐκρίθη (by the umpires of the games at Olympia)—εἶναι Ἕλληνας. Herod. 5. 22. But Demosthenes, Phil. 3. 118, gives a very different account: οὐ μόνον οὐχ Ἕλληνας ὄντας, οὐδὲ προσήκοντας οὐδὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν βαρβάρου ἐντεῦθεν, ὅθεν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ὀλίθρου Μακεδόνα, ὅθεν οὐδ' ἀνδράποδον σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἦν πρότερον πρίασθαι. Conf. Olynth. 3. 35; de Symmor. 186; de Coron. 290.

however calculated it may be to throw light upon the picture of dissension, treachery, and imbecility presented by the Grecian states, I proceed to show how, on the one hand, the latter promoted their own degradation by voluntarily lending themselves to the crafty designs of Philip, and how, on the other, his plans encountered resistance from two opposite quarters, viz., from Athens and Phocis, both of which states were supported by numerous allies.

Philip's first message to the Athenians was well calculated to produce a favourable impression upon their minds. Having succeeded in humbling his opponent Argæus, to whom they had sent succours, he released the Athenian prisoners, saying, that he wished to be on friendly terms with their city⁴⁰. His attack upon Amphipolis took place when Athens was engaged in the social war, and whilst, however great might have been her inclination to assist that city, her interference could have availed but little, Olymp. 105. 3 ; 357. B. C. Moreover, her attention was still engrossed by the overgrown power of her hereditary foe in Asia; and the dangers to be apprehended from any other foreign power still appeared too remote to induce her suddenly to abandon a line of policy she had so long pursued. Isocrates, who may be looked upon as the representative of this opinion, still felt indignant at the disgrace which his country had incurred by subscribing to the conditions of the peace of Antalcidas. It was not till after the lapse of several years, and only in consequence of repeated aggressions from Philip, that the Athe-

⁴⁰ Diod. 16. 3 ; Demosth. in Aristoc. 660. 13, sqq.

nians became alive to the dangers which were to be apprehended from his designs ⁴¹. The easy credulity with which they hearkened to his promises and insinuations ⁴² during the siege of Amphipolis, were well adapted to inspire the wily monarch with sanguine hopes of future success. The Athenians had, moreover, lost their bravest champion ⁴³, Chabrias, in the social war, and had deprived themselves by their own imprudence of the services of the valiant Iphicrates and Timotheus ⁴⁴, so that they were constrained to make their choice between Phocion and Diopceithes, and Chares and Charidemus ⁴⁵, when unfortunately it generally fell upon the two last ⁴⁶. As the plans of Philip in this quarter were promoted by the social war, so he found a convenient handle for his designs upon the continent in the contentious character of the Thebans. The accusation brought by Thebes and the so-called Amphictyons ⁴⁷ against Phocis, viz., that it had tilled sacred ground, is ascribed by Pausanias to the inveterate hatred which the Thessalians bore the Phocians ⁴⁸. But it is the conduct of Thebes that we must more particularly examine.

⁴¹ See the warning of Dem. de Lib. Rhod. 197. 25, sqq.

⁴² Demosth. ubi sup. 659. 4:—ὅτε μὲν ἐπολιόρκει Ἀμφίπολιν, ἰν' ὑμῖν παραδῶ, πολιορκεῖν ἔφη· ἐπειδὴ δ' ἔλαβε, καὶ Ποτίδαιαν προσαφείλετο. The Athenians were much given to political forebodings: the prospect of secret concessions always had the greatest charm for them. Dem. Ol. 2. 19. 24:—τὴν μὲν ἡμετέραν εὐήθειαν — τῇ τὸ θρυλλούμενον ποτε ἀπόρρητον ἐκεῖνο κατασκευάσαι, κ. τ. λ.

⁴³ Diod. 67. 7; Corn. Nep. Chab. 4.

⁴⁴ Diod. 16. 21; Ælian. V. H. 14. 3.

⁴⁵ See concerning this worthless wretch, between whom and the demagogue Charidemus I see no reason for drawing a distinction, Theopomp. ap. Ath. 10. 436, C.; and in particular Dem. in Aristocr. 669. 20, sqq. Comp. Rumpf de Charidemo Orita. Giessen, 1815.

⁴⁶ The proverbial αἱ Χερήτος ὑποσχίσεις, Diog. 2. 1, is very expressive. The people seem in his case to have forgotten such an action as that against the betrayers of the demus.

⁴⁷ See Tittmann, v. d. Amphikt. 170, sqq.

⁴⁸ Paus. 10. 2. 1.

Phocis had refused to perform military service under that state in its war with Sparta, and to this must be ascribed the implacable hostility which it displayed. Little dependence can be placed upon the statement of Duris, that it was occasioned by the conduct of a Phocian who had carried off a Theban woman called Theano⁴⁹; but Aristotle also alludes to a dispute concerning an heiress⁵⁰. Hostilities broke out, Olymp. 106. 2; 355. B. C. Thebes was supported by the Locrians, Thessalians, Per-rhæbians, Magnesians, Ænians, Phthiotan Achæans, Dolopians, and Athamanes⁵¹. But amongst the towns of Thessaly, Pheræ must be excepted. Phocis had indeed once made war upon Jason, and according to the ancient practice of these hostile borderers (without sending a herald to give notice of its intention⁵²); but Pheræ was now upon the side of Phocis. In spite of the dreadful character which the war assumed in consequence of the spoliation of the oracle⁵³, Athens⁵⁴ and Sparta made common cause with Phocis; they were both hostile to Thebes, the former in consequence of the apprehensions it entertained of a conjunction between Thebes and the Macedonian king, and the latter because it had been adjudged by the council of the Amphictyons to pay a fine for having occupied the Cadmea⁵⁵; but although Phocis succeeded in bribing Deinicha, the wife of Archidamus⁵⁶, Sparta did not take an active part

⁴⁹ Athen. 13. 560.

⁵⁰ Arist. Pol. 5. 3. 4; 5. 3. 3, and Plut. Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 280, appear to relate to different circumstances.

⁵¹ Diod. 16. 29.

⁵² Xenoph. Hell. 6. 4. 21.

⁵³ Diod. 16. 30

⁵⁴ Diod. 16. 25. 57; Demosth. de Coron. 230. 28, sqq.; Paus. 3. 10. 4.

⁵⁵ Diod. 16. 29.

⁵⁶ Theopomp. ap. Pausan. 3. 10. 4; Diod. 16. 30.

in the war: the campaign which Archidamus made at the head of a small army effected nothing⁵⁷. Amongst the Bœotian towns, Coronea, Orchomenus, and Chæronea successively fell into the hands of the Phocians⁵⁸. The effective force of the Phocians themselves was inconsiderable, but the treasures of the oracle for some time enabled them to keep on foot large bodies of mercenaries. The dissensions in Thessaly brought about the intervention of Philip, who took the fortress of Ithome, Olymp. 106. 4; 353. B. C.⁵⁹, and thereby commanded the whole line of coast as far as Thessaly. Like Archelaus, Amyntas, and Alexander in former times, Philip was now called upon to assist the Aleuads of Larissa in their contest with Pheræ, the ally of the Phocians⁶⁰. The Phocians and Pheræans suffered repeated defeats, and all Thessaly eventually fell under the dominion of Philip⁶¹.

Meanwhile the attention of Athens had been turned to the Thracian coast and Eubœa, and in the events which ensued, we have ample opportunity to admire the greatness of Demosthenes, contrasted as it was with the utter imbecility of the people at large. Athens endeavoured to secure the passage of the Hellespont for her corn-vessels, by means of conquests in the Chersonese, and Chabrias took Sestos⁶², Olymp. 106. 4; 353. B. C.; the Thracian king Cersobleptes gave up to the Athenians the whole of the Chersonese

⁵⁷ Diod. 16. 58.⁵⁸ Diod. 16. 33. 35. 39.⁵⁹ Diod. 16. 34; Demosth. Olynth. 1. 12. 28.⁶⁰ Diod. 16. 14. 35.⁶¹ Diod. 16. 35.⁶² Diod. 16. 34.

except Cardia⁶³. Philip thereupon prepared to attack Heræum in the vicinity of Byzantium; whereupon the Athenians became alarmed. But being informed that Philip was dangerously ill, and that his death was hourly expected, they gradually relaxed in their preparations, and seemed wholly incapable of availing themselves of the favourable conjuncture that presented itself. Too much impoverished by their luxury and extravagance to purchase the services of mercenaries, and too enervated personally to share in the toils and dangers of an expedition, they had not the courage to attack their enemy with vigour and determination; and the general conduct of the war, and the single undertakings displayed an equal degree of feebleness and irresolution⁶⁴. Some time afterwards, when it became necessary to send succours to Olynthus, instead of collecting forty ships and sixty talents, and arming all the citizens up to forty-five years of age, they could only bring together ten vessels and five talents⁶⁵ in all. Generally speaking the Athenians never resolved upon an undertaking till after an unprofitable and stormy discussion in the popular assembly⁶⁶, and most frequently, when the favourable moment had elapsed; besides which their measures themselves were disconnected and detached, and not adopted in conformity to any systematic or well-concerted plan of operations; Philip on the other hand not only

⁶³ Diod. ubi sup. The account in Argum. Dem. in Aristocr. 618, sqq., is more circumstantial.

⁶⁴ See Demosth. Phil. 1. 51. 20, sqq.

⁶⁵ Demosth. Olynth. 3. 29. 20. sqq.

⁶⁶ Demosth. Olynth. 3. 29. 23: πολλῶν δὲ λόγων καὶ θορύβου γιγνομένου παρ' ὑμῖν, κ. τ. λ. Æschin. de Fals. Legat. 251: — ἐκκλησιάζειν μετὰ φόβου καὶ θορύβου, et ubi sup.

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resolved and executed with equal promptitude and decision, but derived the greatest advantage in the prosecution of his enterprizes from his local position, which enabled him to send forth his armies and fleets, when the Etesian winds⁶⁷ prevented the Athenians from sailing towards the north. Hence, although the Athenians for a short time exulted at their success, in frustrating his premature attempt to force a passage through the straits of Thermopylæ⁶⁸, it was not long before their fears were renewed and redoubled. Philip had availed himself of the dissensions which prevailed in Eubœa to carry on his intrigues, and by dispensing his gold with a liberal hand, had succeeded in setting up several tyrants and gaining over others to his interest⁶⁹. In the mean time Olynthus was threatened with an invasion from Philip, who had formerly given it Anthemus and Potidæa in order to induce it to enter into a league with him against Athens⁷⁰, and in its emergency it had recourse to Athens, Ol. 107. 4 ; 349. B. C.⁷¹. The three (Olynthian) orations of Demosthenes produced three expeditions in its favour⁷² ; but their result is well known. Chares set sail with a fleet of thirty ships and two thousand men, extorted sixty talents from the Phocians,

⁶⁷ Demosth. Phil. 1. 48. 24 : — τοῖς πνεύμασι καὶ ταῖς ὥραις τοῦ ἔτους τὰ πολλὰ προλαμβάνων διαπράττεται Φίλιππος· καὶ φυλάξας τοὺς ἐγησίας, ἢ τὸν χειμῶνα ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἥνικ' ἀν ἡμεῖς μὴ δυνώμεθα ἔκκεισε ἀφείσθαι. Conf. 44. 23.

⁶⁸ Diod. 16. 38 ; conf. Dem. de Coron. 236. 15 ; de Falsâ Legat. 367. 21, sqq. ; Ulpian, 93. ed. Wolf. See below, § 77, on Diophantus.

⁶⁹ See § 78.

⁷⁰ Argum. Demosth. Olynth. 1. p. 7. 8. and 10 ; Demosth. in Aristocr. 656. 9.

⁷¹ Argum. Demosth. Olynth. 1 ; Dionys. Halicarn. ad Amm. 6. p. 6, Tauchn. ; Justin. 8. 3 ; Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 361.

⁷² Philoch. ap. Schol. Demosth. 2. 23.

and plundered Chalcidice⁷³; his successor the profligate Charidemus, was still more worthless than himself⁷⁴. It was at length resolved to assemble an army of two thousand heavy-armed troops and three hundred horse⁷⁵, but all in vain; Olynthus, Ol. 108. 1; 347. B. C., fell through domestic treachery into the power of Philip⁷⁶, who reduced the inhabitants to slavery⁷⁷, destroyed it together with Apollonia, and thirty-two other towns in Chalcidice, and on the adjoining coast of Thrace, which he captured within a year⁷⁸, though several, such as Torone and Mecyberna⁷⁹, had fallen into his hands before the reduction of Olynthus; whilst so completely were they demolished that their sites could scarcely be discovered⁸⁰. Philip next made a descent upon Lemnos and Imbrus⁸¹, and even went so far as to capture and carry off the Salaminian trireme⁸² near Marathon, after which he once more established himself in Eubœa. The indignation of the Athenians being roused by these events, and by the second philippic of Demosthenes⁸³, they had, immediately upon the fall of

⁷³ Theopomp. ap. Athen. 12. 532. C. D.; Philoch. ap. Dionys. ad Amm. 6. 14. Tauchn.

⁷⁴ Theopomp. ap. Ath. 10. 436. C.

⁷⁵ Dionys. ad Amm. 6. 14.

⁷⁶ Demosth. Phil. 3. 125. 10. sqq.; de Cherson. 99. 22; de Coron. 241. 25, etc.

⁷⁷ Diod. 16. 53; Demosth. de Falsa Legat. 439. 3.

⁷⁸ Demosth. ubi sup. 426. 14, sqq.

⁷⁹ Diod. 16. 53.

⁸⁰ Demosth. Phil. 3. 117. 19, sqq.

⁸¹ The departure of the Athenians sent in search of Chares took place at this time; Antiochus was instructed ζητεῖν τὸν στρατηγὸν — καὶ ἐντυχόντου φράζειν, ὅτι θαυμάζει ὁ δῆμος τῶν Ἀθηναίων, εἰ Φίλιππος μὲν ἐπὶ Χερρόνησον τῶν Ἀθηναίων πορεύεται, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἴσασιν, οὐδὲ τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν ἐξέπεμψαν, ὅπου ἐστίν.

⁸² Demosth. Phil. 1. 49. 25, sqq.

⁸³ I entirely agree with Dionys. Hal. (ad Amm. 6. 15. Tauchn.) in looking upon the second part of the so-called first speech, as a separate and distinct oration, περὶ τῆς φυλακῆς τῶν νησιωτῶν (Lemnos, Imbrus, Sciathus) καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ πόλεων. Conf. Fr. Jacobs: Demosthenes Staatsreden, 1805, p. 46, sqq.

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Olynthus, sent Æschines to the Peloponnesus, in order to obtain the co-operation of Megalopolis⁸⁴, but were appeased⁸⁵ by the representations of Neoptolemus and Aristodemus, two actors whom Philip had bribed over to his purposes, and who first advised them to make peace⁸⁶; whilst the account which Phrynon, who had been taken prisoner by some Macedonian soldiers, gave of the clemency with which he had been treated, entirely removed from their minds any remains of animosity they might still harbour against Philip⁸⁷; wherefore hoping to obtain peace from that monarch as a matter of favour and friendship, and not by means of a regular treaty, they suspended all their war-like preparations.

Philip, in the mean time, Olymp. 108. 2; 347. B. C., having been summoned by the Thebans to assist them against the Phocians⁸⁸, who had reduced them to great straits, intimidated the exhausted Phocians by his preparations. Athens entertained hopes that the peace which she was about to negotiate with Philip, would likewise include the Phocians. Two embassies were now sent to him. In the first, his gold⁸⁹ corrupted the fidelity of Æschines, Philocrates, etc., whilst the presence of Philip so humbled and abashed Demosthenes, that his self-possession entirely forsook him, and he could not utter a word⁹⁰; the second

⁸⁴ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 344. 12, sqq. 439. 3, sqq.; Æschin. de Falsâ Legat. 257.

⁸⁵ Argum. Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 334. 16, sqq.

⁸⁶ Dem. ubi sup. 344. 7. 21; conf. 442. 27: Φίλιππος — τοὺς τὰ φιλόανθρωπα λέγοντας ἐκείνους ἀπέστειλεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, τὸν Νεοπτόλεμον, τὸν Ἀριστόδημον, τὸν Κτησιφῶντα.

⁸⁷ Argum. ubi sup. 335. 12, sqq.; Æschin. de Falsâ Legat. 196, sqq.

⁸⁸ Diodor. 16. 58.

⁸⁹ Dem. de Falsâ Legat. 439. 18, sqq. Argum.

⁹⁰ Æschin. de Falsâ Legat. 219, sqq.

consisted of Æschines and Eubulus, whom Demosthenes was appointed to attend as an ambassador extraordinary⁹¹; Demosthenes tried in vain to accelerate the movements of his faithless and dilatory colleagues, who remained absent three entire months, during which Cersobleptes⁹² and the Thracian towns Serrion, Doriscus, Hieron Oros⁹³, etc., were reduced⁹⁴ by Philip, who gave them fair words indeed⁹⁵, but no solid assurances of a favourable issue of the holy war. But Æschines kept up the confidence of the Athenians in the amicable termination of the war, by declaring that Philip had whispered in his ear, that he durst not, on account of Thebes, declare openly in favour of the Phocians, and that, for the same reason, they could not be expressly named in the articles of the peace⁹⁶, etc. But they were soon undeceived: before a third embassy could reach Philip⁹⁷, a Macedonian army, in conjunction with some Thessalians, Thebans, etc., entered Phocis, which offered no resistance, as it had, in Olymp. 108. 2; 346. B. C., in confident expectation of peace, declined the assistance of Archidamus the Spartan, who was marching to its relief⁹⁸; the so-styled council of the Amphictyons passed sentence upon the Phocians as temple-robbers⁹⁹, after which, all the towns in the

⁹¹ See Taylor ad Argum. Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. p. 340, on the singular words *οὐκ ἀπὸ ἑλθεῖν*, which can only be explained by his having been deputed to follow them, or to accompany them in an extraordinary capacity.

⁹² Demosth. de Coron. 235. 17, sqq.; Phil. 3. 148.

⁹³ Demosth. Phil. 3. 114; de Coron. 234. 12.

⁹⁴ See the dates in Taylor ad Demosth. de Coron. 196—205.

⁹⁵ Argum. Dem. de Pac. 55. 6, sqq.; Ibid. 59. 12, sqq.; Argum. Dem. Phil. 2. 65. 4, sqq.; Dem. de Falsâ Legat. 346. 12, sqq.

⁹⁶ Dem. de Falsâ Legat. ubi sup. et Argum. 337. 17.

⁹⁷ Dem. de Falsâ Legat. 379. 18, sqq.

⁹⁸ Dem. de Falsâ Legat. 365; Æschin. 302.

⁹⁹ Diodor. 16. 60; Paus. 3. 10. 2; Dem. de Falsâ Legat. 362. 19, sqq.; conf. Append. ix.

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district were laid in ruins, the inhabitants dispersed amongst the villages, and many of them dragged into Macedonia¹⁰⁰, Olymp. 108. 3; 364. B. C.¹⁰¹. Philip was now received into the Amphictyonic league in the place of the Phocians, and invested with the promanteia of the oracle and the superintendence of the Pythian games¹⁰². These measures were effected with the zealous concurrence and at the instigation of Thebes¹⁰³. Athens did not consume much time in vain and unprofitable repentance; her first step was to protest against Philip's admission into the Amphictyonic league, after which she offered an asylum to the Phocian fugitives, and prepared to fortify the Piræus¹⁰⁴ and the fortresses. Upon this occasion the ardour of the Athenians made them disregard the advice of Demosthenes, who was opposed to a rupture¹⁰⁵. But he, too, was soon after roused to make a last and desperate stand against the restless aggressions of the Macedonian.

Philip now spread out his snares more widely than before, and sought to gain over the Peloponnese and the states on the Ionian sea on the one side, and those in the Chersonese and on the Thracian Bosphorus on the other, with the view of detaching Athens from its allies, and then investing and reducing it by famine. In the third year after the conclusion of the peace, Olymp. 109. 1; 344. B. C., Demosthenes dissuaded his fellow-citizens

¹⁰⁰ Justin. 8. 5.

¹⁰¹ This is the date in Diodorus. Pans. 10. 3. 1, fixes it in Olymp. 108. 1, during the archonship of Theophilus. Corsini (Olymp. 108. 2-3) correctly decides for the first.

¹⁰² Diodor. 16. 60.

¹⁰³ Dem. de Falsâ Legat. 445. 25: *Θηβαῖοι δ' ἦσαν οἱ κατασκάπτουρες*.

¹⁰⁴ Dem. de Pac. 61. 27, sqq.; Ulpian, 94, ed. Wolf.

¹⁰⁵ Orat. de Pac.

from infringing its provisions. Against Philip himself he directed the thunders of his second philippic¹⁰⁶, and then, Olymp. 109. 2; 348. B. C., impeached the domestic traitor Æschines¹⁰⁷, whilst Hyperides accused Philocrates¹⁰⁸; but the Athenians having capital prosecutions to engage their attention, could spare no time from these all-engrossing pursuits to obstruct the progress of Philip, who now partially executed his intentions with regard to the states of the Peloponnesus and those on the western sea. As a preliminary step, he had induced Elis¹⁰⁹, Sicyon¹¹⁰, and Megara¹¹¹ by bribes, and Argos, Arcadia, and Messenia¹¹² by the offer of his friendship and alliance, to make a joint attack upon Sparta. Before Demosthenes pronounced his oration against Æschines¹¹³, a sanguinary conflict broke out between Philip's partisans and opponents in Elis¹¹⁴; this was followed by his attempt upon Ambracia and Leucas¹¹⁵, and the occupation of Naupactus, Cassiopea, and Pandosia¹¹⁶. He now began to attack Athens in her most vulnerable point, viz., by directing his force against the places on the northern straits; he captured Cardia on the Chersonesus¹¹⁷, which the valiant Diopetides had closely invested. This roused the Athenians to increased exertions. Ok

¹⁰⁶ Dionys. ad Ann. 6. 15. When I say the second Philippic, I mean according to the order in which they are usually printed, comp. n. 83.

¹⁰⁷ Conf. Taylor ap. Reiske, appar. ad Demosth. 1. 330.

¹⁰⁸ Dem. de Falsa Legat. 376. 16.

¹⁰⁹ Paus. 4. 28. 3.

¹¹⁰ Demosth. de Coron. 242. 2.

¹¹¹ Dem. ubi sup.; conf. Philipp. 3. 118. 6.

¹¹² Argum. Phil. 2.

¹¹³ This results from Dem. de Falsa Legat. 424. 24. But compare Weiske de Hyperbole, 1. 35. 36.

¹¹⁴ Dem. Phil. 4. 183. 29; de Falsa Legat. 424. 24 (τὰς ἐν Ἑλίδι πόλεις); conf. Paus. 4. 28. 3.

¹¹⁵ Dem. Phil. 3. 119. 29, sqq.; conf. Weiske de Hyperb. 2. 40.

¹¹⁶ Ps. Dem. de Halonn. 84. 22.

¹¹⁷ Dem. Phil. 3. 120. 6; de Cherson. 104. 8; 105. 16; Argum. Orat. de Cherson. 88.

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109. 3; 342. B. C.¹¹⁸, Demosthenes succeeded, by means of the third philippic, and his speech on the posture of affairs in the Chersonese, in counter-acting the impression which was produced by an epistle from Philip¹¹⁹, as well as in baffling the insidious machinations of his hirelings¹²⁰. Diopeithes retained the command of the forces in the Chersonese, whilst Phocion drove out the tyrants of Eubœa, Clitarchus, etc., Ol. 109. 4; 341. B. C.¹²¹. Philip now prepared to attack Perinthus and Byzantium¹²², whereupon Demosthenes pronounced his fourth philippic; Philip's assault upon Perinthus was repulsed by a body of mercenaries, sent there by Artaxerxes Ochus¹²³. Diopeithes, indeed, some time afterwards fell in an engagement in the Chersonese; but the letter which Philip sent to the Athenians, in Ol. 110. 1., and in which he offered a justification of his own conduct, and reproached Athens for having made common cause with the Persian monarch¹²⁴, failed to produce the desired effect; public opinion still continued to be with Demosthenes, and the war was vigorously prosecuted. Chios, Rhodes, and Cos, sent succours¹²⁵. The Athenians committed a signal error in nominating Chares to the command; he accomplished nothing¹²⁶; but Phocion made ample amends for the ill success that had attended his operations, by preserving Byzantium¹²⁷, whereupon the Byzantines and Chersonesians testified their gratitude to

¹¹⁸ Dionys. ad Amm. 6. 16.

¹¹⁹ Argum. Dem. de Cherson. 89.

¹²⁰ Dem. Phil. 3. 129. 16.

¹²¹ Diodor. 16. 74; Plut. Demosth. 17; conf. Böckh, Pub. Econ. 2. 111.

¹²² This is the date in Philochorus, ap. Dionys. ad Amm. 6. 18. Diodorus, 16. 74, has Ol. 109. 4: both may be right.

¹²³ Dem. de Phil. Epist. 153. 20, sqq.; conf. Diodor. 16. 75; Paus. 1. 29. 7.

¹²⁴ Demosth. p. 158, sqq.

¹²⁵ Diodor. 16. 77.

¹²⁶ Plut. Phoc. 14.

¹²⁷ Plut. ubi sup.

the Athenians by public decrees to their honour and advantage¹²⁸. The incendiary Antiphon, whom Philip had bribed to set fire to the dockyards and the fleet in the Piræus, and who had been acquitted upon his first trial, was once more summoned by Demosthenes to appear before the Areopagus¹²⁹.

A new war upon the main-land, the last of those denominated holy wars, decided the event. The Locrians of Amphissa, like the Phocians before them, had tilled some of the Delphic lands, whereupon Æschines accused them at the bar of the Amphictyons, Olymp. 110. 1; 339. B. C.¹³⁰; this produced hostilities, which at length led to a regular war; after an unsuccessful campaign of the Amphictyons, Philip was chosen their generalissimo. Athens sent ten thousand mercenaries to the assistance of the Amphisseans¹³¹. The treachery of the Theban Proxenus, who commanded the mercenaries at Amphissa¹³², paved the way for the eventual triumph of Philip's arms, who now suddenly occupied Elatea¹³³, and thereby gave the Athenians to understand that his next attack would be directed against themselves. Athens was startled, but not dispirited. Demosthenes threatened to drag by the hair to prison the first man who should dare to speak of peace¹³⁴, and formed a league between Athens, Megara (which contained an Athenian garrison, and whose long walls had been rebuilt by Phocion¹³⁵), Eubœa, Corinth, Achaia, Corcyra, and

¹²⁸ Demosth. de Coron. 255, sqq.

¹²⁹ Demosth. ubi sup. 261. 6, sqq.; Plut. Demosth. 14.

¹³⁰ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 505, sqq.

¹³¹ Æschin. ubi sup. 536.

¹³² Deinarch. in Demosth. 52.

¹³³ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 532; Diodor. 16. 84.

¹³⁴ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 39.

¹³⁵ Plut. Phoc. 15.

Locradia¹³⁶; even Thebes, where his eloquence had to sustain a severe struggle against the power and subtlety of the Byzantine orator Pythos¹³⁷, was prevailed upon to break off its alliance with Philip, and to join the standard of the patriots¹³⁸. The battle of Chæronea, Ol. 110. 3; 338. B. C.¹³⁹, secured the dominion of Bœotia to Philip, who, finding that the Athenians were preparing to renew the conflict¹⁴⁰, prevailed upon them by his lenity to desist from all further preparations and thereby put an end to the war. Nearly all the states of Greece recognised Philip's hegemony *de facto*, whilst some, and Thebes amongst the number, experienced its oppressive effects¹⁴¹. Sparta was invaded by Philip, and constrained to relinquish her military supremacy in the Peloponnesus, and to restore to the Argives, Tegeatæ, Megalopolitans, and Messenians, those places which she had formerly wrested from them¹⁴².

II. ATHENS.

§ 77. The foregoing outline of the proceedings of the Athenians in their contests and negotiations with Philip, has thrown sufficient light upon their public system in general to confirm the truth of what has been several times advanced with regard to the deep degradation at which the national character had arrived¹. Nevertheless, the democracy² of this period, wild and disorganized as it was, still

¹³⁶ Plut. Demosth. 17.

¹³⁷ Diodor. 16. 85.

¹³⁸ Plut. Demosth. 18.

¹³⁹ Diodor. 16. 86; Plut. Dem. 18. 19. 20.

¹⁴⁰ Lyc. in Leocr. 164. 170.

¹⁴¹ Justin, 9. 4.

¹⁴² Polyb. 9. 28; 17. 14; conf. Manso, Sparta, 3. 1. 245. n.

¹ Conf. § 76. n. 12.

² In the series of Aristotle it is entitled *νεωράνη*—Polit. 5. 4. 6; *νεανωράνη*—4. 9. 8; likewise, *τοχάνη*. See its leading lights and shadows, Ibid. 4. 4. 4-6; 5. 9. 6; 6. 2. 9; 4. 5. 4; 6. 2. 12.

preserved the character of a constitutional system, and, therefore, offers to the historian and the politician far ampler materials for consideration than are presented to them in analysing a tyranny, of which it is the peculiar characteristic, that law and legal authorities are wholly superseded by the uncontrolled power of an individual. Their annals still contain evidences of an internally connected system; even in their degeneracy the Athenians retained their leading characteristics; the seeds of virtue were not extinct within them³, but they wanted the energy and persistency requisite to quicken and expand them. Many of the forms of the constitution were, however, little more than dead letters, and numerous ordinances seemed only destined to show, with what impunity they might be violated.

The best title to the citizenship still continued to be based upon the extraction of parents, who had possessed civil rights⁴. The custom of proving it by means of the Phratores was still retained⁵; but this law was infringed with the greatest effrontery⁶. In the same manner as individuals prided themselves upon the antiquity and purity of their civil blood, so the vanity of the people at large was gratified by constant appeals to their imagined Autochthony⁷. In cases of natural-

³ Unqualified praise is due to their conduct in sending back an intercepted letter from Philip to Olympia (Plut. Demetr. 22; Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 191). Cicero's conduct presents the direct reverse to this proceeding, see Epist. ad Attic. 1. 13; 6. 3; 11. 9.

⁴ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 559, where there is likewise an enumeration of the other qualities requisite to form a good citizen.

⁵ Demosth. in Eubul. 1305; in Macart. 1074; in Leocr. 1092; adv. Boeot. de Nom. 95; Isæus, p. 40. 168. 170, etc. See the passages of the orators collected by Platner, Beitr. z. Att. Recht. p. 72. conf. 85. 105.

⁶ See Demosth. in Eubul. 1317. 17: conf. 1306. 22.

⁷ The orators in this respect give utterance to the feelings of the people at

ization, it was necessary that the person on whom the franchise was to be conferred, should have rendered some service to the state. Though the degeneracy of the Athenians themselves did not render them more liberal in dispensing their citizenship to Metœci, they were sufficiently lavish of it to foreigners⁸; but by bribing the citizens themselves, a still more numerous class of persons⁹ obtained it surreptitiously¹⁰. Upon a par with these unprincipled practices, was the abandoned sycophancy which prevailed, and which, in the total incapacity of the people to estimate the character of evidence, was no less calculated to endanger genuine citizenship, than to shelter and embolden those whose claims to it were unfounded¹¹. Amongst those who had received the Athenian citizenship were several monarchs, who, like Perdiccas¹² and Sitalces¹³ before them, were in friendship and alliance with Athens, as Leucon¹⁴ on the Cimmerian Bosphorus, Cotys¹⁵, Cersobleptes and Teres¹⁶, kings in Thrace, Evagoras of Salamis and Dionysius of Syracuse¹⁷, and Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea on the Pontus¹⁸. The value which the Athenians set upon this privilege, is proved by their conduct towards the

large. Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 424. 29, unless the passage is an interpolation; Orat. in Nær. 1370. 14; Orat. Funeb. 1390. 3; Lycurg. in Leocr. 170; Eurip. Fragm. ap. Lycurg. 204; conf. Isocrat. Symmach. 268.

⁸ Demosth. in Aristocr. 687. 17: οὐ μόνον δ' αὐτῇ τῆς πόλεως ἡ δωρεὰ προπεπληάκιται καὶ φάσκει γέγονεν κ. τ. λ. This is followed by examples, Isocrat. Symmach. 268: ῥᾶον δὲ μεταδίδομεν τοῖς βουλομένοις ταύτης τῆς εὐγενείας, ἢ Τριβαλλοὶ καὶ Λευκανοὶ τῆς αὐτῶν δυσγενείας.

⁹ Conf. Meier de Bon. 77.

¹⁰ Ps. Dem. in Nær. 1317. 5.

¹¹ Likewise, on this point consult Meier, ubi sup. 87, and on the proceedings generally, 57.

¹² Dem. in Lept. 687. 11; but according to the speech de Syntax, 173. 7, he only had ἀτίλειαν.

¹³ Philip's letter, Demosth. 161. 3.

¹⁴ Dem. in Lept. 466. 15.

¹⁵ Dem. in Aristocr. 659. 22.

¹⁶ Philip's letter in Demosth. 160. 20; conf. Dem. in Aristocr. 688. 8.

¹⁷ Phil. Epist. 161. 11.

¹⁸ Dem. in Lept. 482. 27.

Phœnician prince Straton, who had done them a service, and on whom, though they testified their respect for him in various ways, they refused to confer their citizenship¹⁹; they likewise evinced a feeling of shame at having granted it to the Thesalian Pitholaus and the Olynthian Apollonides, and accordingly deprived them of it again²⁰.

Gradations in civil rights according to a valuation still existed, and this formed the basis of Demosthenes' institution of the Symmorias. Even after the bitter experience of the social war, provision was made for citizens by means of Cleruchiae, as, for instance, in Samos and the Chersonese²¹. Family nobility, notwithstanding the priesthoods which were still annexed to it, could scarcely have retained any degree of exclusive authority after having been so long stripped of its hereditary rights and immunities; but illustrious ancestry was still regarded with respect, and ancient families took pride in carefully continuing their pedigrees²². Marks of honour conferred on deserving citizens, or such as were considered so, became more numerous than before²³; besides presenting them with crowns, it became usual to erect statues to them, which honour was conferred upon Conon, for the first time after the days of Harmodius and Aristogiton²⁴.

It was scarcely possible that a division of parties based upon any political difference, the opposition between the optimates and the popular party,

¹⁹ See Inscript. Böckh, Thesaur. Inscript. p. 126, and see Böckh, ad eand.

²⁰ Ps. Dem. in Near. 1376. 5.

²¹ See above, § 76. n. 25.

²² Concerning Lycurg. see Vit. Dec. Orat. Plut. 9. 355.

²³ See the particulars of the manner in which this was done Dem. de Coron. and Æschin. in Ctesiph. Conf. Taylor's introduction to the Speech of Æschines.

²⁴ Dem. in Lept. 478. 5.

should exist after the last remnants of aristocracy had been extirpated; there were still Laconistæ²⁵ indeed, of whom we have already spoken, but their pursuits were as insignificant as before. Still even at this stage a difference may be perceived between the friends of the constitution and the laws, and those selfish and unprincipled plunderers who only regarded the constitution as a source of advantage to themselves; as well as between the patriotic supporters of the freedom and independence of the state—the zealous defenders of the republic as such, and the hired partisans of Philip on the one side, and the supporters of monarchy on the other²⁶. The patriots in general may be divided into such as were opposed to the Macedonian, and such as were opposed to the Persian interest. Finally there were, as was before observed, various associations destitute of a political character, some of which had been formed solely with a view to festive objects, and only rendered themselves liable to censure by occasional acts of levity and wantonness, such as the Sixty²⁷; this association appears to have conduced to bring about the treaty of peace with Philip after the battle of Chæronea; whilst others were united for the purpose of carrying on the most abominable system of chicanery and intrigue, sycophancy, etc²⁸.

The condition of the non-citizens appears to have undergone no change. The slaves were

²⁵ See § 71. n. 76. Conf. Plut. Phoc. 10.

²⁶ Perhaps Isocrates alone united the characters of a monarchist and a patriot; that he was the latter is proved by his voluntary death after the battle of Chæronea. Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 330. Conf. Pausan. 1. 18. 7.

²⁷ Athen. 14. 614, D. E.

²⁸ Demosth. in Zenothem. 885. 1 :—*ἴστιν ἐργαστήρια μοχθηρῶν ἀνθρώπων συνεστηκότων ἐν τῇ Πειραιῇ.*

allowed the same licence of speech as before²⁹; the example of their masters appears to have infected them; but on the other hand it is probable that, from the constant increase of sycophancy, and the total inability of the judges to distinguish between truth and falsehood, it became more usual to put those unhappy beings to the rack in order to extort the truth from them! Enfranchisement appears to have been permitted even in opposition to the will of the master³⁰. The ordinance enacting that no slave should be called Harmodius or Aristogiton³¹, probably dated from a remote age. In consequence of the considerable trade which was still carried on in Athens, the Metœci continued to form a numerous class, to which belonged the money-changers (*τραπεζῖται*); Pasion³², on whom the rights of citizenship were deservedly conferred, was the most considerable amongst them.

The orators have left us a highly-coloured picture of the disgraceful conduct of the demus in the popular assembly. Seriousness, calmness, and consistency were alike foreign to their proceedings; bursts of rage and frivolous jests alternately diverted them from the path of sober deliberation. A new means had been adopted since Timarchus' pugilistic contest with his adversary to preserve order in the assembly, and to restrain the turbu-

²⁹ Demosth. in Phil. 3. 111. 7:—*ὁμοῖς τὴν παρρησίαν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὕτω κοινὴν οἴεσθε δεῖν εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὥστε καὶ τοῖς ξένοις καὶ τοῖς δούλοις αὐτῆς μεταδιδώκατε.*

³⁰ If we are authorized in reasoning back from the case of Casina, Plaut. 2. 5. 7.

³¹ Gellius, Nect. Att. 9. 2.

³² Böckh, Pub. Econ. 2. 12. Others were: Cittus, Dem. in Phorm. 908. 22; Darnius and Pamphilus, Arg. Dem. in Dionysod. 1281. 1; Xenon, Euphræus, Euphron, Callistratus, Dem. in Phorm. 948. 16. 17; Sosicles, 953. 15. etc. Comp. Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 139, sqq.

lence of the speakers³³; but there is no reason to think that it had the desired effect; the propensity of the people to noise and violence was uncontrollable³⁴; Demosthenes compares the instability of the assembly with the winds of the sea³⁵. The citizens frequented it from curiosity and in search of amusement, and the first question they generally asked was, whether there was any thing new³⁶. To this must be added their extraordinary credulity in the estimation of evidence, and the remarkable flippancy with which they decided upon matters of the last importance³⁷. After enquiring whether any thing new had happened, their incapacity for deliberation expressed itself in the question—what is to be done now³⁸? During the debate every opportunity for merriment was seized with avidity³⁹; jesters were called well-bred people⁴⁰, and the laughter and applause of the assembly rewarded and encouraged them⁴¹; Phocion was taunted by Chares with the seriousness of his demeanour⁴². It cannot, therefore, excite astonishment if, amidst so many causes of distraction, coupled with the artifices of the orators and cajolers

³³ Schömann, de Comit. 88 (see Sheet G.). Conf. Demosth. in Aristog. 797. 15.

³⁴ Æschin. in Tim. 100: εὐθὺς—θορυβεῖτε ὑμεῖς.

³⁵ Dem. de Falsâ Legat. 383. 4. sqq. :—ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἐστὶν ὄχλος, ἀσταθμητότατον πρᾶγμα τῶν πάντων καὶ ἀσυνθετώτατον, ὥσπερ ἐν θαλάττῃ πνεῦμα ἀκατάστατον, ὡς ἂν τύχοι, κινούμενον.

³⁶ Demosth. Phil. Epist. 156, 27. sqq. :—εἴ τι λέγεται νεώτερον.

³⁷ Παθυμία.

³⁸ Τί οὖν χρὴ ποιεῖν; Demosth. de Cherson. 99. 10, in Phil. 4. 5, sqq.

³⁹ Æschin. in Tim. 106. 128.

⁴⁰ Isocrat. Areopag. 233 :—τοὺς εὐτραπέλους δὲ καὶ σκώπτειν δυναμένους, οὓς νῦν εὐφρεῖς προσαγορεύουσιν.

⁴¹ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 348 (Philocrates and his accomplices): ἰβδὼν, ἰξέκρουόν με, τελευτῶντες ἰχλεύαζον· ὑμεῖς δ' ἐγελάτε, καὶ οὐδ' ἀκούειν ἠθέλετε, κ. τ. λ. Conf. 355. 22. sqq. Philocrates declared that it was not surprising that he and Demosthenes should differ in opinion, and adds—οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ὕδωρ, ἐγὼ δὲ οἶνον πίνω· καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐγελάτε.

⁴² Plut. Phoc. 15.

of the people⁴³, the assembly signaled itself by dysbulia, and if the stability of the law was sacrificed to the fleeting caprice of the moment⁴⁴; the duty of expounding and enforcing the law was disregarded, whilst psephisms multiplied to an alarming extent⁴⁵; speaking and acting⁴⁶ were separated by a wide gulf, the matters which had been debated and decided on in the assembly were forgotten at home⁴⁷, and deliberation was sometimes known to take place after action⁴⁸.

The courts of justice still continued to be the favourite resorts of the people, and the general avidity for legal proceedings was nourished and supported by the prevalence of quarrels and chicane. This afforded the Athenian an opportunity of pouring forth all the angry vehemence of his nature. Constant allusions are made to the vindictive malice of the accuser⁴⁹ and the irascibility of the judges⁵⁰. The prosecutor never attempted to conceal his hatred⁵¹, and endeavoured to arouse the indignation of the judges, less by stating the offence of the party accused and the manner in which he had infringed the law, than by violence and invective. Now though there can be no doubt that human feelings and passions require to be aroused

⁴³ Demosth. in Tim. 704. 29:—κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν λογοποιουὺς καθίεσαν.

⁴⁴ The remark in Schol. Aristoph. Nub. 1188:—ῥητόρας, οἱ τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα τῶν νομοθετῶν ἴσασιν, οὐ μέντοι τοὺς νόμους, is applicable here.

⁴⁵ See § 71. n. 6.

⁴⁶ Demosth. de Chers. 98. 10. sqq.

⁴⁷ Demosth. in Phil. 4. 131. 10. sqq.; de Falsâ Legat. 383. 9.

⁴⁸ Demosth. de Pac. 57. 10: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι πρὸ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰώθασιν χρῆσθαι τῷ βουλευέσθαι· ὑμεῖς δὲ μετὰ τὰ πράγματα. Comp. de Chers. 92. 25. sqq.; in Phil. 4. 137. 1. sqq.

⁴⁹ Demosth. in Nicostr. 1246. 16; in Theocr. 1322. 5; in Neær. 1345. 7; Lysias in Agor. 447. 469; in Alcib. 519. 569.

⁵⁰ Demosth. in Phorm. 913. 6: ὀργὴ μεγάλη; Lyc. in Leocr. 158. 232, etc.

⁵¹ Demosth. in Timocr. 702. 11: ἀδιάλλακτον ἰχθρὸν ἡγοίμην.

before the law can be administered, according to its true spirit and intention; still the rancour and malignity with which these wretches laboured to effect the destruction of their fellow-citizens, must excite the utmost detestation and abhorrence; the lives of others had no value in their eyes. Here, too, the assembly appears to have shown much of its usual listlessness and negligence⁵²; it patiently endured the violence and clamour of the prosecutors, listened with pleasure to the jests and ribaldry of the speakers, and lent itself to the frauds of those who sought to attain their ends by illicit means⁵³. The baseness of the sycophants coincided with the effrontery of the orators⁵⁴; and we can form no conception of the evils which resulted from their unprincipled audacity, supported as it was by the corruptness of the judges, and not unfrequently screening itself behind the most excellent provisions of the constitution. Compared with this flagitious tribe, the accusers of Socrates appear spotless and pure. It was no longer possible to oppose any effectual obstacle to their iniquitous career. As, formerly, distinguished citizens had seldom escaped ostracism, so now the most unimpeachable integrity was not safe from the accusations of sycophants; and honest citizens who

⁵² Amongst the means used to rouse the attention of the assembly, may be mentioned such expressions as occur, Demosth. in Callicl. 1274. 11: ἀλλὰ προσέχετε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς Διὸς καὶ θεῶν τὸν νοῦν.

⁵³ Demosth. in Aristocr. 689. 4, sqq.: ὑμεῖς — τοὺς τὰ μέγιστ' ἀδικοῦντας καὶ φανερώς ἐξελεγχομένους, ἀν' ἐν ἧ δύο ἀστεῖα εἶπωσι, καὶ παρὰ τῶν φυλετῶν τινες ἡρημένοι σύνδικοι δεηθῶσιν, ἀφίετε.

⁵⁴ Ps. Demosth. in Neær. 1359. 15: — συκοφάντης, τῶν παραβοώντων παρὰ τὸ βῆμα, καὶ γραφομένων μισθοῦ, κ. τ. λ.; Demosth. in Eubul. 1309. 11: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ συκοφάντης, αἰτιάσασθαι μὲν πάντα, ἐξιλέγξαι δὲ μηδέν. To this head must be referred the threats of accusations and the expressions ἀνασειῶ, ἐπαινασειῶ, διασειῶ, for the explanation of which, see the lexicographers.

desired to live in peace could, like Lydurgus, even prevail upon themselves to bribe them, in order to purchase exemption from their attacks⁵⁵.

The agency of the council of Five Hundred and the Areopagus had become exceedingly insignificant. But the latter was not even yet, the cypher which it subsequently became; it repealed the decree appointing Æschines to advocate the cause of Athens in its claims upon Delos, and nominated Hyperides in his stead⁵⁶; but how was it possible for it to produce any moral impression on such a dissolute multitude as the Athenians had now become, or for its members to have retained, in the midst of corruption thus wide-spread and deep-seated, the moral dignity and excellence by which they had once been characterized. As the power of the Areopagus was almost paralyzed, so the council of Five Hundred was exposed to the encroachments of the populace; and we may form some idea of the interruption which was offered to their proceedings, from the mere fact that the council-house was filled with non-official citizens⁵⁷, as was, in modern days, the case with the *tribunes* of the French national convention.

Candidates were most anxious to obtain those offices which were charged with the management of the public finances, and these were not unfrequently purchased⁵⁸ with money, and employed⁵⁹ as a means to amass riches. This was effected

⁵⁵ Plut. de sui laude. 8. 143.

⁵⁶ Demosth. de Coron. 271. 20.

⁵⁷ Demosth. de Falsa Legat. 346. 18: τὸ γὰρ βουλευτήριον μιστὸν ἦν ἰδιωτῶν. Conf. Æschin. in Ctesiph. 516: εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον καὶ μετασπασάμενος τοὺς ἰδιώτας.

⁵⁸ Æschin. in Timocr. 126.

⁵⁹ Æschin. ibid.

the more easily, as the whole administration of the public revenue was regarded with suspicion, owing to the habitual malversations of the *Poristæ*; but although these peculations were exercised with the utmost publicity, it was still the favourite occupation of the Athenians to detect and to punish them. The once important office of strategus had lost all consideration, since the citizens had ceased to perform military service themselves. Natives of Athens no longer aspired to command the armies of the state, as the citizens did not take part in the expeditions; but the Athenians still exhibited the same eagerness to impeach their generals⁶⁰. Few men were now found, who were willing to expose themselves to the fickleness of the people, when they saw that it was their enemies alone that they could terrify.

The brave and worthy Phocion⁶¹, the scholar of Plato and Xenocrates⁶², was as austere as Pericles and Socrates; stern and hardy as the Marathonians, smiles and tears were alike foreign to his nature. He was chosen strategus forty-five times⁶³. His conduct merits particular attention, inasmuch as he did not renounce the pursuits of the statesman, but combined with an influence upon the people at home, the duties of strategus abroad⁶⁴, without attempting to gain their favour by demagoguery. Though not a regular orator, he possessed a certain racy vigour of expression, which he could apply with singular energy and effect⁶⁵. Both in

⁶⁰ Demosth. de Cherson. 97. 12.

⁶¹ *Χρηστός*. Ælian. V. H. 3. 47; 4. 16; 12. 43.

⁶² Plat. Phoc. 4.

⁶³ Plat. Phoc. 5.

⁶⁴ Plat. Phoc. 7.

⁶⁵ Plat. Phoc. 20, sqq. Conf. Apophth. 6. 711; de Vitiis. Pub. 8. 110.

his countenance and words the people constantly saw their faults reflected as in a true and faithful mirror; and he sternly and harshly reproached them with their unworthiness, instead of endeavouring to raise them to the moral elevation and dignity of his own character; thus he kept aloof from the people, and uniformly repulsed their approaches, except when they adventured their lives against the enemies of their country. The fault of this estrangement did not lie with the demus alone; Phocion himself was deficient in that humane and high-minded patriotism, which generously bears with the foibles and infirmities of others, and strives to amend them by exhorting them to virtue and inspiring them with loftier aims; the incisions he made were keen and deep, but they brought with them no cure of the evil.

Lastly, the office of ambassador was of great importance from its connection with demagogy. From the time that Gorgias had appeared at Athens as the ambassador of the Leontines during the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians had selected their most able orators as envoys to other states. Thus Callistratus, etc., were sent to Sparta; Demosthenes, Æschines, Lycurgus, and Hyperides were charged with similar duties at other places. Other states imitated the example of Athens; even the short and pithy sayings of the Spartans became somewhat extended after the time of Brasidas, Lysander, and Antalcidas. In fact no Grecian state could dispense with the aid of oratory, that powerful lever of Grecian diplomacy, in which the use of writing was almost unknown.

The demagogues, in the invidious sense of the

word; still continued to oppose the legally-appointed functionaries, and maintained their unconstitutional power by the same base arts as their prototypes in antiquity had done, viz., by flattering the people and pandering to their love of luxury and pleasure. How estranged from all dignity and decorum, the intercourse of the people and the orators had become, is proved by the freedom with which even the more dignified among them, like Demosthenes, who disclaimed all community of feeling with the corrupt demagogues of his time⁶⁶, expostulated with the people upon their faults, and the patience with which the latter listened to their reproaches. It would almost seem as though the Athenians, upon the restriction of the comic licence, had conceded to the orators the right of indulging in a strain of sarcasm and abuse, which, like the attacks of comedy in former days, without reference to its justice or injustice, gratified them by its violence and asperity. An anthology of vituperative phrases might doubtless be culled from the speeches of Demosthenes and Æschines⁶⁷, which would probably exceed any thing that was ever uttered by a modern orator. If it should excite

⁶⁶ Demosth. in Aristocr. 687. 19: — διὰ τὴν τῶν καταράτων καὶ θεοῖς ἰχθρῶν ῥητόρων — πονηρίαν. Conf. in Aristog. 772. 2, sqq. He also says in his speech against Aristog. 782. 7. Κύνων τοῦ δήμου. In Lept. 508. 6: πολλὰ γὰρ ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλάκις οὐκ ἐδιδάχθητε, ὥς ἴσθι δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἀφγρέθητε ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν λεγόντων κραυγῆς καὶ βίας καὶ ἀναισχυντίας.

⁶⁷ Demosth. de Coron. 281. 1: — πολὺ τι σκότος, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἴσθι παρ' ὑμῖν πρὸς τῆς ἀληθείας; in Phil. 2. 72. 16: οὕτως ἡ παραντίς ἡδονὴ καὶ ῥαστώνη μῖζον ἰσχύει τοῦ ποθ' ὕστερον συνοίσειν μέλλοντος; in Phil. 4. 133. 1: ἀλλὰ μανδραγόραν πεπωκόσιν, ἢ τι φάρμακον ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἰοίκαμεν ἀνθρώποις; *ibid.* 136. 23: — γελῶς ἴσθιν, ὥς χρώμεθα τοῖς πράγμασιν; *ibid.* 140. 9: τὴν ἀβελτερίαν; in Androt. 618. 1: ὑμεῖς δ' εἰς τοῦτο — προήχθητε εὐηθείας καὶ ῥαθυμίας; in Phil. 3. 124. 23: εἰς τοῦτο ἀφίχθε μωρίας ἢ παρανοίας ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγειν, κ. τ. λ. Still stronger are such expressions as ὦ πάντων ἀνθρώπων φαυλότατοι, de Cherson. 98. 22; ὦ σιδήρειοι, Æschin. in Ctesiph. 544, etc.

surprise, that these reproaches were patiently endured, it is still more astonishing that such bitter truths should require to be enforced⁶⁸. The popular assembly and the Heliaea were of course highly delighted when the orators loaded each other with abusive epithets⁶⁹, of which, as well as of invectives against other Greeks, numerous examples occur in the ancient writers⁷⁰. They seldom omitted to support their cause by personal attacks upon their adversary, which, though rather characterized by noise and vehemence than by cunning and deception, opened a wide field for the exercise of sycophancy, from which even the nobler of the orators can by no means be absolved.

In enumerating the demagogues of this period, nearly the whole of them may, conformably to the twofold direction of the politics of the age, be ranged under two classes, viz. those who were *for* Philip, and such as were *against* him; in

⁶⁸ Conf. the words of Hyperides, Plut. Phoc. 10: "Ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ ἀποκρίτε μέγαν, εἰ πικρὸν, ἀλλ' εἰ προῖκά τίμι πικρὸν."

⁶⁹ Demosth. in Phil. 3. 124. 26: — λαιδορίας ἢ φθόνου ἢ σκώμματος ἢ ἥστινός ἀν τύχηι ἔνεκ' αἰτίας, ἀνθρώπους μαθαιτοὺς — λέγειν καλεῖσθε καὶ γελάτε, ἀν τισι λαιδορηθῶσι.

⁷⁰ Demosth. de Coron. 297. 21: ὦ κατάρατε καὶ γραμματοκύφων; 296. 23: τὸν κατὰπτυστον τουτονί; in Timocr. 762. 8: ὦ κατάρατε; de Falsâ Legat. 345. 1: τὸν μιᾶρόν καὶ ἀναιδῆ — Φιλοκράτην; ibid. 6: διεφθαρμένος καὶ πεπρακὼς ἑαυτόν; 23: τοῦ καταπτύστου Φιλοκράτους; in Phil. 4. 150. 29: σοὶ (viz. Aristodemus) μὲν γὰρ κλέπτης ὁ πατήρ, εἴπερ ἦν ὁμοίός σοι; in Aristog. 1. 772. 5: πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα θηρία (demagogues); ibid. 788. 9: μιᾶρόν, μιᾶρόν τὸ θηρίον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο καὶ ἄμικτον; in Macart. 1678. 29: ὑπὸ τῶν μιᾶρῶν τούτων θηρίων, conf. in Lacrit. 925. 14. Æschines is no less partial to the word θηρίον, e. g. with reference to Demosthenes τὸ θηρίον τοῦτο, de Falsâ Legat. 219; conf. in Ctesiph. 671, and Deinarch. adv. Demosth. 9. Κίναδος, Æsch. adv. Ctesiph. 667, and even in Andoc. de Myster. 49: ἐπίτριπτον κίναδος. Κατάρατοι and κατὰπτυστοι are favourite expressions of Demosthenes for the Thessalians, de Coron. 240. 10; Megarians, in Aristocr. 691. 4; Thebans, de Coron. 240. 10; Eubœans, de Falsâ Legat. 364. 24. What a strange contrast to the refinement of phrase, which, according to Plutarch, was afterwards introduced, Sol. 15: — τοὺς Ἀθηναίους λέγουσι τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων δυσχερείας ἐνόμασι χρηστοῖς καὶ φιλανθρώποις ἐπικαλύπτοντας ἀστυίως ὑποκορίζεσθαι, τὰς μὲν πόρνas, εἰσάρας, τοὺς δὲ φόρους, συντάξεις, φυλακὰς δὲ τὰς φρουρὰς τῶν πόλεων, οἰκημα δὲ τὸ δεσμώτηριον καλοῦντας. Conf. οἰκημα, Din. in Demosth. 17, instead of πορνείον, which Antiphon has 611.

the accounts which have reached us almost exclusive attention is paid to their relation to Philip, and to this all their other political characteristics are regarded as subordinate.

Demosthenes was born in Olymp. 98. 4 ; 385: B. C.⁷¹, and though the son of a deserving citizen⁷², belonged to the mass ; but sparingly endowed with personal advantages⁷³, he became the pupil of Plato⁷⁴, and was first incited to the cultivation of eloquence by Callistratus' oration on the subject of Oropus⁷⁵ ; he enjoyed the instructions of Isæus, Isocrates, and the actor Satyrus⁷⁶, and commands respect and admiration by his persevering efforts to overcome his natural infirmities, and to remove the impression produced by his first public appearance, when he was received with scorn and derision⁷⁷. He was not indebted, for the renown he acquired, to the bounty of nature⁷⁸, or the favour of circumstances, but to the inherent strength of his own will, and to the patriotism, integrity, and political sagacity he displayed. The effects of his eloquence, at a time when the sentiments of the Athenians were far from being favourable to the execution of his plans, and the respect which they manifested for his great and distinguished qualities, are

⁷¹ According to Ps. Plut. 9. 361. (II. 847. C. Fr. ed.): Corsini, Böckh, Pub. Econ. 2. 109. Clinton places his birth in Olymp. 99. 3. Taylor, according to Dionys. ad. Amm. (6. p. 8. Fauchn.), Olymp. 99. 4. For the biography of Demosthenes in general, see Taylor's Collect. ap. Reiske, Or. Gr. 8. 737, sqq. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. ed. Harl. 2. 8. 6, sqq. A. G. Becker, Demosthenes as a Statesman and an Orator, 1815.

⁷² Plut. Demosth. 5.

⁷³ Plut. ubi sup.

⁷⁴ Cic. Brut. 61. See copious citations in Taylor, 745.

⁷⁵ Taylor, 747.

⁷⁶ Taylor, 747. 754.

⁷⁷ Plut. Demosth. 7.

⁷⁸ Without reference to the natural impediments, such as stammering, etc., which he overcame, he never became an extemporary speaker. Plut. Demosth. 8. Compare his *ὁ συντρέγματος* ap. Plut. (3) *de Liberis Educand.* 6. 20.

truly wonderful. His enemies have been sedulous in blackening his fame, and amongst other things asserted that he condescended to accept gold from the Persian monarch⁷⁹, and from Alexander's treasurer Harpalus⁸⁰, who fled to Athens in Olymp. 113. 3; 326. B. C.; neither of which accusations was ever satisfactorily proved, whilst the latter was warmly contested amongst the ancients themselves, and even then almost refuted⁸¹. But even allowing these accusations to have been well-founded, his political sentiments, namely, his hostility to Macedonia, his attachment to the democracy of his native city, and the earnest wish to promote unanimity among the states of Greece⁸², were not inspired by the gold of Persia or by the bribes of Harpalus; nor were they in any degree inconsistent with the policy he had ever advocated at an earlier period. Even if it could be proved that he had accepted a reward for the patriotic sentiments he had boldly and eloquently uttered long before, he would indeed possess one virtue less; but how immeasurable a distance would there still be between him, the representative of his country's honour and independence, and those false traitors who accepted bribes for delivering it into the power of Philip! Demosthenes was ever guided by the firm conviction that it required all the resolution and vigilance of the Greeks to check the growing ascendant of Philip; this feeling was neither strengthened by gold, nor so perverted by it, that he should be induced to do for money that

⁷⁹ Plut. Demosth. 20; Æschin. in Ctesiph. 633; Dinarch (?) in Demosth. 9.

⁸⁰ Plut. Demosth. 25. Compare the three speeches of the reputed Dinarchus.

⁸¹ Paus. 2. 33. 3.

⁸² See Orat. de Pac. 61; in Phil. 3. 118; de Coron. 259, etc.

which he had solely and exclusively done from an honest zeal in the cause itself; and lastly, it lost none of its force in consequence of persecution or humiliations, such as he experienced on his embassy to Philip⁸³. In political consistency he was far superior to Cicero, and the effect of his earnestness was never impaired by the effort to be sarcastic, or the petty vanity of endeavouring to raise the laughter of his audience⁸⁴; whilst even in exile and adversity, having been compelled to fly from Athens, in consequence of the investigation respecting the gold of Harpalus, when his heart fondly yearned after the home he had left⁸⁵, he appears by far less pitiable⁸⁶ than the miserable and spirit-broken Roman.

Lycurgus⁸⁷, who was as disinterested as Aristides, was unequalled as an administrator of the finances of the state; for at a time when the public treasure was squandered with reckless prodigality he found means to realize a surplus⁸⁸, on which account the people, who always judged more correctly of good than of bad men, repeatedly confided to him the important office of public treasurer (*ταμίας τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου*⁸⁹). His sentiments towards Macedonia, may be collected from the fact that he was sent with Demosthenes⁹⁰ to rouse the Peloponnesians against Philip, from his accusation

⁸³ See the cutting description in *Æschin. de Falsâ Legat.* 219: *φθίγγεται τὸ θηρίον τοῦτο προοίμιον σκοτεινόν τε καὶ τεθνηκὸς δαλίᾳ καὶ μικρὸν—ἐξαίφνης ἐσίγησε καὶ διηγορήθη, τελευτῶν δὲ ἐκπίπτει ἐκ τοῦ λόγου.*

⁸⁴ Compare, on the other hand, the conduct of Cicero in his zeal to outvie Clodius in obscene jests, *Epist. ad Attic.* 1. 16.

⁸⁵ *Plut. Demosth.* 28.

⁸⁶ See the beautiful passage *Epist.* 1473. 15, sqq.

⁸⁷ *Comp. Taylor, Præfat. ad Lyc. ap. Reiske, Or. Gr.* 4. *Fabric. Bibl. Gr. ed. Harl.* 2. 812, sqq.

⁸⁸ See the psephism, *Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat.* 9. 385.

⁸⁹ *Ps. Plut. ubi sup.* 346.

⁹⁰ *Ps. Plut. ubi sup.* 347.

of Lysicles, one of the generals at Chæronea⁹¹, as well as of the cowardly⁹² Leocrates, the justification of his conduct, which he was afterwards compelled to offer to Demades⁹³, and the demand of Alexander, that he should be delivered up to him, together with Demosthenes and the other orators⁹⁴. The purity of his mind was reflected in the lucid clearness of his eloquence, which, disdaining the meretricious artifices of the sycophants⁹⁵, calmly and steadily pursued the exposition of the subject, and enriched it with sentiments of the purest and most exalted patriotism.

Hyperides⁹⁶, appointed by the Areopagus to replace Æschines in the affair of the Delian temple⁹⁷ is, it is true, named amongst the accusers of Demosthenes in the affair of Harpalus, to whose gold he was said to have been inaccessible⁹⁸; but he was in reality opposed to the Macedonians, and had received a portion of the Persian gold which Ephialtes brought to Athens⁹⁹; he denounced the abject Philocrates¹⁰⁰, accompanied Demosthenes to Thebes¹⁰¹, and immediately after the battle of Chæronea proposed to provide for the defence of the city, by restoring their legal rights to those who had been deprived of them, and by converting the

⁹¹ Diodor. 16. 88.

⁹² Lyc. in Leocr. 184: ὅτι μόνος τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν οὐ κοινήν, ἀλλ' ἰδίαν τὴν σωτηρίαν ἐζήτησεν.

⁹³ Harpocrat. ἀποβάτης. Schol. Aristoph. Plut. 690.

⁹⁴ Plut. Demosth. 23.

⁹⁵ See Lycurgus himself, in Leocr. 240: ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν — ἀποδίδωκα τὸν ἀγῶνα ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως, οὔτε τὸν ἄλλον βίον διαβαλὼν οὔτ' ἐξω τοῦ πράγματος οὐδὲν κατηγορήσας. Conf. p. 144.

⁹⁶ See Fabric. Bibl. Gr. ed. Harl. 2. 856, sqq.; Ruhnken, Hist. Cr. 68, sqq.

⁹⁷ Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 377.

⁹⁸ Ibid. 373.

⁹⁹ Ibid. ubi sup.

¹⁰⁰ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 376. 17.

¹⁰¹ Demosth. de Coron. 291. 6.

Metœci into citizens, and the slaves into Metœci ¹⁰². He subsequently rose against Alexander, and probably pronounced the speech against him which has reached us with the name of Demosthenes attached to it ¹⁰³; he was one of the orators whom Alexander required to be delivered up to him ¹⁰⁴. After the death of that monarch he was one of the promoters of the Lamian war ¹⁰⁵, on which account he incurred the hostility of Antipater, who caused him to be barbarously executed ¹⁰⁶.

Polyeuctus ¹⁰⁷, the Sphettian, a friend of Demosthenes ¹⁰⁸, and an admirer of the vigorous conciseness of Phocion's eloquence ¹⁰⁹, was one of the promoters of the war against Philip ¹¹⁰; he likewise accompanied Demosthenes to the Peloponnese ¹¹¹, and during his exile was sent on a similar errand into Arcadia ¹¹².

Diophantus, a distinguished orator ¹¹³, was the friend of Demosthenes, and his witness against Æschines ¹¹⁴, Olymp. 107. 1; 352. B. C.; he proposed the institution of a festival out of gratitude to the gods who had prevented Philip from effecting a passage through the defile of Thermopylæ ¹¹⁵. It is probably to him that Aristotle alludes, in his

¹⁰² Demosth. in Aristog. 2. 803. 27, sqq. Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 374. Conf. Lycurg. in Leocr. 164. 170, and Taylor, *ibid*.

¹⁰³ See Argum. 203.

¹⁰⁴ Plut. Demosth. 23.

¹⁰⁵ Plut. Phoc. 23; Justin. 13. 5; Ps. Plut. 9. 377. In Stobæus, Serm. 123. p. 618. Orl. A fragment of a funeral oration is attributed to Hyperides; with what justice I know not.

¹⁰⁶ Plut. Demosth. 28; Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 376.

¹⁰⁷ Ruhnken, *Hist. Cr.* 80.

¹⁰⁸ Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. R. 9. 359.

¹⁰⁹ Plut. Phoc. 5; Demosth. 10.

¹¹⁰ Plut. Phoc. 9.

¹¹¹ Dem. in Phil. 3. 129. 18; Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 349.

¹¹² Ps. Plut. *ubi sup*.

¹¹³ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 436. 13; *adv. Lept.* 498. 26.

¹¹⁴ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 403. 11.

¹¹⁵ Demosth. *ubi sup*. 368. 6; Ulpian, 93. ed. Weas.

observations on a law relative to public slaves¹¹⁶, and he was perhaps the leader of a corps of mercenaries in the pay of the Ægyptian chieftain Nectanebus¹¹⁷.

Hegesippus, generally called Crobylus by Æschines and the grammarians¹¹⁸, was in all probability the author of the speech on Halonnesus¹¹⁹; he accompanied Demosthenes to the Peloponnesus¹²⁰, and incurred the violent aversion of Philip¹²¹.

Moerocles was by no means undistinguished as an orator¹²², but he was an enemy to Lycurgus, whose children he persecuted¹²³, and also deserved censure in other respects¹²⁴; he perhaps embezzled the public monies¹²⁵, and even allowing the charge to have been well founded, it was somewhat extraordinary that he should have been accused by Eubulus¹²⁶, whose delinquencies in this respect were so notorious; as one of the Macedonian party he was demanded of the Athenians by Alexander¹²⁷.

The following appear to have been of inferior importance: Callisthenes, who, when the news of the destruction of Phocis arrived, urged the Athenians to prepare for war¹²⁸, and belonged to those whom Alexander requested to be delivered up¹²⁹; Democrates, one of the ambassadors to Philip¹³⁰,

¹¹⁶ Aristot. Pol. 2. 4. 13.

¹¹⁷ Diodor. 16. 47.

¹¹⁸ Harpocr. Ἡγησιππ.

¹¹⁹ See Argum. p. 75. 76. According to the Etym. M. Ἡγησιππ. the seventh Philippic (now the second) was also considered his work.

¹²⁰ Demosth. Phil. 3. 129.

¹²¹ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 447. 9, sqq.

¹²² Harpocr. Μοιροκλῆς — τῶν παρ' Ἀθηναίοις οὐκ ἀφανῶς πολιτευσαμένων.

¹²³ Demosth. Epist. 1478. 15.

¹²⁴ Photius, Μυροκλῆς — τῶν παρὰ Ἀθηναίοις οὐ καλῶς πολιτευσαμένων. But I regard the καλῶς with suspicion (comp. the οὐκ ἀφανῶς in Harpocr.).

¹²⁵ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 435. 6.

¹²⁶ Demosth. ubi sup.

¹²⁷ Plut. Demosth. 23.

¹²⁸ Demosth. de Coron. 238. 5.

¹²⁹ Plut. Demosth. 23.

¹³⁰ Demosth. de Coron. 235. 18.

Metœci into citizens, and the slaves into Men. He subsequently rose against Alexander, probably pronounced the speech against him, reached us with the name of Demosthenes to it¹⁰³; he was one of the orators under required to be delivered by the death of that monarch he was one of the promoters of the Lamian war, he incurred the hostility of Philip, and he was barbarously executed.

Polyeuctus¹⁰⁷, the mosthenes¹⁰⁸, and aristocracies of Phocion, promoters of the wise accompaniment of Demosthenes¹⁰⁹, and during his errand into Macedonia.

Diophanes, friend of Demosthenes, sold both his country and his voice¹⁴¹ to the Macedonians against the Athenians and the Greeks in general, and more particularly to the Phocians. Æschir became one of the chief authors proposed to the Athenians and the Greeks in the name of the Phocians. Demosthenes, the Anaphlystian¹⁴², who must not be confounded with a Probalisian¹⁴³ and a Cyprian of the same name¹⁴⁴, was a Poristes, outvying in

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perhaps the leader of a party of orators on a law relative to the pay of the Athenians.

probably called Crobylus by Æschir, was in all probability on Halonnesus; he was one of the Peloponnesians.

was distinguished as a lawyer, and was one of the most powerful orators of his time.

¹⁰³ Demosth. ubi sup. 291. 7. Plutarch, Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 205, says, respecting him: ἀναβαίνων μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἔφη, καθάπερ ὁ πόλις, μικρὸν ἰσχύειν καὶ μέγα φροῦν.
¹⁰⁷ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 433. 6.
¹⁰⁸ Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 371. 373.
¹⁰⁹ Plut. Demosth. 23. Compare Demosth. Epist. 1482. 6.
¹¹⁰ Plut. ubi sup.
¹¹¹ See Fabric. Bibl. Gr. ed. Harl. 2. 850, sqq.
¹¹² Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 428. 5. 24. 343, sqq.
¹¹³ Demosth. ubi sup. 438. 23.
¹¹⁴ Demosth. ubi sup. 405. 16.
¹¹⁵ See Ruhken, Hist. Cr. 65, sqq. Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 242.
¹¹⁶ Ps. Demosth. in Nær. 1361. 20.
¹¹⁷ Demosth. de Coron. 249. 13.

ity all his predecessors ¹⁴⁵, and was indebted
 influence he possessed to infamous cabals
 ting propositions; amongst other things
 that every one should be put to death
 commend the Theoricon to be applied
 the war ¹⁴⁶; he was moreover stig-
 on ¹⁴⁷; still he was an influential
 opposed Demosthenes by sup-
 Æschines, whose hostility to
 red, had once been his
 him in drawing up the
 bassy to the Pelopon-
 chosen ambassador to
 ne ¹⁵², and accord-
 menians to make peace
 supported Æschines when he was
 conversation during his embassy, and
 chiefly through him that he was acquitted ¹⁵⁴.

Philocrates, who as much surpassed ¹⁵⁵ Eubulus
 in infamy as Hyperbolus once had surpassed Cleon,
 advised the Athenians to make peace with Philip at
 the very time he was besieging Amphipolis ¹⁵⁶; he
 afterwards exceeded in effrontery all the accom-
 plices of his treasons, and all who participated with
 him in the bribes of Philip ¹⁵⁷. He and Æschines
 settled the terms of the peace, and in so doing

¹⁴⁵ Theopomp. ap. Harpocr. Εὐβουλος.

¹⁴⁷ Theopomp. ap. Ath. 4. 166, E.

¹⁴⁸ Demosth. in Mid. 580. 24; 581. 7.

¹⁵⁰ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 438. 23.

¹⁵¹ Demosth. de Coron. 235. 17.

¹⁵² Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 435. 4.

¹⁵³ Demosth. de Coron. 232. 14.

¹⁵⁶ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 405. 11: τίνα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει φήσαιτ' ἀν-
 βδελυρώτατον εἶναι καὶ πλείστης ὀλιγωρίας καὶ ἀναιδεΐας μεστόν; κ. τ. λ.
 Conf. in Aristog. 1. 783. 21, sqq.

¹⁵⁶ Ps. Demosth. de Halonn. 1. 82. 23; 83. 2.

¹⁵⁷ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 375. 17; 405. 14; Argum. Orat. de Pac.
 56. 19. 20.

¹⁴⁶ Ruhnk. 66.

¹⁴⁹ Ruhnk. 65.

¹⁵⁴ Ruhnk. 65.

on a law relative to public slaves in
 the leader of a corps of men
 of the Egyptian chieftain
 probably by Æschines
 all probability
 is no; he

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committed fraud to secure certain advantages to Philip¹⁵⁸. It was notorious that he was rewarded for his perfidy with estates in Phocis, Olynthian prisoners¹⁵⁹, etc.; he himself boasted of it¹⁶⁰, and indulged in all sorts of luxury, bought courtesans, etc¹⁶¹. He was the first who paid the penalty of his treachery, and upon an eisangelia being laid against him¹⁶² he fled from Athens.

Aristodemus, the tragic actor¹⁶³, the first citizen who recommended peace and friendship with Philip¹⁶⁴, and his accomplice Neoptolemus¹⁶⁵, may here be classed together with Philocrates, although they cannot be strictly enumerated amongst the orators.

Demades¹⁶⁶, originally a ferryman¹⁶⁷, became an orator without any regular instruction whatever¹⁶⁸; he possessed distinguished powers as an extemporary speaker, and frequently overcame Demosthenes¹⁶⁹ whom he opposed in the Olynthian affair¹⁷⁰, and was, after the battle of Chæronea¹⁷¹, rewarded by Philip, with land in Bœotia; but he did not attain the zenith of demagogy till the time of Antipater, and his abandoned character must therefore be described afterwards.

Stratocles, who, after the time of Demades, played a prominent part in the intrigues of the

¹⁵⁸ Æschin. in Timocr. 170; Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 356. 14, sqq.; 395. 25, sqq. ¹⁵⁹ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 386. 2, sqq.; 440. 4, sqq.

¹⁶⁰ Demosth. ubi sup. 377. 17.

¹⁶¹ Æschin. de Falsâ Legat. 232; Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 232; Plut. de Garrulit. 8. 30; de Fato, 6. 368.

¹⁶² Æschin. in Ctesiph. 470. Conf. § 76. n. 94.

¹⁶³ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 418. 8.

¹⁶⁴ Demosth. ubi sup. 344. 21; 371. 15; de Coron. 232. 7.

¹⁶⁵ Demosth. de Pac. 58. 15; de Falsâ Legat. 442. 29.

¹⁶⁶ Conf. Hauptmann de Demade ap. Reiske, Or. Gr. 4. 243, sqq.; Ruhken, Hist. Cr. 71, sqq.; Fabric. Bibl. Gr. ed. Harles 2. 868, sqq.

¹⁶⁷ Suidas, Δημ.

¹⁶⁸ Sext. Empir. adv. Math. 67. B.

¹⁶⁹ Plut. Demosth. 9. 10.

¹⁷⁰ Suidas, Δημ.

¹⁷¹ Suidas, Δημ.

time, was even at this period renowned as a skilful rhetorician ¹⁷².

Subordinate members of the same party were Hegemon, who, besides his accessibility to bribery ¹⁷³, was notorious for his sycophancy ¹⁷⁴; Cephisophon who supported Philocrates ¹⁷⁵, and afterwards joined Æschines in opposing Ctesiphon ¹⁷⁶; Phrynon who, when peace was concluded with Philip, was a party to the frauds of Æschines and Philocrates ¹⁷⁷.

Amongst those who arrived at eminence without any immediate connection with the Macedonian quarrels were Leptines, an honourable man upon the whole, but whose proposal for abolishing every sort of exemption from public obligations was fraught with danger to the commonwealth. He as well as the following orators are known to us from the speeches which Demosthenes made against them: Androtion ¹⁷⁸, who had attained celebrity before the age of Philip, was esteemed for his remarkable eloquence, and who during the social war was ambassador to Mausolus; Timocrates, the author of a law relating to securities in the case of public debtors, which struck at the very root of the constitution; Aristocrates, whose protection of Charidemus of Oreos had material influence upon the political importance of Athens on the Chersonesus; Aristogiton a coward and a sycophant ¹⁷⁹,

¹⁷² Demosth. in Pantænet. (about Olymp. 108. 3): *Στρατοκλεῖ, τῷ πιθωνωτάτῳ πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ πονηροτάτῳ.*

¹⁷³ Ps. Æschin. Epist. 12. 696.

¹⁷⁴ Rubnk. H. Cr. 76.

¹⁷⁵ Demosth. de Coron. 232. 14.

¹⁷⁶ Demosth. ubi sup. 244. 4.

¹⁷⁷ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 400. 14; *μιαρὸς Φρύνων*, Demosth. ubi sup. 412. 25.

¹⁷⁸ See above, § 71. n. 130, sqq.; Taylor, Præf. Demosth. in Androt.

¹⁷⁹ Plut. Phoc. 10; Taylor, Introduction to Demosth. in Aristog.

whose conduct was so flagitious that Lycurgus and Demosthenes arose as his accusers, and endeavoured to bring him to punishment as an Atimos, which was again attempted by Dinarchus, in Olymp. 113. 3.

3. THE OTHER STATES.

§ 78. The public system in these was likewise determined and agitated by their relation to Philip, as well as by the restless spirit of contention and conquest, which embroiled them in continual hostilities with the neighbouring states. But we are unfortunately almost destitute of information respecting Argos, Achaia, Locris, Ætolia, Acarnania, and, if we except its relation to Syracuse, we may add Corinth¹; of Thebes little more is known than is contained in the accounts of its campaigns against the Phocians, and the fact that thousands of its brave and able-bodied citizens went forth as mercenaries, whilst traitors, like the infamous Timolaus², remained at home and revelled on Macedonian gold; the sacred band, however, displayed its courage and strength as late as the battle of Chæronea³. The annals of many states are one uninterrupted record of civil warfare, party feuds, and treachery, as for, instance, those of Sicyon⁴, Phlius⁵, Thasus, to which Philip brought back the fugitives⁶, Olynthus and the surrounding Thra-

¹ Plut. Timol. 5, calls the constitution of that time democracy; but the word democracy there expresses the general opposition to tyranny. Cap. 3, Timoleon is appointed general by the people; but the council conducts the affair.

² Demosth. de Coron. 241. 26; Theopomp. ap. Ath. 10. 436. B.

³ Plut. Alex. 9; conf. Diodor. 16. 86.

⁴ Plut. Arat. 2; compare above, § 76. n. 103—106.

⁵ Demosth. de Synt. 175. 26.

⁶ Ps. Demosth. de Halon. 80. 12 and Schol.

cian states, thirty-two of which, as already remarked, were within the space of a year betrayed into the hands of Philip, and Megara, whose citizens were moreover despised for their worthless and degraded qualities⁷. Perilaus was then in the pay of Philip⁸. There is unfortunately reason to conjecture that even those, concerning which no accounts have reached us, were equally deficient in legal order and welfare; exact particulars respecting them would, in all probability, only swell the gloomier records of history; still we cannot help lamenting the loss of the works of Theopompus, who can hardly have judged of this iniquitous period more severely than it deserved.

1. SPARTA.

The diminution of the population, and particularly in the numbers of the regular citizens, and the degeneration of the national character, increased with equal rapidity. The Spartan policy was too uninventive to devise expedients for arresting the progress of the former evil; and even had any systematic attempts been made for the purpose, it is probable that they would have been unattended with success, as nature herself seemed to have decreed the downfall of the present system. Endeavours were indeed made to preserve the remains of the ancient laws, and to keep up some outward regard for legal forms and observances; but the proposal of Agesilaus, after the battle of Leuctra, for suspending for that day⁹,

⁷ Ps. Demosth. in Neær. 1357: — οἱ Μεγαρεῖς ἀνελεύθεροι καὶ μικρολόγοι. Diogenes would rather have been the ram (κρίος) than the son (υἱός) of a Megarian; Æl. V. H. 12. 56; conf. Plut. Dion 17, on the ostentatious pride of the Megarian dynast Ptoiodorus.

⁸ Demosth. de Coron. 242. 2.

⁹ Plut. Ages. 30.

the operation of the law, directing Atimia to be imposed upon the vanquished, must be regarded as one of those wretched shifts, which, though they may enable those who adopt them, to infringe the laws with some appearance of decency, are utterly incapable of preserving a regard for their real tenor and spirit; but the joy which the Spartans endeavoured to express in their countenances, when the dreadful intelligence reached them, must either be looked upon as a flimsy veil assumed to hide their real anguish and terror, or as a consequence of the most hopeless blindness and infatuation¹⁰. On the other hand they gave vent to their natural feelings after the tearless battle¹¹. Epaminondas' first incursion into the Peloponnesus shook the very foundations of the political edifice. Sparta called the Perioeci and Helots to arms; a thousand of the latter had a short time before been enfranchised¹²; and now six thousand of them were summoned to perform service¹³: but several communities of Perioeci¹⁴, as well as large bodies of Helots, and probably all the former Messenians joined the Theban standard¹⁵. The Perioeci were, with the help of the troops sent by Dionysius¹⁶, soon reduced to submission; but the fair pastures of Messenia and thousands of able-bodied labourers were for ever lost to Sparta, whilst from the latter

¹⁰ Ibid. 29; Xenoph. Hell. 6. 4. 16.¹¹ Plut. Ages. 33.¹² Diod. 15. 65.¹³ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 5. 27—29.¹⁴ Xenoph. Hell. 7. 2. 2: ἀποστάντων μὲν πολλῶν περιόικων, ἀποστάντων δὲ πάντων τῶν Εἰλώτων. Conf. Plut. Ages. 32.¹⁵ Xenoph. Hell. 6. 5. 32: τινὲς τῶν περιόικων; according to Diodor. 15. 64: Sellasia and Caryæ.¹⁶ Xenoph. Hell. 7. 1. 28; conf. Polyæn. 1. 41. 4. The strange story in Vitruvius, 1. 1. who deduces the use of the Caryatides in art from the subjugation of the virgins of Caryæ, cannot be referred to this period, for Clearchus the leader of the mercenaries in the service of Cyrus the younger, already had Caryatides engraved on the seal of his ring, Plut. Artax. 18.

sprang a hostile race, who became a constant source of inquietude to the inhabitants of the frontier; though the only effect of this may have been to compel them to hold themselves prepared to resist their incursions, and Sparta was probably very soon secured against attacks from without, still the restoration of peace in her provinces brought with it no moral and political regeneration. Whilst this general and radical decay was accelerated by the circumstance, that so many of the Spartans had quitted their country, and entered the service of foreign masters as mercenaries. In the time of Aristotle Sparta had but a thousand citizens¹⁷, two-fifths of the estates were in the hands of females¹⁸, whose licentiousness daily increased¹⁹, whilst the citizens were compelled to till their lands themselves²⁰.

2. MESSENIA.

There was, probably, as little of the true spirit of citizenship amongst the enfranchised Helots, as amongst their kinsmen who had been corrupted by the luxuries and vices of foreign countries. It is a matter of surprise that the Messenians were, till a very late date, remarked as having preserved the Doric language in its greatest purity and perfection²¹. By a steady and consistent adherence to their natural policy of opposing Sparta, their constitution might have become consolidated and secured; but violence and intemperance soon disjointed and unhinged it; the Messenians in-

¹⁷ Arist. Pol. 2. 5. 11.

¹⁸ Conf. Arist. Pol. 2. 6. 10. 11; Schneider, p. 124.

¹⁹ Arist. ubi sup.

²⁰ Arist. Pol. 2. 5. 11.

²¹ Paus. 4. 27. 5.

clined towards Philip²², and fell under the tyranny of Philiades, which, however, never became firmly established, and did not survive till the end of this period, for the expelled sons of Philiades were restored to their country by Alexander the son of Philip²³.

3. ARCADIA.

A year after the battle of Mantinea, the inhabitants of Megalopolis deserted it, in order to return to their former habitations; but, with the help of Athens, they were forced to return to the common capital²⁴. The subsequent relation of the Megalopolitans to the Tegeatæ, Mantineans, Orchomenians, etc. is involved in some obscurity; but there is no reason to suppose that it was different from what had been originally intended; mention still occurs of the Murioi²⁵, but as the united town still continued to exist, in spite of the assaults of the Spartans, who during the sacred war particularly endeavoured to subjugate Arcadia²⁶, it prevailed over all the other communities; in the age of Philip, Megalopolis alone is spoken of²⁷. But after the spoliation of the Olympic sanctuary, Arcadia lost the manly honesty and simplicity of the mountain character, and was unable to offer any vigorous opposition to the attacks of Sparta; a consequence of this was, that the alliance with Thebes, like that between Thebes and Messenia

²² Paus. 4. 28. 2.

²³ Demosth. Megalop. 212. 26. de Coron. 324. 12; Argum. Demosth. de Fœd. Alex. 211.

²⁴ Diodor. 15. 94.

²⁵ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 344. 13; 403. 10.

²⁶ Paus. 8. 27. 7.

²⁷ Heræa, which is mentioned in Aristotle Pol. 5. 2. 9. as having introduced the custom of appointing its magistrates by election, instead of by lot, was probably still unimportant.

was kept up, and amongst the evil fruits which sprang from it was an understanding between certain chiefs and Philip of Macedon. Amongst these are recorded Cercidas and Hieronymus²⁸, the former of whom seems to have been called one of the legislators of the Arcadians²⁹, unless the statement perhaps applies to a Cercidas who lived at the time of Aratus³⁰; Hieronymus was attacked as a partisan of Philip by Æschines, in a speech which he delivered during his mission to Megalopolis, and whilst he was still faithful to the interests of his country³¹.

4. ELIS.

Whilst the people were still inconsolable for the loss of Triphylia³², they became a prey to all the horrors of discord, which Philip did every thing in his power to foment³³. Its outbreak was fearful: the bloodshed and calamities³⁴ of the Eleans became proverbial³⁵. The democracy was dissolved at the end of this period³⁶.

5. EUBŒA.

During the dependence of Eubœa upon Thebes, the various states of the island seem to have entered into federal relations with one another, and to have established a joint council, called the Eubœan Synedrion³⁷. Eretria and Oreus were the leading states of the confederacy; Chalcis was of

²⁸ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 324. 9.

²⁹ See above, § 73. n. 60.

³⁰ Polyb. 2. 48.

³¹ Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 344. 14.

³² Demosth. Megalop. 206. 5.

³³ Paus. 5. 4. 5; Diod. 16. 63.

³⁴ Dem. de Falsâ Legat. 424, 22: τὰς ἐν Ἑλίδι σφαγὰς, in Phil. 4. 133. 29.

³⁵ Τὰ Ἑλεῖα δυστυχήματα, Himer. 26, Wernsd.

³⁶ Dem. de Falsâ. Legat. 435. 18.

³⁷ Τὸ καλούμενον Εὐβοϊκὸν συνέδριον, Æschin. in Ctesiph. 486.

less importance. A short time before the commencement of the Athenian social war, Olymp. 105. 3; 358. B. C., a party was formed against those who were suspected of being in the Theban interest; the latter sent to Thebes for help, whilst the former had recourse to the Athenians, who, at the instigation of Timotheus, sent them succours³⁸. The war which ensued was of the most destructive character, but was soon terminated by a convention³⁹, whereupon the Bœotians and Thebans evacuated the island⁴⁰. About five years afterwards, Olymp. 106. 4; 353. B. C.⁴¹, Philip began his intrigues, to frustrate which, Plutarch, tyrant of Eretria, applied to Athens for assistance. In consequence of this, Phocion was sent with an army under his command to Eubœa, and conquered in the battle of Tamynæ⁴². Plutarch himself was soon afterward expelled for having plotted against the Athenians⁴³. The important consequences of Philip's interference daily became more apparent⁴⁴, and by the aid of the supplies of men and money which were furnished by him, there arose dynasts in Eretria and Oreus⁴⁵. Those of Eretria were Clitarchus, Automedon, Hipparchus⁴⁶, and Sosis-tratus⁴⁷; in Oreus, Philistides, Socrates⁴⁸, Chari-genes⁴⁹, etc. Clitarchus was, however, driven out

³⁸ Demosth. de Cherson. 108. 10.

³⁹ Æsch. in Ctesiph. 479, represents the Athenians as having been victorious. The Thebans had been obliged to quit the island, ὑπόσπονδοι.

⁴⁰ Diod. 16. 7; compare above, § 76. n. 27.

⁴¹ Böckh, Pub. Econ. 2. 62. 109; compare Böckh, üb. d. Zeitverh. d. Demosth. R. g. Mid. in Berl. Abh. 1818, 1819, Hist. Philol. Cl. p. 82, sqq.

⁴² Plut. Phoc. 11—13; Demosth. in Mid. 567, sqq.; Æsch. in Ctesiph. 480. ⁴³ Plut. Phoc. 11—13; conf. Böckh, 2. 110. n. 375.

⁴⁴ Dem. in Phil. 3. 113. 24, sqq.

⁴⁵ Dem. in Phil. 3. 115. 2.

⁴⁶ Dem. in Phil. 3. 125. 17, sqq., 128. 6.

⁴⁷ Dem. de Coron. 324. 17.

⁴⁸ Dem. in Phil. 3. 126. 2, sqq.; Strab. 10. 445.

⁴⁹ Æsch. in Ctesiph. 495.

by Phocion, Olymp. 109. 4; 341. B. C.⁵⁰, and Philistides was about the same time⁵¹ expelled by a body of Athenians, Megarians, and Chalcidians; some free states of Eubœa sent soldiers to the battle of Chæronea.

6. PHOCIS.

The ancient enmity between Phocis and Delphi still prevailed. But it cannot be ascertained whether Thebes or Delphi was more immediately concerned in the quarrel respecting an heiress, which is said to have led to the eruption of the sacred war⁵². The hostile parties were respectively headed by Euthycrates, the father of Onomarchus, and Mnaseus, the father of Mneson⁵³. It is probable that Delphi had no inconsiderable share in causing the revengeful decree of the Amphictyons against Phocis, which was carried into effect by Thebes. Other motives than the mere desire of obtaining spoil, must have animated the Phocians when they took possession of Delphi, under the command of Philomelus, Olymp. 105. 4; 357. B. C.⁵⁴, the slaughter of the Thracidæ⁵⁵, their wild design of murdering all the Delphians and destroying the town, which Archidamus of Sparta⁵⁶ prevented them from executing, and lastly, the oppression which they made the Delphians suffer,

⁵⁰ Diod. 16. 74, and Wessel.; conf. Böckh, 2. 111. n. 378; see above, § 76. n. 120.

⁵¹ Steph. Byz. 'Ορεός, from Charax Chron.

⁵² See § 76. n. 48. 49.

⁵³ Arist. Pol. 5. 3. 3. This Onomarchus was not the same person who was afterwards a general: this one and his brother were the sons of Theotimus, Paus. 10. 2. 1. Diod. 16. 38, mentions a Mnaseas who was afterwards guardian to the youthful Phalæcus; was this one and the same person with the Mnaseas alluded to above, to whose party Philomelus, etc., belonged?

⁵⁴ Paus. 10. 2. 2.

⁵⁵ Diod. 16. 24.

⁵⁶ Paus. 3. 10. 5.

are proofs of inveterate and implacable hatred⁵⁷. The supreme power in Phocis and Delphi was successively held by the brothers Philomelus, Onomarchus and Phayllus⁵⁸; then by Mnaseas, the guardian of Phalæcus, the son of Onomarchus⁵⁹; after which it devolved for some time to three captains, and lastly to Phalæcus⁶⁰. It is probable that the form of this supreme authority, which is merely called dynasty by the ancient writers⁶¹, was Strategia. The consequences of the war occasioned the temporary dissolution of the Phocian state, but it is again mentioned at a later date⁶².

7. THESSALY.

Pheræ and Larissa were still at enmity with each other; the former was subject to the tyranny of the Iasonidæ, the latter to the dynasty of the Aleuadæ. The Aleuadæ united themselves to Thebes and Philip⁶³, the Pheræans to Phocis. Those amongst the former who were in the Macedonian interest, consequently in the language of Demosthenes, traitors, were Eudicus, Simus⁶⁴, Daochus, Cineas, and Thrasydæus⁶⁵. Philip marched to their assistance, Olymp. 105. 4; 357. B. C., and drove out the Pheræans, Lycophron and Pitholaus⁶⁶: Pitholaus seems to have returned, but was

⁵⁷ Diod. 16. 28.

⁵⁸ Diod. 16. 32. 35. 38; Paus. 10. 2. 3. 4.

⁵⁹ Diod. 16. 38; Paus. 10. 2. 5, calls Phalæcus the son of Phayllus.

⁶⁰ Diod. ubi sup.

⁶¹ Demosth. in Aristocr. 661. 12; Paus. 10. 3. 5: 4. 5. 1.

⁶² Liv. 33. 32.

⁶³ Diod. 16. 14.

⁶⁴ Dem. de Coron. 241. 27. Harpocr. Σιμός — εἰς τῶν Ἀλεύαδων; conf. Phot. Σιμός. Schneider and Götting, ad Aristot. Pol. 5. 5. 9. 1, where the reading is τῶν περὶ Σάμον, have only adverted to the error in the notes; but no one can feel any hesitation in altering the spurious name in the text.

⁶⁵ Dem. de Coron. 354. 7.

⁶⁶ Diod. 16. 39.

once more expelled, Olymp. 107. 4; 349. B. C.⁶⁷. Philip occupied Pheræ and Pagasæ⁶⁸, and bestowed Magnesia and Nicæa upon the Aleuadæ⁶⁹. Pharsalus, which was at enmity with Halos⁷⁰, sided with Larissa; Halos was likewise conquered by Philip, who delivered over the ruins to the Pharsalians⁷¹; Philip having now, by means of the Aleuadæ, obtained a firm footing in Thessaly, took no further notice of them⁷², but in Olymp. 109. 1; 344. B. C.⁷³, introduced into Thessaly a constitution suited to his own purposes, viz., Tetrarchies⁷⁴, and received the public revenues himself⁷⁵. He appears to have appointed Thessalians by birth as his lieutenants, and amongst others whom he selected for the office was Thrasydæus, his flatterer⁷⁶. According to Aristotle, there was, in his time⁷⁷, a moderate oligarchy at Pharsalus⁷⁸; if he hereby means before the domination of Philip, the statement may be correct; but after Philip's authority was established there, his lieutenants might be looked upon in the same light as the tyrants who reigned in Ionia, etc., under the protection of Persia, while the Thessalians might be considered doubly enslaved.

⁶⁷ Diod. 16. 52. But he, 16. 69, speaks of another expulsion of the tyrants after Olymp. 109. 1.

⁶⁸ Dem. Olynth. 1. 12. 27; conf. Dem. de Halonn. 84. 19.

⁶⁹ Dem. Phil. 71. 11. ⁷⁰ Dem. de Fals. Legat. 352. 17: 353. 13.

⁷¹ Dem. ubi sup. 353. 15.

⁷² Buttmann. v. d. Aleuad. 209, sqq. Concerning an attempt of Philip against them, see Polymn. 4. 2. 11.

⁷³ Consequently in the year when Diodorus (see n. 67) records another expulsion of the tyrants! He means the Aleuadæ after all.

⁷⁴ Dem. in Phil. 3. 117. 26. That the word *δεκαρχίαν*, Dem. Phil. 2. 71. 12, in commemoration of the institutions of Lysander, is employed figuratively for *δυναστείαν*, is self-evident from the use of the singular (conf. 3. 117. 26, *τετραδαρχίας*), conf. Fr. Jacobs. Demosth. Staatsv. 368.

⁷⁵ Demosth. in Phil. 2. 71. 14.

⁷⁶ Theopomp. ap. Ath. 6. 249. C.

⁷⁷ That is to say, at the time he wrote the Politics, therefore, after Philip's death, which is mentioned, Pol. 5. 8. 10.

⁷⁸ Aristot. Pol. 5. 5. 7.

8. BYZANTIUM.

Byzantium, wholly independent after the social war, ruled over Chalcedon, and even claimed authority over Selymbria⁷⁹; its federal relations with Perinthus were of the most intimate character⁸⁰. An abundance of luxuriant natural productions, and the profits of an extended trade, conspired to corrupt the manners of the natives. The commander, Leon, was conspicuous for his civil virtues, and instead of perishing *with* his fellow-citizens like Nicias, chose rather to die *for* them⁸¹. Philip succeeded in engaging the services of the powerful orator Python. Was the latter perhaps born at Ænos, and the murderer of Cotys⁸², and called a Byzantine because he had long resided at Byzantium⁸³? Philip sent him to Athens⁸⁴ for the purpose of negotiating a peace, and at a later period to Thebes, that he might exhort that state to remain faithful to its federal engagements⁸⁵; here he almost bore away the prize of eloquence from his great rival Demosthenes⁸⁶. Python gained over the Thebans to the interests of Philip, as much by the dexterity and address with which he distributed his largesses, as by the powerful and commanding character of his oratory⁸⁷. We can form but a very imperfect idea of the nature of the magistracy

⁷⁹ Demosth. de Lib. Rhod. 198. 12. 14.

⁸⁰ See the psephism below, n. 88.

⁸¹ Plut. Nic. 22; Suid. Αἰών.

⁸² Dem. in Aristocr. 659. 27; 674. 21.

⁸³ Menag. ad Diog. Laert. 3. 46, considers the Ænian and the orator to have been the same person, but on no other ground than the identity of name. The Ænian and his brother Heraclides were, according to Demosth. ubi sup. honorary citizens in Athens.

⁸⁴ De Halonn. 81. 24; 82. 17.

⁸⁵ Diod. 16. 85, and Wessel.

⁸⁶ Dem. de Coron. 272. 19: θρασυνομένῳ καὶ πολλῶν ῥίοντι. Conf. Dem. Ep. 1469, 18.

⁸⁷ Suid. Πυθ.

of Byzantium from the public decree in honour of the Athenians; there was a Hieromnemen, as Eponymus, besides a Bola and a Halia⁸⁸; with these was doubtless united a Strategia. The nature and functions of the thirty Boeotians (?) who were killed by Clearchus soon after the end of the Peloponnesian war⁸⁹, cannot be ascertained.

9. THE EASTERN STATES.

The Cyclades had long sunk into total insignificance; the names of the once-powerful Naxos and Paros were almost forgotten; Cythnus and Siphnus were only remarked for the contemptible character of their inhabitants⁹⁰, and Melos⁹¹ and Halonnesus⁹² were the notorious haunts of pirates. Samos, Chios, Lesbos, and Cos still retained some degree of importance, but the prosperity of Rhodes had not yet unfolded itself. At the time of the social war a tyrant had arisen in Samos, and supported himself by means of mercenaries and the protection of Persia, under whose satrap, Tigranes, he governed; he was expelled by Timotheus⁹³. Samos likewise during this period became dependent upon Athens, through its Cleruchiæ. Demosthenes describes the constitution of Chios, Mytilene, and Rhodes as oligarchical, in Olym. 107. 2; 351. B. C⁹⁴. Somewhat later the above-named Cammes⁹⁵ was tyrant in Mytilene. The character of the Rhodian oligarchy, and the reckless de-

⁸⁸ Dem. de Coron. 255. 20, sqq.

⁸⁹ De Syntax. 176. 10.

⁹² Argum. Dem. de Hal. 73. 7.

⁹³ Demosth. de Lib. Rhod. 192. 28, sqq.

⁹⁴ Dem. ubi sup. 196. 1. 2.

⁹⁵ Dem. in Boeot. 1019. 19; conf. § 75. n. 51. The democracy of Mytilene is described in the speech de Syntax, 168. 15, as having been dissolved.

⁹⁰ Diod. 14. 12.

⁹¹ Dem. in Theocr. 1339. 20.

bauchery of Hegesilochus and his companions, are known to us from a fragment of Theopompus⁹⁶. When Athens made peace with Philip, she transferred to the Carian king, Idrieus⁹⁷, the three islands, Rhodes, Cos, and Chios, and Rhodes was not actually delivered from its dependence upon the potentates of the neighbouring coast till some time afterwards. Internal cabals formed no obstacle to a dependence of this nature⁹⁸.

10. THE SICELIOTS.

Whilst the tyranny of Dionysius grew more oppressive, though less terrible than before, Dion, the exile, gained the love of the philosophers of the Academy⁹⁹ and the respect of the Grecian states; Sparta, though she had received succours from Dionysius, conferred the citizenship upon Dion¹⁰⁰, and Speusippus and his friends urged him to attempt the deliverance of his native city¹⁰¹. He began his warlike preparations at the moment that the confederates of Athens took up arms, and was joined by several political philosophers from the school of Plato, the Cyprian Eudemus, the Leucadian Timonides (who afterwards wrote the life of Dion¹⁰²), etc.; but out of a thousand Syracusan exiles, no more than twenty-five took part in the expedition¹⁰³. Even at that time Syracuse was in reality the mistress of the other states; the elder Dionysius had erected Adranus¹⁰⁴, Olymp. 105. 1; 360. B. C.; the younger, Olymp. 105. 3; 358. B. C. had built

⁹⁶ Athen. 10. 444. E.

⁹⁷ Dem. de Pac. 63. 18.

⁹⁸ To the age of Philip may probably be referred the democratic victories in Abydos, Arist. Pol. 5. 5. 6, and Cyzicus, Ps. Aristot. Œcon. 2. 284. F.

⁹⁹ Plut. Dion, 17.

¹⁰⁰ Plut. ubi sup.

¹⁰¹ Plut. Dion, 22.

¹⁰² Plut. Dion, 22. 31.

¹⁰³ Plut. Dion, 22.

¹⁰⁴ Diod. 14. 37.

Tauromenium and destroyed Naxos¹⁰⁵, and Syracuse was garrisoned by a body of Leontines¹⁰⁶. Dion was joined by two hundred Agrigentan knights, who had asserted their liberty on Mount Ecnomus, and by some Geloans and Camarinæans¹⁰⁷; the Leontines evacuated Syracuse upon the approach of Dion¹⁰⁸, and the Syracusans threw open their gates to receive him. Before the town was wholly freed from the enemy, Olymp. 106. 1; 356. B. C., Philistus, who led a body of auxiliaries to support the authority of the absent tyrant, was killed¹⁰⁹. The Syracusans were too corrupt to put faith in the disinterestedness of Dion, and no sooner had the first burst of enthusiasm, at the recovery of their liberties, subsided, than the demagogues began their cabals anew, for which an ample field was now opened to them. The most active among the opponents of Dion, was his colleague Heraclides, whom the people had appointed Navarch¹¹⁰, Dion holding the office of strategus of the land forces; in league with him were Sosis, who even went so far as to wound himself, in order that he might charge Dion with the offence¹¹¹, and Hippon, who proposed that all the lands should be distributed among the people¹¹². Their principal adherents were among the seamen¹¹³. The dignity of Dion, which had something stern and repulsive in its character¹¹⁴, was ill-calculated to secure him friends among the people, who, beholding in him

¹⁰⁵ Diod. 16. 7.¹⁰⁶ Plut. Dion, 26. 27.¹⁰⁷ Plut. Dion, 26.¹⁰⁸ Diod. 16. 16; Plut. Dion, 26.¹⁰⁹ Diod. 16. 16; Plut. Dion, 35.¹¹⁰ Plut. Dion, 33; Diod. ubi sup.¹¹¹ See the account of this absurd transaction, Plut. Dion, 37.¹¹² Plut. ubi sup.¹¹³ Plut. Dion, 32.¹¹⁴ Corn. Nep. Dion, 6, who, upon the whole, somewhat tempers the highly-coloured pictures of Plutarch and Diodorus.

the future tyrant, arose and expelled him. The Leontines very willingly received him¹¹⁵. The twenty-five Strategi, to whom the chief power was confided, were unable to protect the town¹¹⁶; Dion was recalled, the citadel was evacuated by Apollocrates, the son of Dionysius, and after renewed intrigues, and even negotiations with Dionysius, through the instrumentality of the Spartan Pharax, Heraclides was killed¹¹⁷. Having at length obtained the victory over his enemies, Dion prepared to establish a Politeia¹¹⁸, a constitution, consisting of a mixture of aristocracy and democracy; he considered democracy preferable to tyranny, it is true, but was far from entertaining any predilection for that form of government in itself¹¹⁹. But whilst the Syracusans were looking forward to the arrival of deputies from the mother-city, Corinth, who were charged with the regulation of the constitution and the laws, the noble Dion was murdered by Callippus, an Athenian, and the captain of a band of mercenaries, on whom he had bestowed peculiar marks of confidence and favour, Olymp. 106. 3; 354. B. C¹²⁰.

Callippus¹²¹ only enjoyed his ill-gotten power thirteen months¹²², and after his expulsion there arose various candidates for the possession of Syracuse, whilst the people regarded the struggle with apathetic indifference. Hipparinus, the brother of Dionysius, governed two years¹²³, and was succeeded by Nysæus; Dionysius himself returned

¹¹⁵ Plut. Dion, 38—40.¹¹⁶ Plut. Dion. 38.¹¹⁷ Plut. Dion, 48, sqq; Diod. 16. 17—20.¹¹⁸ Plut. Dion, 12. 53.¹¹⁹ Plut. Dion, 12.¹²⁰ Diod. 16. 31.¹²¹ Corn. Nep. Dion, 8: Callicrates.¹²² Plut. D. 58.¹²³ Diod, 16. 36.

and expelled him ¹²⁴; the better-disposed citizens of Syracuse requested Hicetas of Leontini to lead them against Dionysius; the Cathaginians at length interfered, and in a short time Syracuse was parcelled out amongst several masters ¹²⁵. Meanwhile tyrants arose in the surrounding states, several of which were inhabited by barbarians and mercenaries, who did nothing to prevent a change in the constitution, and were fully prepared to welcome a dynast. Amongst these dynasts may be enumerated Mamercus, a Campanian, in Catana ¹²⁶, Leptines in Apollonia and Engyia ¹²⁷, and Andromachus, the father of the historian Timæus in Tauromenium, and a brave man ¹²⁸. Desolation reigned in the towns of Sicily, deer and wild-boars traversed their streets, grass grew in their market-places, and in the general poverty statues were sold in Syracuse to the highest bidders ¹²⁹. At this juncture the friends of legality and order in Syracuse sent to Corinth for help ¹³⁰, Olymp. 108. 3; 346. B. C.

Timoleon, who, since his brother's death, had taken no part in public affairs ¹³¹, was appointed to the command of the Corinthian auxiliaries; Corinth and Leucadia both shared in the expedition ¹³². It was crowned with the most brilliant success; Hicetas was beaten, Dionysius compelled, Olymp. 109. 2; 343. B. C., to evacuate the citadel, and the Carthaginians were driven out of the

¹²⁴ Plut. Timol. 1.

¹²⁵ Plut. Timol. 2; Diod. 16. 67.

¹²⁶ Plut. Timol. 13; Corn. N. Tim. 2.

¹²⁷ Plut. Timol. 14; Diod. 16. 72.

¹²⁸ Plut. D. 10; Diod. 16. 68. Conf. Raoul-Rochette, sur l'Etabl. d. Col. Gr. 4. 91.

¹²⁹ Plut. Timol. 22. 23.

¹³⁰ Diod. 16. 65.

¹³¹ Plut. Timol. 5.

¹³² Plut. 8.

harbour¹³³. Timoleon raged the citadel, the bulwark and symbol of tyranny, and erected upon its site a common hall destined for the meals of those who composed the popular tribunals¹³⁴. Freedom being restored, the liberators now began to work at the regeneration of the state. Corinth issued a proclamation inviting settlers to Syracuse, with the promise of freedom and equality¹³⁵. Six thousand colonists assembled in Syracuse¹³⁶; Timoleon regulated the possession of the houses and estates; Cephalus and Dionysius, who came from Corinth¹³⁷, revived the laws of Diocles¹³⁸; the Amphipolios of the Olympic Zeus, an officer who had been recently created¹³⁹, was appointed Eponymus and authorized to take precedence of all the other magistrates. The victory gained by Timoleon over the Carthaginians near the river Crimesus, Olymp. 110. 1; 339. B. C.¹⁴⁰, affixed the seal to the liberties of Syracuse, and in the peace with Carthage, which was a consequence of it, the river Halycus was fixed as its boundary¹⁴¹. The other towns were now freed from their respective tyrants, Hicetas was expelled from Leontini¹⁴², Mamercus from Catana, Hippon the tyrant of Messana was killed¹⁴³, and those of Centoripa, etc., and the Campanians in Ætna reduced¹⁴⁴. Agrigentum and Gela once more arose from their ruins, some Leontines removed to Syracuse, the population of

¹³³ Plut. 9—21; Diod. 16. 70.¹³⁴ Plut. 21.¹³⁵ Plut. 23:—ἐλευθέρους καὶ αὐτονομούς ἐπ' ἰσοῖς καὶ δικαίοις τὴν χώραν διαλαχόντας.¹³⁶ Plut. ubi sup. Diod. 16. 82, has 14,000.¹³⁷ Plut. 24.¹³⁸ Diod. 16. 82; 13. 35.¹³⁹ Diod. 16. 70.¹⁴⁰ Diod. 16. 77, sqq.; Plut. 25, sqq.¹⁴¹ Diod. 16. 82; Plut. 34.¹⁴² Plut. 32.¹⁴³ Plut. 34.¹⁴⁴ Diod. 16. 82.

Camarina was increased, and ten thousand citizens were sent to Agyrium¹⁴⁵. The government of Timoleon in Syracuse, from this time forward till his death, Olymp. 110. 4; 337. B. C.¹⁴⁶, is the noblest example of Æsymnety on record, whilst the gratitude of the Syracusans¹⁴⁷ was commensurate with the benefits they derived from it; and yet this glorious fabric was so soon destined to be destroyed¹⁴⁸.

11. THE ITALIOTS.

The towns on the Bruttian coast, Rhegium, Locri, and Caulon¹⁴⁹, which had been restored by the younger Dionysius, were in the possession of the tyrant, when Dion went forth to oppose him. Rhegium expelled the garrison of Dionysius, Olymp. 107. 2; 351. B. C.¹⁵⁰, with the help of Leptines and Callippus, Dion's murderers; the latter continued to reside there for some time after these events, but was at length killed¹⁵¹. After being driven out of Syracuse, Dionysius took refuge in Locri, where he committed the most barbarous and revolting atrocities¹⁵²; having violated the chastity of the virgins of the place, the enraged Locrians retaliated in the most horrible manner upon his own wife and daughters. The Greeks, just about the time that Dion set sail for Syracuse, had to contend with some new enemies

¹⁴⁵ Plut. 35; Diod. ubi sup.

¹⁴⁶ Diod. 16. 90.

¹⁴⁷ Plut. Timol. 37. 38.

¹⁴⁸ Plut. 39:—Αὐτοὶ δὲ χρώμενοι πολιτεία καὶ νόμοις, οὗς ἐκείνος κατήστησεν, ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον εὐδαιμονοῦντες διετέλεσαν reminds us of the *Plaudite* at the end of the comedy.

¹⁴⁹ Heyne, Opusc. 2. 204.

¹⁵⁰ Diod. 16. 45.

¹⁵¹ Diod. ubi sup.; Plut. Dion. 58.

¹⁵² Strab. 6. 259; Athen. 12. 541, D.; Justin, 21. 3; Æl. V. H. 6. 12; 9. 8.

¹⁵³ Strab. and Athen. ubi sup.

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in the Bruttians, who had originally been runaway slaves of the Lucanians, and from a horde of robbers had formed themselves into a people¹⁵⁴. They obtained possession, Olymp. 106. 1; 356. B. C., of Terina¹⁵⁵, a settlement of the Crotoniats, Hipponium, a colony of the Locrians¹⁵⁶, Thurii¹⁵⁷, etc. Amongst the other towns Crotona appears to have sustained a conflict with the Bruttians, whose encroachments probably extended almost to the walls of the town. The Tarentines maintained peace and friendship with the younger Dionysius, who presented them with a costly candlestick for their council-house¹⁵⁸; Tarentum interceded with the Locrians in favour of his family¹⁵⁹, though without effect. Upon the death of Archytas the internal corruption seems to have advanced still more rapidly than before; the external enemies, whom the greatness of Archytas had before held in check, now assailed it with irresistible impetuosity. As the Syracusans had applied to the parent-town Corinth, so the Tarentines now sent to Sparta for assistance; Archidamus obeyed the summons¹⁶⁰, Olymp. 110. 3, and perished in the vain attempt to defend them. Of the towns on the Campanian coast, Cuma, Palæopolis, and Naples, the two last were shortly afterwards involved in the Samnite war¹⁶¹, (U. C. 427; 327. B. C.

¹⁵⁴ Strab. 6. 255.

¹⁵⁵ Diod. 16. 15.

¹⁵⁶ Strab. 6. 256. Dindorf. ap. Diod. 16. 15, has restored 'Ιππώνιον in the place of 'Αρπώνιον.

¹⁵⁷ Diod. ubi sup. Strab. 6. 263: ὑπὸ Λευκανῶν ἡνδραποδίσθησαν. This must not be construed too literally. Thurii occurs at a later period as an independent community.

¹⁵⁸ Athen. 15. 700, D.

¹⁵⁹ Strab. 6. 259.

¹⁶⁰ See § 76.

¹⁶¹ Liv. 8. 22.

THE SERVITUDE, DELIVERANCE, RELAPSE, AND POLITICAL EXTINCTION OF THE GREEKS.

THE MACEDONIAN-ROMAN PERIOD.

1. EXTERNAL POLITICAL RELATIONS OF THE STATES OF GREECE.

a. The Mother Country and the Eastern States.

§ 79. Though the battle of Chæronea sealed the dependence of Greece upon Macedonia, the general subjection of the Greeks¹ was not consummated till after the battle of Crannon in the Lamian war. Philip does not appear to have entertained the serious design of subjugating Athens², for he not only concluded peace and contracted friendly relations³ with that state, but made it a present of Oropus, the possession of which it had formerly disputed with Thebes⁴. But the latter, the faithless ally of Philip, was treated with greater severity; she was compelled to receive back three hundred of her fugitives; the government was delivered into the hands of such as were known to be in the interests of Macedonia⁵, and Orchomenus and Plataeæ were rebuilt⁶. But Thessaly alone seems to have had a strictly Macedonian

¹ See the pertinent observations of Plut. Alex. 11.

² So apparently thought the Athenian captives, whom Philip had released without a ransom, and who demanded their baggage into the bargain. See Philip's jest on the occasion, Plut. Apophth. 6. 676.

³ Justin. 9. 4.

⁴ Schol. Demosth. de Coron. 259. 10. (L. 2. 148. ed. R.)

⁵ Justin. 9. 4.

⁶ Paus. 4. 27. 5.

administration, and to have been occupied by a Macedonian garrison⁷. In the congress at Corinth, from which the ambassadors of Sparta alone were absent⁸, Philip merely appeared in the character of Hegemon; he required the assistance of the Greeks in the war against Persia. Though the latter only proposed to serve as mercenaries, their offers possibly corresponded with Philip's expectations; but it is a gross delusion to speak of twenty myriads of infantry and fifteen thousand horse⁹; all the Grecian states together could not have mustered half the number.

Philip's death inspired the Greeks with hopes of regaining their independence, and Demosthenes conceived the most sanguine expectations of success¹⁰, the Thebans armed for a last and desperate struggle¹¹, and the Ætolians prepared to assist them. The resistance which Alexander met with before the walls of Thebes¹², the last, and at the same time the most glorious effort of Theban valour, was followed by the final destruction of that state. The Arcadians and Ætolians soon testified their contrition¹³, and the intervention of Phocion and Demades alone averted from Athens the vengeance of the conqueror¹⁴. Athens was declared free¹⁵, and made a most honourable use

⁷ According to Plut. Apophth. 6. 676, Philip rejected the advice for throwing garrisons into the Greek cities, because *μᾶλλον πολὺν χρόνον ἐθέλειν χρησθῆς ἢ δεσπότης ὀλίγου, καλεῖσθαι*. A garrison in Thebes seems to be alluded to Dinarch. in Demosth. 15.

⁸ Justin, 9. 5.

⁹ Justin, ubi sup.

¹⁰ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 546. 547.

¹¹ Dinarch. in Demosth. 14, sqq., unless a later insurrection be meant (conf. n. 23.)

¹² Diodor. 17. 14; Plut. Alex. 11; Arrhian, 1. 7, sqq.

¹³ Arrhian, 1. 10.

¹⁴ Plut. Phoc. 17; Diodor. 17. 15; Plut. Demosth. 23.

¹⁵ Plut. Alex. 28.

of her liberty, by publicly mourning the disasters of Thebes, and granting an asylum to the Theban exiles¹⁶. Some Macedonian galleys soon after this attempted to run into the Piræus¹⁷; but the Athenians repulsed them, and held themselves upon their guard against any further attempt of the same nature. The liberty of Sparta was likewise respected, but tyrants¹⁸ were imposed upon many of the other states¹⁸, e. g. upon Sicyon¹⁹ and Pelene²⁰. Very few Greeks fought in the ranks of Alexander's army against Persia²¹; but on the other hand there were large bodies of them in the Persian pay, who did honour to the national name by their conduct in the field, and testified greater fidelity and attachment to the despot whose bread they ate, than to the country which had given them birth²². Now, as in the time of Agesilaus, it was attempted by means of Persian gold, to excite disturbances in Greece²³. Some wandering Thebans and Arcadians took up arms, but no hostilities ensued; Agis the second, the son of Archidamus, king of Sparta, who was likewise gained over by Darius²⁴, and after the example of the Spartans, the Eleans, Achæans, with the exception of the Pellenæans, and all the Arcadians, except those of Megalopolis²⁵, were induced to arm²⁶; but the allied army

¹⁶ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 544.

¹⁷ Ps. Demosth. de Fœd. Alex. 219. 28, sqq.

¹⁸ The author of the oration de Fœd. Alex. p. 218. 24: — ἐπιτάττει ἡ συνθήκη εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ, ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ αὐτονόμους τοὺς Ἕλληνας. was that really the case? ?

¹⁹ Ibid. 216. 12.

²⁰ Ibid. 214. 19.

²¹ Curtius, 5. 3.

²² Arrhian, 2. 10; 3. 23.

²³ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 633; conf. n. 11.

²⁴ He had gone to Crete for that purpose, Olymp. 112. 1; Diodor. 17. 48.

²⁵ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 553.

²⁶ Arrhian, 2. 13. 15; Diodor. 17. 48. *Μυομαχία* in Alexander's opinion, Plut. Ages. 15.

was defeated by Antipater, Olymp. 112. 3; 330 B. C.²⁷, whereupon Sparta sent an embassy to declare her submission²⁸. Harpalus, who escaped to Athens in Olymp. 113. 4; 325. B. C., found the Athenians very willing to accept of his bribes, it is true; but the official enquiry which was afterwards instituted, sufficiently shows how intimidated the Athenians were, and how incapable of an effort for the recovery of their liberty and independence. Alexander's order that all the Grecian states should receive back their fugitives, a proceeding²⁹ as well meant as it was impolitic, would have occasioned violent distractions; but through his death which soon after occurred, Olymp. 114. 1; 323. B. C., the execution of it became dependent upon other circumstances.

Leosthenes, a bold and experienced captain of mercenaries³⁰, vied with Demosthenes, who had been recalled from banishment³¹, in rousing the Athenians to revolt; a large body of able mercenaries³² inspired them with confidence: the Athenians rose in arms, and their example was followed by the Ætolians, Argives, Epidaurians, Eleans, Messenians, Thessalians³³, (who were commanded by Menon³⁴,) Locrians, Phocians, etc. The defeat of the confederates at Crannon, Olymp. 114. 3; 322. B. C., reduced them to the most galling servitude under Antipater. Athens was constrained to deliver up her orators, Demosthenes, Hyperides, etc³⁵, and here and in other

²⁷ Diodor. 17. 62. 63.

²⁸ Diodor. 17. 89.

³¹ Plut. Demosth. 27.

³² Diodor. 18. 11. 12.

³⁴ See the following section under the head of Thessaly.

³⁵ Diodor. 18. 17.

²⁹ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 525.

³⁰ Diodor. 18. 9.

³² Diodor. 18. 9.

states dynasties were established, composed of men in the Macedonian interest, whose authority was maintained by Macedonian garrisons. This system was continued for several years under Cassander, the son of Antipater, nor did any change of importance result from Polysperchon's proclamation of freedom to the Greeks, Olymp. 115. 2; 319. B. C.³⁶. In the mean time, Cassander, to the great joy of the Athenians, rebuilt Thebes³⁷, Olymp. 116. 1; 315. B. C.; a town was erected upon the site of Potidæa, from him named Cassandreia³⁸, which was shortly afterwards subject³⁹ to the tyranny of the tremendous Apollodorus, whose name is usually classed with those of Phalaris and Dionysius⁴⁰. Cyrene, however, fell under the power of the Lagid Ptolemy⁴¹, Olymp. 114. 2.

With the view of supporting an attack upon Cassander, Olymp. 116. 2; 315. B. C., Antigonus and Ptolemy once more declared the Greeks free⁴², and the former soon afterwards sent a general named Ptolemy to drive out Cassander's garrison⁴³, Olymp. 117. 1; 312. B. C. But a body of troops

³⁶ Diodor. 18. 56.

³⁷ Diodor. 19. 54. Concerning the share which the Athenians had in it, see Paus. 9. 7. 1; Plut. Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 243.

³⁸ Diodor. 19. 52; Paus. 5. 23. 2.

³⁹ According to Polyæn. 6. 7. 2, Apollodorus was still a demagogue at the time Lachares fled from Athens (Olymp. 120. 1; 299. B. C.): the establishment of his tyranny was probably coincident in time with the anarchy after Cassander's death (297—294. B. C.)

⁴⁰ Polyæn. ubi sup.; Diod. Fragm. v. 9. p. 294. Bipont; Ælian, V. H. 14. 41. and Periz.; Plut. de Sera Numin. Vindict. 8. 202; Polyb. 7. 7. 2; Seneca de Irac. 2. 5; de Benef. 7. 19; conf. Heins. ad Ovid. Epist., Pont. 2. 9. 43; Clavier in the Mém. de l'Inst. Hist. v. 4. As an appendage to the brutality of the Macedonian age, we may here mention one of those wild vagaries which are no less characteristic of its spirit. Cassander's brother, Alexander, founded a town, called Uranopolis, where he introduced a new dialect; a cock was called *ὀρθροβόας*, a herald *ἀπύτης*, etc. See Heraclides Lembos ap. Athen. 3. 98. D. E., where there is a letter written by this Alexander, in this new jargon.

⁴¹ Diodor. 18. 21.

⁴² Diodor. 19. 61. 62.

⁴³ Diodor. 19. 78. 87.

496. POLITICAL EXTINCTION OF THE GREEKS.

was likewise despatched by Ptolemy the Lagid, to make the freedom which had already been proclaimed subservient to his own objects; they accordingly occupied Sicyon and Corinth, Olymp. 118. 1; 308. B. C.⁴⁴. Antigonus, Olymp. 118. 2; 307. B. C., now sent his son the youthful and heroic Demetrius Poliorcetes, to replace the first-named Ptolemy who had gone over to Cassander⁴⁵. He soon delivered Athens from the garrison of Cassander⁴⁶, and made it his chief seat of government, and from hence Megara⁴⁷ and Salamis⁴⁸, and some time afterwards, particularly in Olymp. 119. 2; 303. B. C., no inconsiderable number of towns situate in the northern districts and the Peloponnesus, namely Heraclea in Trachis, the towns of the Acte in Argolis, those of Arcadia, with the exception of Mantinea, Sicyon and Corinth⁴⁹, received new liberty and a new yoke. Rhodes, which had expelled the Macedonian garrison immediately upon the death of Alexander⁵⁰, and Olymp. 118. 4; 304. B. C., united itself with the Lagid Ptolemy, victoriously supported a contest with Demetrius, and in the following year obtained real liberty⁵¹. After the battle of Ipsus, Olymp. 119. 4; 301. B. C., several states, and Athens amongst the number, threw off their allegiance to Demetrius for a time, whereupon some of them fell under the power of Cassander; Demetrius returned, recovered

⁴⁴ Diodor. 20. 37; Plut. Demetr. 15.

⁴⁵ Diodor. 20. 19.

⁴⁶ Plut. Demetr. 8; Diodor. 20. 45.

⁴⁷ Plut. Demetr. 9.

⁴⁸ According to Paus. 1. 35. 2, the Salaminians were expelled by the Athenians; this can scarcely have happened yet. (Conf. § 80. n. 112); but Salamis fell into the hands of Demetrius.

⁴⁹ Plut. Demetr. 15. 23. 25.

⁵⁰ Diodor. 18. 8.

⁵¹ Diodor. 20. 82, sqq.; Plut. Demetr. 21, sqq.

all that he had lost ⁵², and after the death of Cassander even added Macedonia to his other conquests. From hence Demetrius erected the fortress Demetrias on the Pagasæan gulf ⁵³, which was called one of the three fetters of Greece ⁵⁴; Pyrrhus and Ptolemy were the means of overturning this despotism; the latter inveigled the Greeks to rebel; Olympiodorus the Athenian beat the Macedonians ⁵⁵, and with thirteen men stormed the Musæum which had been fortified and converted into a citadel, and to which the remainder of them had retreated ⁵⁶. Ptolemy thereupon celebrated the Isthmian games, and the Greeks were obliged to appear as spectators adorned with palm-boughs, in honour of their newly-recovered liberties ⁵⁷. He left Leonidas ⁵⁸ as his lieutenant, who could not, however, long maintain his ground.

Some Celtic hordes issuing from the heart of Macedonia to invade Greece, Olymp. 125. 2; 279. B. C. ⁵⁹, the Greeks resisted them with an energy and resolution which, in their then exhausted state, could hardly have been expected of them ⁶⁰. Boeotia furnished 10,000 (?) Hoplitæ, and five hundred horse; Ætolia 7,000 Hoplitæ, and ninety (?) light-armed soldiers, Athens a thousand foot ⁶¹, etc. They attacked the barbarians with vigour and determination, and gained a complete victory over them ⁶². But after the discomfiture of their barbarous invaders the Greeks fell

⁵² Plut. Demetr. 30, sqq.

⁵⁴ See vol. i. p. 5.

⁵⁵ Paus. i. 29. 11.

⁵⁶ Suid. ubi sup.

⁵⁷ Diodor. Fragm. 9. 300. Bipont.; Paus. 10. 19. 4, sqq.

⁵⁸ This is the statement in Pausan. 10. 20. 3; but these numbers are evidently corrupt.

⁵⁹ Paus. 10. 21—24.

⁶⁰ Plut. Demetr. 53; Strab. 9. 436.

⁶¹ Paus. 1. 26. 1.

⁶² Suid. Δημήτριος, l. 540. ed. Küst.

⁶³ Paus. 10. 23. 9.

out among themselves. The supremacy of the Grecian states was contested by the son of Demetrius Poliorcetes, Antigonus Gonnatas, and Pyrrhus the Æacid, who had returned from Italy; the latter chose to take part in the party dissensions of the Greeks; Olymp. 127. 1; 272. B. C., he endeavoured to effect the restoration of Cleonymus who had been expelled from Sparta; but the women defended the city, and some Messenians came to their assistance⁶³; at length fighting for a faction in Argos he was slain⁶⁴. Almost the whole of Greece now sunk into subjection under Antigonus⁶⁵, who after reducing Alexander the son of Pyrrhus, retained uninterrupted possession of the sovereign power in Macedonia. Athens having sided with Pyrrhus, was compelled to receive a Macedonian garrison in the Musæum⁶⁶; this was, however, soon afterwards withdrawn, so that Athens was now regarded as a free town⁶⁷. Corinth, which was in the hands of Nicæa, the heroic widow of Alexander, was taken by stratagem and garrisoned with Macedonians⁶⁸. Almost all the Peloponnesus was subject to the dominion of tyrants under the protectorate of Antigonus; the ancient provinces were dismembered, all former ties dissolved, and the fugitives and mercenaries formed themselves into bands⁶⁹ of robbers, like the *fuorusciti* and *sbanditi*

⁶³ Paus. 4. 29. 2. After that time the hatred between Sparta and Messenia ceased; but he states, 4. 31. 2, that in the war between Antony and Octavius the Messenians sided with the former, whilst the Lacedæmonians adhered to Octavius.

⁶⁴ Plutarch, Pyrrh. 26, sqq.; Paus. 413. 3, sqq.; Justin, 25. 4. 5.

⁶⁵ Justin, 26. 2.

⁶⁶ Paus. 3. 6. 3.

⁶⁷ Paus. ubi sup.; conf. Euseb. Can. Olymp. 131. 1: Antigonus Atheniensibus reddidit libertatem.

⁶⁸ Plut. Arat. 17.

⁶⁹ The ἀρχικλωψ, Plut. Arat. 6, has an analogon in the *archipirata* of Liv. 37. 11; herein we already perceive the prototypes of the Klephts.

of Italy in a later age, and when nothing was to be earned by mercenary warfare, committed depredations upon the surrounding country⁷⁰; legal freedom was to be found in Rhodes and Byzantium alone.

The festal and federal unions of Greece, with the exception of the Olympic, Pythian and other panegyres, had, since the rise of the hegemonies, sunk into utter insignificance; whilst many of them had become altogether extinct; the more recent confederacies, which were the offspring of external force alone, and not of any natural and inherent tendency to unity and friendship, and were for the most part of a military character, fell to pieces as soon as the power by which they had been created and held together ceased to exist. But amidst this general decay of the national institutions, two confederacies arose, through whose efforts Greece recovered for a time some degree of her former liberty and political importance.

The Ætolians⁷¹, in the earlier age only known as mercenaries and robbers⁷², did not assume the character of a people till after the age of Philip, during the contests which they supported with Thebes, etc. against Alexander⁷³, and afterwards against Antipater⁷⁴ and the Celts⁷⁵. To this period must probably be referred the first rise of a regularly-organized league amongst the Ætolian tribes⁷⁶; for we cannot give that name to those occasional alliances which they contracted in former ages

⁷⁰ Plut. Arat. 6: 'Ἡ μὲν οὖν ὅπλων παρασκευὴ συνήθης ἦν, πάντων, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τότε κλοπείαις χρωμένων καὶ καταδρομαῖς ἐπ' ἀλλήλους.

⁷¹ ⁷² Vol. i. p. 93.

⁷³ Arrh. 1. 10.

⁷⁴ Above, n. 32.

⁷⁵ N. 61.

⁷⁶ It was not a confederacy, but the Ætolians' *κατὰ ἔθνη*, who sent deputies to appease Alexander, Arrh. 1. 10.

against an invading enemy, as for instance, against the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war. The league began to feel greater confidence in its own powers, after Antipater and Craterus had made an unsuccessful incursion into Ætolia, soon after the Lamian war, Olymp. 114. 3; 322. B. C., and entered into a formal convention with them⁷⁷. The Ætolian arms were soon after turned against Thessaly; in the year before the Celtic war Heraclæa in Trachis had been occupied by the Ætoli-
 ans⁷⁸; at a later period the Phthiotan Thebes⁷⁹, Lamia⁸⁰, etc., as well as Naupactus in the Ozolian Locris, are called Ætolian⁸¹. The conquered townships entered the league⁸². They made incursions into the Peloponnesus, in the hope of obtaining booty⁸³, but some time afterwards several places in the Peninsula, as for instance Phigalia⁸⁴, united themselves to the Ætoli-
 ans. On the other side Acarnania appears to have been separate from Ætolia; Olymp. 114. 1, the treaty, which the Ætoli-
 ans had concluded with the Epirot Alexander for the partition of Acarnania⁸⁵, was probably never carried into effect. Dorimachus and Scopas⁸⁶, who lived in the age of the younger Philip, are commemorated as legislators of the Ætoli-
 ans; but they might probably, with greater propriety, be denominated the regulators of the league; however, the greater part of their ordinances, which are re-

⁷⁷ Diodor. 18. 25.⁷⁸ Paus. 10. 21. 1.⁷⁹ Polyb. 5. 99.⁸⁰ Liv. 36. 25.⁸¹ Polyb. 5. 103.⁸² Paus. 10. 21. 1, has *συντελεῖν*, consequently they probably did not possess equal rights; but the expression of Pausanias must not be interpreted strictly, conf. 10. 8. 3.⁸³ Before the time of Cleomenes the Ætoli-
 ans had carried off nearly 50,000 helots. Plut. Cleom. 18.⁸⁴ Polyb. 4. 3. 6.⁸⁵ Polyb. 9. 34. 7; conf. 2. 45. 1.⁸⁶ Polyb. 13. 1.

corded in history, existed in the earlier times, and the Ætolians never lost the rudeness, rapacity and contentiousness for which they had always been conspicuous; the legislation in question aimed at remedying the corruption and disorders which prevailed within, by the enactment of wise and salutary laws of debt. The federal council, the Panætolium⁸⁷, entirely democratic in its nature and constitution⁸⁸, was generally held at Thermos, and upon extraordinary occasions it assembled at other places, as for instance, at Naupactus, Hypata, Lammia⁸⁹; afterwards the assembly at Thermopylæ also became Ætolian⁹⁰. The chief officer was the Strategus, who there officiated as president⁹¹. The Apocleti formed a sort of lesser council⁹²; they are also occasionally called Archons⁹³, and may be compared with the Prytanes, but they likewise occur in the character of deputies of the assembly⁹⁴; the Synedri seem to have been a judicial body⁹⁵; the office of the Grammateus⁹⁶ was of great importance, as in all the younger states of Greece. All the officers were elected in the federal council⁹⁷, where matters relating to peace and war, and to alliances and negotiations with foreign powers, were discussed and decided upon⁹⁸. Amongst the military force of the Ætolians, the cavalry was distinguished by peculiar excellence⁹⁹.

⁸⁷ Tittmann, Griech. Staatsv. 722. n. 32.

⁸⁸ Tittmann, ubi sup. 725. The whole analogy of the political institutions of the age vouches for it.

⁸⁹ Tittmann, ubi sup. 726.

⁹⁰ Liv. 31. 32: nisi in Panætologico et Pylaico concilio ageretur.

⁹¹ Polyb. 2. 2. 8.

⁹² Polyb. 4. 5. 9; 20. 10. 13.

⁹³ Polyb. 21. 2. 7. They are doubtless the same as the *Principes* of Liv. 38. 8, etc.

⁹⁴ Liv. 35. 45; 36. 28.

⁹⁵ Tittmann, ubi sup. 727. n. 68.

⁹⁶ Polyb. 22. 15. 10.

⁹⁷ Polyb. 4. 37. 2.

⁹⁸ Tittmann, ubi sup. 724. n. 49.

⁹⁹ Liv. 33. 7.

The ancient Achæan league, which had been entirely broken up in consequence of the destruction of Helice and Bura ¹⁰⁰, the separation or encroachments of Pellene, and lastly, through the despotism of Antipater and Polysperchon ¹⁰¹, was revived about the time that Pyrrhus went to Italy, Olymp. 124. 4; 280. B. C. ¹⁰². In the same year Dyme, Patræ, Tritæa, and Pharæ renewed the confederacy ¹⁰³; these were soon joined by the other towns, with the exception of Olenus ¹⁰⁴; but it continued unimportant for nearly thirty years, and its operations were limited to the restoration and maintenance of internal concord. Sicyon had hitherto, like its neighbour Pellene, obeyed the tyrant who had been imposed upon it by the Macedonians ¹⁰⁵; Aratus, who when a child had taken refuge in Argos ¹⁰⁶ from the persecutions of one of the tyrants, and enjoyed the paternal hospitality of this city and the neighbouring places till he had attained the age of manhood, assembled a band of daring adventurers, surprised Sicyon, his native place, which was very badly guarded, expelled its tyrant Nicocles, and annexed it as a republic to the Achæan league ¹⁰⁷, twenty-nine years after its revival ¹⁰⁸, Olymp. 1. 132; 252. B. C. Aratus now became the soul of the confederacy; no one was considered more fit than himself to be entrusted with the Strategia; skilful in negotiation, and enterprising in war, though not possessing in

¹⁰⁰ Vol. i. p. 3. n. 17.¹⁰² Strab. ubi sup; Polyb. 2. 41.¹⁰³ Strab. ubi sup.; Polyb. ubi sup.¹⁰⁴ Strab. 8. 384.¹⁰⁵ Plut. Arat. 2. 3.¹⁰⁸ Polyb. 2. 43.¹⁰¹ Strab. 8. 384.¹⁰⁵ Plut. Arat. 2; Paus. 2. 8. 2.¹⁰⁷ Plut. Arat. 6—10.

a remarkable degree the qualities of the general and the soldier, he incited the peaceful Achæans to pass their own narrow confines; whereby they eventually succeeded in driving out the Macedonian chiefs and garrisons from most of the towns of the adjacent districts, and annexing them to the league. The capture of Acrocorinth, Olymp. 134. 2; 243. B. C.¹⁰⁹, and the accession of Megalopolis¹¹⁰, whose tyrant Lydiades had voluntarily resigned his authority, were most important in their results; besides these, the league, in the zenith of its independence and power, included nearly the whole of Arcadia, viz., Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenus¹¹¹ and Heræ¹¹², Messenia¹¹³, Hermione, Trœzen, Epidaurus, Phlius¹¹⁴, Argos¹¹⁵, Cleonæ¹¹⁶, Megara¹¹⁷, Ægina and Athens, for which Aratus, by bribing the Macedonian commander, recovered Salamis, Sunium, the Piræus and Munychia¹¹⁸. However, Athens does not seem to have stood upon an equal footing with the Achæans, or to have been united to them so closely and permanently as the other states¹¹⁹. In the Peloponnesus the Eleans were adverse to them, and Sparta watched their proceedings with jealousy.

The internal constitution of the league had been partly determined at the period of its renewal, and partly perfected and matured upon its subsequent extension, and through the influence of Aratus,

¹⁰⁹ Polyb. 2. 43; Strab. 8. 385; Paus. 2. 8. 4; Plut. Arat. 18, sqq.

¹¹⁰ Plut. Arat. 30.

¹¹¹ Polyb. 2. 46.

¹¹² Polyæn. 2. 36; Ann. Pol. 28.

¹¹³ Paus. 4. 29; 2. 3.

¹¹⁴ Polyb. 2. 44.

¹¹⁵ Plut. Arat. 29; Paus. 2. 8. 5.

¹¹⁶ Polyb. 2. 44.

¹¹⁷ Polyb. 2. 43.

¹¹⁸ Plut. Arat. 34.

¹¹⁹ This must be considered in estimating the sentence of the Achæans in the contention between Athens and Delos, Polyb. 32. 17; as well as the political rank of Athens afterwards.

etc. It also possessed a federal assembly of a democratic nature¹²⁰, which was held regularly twice a year¹²¹ in Ægium¹²²; every citizen had a right to be admitted to it upon attaining his thirtieth year¹²³, and at the same time became entitled to speak, which he was called upon to do by a herald¹²⁴; the Strategi presided and conducted the proceedings¹²⁵, and the Demiurgi¹²⁶, who were either associated with them, or distinct from and co-ordinate with them, assisted them in the discharge of this duty. A Bule¹²⁷, which must be looked upon as a permanent body, and not as a committee specially selected from the general body upon every fresh occasion, was charged with the preparation of the subjects for discussion, and sometimes probably represented the assembly. The chief functionaries of the league were two Strategi, afterwards one only¹²⁸, a Grammateus¹²⁹, and Demiurgi¹³⁰. Special judges were sometimes chosen¹³¹. The league was more closely united than a mere armed confederacy, on which account the duties of the assembly were more diversified; still the individual communities were by no means dissolved. Peculiar features in the constitution of this league were not only the mutual representation of its members and its federal tribunal¹³², but likewise

¹²⁰ Polyb. 2. 38. 6 :—τῆς ἰσηγορίας καὶ παρόρησίας καὶ καθόλου δημοκρατίας ἀληθινῆς σύστημα καὶ προαίρεσιν εἰλικρινεστέραν οὐκ ἂν εὔροι τις τῆς παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ὑπαρχούσης.

¹²¹ Polyb. 5. 1. 9.

¹²² On the subject of the sanctuary Homarion (?) consult Tittmann, Staatsv. 681. 89, and above, vol. i. p. 171. n. 27.

¹²³ Polyb. 9. 29. 6.

¹²⁴ Liv. 32. 20; Polyb. 29. 9. 10.

¹²⁵ Polyb. 28. 7, etc.

¹²⁶ Liv. 32. 22.

¹²⁷ Polyb. 2. 46. 6; 4. 26. 8, etc. Conf. Tittmann, 685. n. 28, and on a Gerusia, Polyb. 38. 5. 1.

¹²⁸ Strab. 8. 385.

¹²⁹ Strab. ubi sup.

¹³⁰ Liv. 32. 22.

¹³¹ Polyb. 2. 37. 10.

¹³² Paus. 7. 9. 2. 3.

the introduction of uniform coins, weights, and measures ¹³³. No one of the former federal unions had been so closely united in its interior.

The Achæan league was superior to the Ætolian in external extent, in internal order, and in the justice of its proceedings. It was useless to attempt keeping up a sure or lasting alliance with the latter, which always retained somewhat of its disorderly and lawless character. But Aratus, notwithstanding his excellent qualities, was not free from mean-spirited jealousy, or from wilfulness and passion; for being opposed by an antagonist, his superior in courage and military genius, he sacrificed the true feelings of liberty and patriotism to personal pique and resentment.

Sparta had, under the victorious Agis III., the son of Eudamidas, shown a disposition to make common cause with the Achæans against the Ætoli-ans ¹³⁴; but hostilities ensued a short time after, and broke out into open war ¹³⁵, under Cleomenes, Olymp. 138. 4; 225. B. C. Cleomenes, in conjunction with the Ætolians ¹³⁶ and Eleans, several times beat Aratus in the open field; Mantinea, Argos, and the towns of the Acte, Phlius and Megalopolis, were severed from the Achæan league. It was in vain that the conqueror made overtures towards a reconciliation with Aratus, in order that the whole Peloponnesus might be united ¹³⁷; Aratus called in the assistance of the Macedonian king

¹³³ Polyb. 2. 37. 10. Compare in general, on the constitution of the Ætolian and Achæan leagues, Tittmann, Gr. Staatsv. 673—688; 721—728. Drumann, Gesch. des Verfalls d. Gr. Staaten. 461, sqq. On the chronology, Bayer, fasti Achaici in the Comment. Acad. Petrop. vol. v.

¹³⁴ Plut. Agis, 14, sqq.

¹³⁵ Polyb. 2. 46, sqq.

¹³⁶ Polyb. 2. 45; Plut. Cleom. 3, sqq.; Arat. 53, sqq.

¹³⁷ Plut. Cleom. 17.

Antigonus Doson ¹³⁸, and, as might easily have been foreseen, he soon obtained an authority over the league, which hereupon threw itself into his arms ¹³⁹.

Antigonus arrived in Olymp. 139. 1 ; 224. B. C. He proclaimed his despotic principles by setting up the statues of the tyrants in Argos, his barbarity by destroying the town of Mantinea, whose inhabitants were killed or sold ¹⁴⁰, and his power by a victory over Cleomenes at Sellasia, Olymp. 139. 2 ; 222. B. C., and by the occupation of Sparta ¹⁴¹. The restoration of the constitution of Sparta was the surest guarantee of her weakness. Antigonus now entered into a confederacy with the Achæans, Bœotians, Phocians, Thessalians, Acarnanians, and Epirots ¹⁴². But the power of the Achæan league was broken, and it was no longer able to guard its territories against the aggressions of the rapacious Ætolians ¹⁴³. The Ætolians, who were at that time headed by Dorimachus and Scopas ¹⁴⁴, kept up relations with Elis ¹⁴⁵ and Sparta ¹⁴⁶, and Macedonian assistance now became doubly needful to the Achæans.

Such was the condition in which the younger Philip found the states of Greece. No sooner had he appeared upon the scene than the confusion increased ; he was supported by the Achæans, and opposed by the Ætolians and their confederates. The social war ¹⁴⁷, Olymp. 140. 2 ; 219. B. C., and Olymp. 140. 3, increased the enmity which the

¹³⁸ Plut. Arat. 42 ; Polyb. 2. 47, sqq.

¹³⁹ Plut. Arat. 45.

¹⁴¹ Polyb. 2. 69, sqq. ; Plut. Cleom. 28.

¹⁴² Polyb. 4. 25.

¹⁴³ Polyb. 4. 9.

¹⁴⁷ Polyb. 4. 1—5. 105.

¹⁴⁰ Plut. ubi sup.

¹⁴² Polyb. 4. 9. 4.

¹⁴⁴ Polyb. 4. 3, sqq.

¹⁴⁶ Polyb. 4. 16.

Ætolians bore him, and opened the eyes of the Achæans to their own dishonour in bowing to the caprices of a despot whose tyranny daily grew more oppressive. The poisoning of Aratus by Philip ¹⁴⁸, Olymp. 141. 2; 215. B. C., was a dreadful warning to them. Philopœmen, a friend to his country, and eminently distinguished as a statesman and a warrior, was less subject to the influence of prejudice and passion than his predecessor Aratus; and as long as he remained at the head of affairs, the league struggled hard to preserve its independence ¹⁴⁹. But it was now too much entangled in the quarrels and disputes of the surrounding states to be able to stand alone, and assert its own freedom. Prusias, king of Bithynia, and Attalus, king of Pergamus, had taken part in the commercial war between Rhodes and Byzantium ¹⁵⁰, Olymp. 139. 4; 321. B. C., and the whole of the Greek states were involved in the contest between Philip and the Romans. As long as the Romans had to contend with Hannibal, from Olymp. 142. 3; 210. B. C., they kept Philip employed against the Ætolians, who eagerly offered them their co-operation, with the understanding that Acarnania and all the towns from Ætolia to Corcyra were to be given up to them ¹⁵¹; but when they had been compelled by Philip to make their submission, the Romans concluded peace with the latter, three years before the end of the second Punic war ¹⁵², which peace included the Achæans, Bœotians, Thessalians, and Acarnanians as his

¹⁴⁸ Polyb. 8. 14; Plut. Arat. 52.

¹⁴⁹ Plut. Philopœm. 8.

¹⁵¹ Liv. 26. 24.

¹⁵⁰ Polyb. 4. 47, sqq

¹⁵² Liv. 31. 1.

allies; and Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, the Eleans, Messenians, and Athenians¹⁵³ as the allies of Rome. Hereupon six thousand Ætolians went to Egypt as mercenaries¹⁵⁴.

The Macedonian Hegemony over Greece was now only maintained by the possession of places of strength, particularly the three fetters, to which allusion has repeatedly been made, viz., Demetrias, Chalcis, and Corinth¹⁵⁵; individual cities, not to mention the towns of the Ætolians, were exceedingly exasperated against Philip; the Athenians, who were obliged singly to carry on a war against him, and were thereby reduced to great extremities, made the most bitter complaints at Rome¹⁵⁶. The Rhodians and their confederate Attalus of Pergamus¹⁵⁷ did the same. Byzantium likewise henceforward attached itself to the Romans¹⁵⁸. In the third year of the war, Olymp. 145. 3; 198. B. C., the majority of the Achæans declared themselves hostile to Philip¹⁵⁹. Flaminius¹⁶⁰ by his blandishments only decoyed the Achæans from their dependence upon Macedonia that he might impose a new yoke upon them. But they were far from foreboding their future servitude; when the former had by the battle of Cynoscephalæ forced Philip into a peace, and he had withdrawn his garrisons from all the towns of Greece, the freedom of the Greeks, that is to say, of such as had been subject to Philip, namely, the Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Eubœans, Magnesians, Thessalians, Perrhæbians,

¹⁵³ Liv. 29. 12.

¹⁵⁵ Liv. 32. 37; Polyb. 17. 11.

¹⁵⁷ Liv. 31. 15.

¹⁵⁹ Liv. 32. 32. 33.

¹⁵⁴ Liv. 31. 44.

¹⁵⁶ Liv. 31. 14.

¹⁵⁸ Tacit. Ann. 12. 62.

¹⁶⁰ Plut. Flamin. 2.

Phthiotan Achæans¹⁶¹, was once more proclaimed at the Isthmian games, Olymp. 146. 1; 196. B. C., and the proclamation was hailed with demonstrations of the most unbounded joy¹⁶². Flaminius made war upon Nabis the tyrant of Sparta¹⁶³, but did not depose him. However, the slighting manner in which Flaminius¹⁶⁴ treated the Ætolians, whose rapacity had not been satisfied by the war, rankled in their minds, and they soon afterwards endeavoured to revolt from Rome.

Antiochus, the Seleucid, prepared for a war with Rome, and was supported by the Ætolians¹⁶⁵, and by the Bœotians¹⁶⁶, who displayed still greater alacrity in his cause; the Achæans, Rhodians, etc., sided with the Romans¹⁶⁷. The war began Olymp. 147. 1; 191. B. C. The Ætolians soon had cause to repent of the step they had taken; but their courage was not entirely broken till Antiochus was finally reduced¹⁶⁸; they retained their liberty in name, indeed, but the heavy tribute imposed upon them by Rome in time of peace, produced the utmost distress and embarrassment in the interior¹⁶⁹. In the peace with Antiochus, several of the Grecian towns in Asia, which had been subject to his authority, such as Miletus, Colophon, Cuma, etc., were declared free; others, like Ephesus, devolved to Eumenes of Pergamus; the Rhodians, who had

¹⁶¹ Liv. 33. 32. Conf. 30; Polyb. 18. 29.

¹⁶² Liv. 33. 32; Plut. Flamin. 12. Valer. Max. 4. 8. 5: tanta cœlum clamoris alacritate compleverunt, ut certo constet (as in the case of the prodigies,) aves, quæ supervolabant, attonitas paventesque decidisse.

¹⁶³ Liv. 34. 35; Plut. Flamin. 13.

¹⁶⁴ Liv. 33. 11—13.

¹⁶⁵ Liv. 35. 32.

¹⁶⁶ Polyb. 19. 4.

¹⁶⁷ Liv. 35. 50.

¹⁶⁸ Polyb. 20. 10; 21. 3; 22. 11. 5. To the corresponding statement of Livy in this instance, as well as through the whole of this narration, applies what he himself says, 33. 10: Nos Polybium secuti sumus, non incertum auctorem, etc.

¹⁶⁹ Polyb. 30. 14.

carried on and decided the naval war almost alone, were rewarded with Lycia and Caria as far as the Mæander¹⁷⁰. The little political dignity which the Greek states still retained, centered in the Rhodians and in Philopœmen. But the Achæans suffered more and more beneath the iron rule of their despotic allies, and from the intrigues of the embassies which thronged their cities; but Philopœmen marched against Sparta, Olymp. 147. 1; 192. B. C., after the murder of Nabis, without having previously obtained the consent of the Romans to the expedition, and annexed it to the Achæan league¹⁷¹. Sparta was, upon the death of Philopœmen, united with the league¹⁷², which thereby, and by the accession of Heraclea in Trachis¹⁷³, attained its largest extent. Philopœmen, however, was not only unable to frustrate the cabals of a wretch called Dinocrates, or to prevent the defection of Messenia from the Achæan league, but he himself was defeated and taken prisoner, and died a violent death in a Messenian dungeon, Olymp. 149. 2; 183. B. C.¹⁷⁴. Lycortas, the father of Polybius, who had ever been the faithful and worthy ally of Philopœmen, supplied his place, revenged his death, and once more united Messenia to the league¹⁷⁵. Meanwhile, the Rhodians tried their strength in wars with the Cretans¹⁷⁶.

The prostration of the Greeks, and their utter in-

¹⁷⁰ Polyb. 22. 27.

¹⁷¹ Polyb. 22. 23. Still more fully in Liv. 38. 34; Plut. Philopœm. 16; Paus. 7. 8. 3.

¹⁷² Polyb. 25. 1. 2.

¹⁷³ That this belonged to the league is proved, Paus. 7. 14. 1.

¹⁷⁴ Plut. Philop. 18, sqq.; Polyb. 24. 9. 12; Liv. 39. 49. 50.

¹⁷⁵ Polyb. 24. 12. 25. 1.

¹⁷⁶ Polyb. 33. 14. 15.

ability to defend themselves against aggression, were so apparent, that the Romans thought they might trample upon them with impunity¹⁷⁷. The partisans of Macedonia existed in by no means inconsiderable numbers when the war broke out, and many of the Grecian states refused to bear arms against Perseus¹⁷⁸; but the Achæans sent Polybius with offers of assistance to the Romans¹⁷⁹. In the course of the war, the number of the malcontents increased, owing to the oppression and exactions of the Roman generals¹⁸⁰; whilst the Roman party, emboldened by the protection of Roman functionaries and soldiers, committed with impunity¹⁸¹ the most dreadful outrages against their adversaries, and wickedly calumniated all who attempted to offer any obstruction to their proceedings¹⁸². At the head of this base faction was Callicrates, who may be compared with Æschines, Philocrates, etc., though he was still more abandoned than they were¹⁸³, Olymp. 153. 2; 167. B. C.; he delivered up more than a thousand Achæans, and Polybius amongst the number, upon pretence of sending them to take their trial at Rome¹⁸⁴. The Rhodians, who, like the Ætolians in the first Macedonian war, had deluded themselves into the arrogant belief that the issue of the contest depended upon themselves¹⁸⁵, and had sent

¹⁷⁷ Liv. 42. 55. The Peloponnesus had some years before hardly been able to collect 6000 talents; Polyb. 2. 62.

¹⁷⁸ Concerning Coronea and Haliartus see Polyb. 27. 5. Conf. Liv. 42. 56.

¹⁷⁹ Polyb. 28. 10. ¹⁸⁰ Liv. 34. 4. 17; Polyb. 18. 11.

¹⁸¹ This was the case in Boeotia as early as the time of Flaminius; Polyb. 18. 26. In Ætolia, 550 of the anti-Roman party were slain, during which Roman soldiers kept guard, Liv. 45. 28.

¹⁸² See Liv. 45. 31. A passage pregnant with matter.

¹⁸³ On his treachery see Polyb. 26. 1—3; 30. 10; 33. 15.

¹⁸⁴ Paus. 7. 10; Liv. 35. 31. ¹⁸⁵ Polyb. 28. 15.

haughty messages to the Roman generals and senate¹⁸⁶, soon paid the penalty of their insolence, by the loss of Lycia and Caria, and of the toll they had hitherto levied in the sound between their island and the main-land¹⁸⁷.

Another twenty years passed amidst internal treason and distractions, and Roman insult and oppression; Sparta had detached herself from the Achæan league, and was supported in her opposition to it by the Roman arbitrators¹⁸⁸. At length the Achæans gave vent to their long-suppressed rage, when the Roman senate declared that Sparta, Corinth, Argos, Heraclea on Cæta, and the Arcadian Orchomenus, should no longer form part of the Achæan league¹⁸⁹. Though the feeling by which they were animated was just and laudable, those who encouraged and fomented it, Diæus, Critolaus, and their associates, were worthless wretches¹⁹⁰. The war was as rashly undertaken as it was injudiciously conducted¹⁹¹. The unskilfulness of the commanders, Diæus and Critolaus, was no less remarkable than the cowardice of their troops. The overthrow of the Greeks was complete; unable to recover from their consternation, they laid down their arms, and in the HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH OLYMPIAD, during the archonship of Antitheus, 146. B. C., Mummius laid Corinth in ashes and sealed the servitude of Greece¹⁹².

¹⁸⁶ Liv. 42. 14: Per quos stetisset, quo minus belli finis fieret, adversus eos, quid sibi faciendum esset, Rhodios consideraturos esse.

¹⁸⁷ Polyb. 30. 5.

¹⁸⁸ Paus. 7. 9—13.

¹⁸⁹ Paus. 7. 14. 1.

¹⁹⁰ Polyb. 38. 2:—ἐξ ἐκάστης πόλεως κατ' ἐκλογὴν οἱ χεῖριστοι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἐχθροὶ καὶ λοιμῶν αἰτίοι.

¹⁹¹ Paus. 7. 14. 3: τοῦτον δριμύς καὶ σὺν οὐδενὶ λογισμῷ τὸν Κριτόλαον πολεμεῖν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἔρωσ ἔσχε.

¹⁹² Paus. 7. 14—16. Conf. Polyb. 40.

Athens, Rhodes, Crete and Byzantium still retained some remnant of their former independence. The first remained free from attacks till the war of Mithridates and the Romans; the demagogy of Athenion or Aristion led Athens to side with Mithridates, and thereby drew upon her the vengeance of Sylla, which was fearful in the extreme¹⁹³. But even in the time of Strabo Athens was a republic, and enjoyed *Autonomia*¹⁹⁴. Crete, suffering from the effects of intestine discord¹⁹⁵, and the desertion of its able-bodied warriors who wandered about, as mercenaries¹⁹⁶, selling their services to the highest bidders, dearly expiated the share it had taken in the piracy carried on in those seas, and the favour it had shown to Mithridates, by the extermination of nearly the whole of its inhabitants¹⁹⁷. Rhodes was stripped of its independence by a decree of Claudius¹⁹⁸. Byzantium suffered the most dreadful oppression during the first civil war¹⁹⁹. The proclamation of Grecian independence by Nero, is one of those melancholy caricatures in history which only provoke a smile of pity and contempt²⁰⁰.

The states on the Pontus, Heraclea, Sinope, and the Bosphoran kingdom, did not, during the Macedonian age, come into contact with the continent, and the revolutions which occurred in the states of the Diadochi only partially affected it.

¹⁹³ Paus. 1. 20. 3, sqq.

¹⁹⁴ Strab. 9. 398.

¹⁹⁵ Polyb. 4. 53; 6. 46; Liv. 37. 60; 41. 25.

¹⁹⁶ Liv. 33. 14; 37. 41; 38. 22; 43. 7; Polyb. 17. 16.

¹⁹⁷ Freinsheim, Suppl. Liv. 99. 47.

¹⁹⁸ Dio Cass. 60. 24. But soon afterwards, Tac. Ann. 12. 58: *Redditur Rhodiis libertas, adempta sæpe aut firmata, prout bellis externis meruerant, aut domi seditione deliquerant.*

¹⁹⁹ Strab. 7. 320; Cicero, de Cons. Prov. 3.

²⁰⁰ Plutarch, Flamin. 12; Paus. 7. 17. 2.

But Sinope afterwards fell into the hands of the Pontic king Pharnaces²⁰¹, and became the capital of the great Mithridates²⁰². The kingdom of the Cimmerian Bosphorus was infested by the Scythians: king Pærisades called in the assistance of Mithridates the great, who seized upon the government himself²⁰³. From that time these states shared the vicissitudes of those on the Pontus²⁰⁴.

An enumeration of the Grecian towns and federacies which continued to subsist under the Roman domination, would be foreign to the present purpose. Still it is cheering to observe that many places rich in glorious remembrances, such as Athens, Ephesus, Byzantium, Cyzicus, Chalcis, Eretria, Ægina, Patræ, Rhodes, etc., yet enjoyed a certain degree of prosperity; whilst others, like Smyrna, recovered from their prostration and flourished afresh²⁰⁵, and unions of remote antiquity, such as the Amphictyonic league²⁰⁶, and the Olympic festival²⁰⁷ still continued to exist; but on the other hand, what desolation did Strabo and Pausanias find in their time! Thespiæ and Tanagra the only places in Bœotia that could be called towns²⁰⁸; the lower town of Thebes in ruins, the Cadmea alone inhabited and called Thebes²⁰⁹; in Achaia, Rhypæ, etc., deserted in order that the population of Patræ might be increased²¹⁰; in Arcadia, Mantinea, Orcho-

²⁰¹ Strab. 12. 545; Mithridates, 4, made war upon Sinope, Ol. 139. 4; Polyb. 4. 56.

²⁰² Strab. ubi sup.

²⁰³ Strab. 7. 310; Conf. Justin, 37. 2.

²⁰⁴ On the subject of Heraclea see § 80. n. 5.

²⁰⁵ Concerning its restoration by Antigonos and Lysimachus, see Strab. 14. 646.

²⁰⁶ Paus. 10. 8. 3.

²⁰⁷ In the imperial times a *ἱερὰ σύγκλητος* often occurs, and *δῆμος* and *κοινόν* were favourite designations for a community. See the ample collection of matter relating to this subject in Tittmann's *Griech. Staatsv.*, particularly 433. 441. 740.

²⁰⁸ Strab. 9. 410:—*τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἱερῆια καὶ ὀνόματα λείπεται.*

²⁰⁹ Paus. 9. 7. 4.

²¹⁰ Paus. 7. 18. 5.

menus, Clitor, Pheneus, Stymphalus, Mænalus, Methydrium, Caphyæ, Cynætha²¹¹, and Midea and Nauplia in Argolis²¹² in ruins; on the gulf of Ambracia the old towns dilapidated and deserted, and their inhabitants transplanted to the Roman city of Nicopolis²¹³; amongst the islands Delos depopulated, and an Athenian guard-house near the sanctuary²¹⁴; Gyarus abandoned by its inhabitants in consequence of the mice by which it was infested²¹⁵; Icaria deserted and used as a pasture by Samos²¹⁶, Myus abandoned on account of the gnats²¹⁷; not to mention the devastations committed in earlier times, particularly by Philip. Plutarch states it as his opinion that the whole of Greece could not have mustered three thousand Hoplitæ²¹⁸. Megara alone once sent that number to the battle of Plataæ. Hence, well might it be said of this unhappy country, even after its reckless spoliation by the Romans, that it contained more statues than men.

b. The Western States.

These became politically extinct, still earlier than the states of the mother-country. The relations of the states in the west with the latter were very lax; and no ties of an intimate or permanent nature existed between them. Their internal decay was

²¹¹ Strab. 8. 388:—*ἡ οὐκέτ' εἰσὶν, ἥ μόλις αὐτῶν ἵχνη φαίνεται καὶ σημεία.*

²¹² Paus. 2. 25. 8; 2. 38. 2.

²¹³ Strab. 10. 450.

²¹⁴ Paus. 8. 33. 1. In the war between the Romans and Perseus, Delos had been a common sanctuary, (Liv. 44. 29); in the Mithridatic war it was laid in ruins; Paus. 3. 23. 3.

²¹⁵ Plin. Hist. Nat. 8. 29. In Strabo's time the island could not raise 150 drachmas in taxes; Strab. 10. 485.

²¹⁶ Strab. 14. 639.

²¹⁷ Paus. 7. 2. 7. Conf. Strab. 14. 636.

²¹⁸ Plut. de Orac. Defect. 7. 629.

precipitated by civil dissensions, the violence of a mercenary soldiery and tyranny; whilst without they were exposed to the attacks of the Carthaginians, Lucanians, and Romans.

The history of the Siceliots must once more be annexed to that of Syracuse. Upon the death of Timoleon, Ol. 110. 4; 337. B. C., the spirit of discord burst forth anew, and these dissensions were fomented by the party-leaders Sosistratus and Agathocles. The former was overcome and expelled, together with a large body of Optimates; after a council of six hundred citizens, likewise of an oligarchical character, had held the reins of government for a time, Agathocles attacked the council and its adherents to the number of four thousand men, with a body of mercenaries and a mob, slew them, expelled nearly six thousand citizens, and made himself tyrant, Ol. 115. 4; 317. B. C.²¹⁹. His mode of government resembled that of the elder Dionysius; but in consequence of the exhaustion of Syracuse, he could not exercise the same important and destructive influence upon the political destinies of Greece as that tyrant had done. The subjugation of the neighbouring states and his wars with Carthage were the main objects of his foreign policy; and whilst these served to endanger the state externally, his exactions and barbarities²²⁰ banished civil order and security within. Agrigentum, to which a number of Syracusan fugitives had retired, united itself with Gela and Messana, Ol. 116. 3; 314. B. C., and invited Acrotatus, the son of the Lacedæmonian king Cleomenes, to com-

²¹⁹ Diod. 19. 2—9; Justin, 22. 1.

²²⁰ Diod. 20. 4. 19; 1. 20. 71.

mand them ; but he being an abandoned profligate, plundered the public treasure, revelled like a Persian, and at length murdered Sosistratus ; the people expelled him, and through the intervention of the Carthaginian Amilcar a peace was concluded between the Agrigentans and Agathocles²²¹. Messana and Gela now fell into the power of Agathocles, Olymp. 117. 1. 2.²²², but Leontini asserted its freedom²²³. After the expedition against Carthage, Olymp. 117. 3 ; 310. B. C.²²⁴, which brought this hereditary enemy of the Greeks to the very verge of destruction, Agathocles, following the example of the Diadochi of Alexander's empire, assumed the title of king, Olymp. 118. 2 ; 307. B. C.²²⁵. Like Dionysius he sought to extend his authority over the Italiots, and the nations who dwelt along the borders of the Ionian sea, occupied Corcyra²²⁶, Crotona²²⁷, and made a harbour near Hipponium²²⁸. Soon after his death, which happened, Ol. 122. 4 ; 289. B. C., democracy was re-established in Syracuse²²⁹. The feud between the party of Mænon, who had poisoned Agathocles, and then aspired to tyranny, and the patriots, was terminated by a decree of the mighty Carthage. The Italian mercenaries, called Mamertini, thereupon left Syracuse, seized Messana, murdered the men of the place, and took their wives to themselves, Olymp. 124. 3 ; 282. B. C.²³⁰. Soon after this tyrants arose in almost all the towns of Sicily, viz. Hicetas in Syracuse, formerly general against Mænon, Phin-

²²¹ Diod. 19. 70, sqq.²²² Diod. 19. 102. 107.²²³ Diod. 20. 32.²²⁴ Diod. 20. 5, sqq. ; Justin, 22. 2, sqq.²²⁵ Diod. 20. 54.²²⁶ Plut. Pyrrh. 9 ; Diod. Fragm. v. ix. p. 265. Bipont.²²⁷ Ibid. p. 266.²²⁸ Strab. 6. 256.²²⁹ Diod. Fragm. 9. p. 273.²³⁰ Ibid. p. 280, sqq.

tias in Agrigentum, Tyndarion in Tauromenium²³¹, etc. After Hicetas, Thynnion and Sosistratus obtained possession of sovereign power in Syracuse, but shortly after disagreeing, and being hard pressed by the Carthaginians, they called in from Italy the assistance of Pyrrhus, who had married Lanassa, the daughter of Agathocles²³², Olymp. 125. 3; 278. B. C.²³³.

Amongst the Italiots, Tarentum had hitherto asserted the supremacy, and revelled in luxury, at a time when many of the surrounding towns began to decay, and the Romans were subjugating the warlike nations who dwelt between them and the Greeks. Alexander of Epirus was called in to assist them against the Lucanians and Bruttians; he fell in battle, Olymp. 113. 3; 326. B. C.²³⁴. Soon afterwards, in Olymp. 119. 2; 303. B. C., the royal adventurer Cleonymus, from Sparta, arrived in Lower Italy, and occupied Thurii, but was driven out again by the Romans²³⁵. In the mean time the Samnite war had not only brought Roman armies into the neighbourhood of Tarentum, but a Roman fleet, though without hostile intentions, appeared in sight of the harbour. The brutality and violence with which the Tarentines fell upon these ships²³⁶, the insulting behaviour of the popular assembly towards the Roman ambassador Posthumius Megellus, whose pronunciation of the Greek language called forth bursts of laughter, and above all their delight at the vile ribaldry of the jester

²³¹ Diod. p. 291.²³² Plut. Pyrrh. 9.²³³ Diod. p. 295.²³⁴ Liv. 8. 24.²³⁵ Liv. 10. 2. Conf. Diod. 20. 104.²³⁶ Zonaras. 8. 2; Appian, 3. v. i. p. 56, sqq., ed. Schweigh.

Philonides²³⁷, sufficiently show what a low rabble the citizens of Tarentum had become. They expected that Pyrrhus would shield them from the vengeance of the Romans. His arrival only entailed upon them privations²³⁸ and a military despotism; and after his departure they fell under the dominion of Rome. Nor did any of the other towns, Locri, Rhegium, Crotona, etc., preserve their liberties; Rhegium, as had been the case with Messana, was moreover compelled to endure the outrages of a legion of Campanians²³⁹. In the Samnite war the Campanian Cuma and the neighbouring towns had already sunk into dependence upon Rome²⁴⁰. Cuma became a *municipium* in the second Punic war²⁴¹.

The expedition of Pyrrhus to Sicily²⁴² neither wholly freed the island from the rule of the Carthaginians nor the towns from that of the tyrants. It was not the greatest misfortune which befel Syracuse, that Hiero, in Olymp. 127. 3; 270. B. C., took possession of the government without any act of violence²⁴³, and retained it till his death, viz., for more than half a century. The territories of Hiero were very limited in extent; the greatest part of the island was in the power of the Carthaginians, and through the consequences of the first Punic war it fell under the dominion of the Romans.

The second Punic war extinguished the small

²³⁷ —τὴν ἐσθῆτα ἀνεσύρατο τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὴν τοῦ πρεσβύτου κατησχιδόνησεν· καὶ τὸ μὲν θέατρον ἐπαιζεν ὡς ἐπὶ γελοιῷ. Appian, ubi sup. p. 58; Zonar. ubi sup.

²³⁸ Plut. Pyrrh. 16.

²³⁹ Zonar. 7. 6; Diod. v. 9. 289; App. v. 1. p. 61; Oros. 4. 3.

²⁴⁰ Liv. 8. 25.

²⁴¹ Liv. 23. 31.

²⁴² Diod. v. 9. 302, sqq.

²⁴³ Polyb. 1. 9.

remains of Grecian political life in Lower Italy; Tarentum, till that time the third city in Italy, was crushed by Fabius²⁴⁴. In Syracuse, the only town in Sicily which still retained its independence, the tyranny of Hiero, Olymp. 141. 2; 215. B. C., descended to his grandson Hieronymus²⁴⁵; but after his assassination, Hippocrates and Epicydes, dynasts in the Punic interest, obtained possession of the government, after which Syracuse fell into the power of the Romans, Olymp. 142. 1; 212. B. C.²⁴⁶.

Sicily and Lower Italy, after the second Punic war, exhibited the same fearful spectacle of ruin and desolation²⁴⁷ as Greece itself, and the havoc was increased by the ravages of the Romans.

Massalia, through well-timed and prudent concessions, retained its freedom somewhat longer; it formed an alliance with Rome, when Asdrubal was marching to the assistance of his brother Hannibal²⁴⁸; but after it had applied to the Romans for help against the invasion of their Celtic neighbours, Roman settlers established themselves in its neighbourhood; it soon fell under the Roman sway, and experienced its oppressive effects in the civil wars of Cæsar and Pompey. Nevertheless it was still at a later period reckoned amongst the free towns²⁴⁹.

²⁴⁴ Liv. 27. 16.

²⁴⁵ Concerning him, see Polyb. 2. 7—8; Liv. 24. 6, sqq.

²⁴⁶ Polyb. 8. 5—9; Liv. 25. 24, sqq.

²⁴⁷ Concerning the ruins of Himera, Gela, Selinus, Callipolis, Eubœa, see Strab. 6. 272; on Naxos, Paus. 6. 13. 4; on the subject of Magna Græcia, Cicero de Amicit. 4; Dio Chrys. 2. 12. ed. R.: Κρότων δὲ καὶ Θούριοι καὶ Μεταποντῖνοι καὶ Τάρας—ποίας πόλεως οὐκ εἰσὶ νῦν ἐρημώτεροι. Comp. in general Micali, *l'Italia avanti il dominio de' Romani*, v. 4.

²⁴⁸ Polyb. 3. 95.

²⁴⁹ Strab. 4. 181.

II, THE INTERIOR.

§ 80. The internal corruption of the Grecian states has been so often described that it would be superfluous to repeat the picture here. In tracing its final development and growth during the latter ages, we behold a fearful succession of dissension and selfishness, mercenary warfare and treason, low debauchery on the one side—impoverishment and debt on the other¹. When a nation has sunk so low as this, the virtue of individuals can be of little avail; it may rouse its last vital energies, and breathe a better spirit into it for a while, but it soon resumes its progress towards dissolution and decay. Mercenaries degenerated into banditti, self-esteem into arrogant presumption, eloquence became loquacity, and treachery produced shameless and sordid servility to foreign despots: such are the characteristics of the age we are now called upon to consider.

The constitution of the republics was almost without exception democratic; in Sparta indeed there subsisted the dynasty of the Ephors, in Massilia the oligarchy of the Timuchi², etc., whilst feuds prevailed between the demus and the oligarchs in several places; the latter being driven from Crotona found a refuge in Thurii³. Similar scenes occurred in Locri⁴, and even as late as the

¹ On this subject, see Liv. 32. 5. 30.

² Cicero de Repub. 1. 28:—Si Massilienses—per delectos et principes cives summa justitia reguntur, inest tamen in ea conditione populi similitudo quædam servitutis. Conf. Brückner, Hist. Reipubl. Massiliens. p. 38, sqq., a work which is more satisfactory than those of Johannsen and Hendreich, but at the same time affords another proof of our poverty in accounts of the ancient writers respecting the constitution of Massilia. Conf. also, vol. i. p. 265. n. 45. Tittmann, Griech. Staatsv. 516.

³ Diod. 19. 10.

⁴ Diod. 19. 5. 6. 9.

second Punic war, an opposition existed between the *demus* and the upper orders here⁵, but whether it was of the same nature as that which prevails in all commonwealths, or merely a consequence of ancient aristocracy, does not appear. Very few remains of ancient and illustrious families can be pointed out with certainty; even the royal line of the *Heraclidæ* became extinct before the state wholly lost its independence. Tyranny, even without any immediate connection with external causes, occasionally supplanted free constitutions, as in Syracuse and Sparta; and dynasts, either singly or in bodies, ruled in dependent towns. Amongst the public authorities in the republics it was natural that the popular assembly should still continue to assert the first place; this it effected the more easily the smaller the states became through the dissolution of the ancient connections which had subsisted between the inhabitants of the same districts; the principle of an assembly of popular representatives—a body of delegates, was never clearly developed and recognised, even during the federal relations of the *Achæans*. But a *Bule* continued till the latest times to act as a body appointed to prepare subjects for the consideration of the popular assembly. The office of *Strategus* retained its importance in the state long after the period of slavery had begun⁶; and frequent mention also occurs of the *Prytanes*⁷; the priestly character,

⁵ Liv. 23. 30.

⁶ Concerning Byzantium, see Tittmann, *ubi sup.* 402; Ephesus, *ibid.* 431; Corcyra, 491; Heraclea, 497; Eretria, *Diog. Laert.* 2. 142; Acarnania, Liv. 36. 1, etc.

⁷ They were of most importance in Rhodes. *Plut. Præcept. Reipub. Gerend.* 9. 240. On Ephesus, Smyrna, Cyzicus, Cos, etc., see Tittmann on these communities.

which maintained itself as long as the sanctuaries continued to exist, comes forward very prominently in a great variety of offices, many of which were, however, produced by recent unions and festivals⁸; but the financial authorities declined, together with the property and resources of the state.

1. ATHENS.

The citizens, in Olymp. 117. 4; 308. B. C., when Demetrius Phalereus instituted a census of the inhabitants of Athens, are said to have been 21,000 in number, the Metœci 10,000, the slaves 400,000⁹. There is reason to suppose that the citizens had rarely been more numerous at any former period¹⁰; and we may affirm, without fear of contradiction, that they never amounted to 30,000. The population of Athens, therefore, by no means diminished in the same alarming proportion as that of Sparta and the rest of Greece. But did not naturalization become more frequent after the battle of Chæronea? And lastly, is this number to be depended upon? When the constitution under which the census in question was taken, was established in obedience to the commands of Antipater, more than twelve thousand persons were deprived of the citizenship; these were, it is true, reinstated in their rights some years before the census was taken¹¹; but did the whole of them return? However this may have been, the citizenship had experienced the effects of external force, and this must have served

⁸ Tittmann, *ubi sup.* 477, *sqq.*; 740, *sqq.* Compare above, § 79. n. 198.

⁹ Ctesicl. *apud Athen.* 6. 272, B. Conf. Böckh, *Pub. Econ.* 1. 38. 39.

¹⁰ Böckh, *Pub. Econ.* 1. 39.

¹¹ Diod. 18. 66; Olymp. 115. 3.

to corrupt its ingredients, and to render them discordant and incongruous; frivolity henceforward became the predominant characteristic of the Athenian mind. The degree to which this prevailed in all the acts of the people, as well as the general proceedings of this period, and the character of the mass itself will be best understood by describing the character and operations of the demagogues, who successively assumed the direction of affairs.

Though Philip and Alexander were admitted to the citizenship, after the battle of Chæronea¹² the public mind was still hostile to the Macedonians, and Demosthenes continued to be the most influential of the Athenian orators. After the death of Philip he incited his countrymen to a war against Alexander¹³, and they readily obeyed his call. The men whom Alexander commanded the Athenians to deliver up to him, as leaders of the anti-Macedonian party, were, besides Demosthenes, Polyeuctus, Ephialtes, Lycurgus, Moirocles, Damon (or Diotimus), Callisthenes, and Charidemus¹⁴. Charidemus was the only one amongst them who was not pardoned, and whereupon he fled to the court of Darius, and soon afterwards perished¹⁵. Those who took part in the subsequent measures of Demosthenes against the Macedonians were Hyperides, Democrates, and Himeræus. Hyperides pronounced the funeral oration of Leosthenes¹⁶;

¹² Schol. Aristid. Panath. p. 178, ed. Jebb.

¹³ Plut. Demosth. 23. Compare the preceding section.

¹⁴ Plut. ubi sup. Arrhian Anab. 1. 10, also names Hyperides, and Diotimus instead of Damon. His name and that of Hyperides occur in Suidas (Ἀντίπατρος), and at the same time those of a Patrocles (read Μοιροκλῆς), Chares, and Cassander. Plutarch's statement, according to his remark, coincides with that of the most trustworthy authorities. Comp. Ruhnken ad. Rutil. Lup. p. 33.

¹⁵ Diod. 17. 30; Arrhian, Anab. 1. 10.

¹⁶ Diod. 18. 13.

Demochares, who was the nephew of Demosthenes, was notorious for his incontinence¹⁷; being appointed ambassador to Philip after the battle of Chaeronea, he conducted himself upon that occasion with unparalleled insolence and effrontery¹⁸. Thirty-six years afterwards he became the opponent of Stratocles, by whom he was eventually expelled¹⁹. Himeræus was the brother of Demetrius Phalereus: although he accused Demosthenes in the affair of Harpalus²⁰, he nevertheless at a later period fled with him from the persecution of Antipater, by whose command he was afterwards put to death²¹.

The adherents and creatures of the Macedonians were far more numerous; these constituted an extensive class, whose character and objects varied from the purest patriotism and integrity of purpose down to the vilest treachery and the most abject servility. The most distinguished among them was Phocion, who, during the latter part of his public life, was rather a demagogue than a Strategus. His disinterestedness and patriotism were exposed to severe trials; Alexander not only wished to send him presents from Asia²², but honoured him with peculiar confidence²³. He refused

¹⁷ Suidas *Δημοχ.* from Timæus. On the other side, see his justification in Polyb. 12. 13.

¹⁸ Philip said: Dicite mihi, facere quid possum, quod sit Atheniensibus gratum? Excepit Demochares: Te, inquit, suspendere. Seneca de Iracund. 3. 23.

¹⁹ Plut. Demetr. 24. According to the probable assumption of Clinton, Olymp. 119. 3; 302. B. C. On the subject of Demochares, however, see the copious note of Ruhnken, ad Rutil. Lup. p. 7, sqq.

²⁰ Plut. Demosth. 28; Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 364.

²¹ Plut. Demosth. 28.

²² Plut. Phoc. 18.

²³ Phocion was one of the very few persons to whom Alexander, after he became conscious of his own greatness, wrote χαίρειν. Plut. Phoc. 17.

the gold of Harpalus²⁴, and would have done so even had he entertained different sentiments towards the Macedonians. In the Lamian war he once more appeared as the general of the democracy²⁵, and in that character displayed qualities which commanded admiration and respect; after the disastrous termination of the war he could not dissuade Antipater from throwing a garrison into Munychia, and restricting the democracy by excluding the poorer class from office; still, as chief of the administration under the new constitution, he endeavoured to the utmost of his power to ameliorate the lot of Athens²⁶. It may easily be supposed that the man who had refused the gifts of Alexander would reject with disdain the offers of Antipater²⁷. The judicial proceedings which were instituted against him²⁸, and in which aliens and slaves were even allowed to take part, after the death of Antipater, when upon the faith of Polysperchon's assurance that the democratic constitution should be respected, he had endeavoured to persuade the fickle and turbulent people to keep up the same relations with Cassander as had existed between them and Antipater, were a repetition of the wild outrages committed against the generals in the battle of the Arginusæ.

Upon a par as to political influence with Phocion, the most upright, was Demades, the most abandoned of his party. It almost seemed as though Demades, who had successively been the

²⁴ Plut. Phoc. 21.

²⁵ Plut. Phoc. 27—29.

²⁶ Plut. 35, sqq.; Diod. 18. 54, sqq.

²⁸ Plut. Phoc. 28.

²⁷ Plut. 30.

hireling of Philip, Alexander, and Antipater, had only interceded in favour of Athens, with those three rulers, in order that he might have a wider and more conspicuous stage to display his baseness upon. He had no equal in extravagance and low sensuality²⁹; Antipater, with all his munificence, could not satisfy him³⁰; the treasures of the great king himself would not have sufficed for his wasteful prodigality. Probably Alcibiades alone could have been compared with him for wanton extravagance. Like him, Demades sent coursers to the Olympic races³¹; there was a law which declared that every one who allowed a stranger to appear upon the stage should pay a fine: Demades brought forward a hundred, and paid the fines³². Hence we may form some idea of the manner in which he administered the office of inspector of the Theoricon; and we cannot be surprised that, owing to his extravagance, the triremes could not be fitted out³³. He moreover committed numerous illegal acts; at the beginning of the war he was indebted to the people in the fines he had incurred for seven unconstitutional measures³⁴. Demades was the author of the proposition for deifying Alexander, and declaring him the thirteenth of the Olympian gods³⁵; he also drew up the psephism for the destruction of Demosthenes³⁶. Antipater, who jestingly said of the glutton, that he had nothing left but tongue and belly³⁷, discovered a

²⁹ Athen. 2. 44, F.; Ælian. V. H. 14. 10. Comp. Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 243.

³⁰ Plut. Phoc. 30.

³¹ Suidas, Δημαδης.

³² Plut. Phoc. 30.

³³ Plut. Precept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 259.

³⁴ Plut. Phoc. 27.

³⁵ Ælian, V. H. 5. 12. A fine of a hundred talents was imposed upon him on that account. The people adapted the prices to the persons.

³⁶ Plut. Demosth. 28.

³⁷ Plut. Phoc. 2; Apopth. 6. 698; 8. 83.

short time before his death that he was faithless to him, whereupon he caused both him and his son to be put to death, Olymp. 115. 2; 319. B. C.³⁸.

The most influential of the followers of Phocion was Dinarchus, a native of Corinth³⁹. There is reason to suppose that there was another Corinthian of the same name, and likewise the friend of Phocion⁴⁰. The latter was put to death at the command of Polysperchon, when Phocion was dragged to Athens to receive sentence of condemnation⁴¹; the former, who was the friend of Theophrastus and Demetrius Phalereus, became an esteemed orator after the death of Alexander, and dwelt in Athens during the sway of Antipater and of his successor Cassander; when the town was taken by Demetrius Poliorcetes during the archonship of Anaxicrates, Ol. 118. 2; 307. B. C., he escaped to Chalcis, and did not return to Athens till fifteen years afterwards, under the archon Philippus⁴², and died a natural death there at a good old age. He accused Demosthenes in the affair of Harpalus, as well as Polyeuctus, Lycurgus, Himeræus⁴³, etc. Those who were executed with Phocion were Hegemon, who has already been signalized as a man of worthless character⁴⁴, Nicocles, Thudippus, Pythocles⁴⁵; sentence of banishment was passed upon Demetrius Phalereus, Callimedon and Charicles,

³⁸ Diod. 18. 48.

³⁹ A Dinarchus of Corinth took succours to Timoleon; Plut. Timol. 21, Demosthenes commemorates a man of this name amongst the agents of Philip in Corinth; de Falsâ Legat. 324. 14; Epist. 1491.

⁴⁰ Corsini, F. Att. 4. 75.

⁴¹ Or is this perhaps an error of Plutarch's, who was thinking of the end of Hyperides, which stood in connection with the destruction of Demosthenes? (Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 374.)

⁴² On the subject generally see Dionys. Halic. Dinarch. vol. v. p. 334, sqq.; Tauchn. and Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 378, sqq.

⁴³ Dion. Hal. ubi sup. 344.

⁴⁴ See § 77. n. 172.

⁴⁵ Plut. Phoc. 35.

during their absence⁴⁶. The most active amongst the enemies of Phocion was the sycophant Agnonides, whom he had once extricated from a very dangerous predicament⁴⁷. Pytheas, though not amongst the adherents of Demades, may nevertheless be compared with him, inasmuch as he became an orator through natural talent alone, unaided by the instructions of the schools⁴⁸; whilst even Demosthenes⁴⁹ smarted from the effects of his ready and pointed wit⁵⁰. The citizenship of Pytheas was not genuine, and he was denounced as an alien by Dinarchus⁵¹; he wavered in his political opinions; in the matter of Harpalus he was one of the accusers of Demosthenes⁵², opposed the apotheosis of Alexander⁵³, and during the Lamian war fled to Antipater⁵⁴.

Demetrius the Phalerean⁵⁵ was, under Cassander, Ol. 115. 3; 318. B. C.—Ol. 118. 2; 307. B. C., what Phocion had been under Antipater⁵⁶; his manners were less austere⁵⁷, his love for his country was equally great, and his benevolence was perhaps still more active⁵⁸. He had been instructed in political knowledge by Theophrastus⁵⁹, and exercised his talents as a writer⁶⁰, a legislator, and a statesman. When Demetrius Poliorcetes took pos-

⁴⁶ Plut. ubi sup.⁴⁷ Plut. Phoc. 29. 33; conf. 38.⁴⁸ Rubnk. ad Rufil. p. 40.⁴⁹ See examples, Plut. Apophth. 6. 711; Ælian, V. H. 14. 28.⁵⁰ He said that the Orations of Demosthenes smelt of the lamp, see Ælian, V. H. 7. 7.⁵¹ Dionys. Hal. 5. 344. Tauchn.⁵² Demosth. Epist. 1481. 13.⁵³ Plut. Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 207.⁵⁴ Plut. Demosth. 27.⁵⁵ Compare the useful dissertation de Vita et Rebus Demetrii Phalerii by Dohrn, Kiel, 1825. § 5—18.⁵⁶ Plut. Demet. Pol. 10.⁵⁷ Duris, ap. Ath. 12. 542. C.⁵⁸ Strab. 9. 398; Diod. 18. 74; Diog. Laert. 5. 75.⁵⁹ Strab. ubi sup.; Diog. Laert. ubi sup.⁶⁰ Dohrn, ubi sup. § 28.

session of Athens, the Phalerean fled to Crates in Thebes⁶¹, and from thence into Egypt, where he neither lost his characteristic openness and candour⁶², nor his attachment to his native country⁶³.

He was replaced by Stratocles⁶⁴, who, in a moral point of view, bore the same relation to him as Demades did to Phocion. Demetrius Poliorcetes had announced to the Athenians the restoration of their democracy; Stratocles practised his base arts during this so-called popular government, and rendered himself no less despicable by his adulation and servility to the arbitrary and oppressive restorer of that democracy, than by the profligacy and effrontery with which he pandered to the luxury and extravagance of the demus⁶⁵. The truth of the first charge is attested by his proposition for sending Theori⁶⁶ to Antigonus and Demetrius Poliorcetes, thus treating them as gods; and by the flattery and obsequiousness which characterized all the public transactions with Demetrius and his father; for though the name of Demades is not expressly mentioned in connection with the whole of these decrees, still the share he had in framing them may easily be perceived. In confirmation of the last we may refer to the accounts of the extraordinary piece of deception he played off, after the defeat of the Athenian fleet at Amorgus; he declared that a victory had been gained, ordered a two or three days' feast to be celebrated, and afterwards represented to the Athenians that they

⁶¹ Plut. Demetr. 9.

⁶² Plut. Apophth. 6. 717:—παρήνει τὰ περὶ βασιλείας καὶ ἡγεμονίας βιβλία κτᾶσθαι καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν ἃ γὰρ οἱ φίλοι τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν οὐ θαῤῥοῦσι παραινεῖν, ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις γέγραπται.

⁶³ Plut. de Exil. 8. 364.

⁶⁴ Plut. Demetr. 10. 11.

⁶⁵ Conf. above, § 77. n. 171.

⁶⁶ Plut. Demetr. 11.

had been the gainers by it⁶⁷. Democles⁶⁸ was the rival of Stratocles, and tried to outdo him in cringing subservience to Demetrius; the opponents of Stratocles were Demochares, whom he expelled⁶⁹, and the comedian Philippides, who wrote some satirical verses against him in the spirit of the old comedy⁷⁰. It is probable that Sophocles arose about this time⁷¹; his proposition for restraining the philosophers from giving instruction to the Athenian youth was adopted, but Phillion⁷² caused it to be repealed in the following year. After the battle of Ipsus, Lachares made an attempt to establish tyranny in Athens⁷³; he was a sacrilegious plunderer, who stripped the statue of Athene of its ornaments⁷⁴. Upon the return of Demetrius he fled, and perished in Bœotia⁷⁵.

The dependence of Athens on the Macedonian rulers was repeatedly interrupted after the expulsion of Demetrius from Macedonia; in consequence of the hostility the Athenians bore him, he granted to the younger Pyrrhus permission to sacrifice at the Acropolis⁷⁶; Athens afterwards contracted an alliance with Demetrius' son, Antigonus Gonnatas, but showed great indifference towards his successors, Demetrius and Antigonus Doson, while she was entirely hostile to the younger Philip. The name of no demagogue of importance during this period has reached us, but there

⁶⁷ Plut. ubi sup.; Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 191.

⁶⁸ Plut. Demetr. 13. 26.

⁶⁹ See above, n. 19.

⁷⁰ Plut. Demetr. 12. 26.

⁷¹ According to Petit, Larcher, Corsini Ol. 118. 3; 306. B. C.; according to Clinton, under Demetrius the Phalerean, which appears less probable.

⁷² Athen. 13. 610. E.; Diog. Laert. 5. 38.

⁷³ Plut. Demetr. 33.

⁷⁴ Paus. 1. 25. 5.

⁷⁵ Paus. ubi sup.; Polyæn. 3. 7. 1—3.

⁷⁶ Plut. Pyrrh. 12.

is little doubt that they were still sufficiently numerous⁷⁷. The last of the Athenian demagogues whose names are expressly recorded, was the above-named Athenion or Aristion, in the time of Mithridates, who induced Athens to revolt from Rome⁷⁸.

The feelings of the multitude during the period we are considering, were, as may be supposed, far more in accordance with those of the depraved than of the virtuous demagogues. Of their ancient virtues they still retained their hospitality and compassion, both of which were experienced by the Thebans⁷⁹, whilst the latter was displayed in conjunction with a regard for propriety and delicacy in their conduct towards Cleopatra, Philip's daughter, to whom they sent an embassy to express their condolence upon the death of the Molossian Alexander⁸⁰. They never wholly ceased to honour and confide in virtue, wherefore Xenocrates was selected to accompany Phocion to Antipater⁸¹; the privilege of partaking of the public meals in the Prytaneum⁸² was conferred upon the descendants of Demosthenes, and Zeno was honoured with a crown⁸³. Their delicacy of perception rendered them more fastidious from day to day as regarded their choice of expressions; the use of an improper inflection or incorrect accent in public declamation rarely passed unnoticed⁸⁴. The mobility, which, from the earliest ages, formed so prominent

⁷⁷ Liv. 34. 4:—*nec unquam ibi desunt linguae promptae ad plebem concitandam.*

⁷⁸ Athen. 5. 211, sqq.; Wyttenbach ad Plut. de Sera. Num. Vindict. 71.

⁷⁹ Plut. Alex. 13.

⁸⁰ Æschin. in Ctesiph. 634.

⁸¹ Plut. Phoc. 27.

⁸² Pa. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 380.

⁸³ Diog. Laert. 7. 10.

⁸⁴ Phot. Lex. *θερίων*. During a scarcity of money a rich Metroecus arose,

a feature of the Athenian character, still displayed itself in the joy with which they hailed every change that seemed favourable to democracy, in the immoderate favour which they showed to those who appeared in the character of liberators and benefactors of the state, and the suddenness with which their enthusiasm cooled as soon as they perceived their error, or the charm of novelty had passed away. No less than three hundred and sixty statues were erected to Demetrius Phalereus⁸⁵ within the space of three hundred days; these were all pulled down upon the entrance of Demetrius Poliorcetes, as were also the statues of Demades, which were moreover melted down into chamber-utensils⁸⁶. The decrees in honour of Demetrius and his father almost bordered upon insanity; besides deifying them, they set apart a whole month, Demetrium, as a Hieromenia, initiated Demetrius into the mysteries, and assigned to him as a residence the Opisthodomus of the temple of Athene, in order that he might have opportunities of familiar converse with the goddess⁸⁷, etc. Now and then they seemed to remember that they had a constitution which was at least nominally a democracy; a person who had been sentenced to pay a fine into the

λίγων, ὅ τι ἐγὼ ὑμῖν δανειῶ; a disturbance ensued on account of the use of this unusual form; the orator corrected himself by saying δανείσω, and then, and not before, he was commended, and his offer accepted. To this, it may be added, that Demosthenes was laughed at for saying Ἀσκληπίος instead of Ἀσκληπιός, Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 360. Concerning the ridicule thrown upon the actor Hegelochus, who, in reciting the verse, ἐκ κυμάτων γὰρ αὐθις αὖ γαλήν' ὄρω, lost his breath and prolonged the word into γαλήν from γαλή, see Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 304, and Eurip. Orest. 279.

⁸⁵ Diog. Laert. 5. 75; Strab. 9. 398; Plin. 34. 8. etc., with some difference in the numbers.

⁸⁶ Plut. Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 365. The same thing is related of the statues of Demetrius Phalereus.

⁸⁷ Plut. Demetr. 12. 23; 26. 30; Schol. Pind. Nem. 3. 2. Two ships, Antigonis and Demetrias, were added to the Salaminia and Paralos, Phot. Lex. παραλοί.

public treasury, obtained from Demetrius a remission of the same, whereupon the demus declared that such appeals should in future be punished by fine; but it must be confessed, as soon as Demetrius had expressed his dissatisfaction with this resolution, those by whom it had been framed were either killed or banished, and it was then decreed that whatever Demetrius uttered should be regarded as consecrated⁸⁸. But after the battle of Ipsus, it was declared capital to speak of a reconciliation with him⁸⁹. The proceedings of the Athenians continued to display this alternation of disgusting servility and overbearing arrogance for some time after these transactions, though, it must be confessed, examples of the latter quality afterwards grew less frequent. As examples of the former, it is only necessary to refer to the rejoicings caused by the premature intelligence of Aratus' death⁹⁰, and the manner in which Attalus was received by the Athenians, Olymp. 145. 3; 198. B. C.⁹¹; they breathed nothing but scorn and defiance against the younger Philip, and exhausted their ingenuity in framing decrees to insult and revile him⁹². The same tendency to scurrility and the same garrulity continued to characterize them till the latest times; they gave a loose to the former in their transactions with Sylla⁹³, whilst it was

⁸⁸ Plut. Demetr. 24:—*πρὸς θεοὺς ὄσιον καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι δίκαιον*. Plutarch's remark applies here: *τοιαῦτα ἔπραττον Ἀθηναῖοι, φρουρᾶς ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἔχειν δοκοῦντες*.

⁸⁹ Plut. Demetr. 33.

⁹⁰ Plut. Arat. 34: *ἑσπεφανηφόρησαν*.

⁹¹ Polyb. 16. 25.

⁹² Liv. 31. 44. It will be sufficient here to give the conclusion of the plebeian hostile decree:—*Si quis quid postea, quod ad notam ignominiamque Philippi pertineret, ferret, id omne populum Atheniensem jussurum; si quis contra ignominiam prove honore ejus dixisset fecissetve, qui occidisset eum, jure cæsurum*.

⁹³ Plut. de Garrul. 8. 12.

owing to the latter that he discovered the weakest part of the fortifications, and thereby became master of the town ⁹⁴.

The constitution itself, without reference to the alternate independence and subjection of the state, underwent various changes during this period. Through Antipater, after the Lamian war, Olymp. 114. 3; 322. B. C., admittance to the rights of citizenship was regulated according to the condition of a new valuation, by which means more than twelve thousand citizens, who did not possess the minimum assessment of ten thousand drachmas, were disfranchised; many of them went to Thrace, where land was apportioned to them by Antipater ⁹⁵. But at the same time the popular tribunals, if not wholly abolished, were confined within very narrow limits, and political eloquence, if not entirely prohibited, was greatly restricted ⁹⁶. The tumultuous outburst of democratic feeling upon the death of Antipater, to which Phocion fell a victim, soon subsided; Cassander made himself master of Athens, and introduced a lower census than had before existed; every one who claimed to exercise civic rights was required to possess a thousand drachmas ⁹⁷. The forms of the ancient democracy were revived under Demetrius Poliorcetes ⁹⁸, but out of adulatory complaisance to him, several of its institutions underwent considerable alteration; two new Phylæ, the Antigone and De-

⁹⁴ Plut. ubi sup. 11.

⁹⁵ Diod. 18. 18; Plut. Phoc. 27; Demetr. 11.

⁹⁶ Suidas Δημάδης· (Antipater)—κατίλυσε τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τοὺς ῥητορικοὺς ἀγῶνας.

⁹⁷ Diod. 18. 75.

⁹⁸ Plut. Demetr. 10.

metriads, were established; the number of the Buleutæ raised to six hundred⁹⁹, and a dignitary, called the priest of the preservers of Antigonus and Demetrius, was appointed in lieu¹⁰⁰ of the Archon Eponymus. All these regulations were not abolished upon the fall of Demetrius; the two new Phylæ were dedicated to Ptolemy and Attalus¹⁰¹. The Areopagus still existed, nor were its labours, even now, altogether inglorious; it conducted the investigation respecting the gold of Harpalus¹⁰²; it refrained from searching the house of Callicles, because he had recently married¹⁰³; it asked Cleanthes how he gained his livelihood, and upon discovering that he worked by night, proposed to reward him¹⁰⁴; and it exhorted Demetrius, the descendant of the Phalerean, to desist from his vicious courses¹⁰⁵. It is probable that amongst the higher offices of state, the Strategia always retained its importance¹⁰⁶; but after the time of Phocion and Leosthenes, we are only acquainted with the name of Callippus, the leader against the Celts¹⁰⁷.

Samos, whither Cleruchi had been sent, Olymp. 107. 1; 352. B. C., belonged to the Athenians till after the death of Alexander¹⁰⁸, after which it was wrested from them by Perdiccas¹⁰⁹, and again guaranteed them by Polysperchon¹¹⁰; but they could not maintain possession of it; Salamis re-

⁹⁹ Plut. ubi sup.

¹⁰⁰ Plut. ubi sup.

¹⁰¹ Pausan. 1. 5. 5; Steph. Byz. 'Ατταλ. and Προλαμ. Liv. 31. 15.

¹⁰² Ps. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. 9. 364.

¹⁰³ Plut. Demosth. 25; Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 243.

¹⁰⁴ Diog. Laert. 7. 168.

¹⁰⁵ Athen. 4. 167. E. F.

¹⁰⁶ Plut. Præcept. Reipub. Gerend. 9. 240.

¹⁰⁷ Pausan. 1. 4. 2.

¹⁰⁸ Böckh, Pub. Econ. 1. 460. n. 535; Panofka, Res Samior. p. 97.

¹⁰⁹ Diod. 18. 18.

¹¹⁰ Diod. 18. 56.

volted from Athens, Olymp. 115. 3; 318. B. C., whilst she adhered to Polysperchon¹¹¹, and was not restored to the Athenians till Aratus made them a present of it about Olymp. 134; 243. B. C., whereupon the Salaminians were driven out¹¹². Lemnos, Imbros, and Delos were made over to the Athenians by the Romans, after they had subdued Perseus¹¹³.

2. SPARTA.

An extraordinary diminution had taken place in the number of the citizens¹¹⁴; there were only seven hundred of them in the middle of the third century before the Christian æra¹¹⁵. This explains the circumstances that most of the landed property was in the hands of females¹¹⁶. The departure from the spirit and customs of the olden time was still more striking than in Athens; but the Spartans were still remarkable for their scrupulous adherence to outward forms, and their conciseness and sententious brevity of expression¹¹⁷. What operated most injuriously to the nationality and constitution of Sparta, was her restless desire to enlarge her natural boundaries; and this she never ceased to display while she had strength enough to assail her neighbours, or means to purchase the aid of mercenaries. Moreover, the barrier between Laconian austerity and foreign licentiousness was entirely removed; those military adventurers who quitted their country to seek

¹¹¹ Paus. 1. 35. 2; Polyæn. 4. 11. 2.

¹¹² Conf. Böckh, Thes. Inscr. p. 148.

¹¹³ Polyb. 30. 18. Conf. Vitruv. 7. 7.

¹¹⁴ Plut. Agis, 5.

¹¹⁵ e. g. the *Alia* in answer to Philip, Plut. de Garrul. 8. 32.

¹¹⁶ Compare above, § 70. n. 1.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. 6.

employment as mercenaries, returned to it libertines and profligates; even kings like Acrotatus¹¹⁸ and Leonidas¹¹⁹ abandoned themselves without reserve to the most unbridled revelry. On the other hand, the women exhibited the most determined spirit of bravery¹²⁰ when Pyrrhus attacked the town, whereas, on former occasions, they had only signalized themselves by noise and clamour¹²¹. The appearance of the two kings, Agis and Cleomenes, marks an important æra in the Spartan annals: they were actuated by the noble and patriotic wish to restore the vitality and vigour of their native state; whereas Athens, though possessed in a much greater degree than Sparta of all the elements of nationality, suffered herself to be influenced by external causes alone.

Agis III., the son of Eudamidas¹²², ascended the throne about Olymp. 134; 244. B. C. The ancient discipline was still observed in the education of youth, and Agis himself had been trained up in it¹²³. He was deeply grieved to behold the radical decay of the national institutions—riches in the hands of the few, grinding poverty the lot of the many, the women possessed of unbounded power in consequence of their wealth¹²⁴, and the Ephors, though destitute of the civil virtue of their predecessors, nevertheless asserting despotic authority. The mother and grandmother of Agis, who both possessed extensive property¹²⁵, were inspired by the same sentiments,

¹¹⁸ Diod. 19. 71.

¹²⁰ Plut. Pyrrh. 26.

¹²² See his genealogy, Plut. Agis, 3.

¹²³ Plut. Agis, 4.

¹²⁵ Plut. Agis, 4.

¹¹⁹ Plut. Agis, 3.

¹²¹ See above, § 70. n. 4.

¹²⁴ Plut. Agis, 7.

whilst he was supported by the young men who gladly hailed the prospect of innovation¹²⁶. His mother's brother, Agesilaus, promised to co-operate with him in framing a new constitution, or rather in restoring that of Lycurgus¹²⁷; but his conduct proved that he was not sincere in his professions. The plan contemplated by Agis was to remit all debts, to make a new distribution of land, to admit Perioeci and aliens as new citizens, and to suffer them to possess landed property, and finally to restore the Syssitia and other ancient ordinances in general. All these points were embodied in a *rhētra*, and submitted to the Gerontes. Agis gave up his own hereditary estates to be distributed with the rest¹²⁸. The preliminary steps were taken for carrying those measures into effect, when Leonidas, the degenerate colleague of Agis, had the baseness and effrontery to endeavour to defeat them; though he was assisted in this disgraceful attempt by the wealthier orders, he was soon obliged to seek safety in flight¹²⁹. But sound and healthful seed could not thrive in this exhausted soil. Agis was obliged to undertake a campaign, Olymp. 135. 1; 240. B. C.¹³⁰, but did not obtain that glory which he had hoped would prove a support to his work at home; and meanwhile the execution of his project fell into improper hands. Agesilaus, actuated by a sordid love of money, grossly abused the powers confided to him¹³¹. Leonidas was recalled

¹²⁶ Plut. Agis, 6.

¹²⁷ Plut. ubi sup.

¹²⁸ Plut. 8. 9.

¹²⁹ Plut. 10—12.

¹³⁰ Manso, 3. 2. 259; Plut. Agis, 14. 15. Concerning the accounts in Pausanias (8. 8. 6; 8. 10. 4; 8. 27. 9), of a war which Agis carried on against the Achæans, the taking of Pellene, and the defeat and death of Agis at Mantinea, see Manso, 3. 2. 123, sqq.

¹³¹ Plut. Agis, 16.

by the adversaries of Agis, and the latter, upon his return, fell a sacrifice to an infamous cabal, Olymp. 135. 1; 240. B. C.¹³².

Cleomenes III., the son and successor of Leonidas, Olymp. 136. 1; 236. B. C., who reigned alone as his father had done, after the murder of Agis, was, both by the boldness of his character and the energy of his proceedings, better qualified to remodel the constitution than the unfortunate Agis had been. He began his work ten years after his accession, when the successes he had obtained in the wars with the Achæans, had secured him the esteem and confidence of the people, Olymp. 138. 3; 226. B. C. His first step was to rid himself of the Ephors¹³³, and the measures which followed were for the most part a repetition of what Agis had attempted to effect; land was distributed, including the private property of Cleomenes; Perioeci were admitted to the citizenship, and all Helots who were able to raise five minæ were enfranchised¹³⁴. Patronomi were appointed instead of the Geronia¹³⁵; Cleomenes chose his brother Eucleidas to reign with him¹³⁶. The restoration of the ancient abuses after the defeat of Cleomenes at Sellasia, and his flight over the sea, Olymp. 139. 2; 222. B. C.¹³⁷, may be compared with the guarantee of the anarchy of Poland by the neighbouring powers in the eighteenth century. But the Ephors and Gerontes of the Achæan party were slain directly after the departure of Antigonus¹³⁸.

¹³² Plut. Agis, 17, seqq.

¹³⁴ Plut. Cleom. 11.

¹³⁶ Plut. Cleom. 11.

¹³⁸ Polyb. 4. 35.

¹³³ Plut. Cleom. 8.

¹³⁵ Paus. 2. 9. 1.

¹³⁷ Plut. Cleom. 28, seqq.

Only one more Heraclid king, Agesipolis III., occupied the throne after Cleomenes; and during his reign Lycurgus, who was not of royal descent, contrived, by bribing the Ephors, to make himself king, Olymp. 139. 4; 221. B. C.¹³⁹. But violent convulsions ensued. Chilon, who was of noble and perhaps of Heraclid descent, attempted to overthrow Lycurgus, and killed the Ephors who were devoted to his interest, Olymp. 140. 2; 219. B. C.; but being overpowered, he was forced to seek safety in flight¹⁴⁰. Both Lycurgus¹⁴¹ and Agesipolis¹⁴² were also compelled to fly, and remained absent for some time; meanwhile the attacks of Philip of Macedon¹⁴³ served to increase the confusion. Upon the death of Lycurgus, Machanidas took possession of the government¹⁴⁴. He was the first tyrant of Sparta, and by him the town was first surrounded with walls¹⁴⁵; he was defeated and killed by Philopoemen, Olymp. 143. 2; 207. B. C.¹⁴⁶. Nabis was still more despotic; his covetousness was notorious¹⁴⁷; in proof of his cruelty it is recorded that he invented a murderous instrument in a human form¹⁴⁸; and finally, he endeavoured to root out the last remains of the ancient Laconian manners¹⁴⁹. Philopoemen, who occupied Sparta after the assassination of Nabis, was adverse to the institutions of Lycurgus, and in order to assimilate the Spartans to the Achæans, to whose league he was

¹³⁹ Polyb. 4. 35.¹⁴¹ Polyb. 5. 29. 8, sqq.¹⁴³ Polyb. 5. 18, sqq.¹⁴⁵ Liv. 34. 33. 38.¹⁴⁷ Diod. Fragm. v. ix. 874. Bipont; Polyb. 13. 6; 17. 16; Liv. 32. 38, sqq.¹⁴⁹ Polyb. and Diod. ubi sup.¹⁴⁰ Polyb. 4. 81.¹⁴² Polyb. 24. 11. 1.¹⁴⁴ Liv. 27. 29.¹⁴⁶ Polyb. 11. 9—18; Plut. Philop. 10.¹⁴⁸ Polyb. 13. 7.

desirous of uniting them, he abolished those few Lycurgic ordinances which still survived¹⁵⁰. Not long afterwards the Lycurgic constitution was restored by the Romans, who had previously received an application from the Spartans to that effect¹⁵¹. There were, in the time of Augustus, Eleutherolacones, who had formerly been Helots; and who had either been declared free by Augustus, or by the Roman people before him¹⁵². Dicaearchus' treatise on the constitution of Sparta was, till a very late period, read once in every year¹⁵³. The severe discipline of the Ephebi was still kept up in the time of Plutarch; he himself saw several of them scourged to death upon the altar of Artemis Orthia¹⁵⁴.

3. THE OTHER STATES OF THE MOTHER COUNTRY.

These present but scanty materials for consideration. Domestic tyrants supported by foreign force, or the lieutenants of Macedonian despots, suspended or wholly arrested the internal development in most of these communities. The Arcadians, collectively considered, continued to form the most important state in the Peloponnesus after Sparta, and the chief of its individual members was Megalopolis. At the time of Polysperchon, the able-bodied citizens, slaves, and aliens of Megalopolis, amounted to fifteen thousand persons¹⁵⁵. The tyrants Aristodemus and Lydiades, at a later period, were good and brave men; the former was

¹⁵⁰ Plut. Philop. 16; Paus. 8. 51. 1; Liv. 38. 34.

¹⁵¹ Plut. ubi sup.

¹⁵² Strab. 8. 366; Pausan. 3. 21. 6.

¹⁵³ Suidas, Δικαίαρχος.

¹⁵⁴ Plut. Lyc. 18.

¹⁵⁵ Diod. 18. 70.

surnamed *Χρηστός*¹⁵⁶, the latter abdicated at the instigation of Aratus¹⁵⁷. Aristodemus was opposed by Ecdemus and Demophanes, pupils of the philosopher Arcesilaus and the guardians of Philopœmen; they subsequently assisted Aratus in overthrowing the Sicyonian tyrant Nicocles, and regulated the political institutions of Cyrene¹⁵⁸. During the age of Aratus, and from that period till the final extinction of Grecian independence, no state in Greece could boast of a brighter array of able statesmen and generals than Megalopolis. Cericidas¹⁵⁹ and the peripatetic Prytanis are recorded as eminent legislators¹⁶⁰; Philopœmen, Lycortas, and Polybius, the last heroes and statesmen of Greece, would have been ornaments to any age or country. In the time of Cleomenes, besides Megalopolis, mention is also made of Tegea, Orchomenus, and Mantinea¹⁶¹; but the most important record that has been preserved of Mantinea, is at the same time the most melancholy one, viz., the account of its destruction by Antigonus¹⁶². Concerning the rough Cynæthi, with the exception of the statement of Polybius, that they were even insensible to the charms of music¹⁶³, we only know that they had Polemarchs¹⁶⁴. Messenia was compelled, by the command of Alexander, once more to receive the children of the tyrant Phyliaides¹⁶⁵; but it is very doubtful whether they really succeeded to the tyranny or not. Messenia was afterwards a re-

¹⁵⁶ Pausan. 8. 27. 8; 8. 36. 3.¹⁵⁷ Polyb. 2. 44; Plut. Philop. 1.¹⁵⁸ Polyb. 10. 25; Plut. Philop. 1.¹⁵⁹ Conf. § 78. n. 29. Polyb. 2. 48, where Nicophanes is mentioned as his colleague.¹⁶⁰ Polyb. 5. 93.¹⁶¹ Plut. Cleom. 4, et pass.¹⁶² Pausan. 8. 8. 6.¹⁶³ Polyb. 4. 20.¹⁶⁴ Polyb. 4. 18.¹⁶⁵ Ps. Demosth. de Fœd. Alex. 212. 25.

public, and its most important magistracy an Ephoralty¹⁶⁶. The decline of Messenia was powerfully promoted by the proceedings of the younger Philip¹⁶⁷. Elis was still convulsed by the feuds of the upper orders and the demus during the life of Alexander¹⁶⁸; after his death one party relied upon the help of Sparta, the other upon that of Messenia, and the Messenians succeeded in obtaining possession of the town by a stratagem¹⁶⁹. In the time of Antigonus (Gonnatas?) there was a barbarous tyrant called Aristotimus¹⁷⁰. Triphylia belonged to Elis during the social war¹⁷¹. Argos was successively governed by the following tyrants: Archinus, who obtained the tyranny by supplying the people with arms¹⁷²; Aristomachus, the contemporary of Aratus, who forbade any one of the citizens to possess a sword¹⁷³; Aristippus, Agis, and a younger Aristomachus¹⁷⁴. Hereupon Argos became, for a time, the residence of the barbarous Nabis and his impious wife¹⁷⁵. The single states of Achaia, Corinth, and Sicyon, have already been spoken of; with the exception of the mention of a tyrant called Cleonymus¹⁷⁶, history is silent on the subject of Phlius. Megara boasted that it had conferred its citizenship upon the Macedonian Alexander, an honour which it had never granted to any one before¹⁷⁷; all the slaves of this little district were

¹⁶⁶ Polyb. 4. 4. 2. 3; 4. 31. 2; 4. 32. 1.¹⁶⁷ Plut. Arat. 49.¹⁶⁸ Pausan. 3. 8. 2.¹⁶⁹ Pausan. 4. 28. 3.¹⁷⁰ Plut. de Mulier. Virtut. 7. 27, sqq.¹⁷¹ Polyb. 4. 77.¹⁷² Polyæn. 3. 8.¹⁷³ Plut. Arat. 25.¹⁷⁴ Plut. Arat. 25. 29.¹⁷⁵ Polyb. 17. 17; Liv. 39. 25, sqq.¹⁷⁶ Polyb. 2. 44. 6.¹⁷⁷ Plut. de Monarch, etc. 9. 285. Compare, on the subject of their former refusal to give the freedom of their city to Lysander's steersman, after the battle of Ægos Potamoi, at the recommendation of Sparta, Demosth. in Arist. 691. 4.

dispersed by Demetrius Poliorcetes¹⁷⁸, after which its name scarcely occurs again. On the island of Eubœa, Chalcis and Eretria were occupied by Macedonian garrisons till Philip was conquered by Flaminius; Eretria enjoyed independence more frequently and for longer periods of time; Strategi and Probuli were its chief magistrates¹⁷⁹; the philosopher Menedemus was once charged with an embassy¹⁸⁰.

Boeotia. When Alexander took Thebes six thousand of the inhabitants were put to the sword, and the rest of the population, to the number of thirty thousand, sold into slavery¹⁸¹. The Boeotian league was continued by the other states, amongst which we must again reckon Plataeæ and Orchomenus. The restoration of Thebes by Cassander produced but little change in the condition of the country; Thebes was soon afterwards twice taken by Demetrius Poliorcetes¹⁸², and was unable to recover from the effects of these shocks. As soon as the Romans set foot upon Grecian ground, violent party dissensions arose in Boeotia; the Romans did every thing in their power to foment these disturbances, and to promote the ruin and misery they occasioned; so that it was not long before the condition of Boeotia was as deplorable as that of Ætolia¹⁸³. Nevertheless the Boeotian league still continued in existence¹⁸⁴.

Thessaly, which under Philip and Alexander had been almost a Macedonian province, showed

¹⁷⁸ Plut. Demetr. 9.

¹⁷⁹ Diog. Laert. 2. 142.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. 2. 140. 142.

¹⁸¹ Plut. Alex. 11.

¹⁸² Plut. Demetr. 39. 40.

¹⁸³ Polyb. 20. 6; 23. 7; 27. 1. 2; Liv. 36. 6; 42. 38. 43.

¹⁸⁴ Tittmann, Griech. Staatsv. 702.

some signs of reviving ardour in the cause of freedom during the Lamian war. Menon, who was undoubtedly descended from the noble house of Pharsalus¹⁸⁵, and brother-in-law to the Molossian king Æacides, who had married his sister, and consequently uncle to Pyrrhus, the issue of that marriage¹⁸⁶, distinguished himself as one of the generals of the Grecian league in that war¹⁸⁷. Thessaly again fell for a time under the yoke of Macedonia; the Ætolians subsequently obtained possession of several fortified places¹⁸⁸, and, like the Threspotian Thessalians of the olden time, the Athamans now pressed forward over the Pindus¹⁸⁹ from Epirus. Unbounded confusion ensued; still till the latest times we constantly read of assemblies of the Thessalians¹⁹⁰, of Strategi¹⁹¹, etc. The proclamation of Flaminius for restoring freedom to the Thessalians and several of the adjacent mountain peoples came too late¹⁹²; they could no longer enjoy it. Honourable mention occurs of the Acarnanians, whose capital was Leucas¹⁹³; but their internal condition never attained to true political culture and civilization, and it was moreover greatly endangered by the attacks of the Ætolians, against whom they still nourished their ancient enmity¹⁹⁴, as well as by the Macedonian-Roman wars.

¹⁸⁵ See above, § 62. n. 53.

¹⁸⁶ Plut. Pyrrh. 1.

¹⁸⁷ Plut. ubi sup. and Phoc. 25; Diod. 18. 15. 17. 39.

¹⁸⁸ § 79. n. 78. 79.

¹⁸⁹ Liv. 36. 13.

¹⁹⁰ Tittmann, Griech. Staatsv. 702.

¹⁹¹ Compare with Eusebius, who gives a list of them, Niebuhr on the Armenian translation of Euseb., Abhandl. d. Hist. Philol. Cl. der Berl. Akad. 1820. 1821. p. 76, sqq.

¹⁹² § 79. n. 159.

¹⁹³ Liv. 33. 17; 36. 11.

¹⁹⁴ Diod. 16. 67.

9. THE STATES ON THE EASTERN ISLANDS AND COASTS.

The first place amongst these belongs to Rhodes¹⁹⁶, whether we regard the degree of independence which it asserted during the Macedonian-Roman age, and the length of time it retained that independence, its external power and authority, or the solidity and strength of its nationality, and the excellence of its political regulations. The life of the Rhodians was simple; their disposition composed and serious, yet active and enterprising¹⁹⁶; they seem to have possessed at once the taciturnity and the alertness of northern mariners. Their honesty and liberality are attested by the law enacting, that children should pay the debts of their parents, even though they did not inherit their property¹⁹⁷, and by that imposing upon the wealthier class, which was in possession of the chief power, besides its other obligations, the charge of providing for the indigent, a noble manner of employing the superfluities of the rich¹⁹⁸. Hence though the constitution was not democratic, (for oratory, which was introduced into Rhodes by Æschines¹⁹⁹, did not become an engine of demagoguery,) still the *demus* was tranquil and contented. But the Rhodian government was very oppressive in those maritime parts of Asia Minor, situate opposite to the island, which belonged to the Rhodians from the overthrow of Antiochus till that of Perseus²⁰⁰.

¹⁹⁶ See besides Meursii *Rhodus*, the excellent treatise of Paulsen on the subject of Rhodes in the time of the Romans (Gött. Preisschr. 1818), and Rost's *Rhodes*, an *Histor. Archæol. Fragm.* 1824.

¹⁹⁶ Dion. Chrys. *Orat.* 31; conf. Meurs. *Rhod.* 1, cap. 20.

¹⁹⁷ Meurs. *ubi sup.* cap. 21.

¹⁹⁸ Strab. 14. 653.

¹⁹⁹ Meurs. *ubi sup.* cap. 11.

²⁰⁰ Liv. 41. 6.

The chief officers of state were Prytanes and Navarchs. Two Prytanes were chosen annually, and officiated six months each²⁰¹. The Navarch²⁰² was entitled to conclude treaties without special instructions to that effect²⁰², and amongst his other duties, was probably charged with the superintendence of the harbours, which it was forbidden to show to a foreigner, upon pain of death²⁰³. The Rhodian maritime laws were so excellent, that they were even adopted by the Romans²⁰⁴. The Buleutæ were entitled *Μάστροι*²⁰⁵, from their office of examining.

Crete, on the contrary, was agitated by intestine dissensions; its inhabitants were notorious as mercenaries and pirates, and were, moreover, distinguished by their vicious and malignant cunning²⁰⁶. Gortys, Gnossus, and Lyctus, were engaged in continual hostilities with each other²⁰⁷, and these contests assumed a more ferocious character as soon as the Romans began to interfere in them²⁰⁸. Some inscriptions appear to have been preserved from the second century before Christ, relating to treaties between single states, the grant of rights and honours, etc.²⁰⁹ The constitutions of the single states seem to have been oligarchical, and Cosmi were their chief magistrates till the revolution, which happened a little before Polybius' time; this led to the establishment of democracy.²¹⁰

²⁰¹ Polyb. 27. 6. 2.²⁰² Polyb. 30. 5. 5.²⁰³ Strab. 14. 653.²⁰⁴ Meurs. Rhod. 1. cap. 21; conf. Pastoret: Quelle a été l'influence des loix maritimes des Rhodiens sur la marine des Grecs et de Romains? 1785.²⁰⁵ Hesych. and Harpocr. *Μάστροι*.²⁰⁶ Polyb. 4. 47. 53; 6. 56; Plut. Philop. 13; Diod. Fragm. ix. p. 374. Bipont.²⁰⁷ Liv. 41. 25; Polyb. 4. 53, sqq.²⁰⁸ Polyb. 23. 15; 27. 16.²⁰⁹ Particularly in Chishull, Antiquitat. Asiat. See the particulars in Tittmann, Gr. Staatsvf. 414. n. 19; conf. 734. n. 14.²¹⁰ Polyb. 6. 46. 3.

Byzantium successfully maintained its independence, which it probably was enabled to do by the mutual jealousy of the neighbouring kings, who were all desirous of adding to their dominions a town so remarkable for the beauty of its situation; besides which its prosperity was promoted by the very considerable revenue it derived from the sound dues²¹¹. Nothing of importance has been transmitted concerning the character and constitution of the Byzantines, after the time of the elder Philip.

Cyrene was violently distracted by the quarrels of Thimbron and his party at the beginning of the Macedonian age²¹², and these, it is not improbable facilitated the conquest of the country by the first Ptolemy. Ophellas, who is recorded as the ruler of Cyrene²¹³, was at first the lieutenant of Ptolemy, but afterwards raised himself to independence. After his death, in Olymp. 118. 1; 308. B. C.²¹⁴, Cyrene again fell under the yoke of Egypt; about Olymp. 120., Magas, the son of the first Ptolemy, was sent there as governor²¹⁵. He also became independent; he died fifteen years afterwards, whereupon his widow Arsinoe, gave her daughter Berenice in marriage to Demetrius the Fair, the son of Demetrius Poliorcetes, and at the same time resigned the government into his hands²¹⁶. He was murdered, and soon afterwards mention again occurs of the establishment of a constitution in Cyrene. This was framed by the Megalopolitans, Ecdemus, and Demophanes²¹⁷.

²¹¹ Polyb. 4. 46.

²¹² Diod. 18. 19, sqq.

²¹³ Diod. ubi sup. 20. 40. 44; Plut. Demetr. 14.

²¹⁴ Diod. 20. 42.

²¹⁵ Niebuhr üb. die armenische Uebers. des Euseb. p. 72.

²¹⁶ Justin. 26. 3; Agatharcid. ap. Athen. 12. 550. B.

²¹⁷ Plut. Arat. 1; Polyb. 10. 25.

Their labours remind us of those of the Mantinean Demonax. The Cyrenæans made war upon Ptolemy Physcon, Olymp. 154. 2; 163. B. C., under the command of an Ætolian called Lycopus, who thereupon assumed the tyranny²¹⁸. As late as the time of Mithridates, a monster in human form, called Nicocrates, was tyrant in Cyrene²¹⁹.

In the states on the Pontus tyranny still prevailed in Heraclea, where it had existed from the time of Philip; Dionysius, the tyrant of Heraclea, died in Olymp. 118. 3; 306. B. C.²²⁰, and was succeeded by his sons Clearchus and Oxathres, who reigned seventeen years²²¹, after which Lysimachus proclaimed the liberty of Heraclea; but it could not be effectually asserted²²². The kingship continued to exist amongst the Bosphorans, where the dynasty of the Leuconidæ was immediately succeeded by that of Mithridates. Amisus and Sinope, on the other hand, remained free from domestic tyranny, and it was not till after the Pontic kingdom had increased in power and extent that they fell under a foreign yoke²²³.

5. THE WESTERN STATES.

The tyranny and internal distractions of Syracuse have already been described; the system which there prevailed as little deserved the name of a constitution as it presented indications of pure and genuine nationality. Polydorus²²⁴ framed

²¹⁸ Polyæn. 8. 64.

²¹⁹ Plut. de Mulier. Virtut. 7. 44, sqq.

²²⁰ Diod. 20. 67. He was also surnamed *χρηστός*, Memnon, cap. 4.

²²¹ Memnon, cap. 5. Diod. ubi sup. has the name of Zathras.

²²² Memnon, cap. 6, sqq. The reinstatement of the exiles without the effusion of blood, related by Memnon, cap. 6, was very honourable.

²²³ Strab. 12. 546. 547.

²²⁴ Diod. 13. 35.

laws under Hiero, or rather he was commissioned by that ruler, to interpret the code of Diocles, which was no longer generally intelligible. The last outburst of democratic enthusiasm after the assassination of Hieronymus, was too tumultuous in itself, and was too quickly followed by the oppressions of the Romans, to lead to any substantial and lasting advantages: still Syracuse, in the moment of her fall, presents a nobler spectacle than the states of the mother-country, and her great citizen Archimedes is justly entitled to rank by the side of Philopœmen.

The democracy of Tarentum stirred up the last dregs of popular depravity²²⁵. Still this state, debased and enfeebled as it was, fell under no other tyranny than that of Pyrrhus. After Tarentum had been deprived of its liberties, Tarentines are frequently mentioned as serving in the armies of the mother-country; e. g. in the history of Demetrius Poliorcetes²²⁶, under the Achæans²²⁷, Cleomenes²²⁸, Philip the younger²²⁹, etc.; perhaps these were emigrants, unless we suppose them to have been a species of light-armed troops²³⁰.

If we once more cast a glance at the condition of Greece under the sway of the Romans, we cannot but be astonished to perceive, that though her nationality was endangered by the worst effects of degeneracy and corruption within, and by the violent inroads of barbarism from without—though

²²⁵ See above, § 79. n. 229. Conf. Plut. Pyrrh. 16.

²²⁶ Polyæn. 3. 7. 1.

²²⁷ Plut. Philop. 10.

²²⁸ Plut. Cleom. 6.

²²⁹ Polyb. 4. 77.

²³⁰ Acontistæ in Plut. Philop. 10. However, in Polyæn. ubi sup., horsemen are spoken of.

she had been stripped of those fair ornaments in which painting and sculpture had arrayed her—though her sanctuaries had been profaned—her inhabitants transplanted—and her ancient cities made desolate, still she not only preserved that nationality pure from external admixture in itself, but disseminated the humanizing influence of her civilization over the wide regions of the east, through the realms of the Macedonian Diadochi and Epigoni, as far as the barren steppes of central Asia and the sandy deserts of Africa, imparting a Grecian colouring to political institutions, religion, language, science, and art. Still it cannot be denied that certain genuine Greek states exhibit premature evidences of degeneracy. The deputation of the Italian Cumæans to Rome, U. C. 574 ; 180. B. C., for permission to make use of the Latin language in proclamations and public proceedings has attained a melancholy celebrity ²³¹. Tarentum, Rhegium, and Naples were the only towns of the Italiots that had retained their Grecian manners and customs ²³² in the time of Strabo; whilst the institutes of Crete were almost exclusively Roman ²³³. On the other hand, we are surprised to behold the characteristics of Grecian life still existing after the birth of Christ at Olbiopolis on the Dnieper ²³⁴. Though it is but too true that the Greeks had become divested of all greatness and dignity, that the consequences of that ruin which they had brought upon themselves, as well as of the unheard-of misuse and oppression they afterwards endured from others, had contracted and de-

²³¹ Liv. 40. 42.²³³ Strab. 10. 484.²³² Strab. 6. 253.²³⁴ Tittmann, Gr. Staatsv. 403.

based their feelings, and that the restless activity and excitability which could never be entirely eradicated from their nature, now exerted themselves upon worthless and contemptible objects²³⁵; still is there any one who does not exclaim against the ruthless and bloodstained Romans, who reproached them with their debasement, and yet did every thing in their power to promote and perpetuate it. And when, at length, after another two thousand years of wrong and suffering, spent beneath the scourge of foreign and domestic misrule and oppression, their descendants have arisen to reclaim the holiest rights of man—rights which God bestowed upon them, and the iniquity of Asiatic despots has too long withheld from them, is it for us to taunt them because they call up with pride the glorious remembrance of their illustrious ancestors, though they may be unable to equal them in virtue and in greatness? And if that discord, to which they would almost appear to have been foredoomed, has unrelentingly pursued them from their earliest appearance in history till the present moment, should we not rather pity than condemn them, and strive to extinguish rather than fan this unhallowed flame?

²³⁵ See, for example, Ath. 1. 19. B—E.

A P P E N D I X.

I.

On the use of the expression προστάτης τοῦ δήμου and other political appellations.

§ 54. n. 19. 20.

BEFORE the political phraseology of the schools of the philosophers, and more particularly that of Aristotle, attained scientific fixity and precision, there arose among the writers of the democratic period, and especially among the Attic historians, orators, and poets, a method of employing words which may be regarded as a practical introduction to the scientific vocabulary of the schools, and which imparted to certain political designations of common and constant occurrence, a definite and specific character in lieu of the more vague and general one they had till that time borne. Most important in this respect were, after Pindar and Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, the tragedians, Aristophanes, Lysias, Andocides, Isocrates, Demosthenes, Æschines, and Lycurgus. It must, however, be remarked of these appellations in general, that they were for the most part borrowed from actually-existing institutions: but, on the other side, it sometimes happened that a word, which had maintained itself in common use without immediate reference to a political object in real being, was afterwards employed to designate some individual and determinate object, and thereby attained a narrower and more precise signification. Both these observations hold good of the expression προστάτης τοῦ δήμου, and the cognate participles. Not to mention the very general signification of presiding over, being at the head of, a party for instance, Herod. 1. 59, τῶν μὲν προεστεῶτος Μεγακλέους, etc.; Thuc. 3. 82, οἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες,

in which sense it was applied to democratic as well as to aristocratic party-leaders—the appellation *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου* appears to have originated in an extension of the meaning of that peculiar word which was originally used to express the person who officiated as the patron and legal representative of a *Metœcus*, as was customary in Athens and other places. As the *Prostates* defended the interests of a *Metœcus*, so it was the duty of the *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου* to act as the representative of the *demus*. The king, in the *Supplices* of Euripides, 964, calls himself *προστάτης* as the sovereign of the country. Speaking of Sparta, Herod. i. 69, says with still greater latitude of meaning, *προεστάναι τῆς Ἑλλάδος*; Xenoph. Hell. 5. 1. 36, *προστάται γενόμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης*. Hence its leading signification was, in this stage of development, a person charged with the duties of a patron, guardian, advocate, representative, and, upon the whole, it rather conveyed the notion of business than of official rank and station. *Προστάτης τοῦ δήμου* attained in substance the sense of *δημαγωγός* in the larger and better signification of the term, as the administrator, the agent, (Thucydides, i. 127, describes Pericles as *ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν*), who probably not unfrequently acted as a legally-elected officer. The word *προστάτης*, and the participle *προεστηκώς*, *προεστεώς*, *προεστώς*, occur most frequently in this sense. Aristoph. Ran. 569,—*τὸν προστάτην Κλέωνα*. Eccles. 176, *ὁρῶ γὰρ αὐτὴν (τὴν πόλιν) προσταταίσι χρωμένην ἀεὶ πονηροῖς*. Plutos 920, *πονηρόν γ' ἄρα προστάτην ἔχει*. Thuc. 8. 89. of Samos, *ἡγωνίζετο οὖν εἰς ἕκαστος—αὐτὸς πρῶτος προστατής τοῦ δήμου γενέσθαι*. Thuc. 8. 65,—*Ἀνδροκλέα—τοῦ δήμου μάλιστα προεστεῶτα*. Ibid. 6. 28, *τοῦ δήμου προεστάναι*, alluding to the adversaries of Alcibiades. Xenoph. Hell. 6. 4. 6, *τῶν Θηβαίων οἱ προεστῶτες* (Epaminondas), conf. 3. 5. 3; Xen. H. 3. 5; i. 4. Timocrates is to give money, *τοῖς προεστηκόσιν ἐν τοῖς πόλεσιν*. Conf. Memorabil. Socr. 2. 8. 4, *προστατεύοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν*. It is also found in the later writers, as Plut. Dion, 32, *πρὸς ἐτέρους ἤδη προστατάς ἀπέβλεπον*.

Diod. Fragm. 10. 181. Bipont., *προστάτης τῆς συγκλήτου*. Hence then conversely *δημαγωγός* was used in the sense of *προστάτης*. Steph. Byz. *δῆμος· δημαγωγός· ὁ προεστηκώς δῆμον*. Conf. Pollux 3. 34, where the Rhetorician (the Demagogue) is called *προστάτης τῶν νόμων, φύλαξ τῆς ἐλευθερίας*. Together with a notion of the representation of the people, we may occasionally discern a secondary meaning in reference to some particular direction or tendency connected with the same, e. g. the opposition to oligarchy: thus in Thucyd. 3. 82, *δῆμου προστάται* and *ὀλίγοι* are opposed to each other; thus in 4. 66, *οἱ τοῦ δῆμου προστάται* in Megara is used of the chiefs of the democratic party in contradistinction to the oligarchical fugitives. In the same manner, Plut. Arat. 49, *στρατηγοί* (as officers of democratic sentiments) and *τῶν πολλῶν προεστῶτες* are opposed to each other.

From this general signification a definite one, viz. that of an office, a magistracy, gradually evolved itself. The word *δημιουργός* is analogous. It cannot be determined with accuracy whether, and in what states *προστάτης τοῦ δῆμου* was the title of a regular officer; in the age of the matured democracy those writers who were either unacquainted with the exact titles of the superior officers of a democracy, or purposely avoided naming them, could hardly have found a more convenient or appropriate designation; in this respect it may be compared with *τὰ τέλη*, *οἱ ἐν τέλει*, which occur so very frequently in the writers of that age, particularly in Xenophon, and which are never used as regular titles. *Προεστῶτες*, in the above-quoted passage of Xenophon, Hell. 6. 4. 6, is applied to the magistrates in Thebes; and already in Herod. 6. 74, *Κλεομένης—τῶν Ἀρκάδων τοὺς προεστεῶτας ἀγινέων*. In the last passage it possibly had a more precise signification, and was perhaps a regular official title. Xenoph. Hell. 5. 2. 3, speaking of Mantinea says, *τοὺς ἐν Μαντινείᾳ τοῦ δῆμου προστάτας*. Conf. 5. 2. 6, and 7. 4. 33.—*ἀνεκαλοῦντο εἰς τοὺς μυρίους τοὺς προστάτας αὐτῶν*. The expression seems to have a less definite meaning in Thuc. in alluding to Corcyra, 3. 70, *Πειθίας—τοῦ δῆμου προει-*

στήκει; 3. 75, οἱ τοῦ δήμου προστάται; (ap. Diod. 12. 57: —τοὺς δημαγωγεῖν εἰωθότας καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ πλήθους προτίσταςθαι. Conf. Müller, Dor. 2. 153. n. 6.) with reference to Syracuse, Thuc. 6. 35, Ἀθηναγόρας, ὃς δήμου προστάτης ἦν. On the other hand, Æn. Poliorc. 11, speaking of Argos, says that ὁ τοῦ δήμου προστάτης, convokes an assembly, (in opposition to which indeed Plut. Alc. 14, τοῖς προεστῶσι τοῦ δήμου (in Argos) is manifestly used in a general sense;) lastly, in a Calymnian decree, Chandler (conf. Müll. Dor. 1. 165), occur the words, ἐδοξε τὰ βουλὰ καὶ τῷ δαμῷ γνῶμα προσταταιν. The two last passages seem to refer to official duties; still I cannot entirely coincide with Müller (Dor. 2. 144.) in the opinion that the προστάται τοῦ δήμου were officers; the name rather appears to me to have been applied to demagogues, no matter whether regular officers or not, or to regular officers with a specific title, which was concealed beneath the favourite word προστάτης. It may, very probably, as Müller conjectures, 2. 141, have been sometimes used for the Demiurgi.

Amongst the expressions by which the state was most frequently designated must be classed τὰ πράγματα. Thucyd. 1. 74, ἔσωσε τὰ πράγματα; 8. 72, τὰ ξύμπαντα πράγματα; Lysias in Polystr. 669, τὰ πράγματα καταπροδιδόναι; 675—παραδοῦναι. It also denoted the political authorities; Herod. 3. 80, ἐς μέσον Πέρσησι καταθεῖναι τὰ πράγματα; 4. 164, ἐπικρατήσας τῶν πραγμάτων; 6. 39, καταλαμψόμενον τὰ πράγματα; 6. 83, οἱ δοῦλοι (in Argos) ἔσχον πάντα τὰ πρήγματα. Xenoph. Hell. 2. 3. 18, μετέχειν τῶν πραγμάτων; Thuc. 3. 72, and Xenoph. Hell. 1. 6. 13, οἱ ἔχοντες τὰ πράγματα, the sovereign people; Thuc. 3. 28, οἱ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι; also Aristot. Pol. 5. 6. 8; Demosth. Phil. 3. 125. 7; Aristoph. Lysistr. 32, τῆς πόλεως τὰ πράγματα are in the hands of females; conf. Eccles. 107. Heracl. Pont. 36, after the murder of Phalaris, Ἀλκμάνης παρέλαβε τὰ πράγματα. It likewise expressed the power of the state with reference to its external operations; Thuc. 1. 74, ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ πράγματα ἐγένετο.

II.

*The Constitution of Epidamnus according to Aristotle's
Politics, 5. 1. 6.*

§ 59. n. 7.

Aristotle is treating of changes in constitutions. After stating that a constitution might, without undergoing a thorough and radical change, be modified in one of its parts (*κατὰ μέρος*), which might bear oppressively upon some portion of the citizens, and be unpopular as an *ἄνισον*, he brings forward the example of Epidamnus, where a Bule was instituted in lieu of the Phylarchs. Here follows the much-controverted passage (most recently commented upon by Osann ad Aristot. Pol. p. 391), *εἰς δὲ τὴν ἡλιαίαν ἐπάναγκές ἐστιν ἔτι τῶν ἐν τῷ* (thus altered by Casaubon from *τῷ αὐτῷ*) *πολιτεύματι βαδίζειν τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐπιψηφίζεται ἀρχή τις. Ὀλιγαρχικὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀρχῶν ὁ εἰς ἣν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἄνισον ἢ στάσις κ. τ. λ.* It is evident, that Aristotle places those parts of the constitution which had remained oligarchical after that which had assumed a democratic character; the *καί* before *ὁ ἀρχῶν* marks the construction which is to be put upon the preceding clause. For this also describes something oligarchical; it must not be understood as though the magistrates belonging to the class which was eligible to the government (*τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι*) had been obliged to appear in the popular assembly (*ἡλιαία*); but the words *τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι* must be made to follow *ἡλιαίαν*, the latter word being regarded either as the customary title of the governing assembly in Epidamnus, or as employed by Aristotle, from the analogy of Athenian institutions, for a judicial assembly in general. Supposing this interpretation of the word to be correct, and that the words *ἡλιαίαν τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι* are to be taken together, then *ἀρχάς* as well as the following *ἀρχή τις* must be taken absolutely; it is unnecessary, with Kortüm (Gesch. hell. Staatsverf. 118. n.) to

transpose the words in the text. *Ἐπιψηφίζεται* must not be looked upon as simply equivalent to *κελεύει*; the words *ὅταν ἐπιψηφίζεται ἀρχή τις* appear to me to imply, that when the magistrates differed on a question, and one of them made a motion on the subject, the *Heliaea* of the governing class was the court of appeal legally empowered to decide upon the matter. The before-named remnants of the oligarchy, which had only yielded to the will of the multitude in one particular, namely, the establishment of a *Bule*, were still in existence in the time of Aristotle, as is evident from *ἐπάναγκές ἐστιν* and from 3. 11. 1: *καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἓνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχή τις ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον*. The correctness of the *ἦν* in the above passage, *ἀρχων ὁ εἰς ἦν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταυτῇ*, is exceedingly questionable, as Müller, *Dor.* 2. 156, also remarks. Finally, it is necessary to add, that although the oligarchical institutions which Aristotle describes as existing in his time were suspended during the exile of the chief men of the state, they were revived a short time before the Peloponnesian war, after the restoration of the refugees, by the Corcyraeans, as may be inferred from their existence at a subsequent period.

III.

The appellations of the Oligarchs during the meridian of Democracy.

§ 60. n. 7.

Although Kortüm has, in his history of the Grecian constitutions, already made a collection of words by which the holders of power under the popular and aristocratic governments were respectively designated, a second attempt of the same nature does not appear to me to be superfluous. The illustrious quality of the ancient nobility is expressed by *ἐπιφανείς*; Herod. 8. 125, with reference to Timodemus, an opponent of Themistocles, says, *οὐ τῶν ἐπιφανέων ἀνδρῶν*. Compare Hesych., *Καπήτιοι οἱ περιφανείς τῆς Κυρήνης*. *Βαθυχαῖος*, (from *χαοί*, an-

cestors, Theocr. 7. 5. and Schol.), Æschyl. Suppl. 855; (Aristoph. Lysistr. 90, παῖς—χαῖτα, and 1157, οὐπα γυναικ' ὅπωπα χαῖωτέραν, must be explained from the Læconian χαός, i. e. brave; (Schol. Theocr. ubi sup., conf. Hesych. χαά). To the same class belongs σεμνός, an epithet expressive of a noble and lofty bearing, so frequent amongst the Attic writers (see above, p. 42); πλουτοῦντες καὶ πάνυ σεμνοί, Aristoph. Ran. 627.—The notion of that refinement of manners which was peculiar to the upper classes is conveyed by χαρίεντες, Aristot. Nicom. Eth. 1. 13; Plut. Phoc. 29, τοὺς ἀστείους καὶ χαρίεντας. Conf. Dion. 28. Χαριέστατοι, in Diod. 11. 86. 87, are the patriotic friends of order (καλοὶ καγαθοί). Allied with this is ἐπεικεῖς, Aristot. Pol. 2. 9. 4, of the partisans of Cimon; as well as γνώριμοι (see above, p. 128), those who stand high in public opinion, or who have a high opinion of themselves). Γνώριμοι and χαρίεντες, Plut. Dion. 28, πλούσιοι καὶ γνώριμοι, Plut. Nic. 2. Conf. Dion. Chrys. 2. 32. Δόκιμος, Herod. 3. 143, and λόγιμος, Herod. 9. 16, must be referred to the same class.—The most usual epithets for persons of distinction were taken from their riches, πλούσιοι, πλουτοῦντες; with these must be classed οἱ ἔχοντες, Soph. Ajax, 157, see the comment.; their *fulness* of wealth appears to have led to the use of παχύς, Herod. 5. 30; ἄνδρες τῶν παχέων, conf. 5. 77; 6. 91; 7. 156. Aristoph. Pac. 639, παχεῖς καὶ πλουσίους. Hence jestingly in Aristoph. Vesp. 853, ἄνδρες μεγάλοι καὶ τετραπήχεις (they are called, οἱ πλατεῖς and εὐρύνωτοι, Sophocl. Ajax, 1237).—Καλός καγαθός, does not so much convey the notion of honourable extraction, ancient citizenship, as of integrity, consequently the contrary to πονηρός, as in Aristoph. Equit. 186. 87, μῶν ἐκ καλῶν εἰ καγαθῶν; εἴμ' ἐκ πονηρῶν—a person of purely patriotic way of thinking, legality and moral conduct (conf. above, p. 58); so far καλοὶ καγαθοὶ are opposed to the populace, as in Aristoph. Ran. 719. 728; or to the demagogues, as in Plut. Demetr. 24. On the one hand, indeed, it is probable that the notion of oligarchical rank became associated

with it, as the *καλοί κἀγαθοί* were always less numerous than the *πλήθος*, as in Plut. Pericl. 11. Thucydides, the opponent of Pericles, assembles τοὺς καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς καλουμένους ἄνδρας (compare above, p. 58. n., the passage from Thuc. 8. 84, and Plut. Pericl. 7. 8; but concerning Pericles see Plut. de Stoic. Repugn. 10. 396, where Cleon's ἀναγωγία and Pericles' καλοκἀγαθία are contrasted with one another). But on the other side, it was also used to signify a man of cultivated manners in general, and was in this sense applied to foreigners, and equivalent to 'gentleman,' *honnête homme*: thus Aristophanes calls the Carystians ἄνδρας καλοὺς τε κἀγαθοὺς.—The case is wholly different with the words ἄριστοι, βέλτιστοι; with these, it will almost invariably be found, that the intrinsic meaning of the words themselves was less regarded than the political position of the persons to whom they were applied. For example; Alcibiades, ap. Thuc. 8. 47, sends to the δυνατωτάτους of the Athenians, who were in the fleet, ὥστε μνησθῆναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐς τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἐπ' ὀλιγαρχία βούληται ξυμπολιτεύειν. Βέλτιστοι is the favourite expression of Xenophon, Hell. 7. 3. 4, στασιασάντων ἐν τῷ Σικυῶνι τῶν τε βελτίστων καὶ τοῦ δήμου. Compare, on the subject of Corinth, 4. 1. 3. (to which belongs the Laconian-oligarchical varnish, 4. 4. 6; speaking of Mantinea, 5. 2. 6; comp. Sturz lex. Xenoph. βέλτιστος, n. 2. and ἄριστος, n. 4. and 5. The Homeric ἀριστῆες continued in use; Eurip. Phœn. 1260. ἀριστεῖς and ἄκροι are classed together. The word κάλλιστοι is also given by Hesych., in v. ἀριστοκρατούμενοι (see above, p. 23) as an adulatory epithet belonging to the same class. To this may be added σοφοί, Pindar, P. 2. 159. 160.—παρὰ τυραννίδι, χῶπόταν ὁ λάβρος στρατός, χῶταν πόλιν οἱ σοφοὶ τηρέωντι. From the words already enumerated must be distinguished those which imply eminence of rank or power, without any secondary meaning. Such are ὑπείροχοι, Herod. 5. 92. 7; δυνατοί, Thuc. 5. 4, and 5. 31, in contradistinction to the δῆμος; δύνασται (comp. above, p. 128, and 315. n. 15. on δυναστεία); Herod. 2. 32, ἀνδρῶν δυναστέων παῖδας ὑβρι-

στάς, besides *δυναστεύοντας ἄνδρας*, 9. 2; 6. 39, and 6. 66; conf. *ἐδυνάστευε*, 6. 35, of Miltiades the elder, whereas Pisistratus, *εἶχε—τὸ πᾶν κράτος*. Thucydides only uses *δυναστεία*, e. g. speaking of Syracuse, 6. 38, *τυραννίδας καὶ δυναστείας ἀδίκους*; of Thessaly, 4. 78, of Thebes, 3. 62. (Conf. Kortüm, *ubi sup.* 19. n. 36).—The coming together and combining for anti-democratic purposes, (*ξυνιστάναι*, Thuc. 8. 48; conf. 8. 66: *τὸ ξυνεστηκός*, the conspirators. Lys. in Nicom. 847. Conf. Demosth. in Eubulid. 1316. 28.) constituted a *ἐταιρεία* (see p. 198, n. 129.) Thuc. 3. 82; Xenoph. Hell. 5. 2. 25; Lys. in Eratosth. 412, *ὑπὸ τῶν καλουμένων ἐταίρων* (after the battle of Ægos Potami).

IV.

On the restriction of the comic freedom by popular decrees and by circumstances.

§ 64. n. 221.

This subject has already been discussed by Petit, de Legib. Attic. 150, sqq. ed. Wessel.; Böckh, Public Economy of the Athenians, 1. 345. n.; Kanngiesser, the ancient Comic Stage in Athens, 467, sqq.; Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, Introd. xxxviii. sqq.; Meineke, Quæstion. Scen. 1. 34. n. In the observations I am about to make, I merely propose to glance over the statements in the ancient writers upon the above subject, and have no higher object in view than to furnish a collection of the passages in question. Nor am I even certain that that will be complete.

1. That the attacks of comedy upon well-known and distinguished living characters were in the first instance not only permitted but encouraged by the people, results from the statement of the Scholiast before Aristoph., Küster's edition, p. xi.: *τὸ παλαιὸν οἱ ἐν ταῖς κώμαις ἀδικούμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν νυκτὸς ἀπήρχοντο παρὰ*

τὸν δῆμον ἐκείνουν, ἔνθα ὁ ἀδικήσας ἦν, καὶ ἔλεγον ὅτι ἔστι τις ἐνταῦθα ποιῶν εἰς τοὺς γεωργοὺς τάδε· καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες ὑπεχώτουν λέγοντες καὶ τοῦνομα. μεθ' ἡμέραν δὲ ὁ δράσας ἐξητάζετο καὶ οὕτω αἰσχυνάμενος ἀνεστέλλετο τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. ὁρῶντες οὖν οἱ πολῖται τοῦτο χρήσιμον τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀδικίας ἀποτρεπτιρόν, ἐκέλευσαν τοὺς ἀδικουμένους ἐπὶ μέσης ἀγορᾶς τοὺς ἀδικήσαντας κωμωδεῖν. οἱ δὲ δεδιότες αὐτοὺς ὥς τε πλουσίους, πῆλψ χρίοντες καὶ τρυγίᾳ ἐπὶ μέσης ἀγορᾶς τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἐκωμῶδουν· ἐπεὶ δὲ μεγάλη ἡ πόλις ὠφελεῖτο ἐκ τούτου, ποιητὰς ἔταξαν ἐπὶ τούτῳ (lege τῷ) κωμωδεῖν ὃν ἂν βούλωνται ἀκωλύτως. It is obvious that this account represents the first appointment of comic poets as too exclusively the result of intention and design. A more probable origin is assigned to the comic licence by Platonius, who says that it was the natural and spontaneous offspring of the humour of the people; Præf. Aristot. ed. Kuster. x., τῆς ἰσηγορίας οὖν πάσης ὑπαρχούσης, ἄδειαν οἱ τὰς κωμωδίας συγγράφοντες εἶχον τοῦ σκώπτειν καὶ στρατηγούς καὶ δικαστὰς τοὺς κακῶς δικάζοντας καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τινάς, ἢ φιλαργύρους, ἢ συζωντας ἀσελγείᾳ. ὁ γὰρ δῆμος—ἐξήρει τὸν φόβον τῶν κωμωδούντων, φιλοτίμως τῶν ἐπὶ τοιούτους βλασφημούντων ἀκούων· ἴσμεν γὰρ ὡς ἀντίκειται φύσει τοῖς πλουσίοις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ δῆμος, καὶ ταῖς δυσπραγίαις αὐτῶν ἥδεται.

2. That it was unlawful to ridicule the people at large is stated by Xenophon (?) de Repub. Ath., κωμωδεῖν δ' αὖ καὶ κακῶς λέγειν τὸν μὲν δῆμον οὐκ ἐῷσιν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοὶ ἀκούωσι κακῶς· ἰδίᾳ δὲ, κ. τ. λ. That this is erroneous is evident from the foregoing examples in the text.

3. A popular decree, prohibiting the comic satire, is said to have been passed in the archonship of Morychides Olymp. 85. 1), but to have remained in force only three years, viz. till the archonship of Euthymenes. Schol. Aristoph. Acharn. 67, Οὗτος ὁ ἄρχων (Εὐθυμένης), ἐφ' οὗ κατελύθη τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦ μὴ κωμωδεῖν, γραφὲν ἐπὶ Μορυχίδου· καὶ ἴσχυσεν ἐκείνόν τε τὸν ἐνιαυτόν, καὶ δύο τοὺς ἐξῆς, ἐπὶ Γλαυκίδου τε (sic lege pro Ἐπιγίνου τε) καὶ

Θεωδόρου, μεθ' οὗς ἐπ' Εὐθυμένους (Olymp. 85. 4.) κατέ-
 λύθη. The μὴ κωμωδεῖν seems to have been construed
 into a total suspension of comic exhibitions; Clinton (Fasti
 Hellenici, Ann. 440. Olymp. 85.) brings forward, from
 former references, two pieces, which were said to have
 been performed at the time that the prohibition in ques-
 tion was in force, and endeavours thence, as Larcher has
 done before him, to prove a contravention of the law; but
 this can scarcely have meant that the exhibition of comedy
 was wholly prohibited: it is more probable that τινά
 must be understood after τοῦ μὴ κωμωδεῖν, therefore that
 the satirizing of individuals only was forbidden; e. g.,
 the Schol. Av. 1298: δοκεῖ δὲ (a certain Συρακούσιος,
 whom Aristophanes compares with a magpie) καὶ ψήφισμα
 τεθεικέναι μὴ κωμωδεῖσθαι ὀνομαστί τινά κ. τ. λ., and in
 the passage quoted below, n. 6. But the Scholiast does
 not inform us who this Syracusan was; his proposal for
 restricting the comic licence was not adopted, as is proved
 by the Birds of Aristophanes.

4. Callias, the son of Hipponicus, was the author of a
 law, τὸν ἄρχοντα μὴ φανερώς κωμωδεῖν. Comp. besides,
 Schol. Arist. Nub. 31. Petit. de Legib. Att. 150. It has
 also been already shown in the text that this law was not
 very strictly observed by the comic poets.

5. The psephism of Antimachus, Schol. Arist. Acharn.
 1149,—ἐδόκει δὲ ὁ Ἀντίμαχος οὗτος ψήφισμα πεποιη-
 κέναι, μὴ δεῖν κωμωδεῖν ἔξ ὀνόματος. Conf. Suidas, Ἀντί-
 μαχος, and Diogen. Prov. 8. 71. This sounds very much
 like the account of the Συρακούσιος. No exact particulars
 can apparently be found respecting it; Petit places the
 popular decree in Olymp. 97; but he only reasons from
 the character of the Plutus which has reached us, and
 this very piece disproves his assumption, for persons are
 ridiculed in it by name, see below, n. 8.

6. Without specifying time or person, Horace speaks
 of a restrictive enactment; ad Pison. 283.

—lex est accepta, chorusque

Turpiter obticuit sublato jure nocendi.

Epist. ad August. 150, sq.,

—doluere cruento

Dente laccessiti; fuit intactis quoque cura

Conditione super communi, quin etiam lex

Pœnaque lata, malo quæ nollet carmine quenquam describi.

Further the biography of Aristophanes, ed. Küst. xiv., ψηφίσματος γὰρ γενομένου χορηγοῦ (lege χορηγικοῦ), ὥστε μὴ ὀνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν τινα, καὶ τῶν χορηγῶν οὐκ ἀντεχόντων πρὸς τὸ χορηγεῖν καὶ παντάπασιν ἐκλελοιπύλας τῆς ὑλῆς τῶν κωμῳδιῶν (αἴτιον γὰρ κωμῳδίας τὸ σκώπτειν τινάς) κ. τ. λ. Also Hermogenes (περὶ στάσεων) p. 75. (as quoted by Petit) ὀνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν ὁ νόμος ἐκώλυσεν.

It is probably safer to refer both these statements to the psephism of Antimachus.

7. The parabasis, the chief element of the old comedy, appears to have ceased at the end of the Peloponnesian war, it is true: but this must not be ascribed to a decree of the people, or even to the oligarchy of the year 411: it rather appears to have resulted from the unfavourableness of circumstances, which incapacitated the Choregi from providing for the exigencies of the Liturgy, and eventually led to the omission of the chorus. Platon. Præf. Aristoph. ed. Küst. xi.:—τῶν χορηγῶν οὐκ ἔχόντων τὰς τροφάς, ὑπεξηρέθη τῆς κωμῳδίας τὰ χορευτῶν μέλη κ. τ. λ. However, it cannot be denied that the influence of the oligarchy is also adverted to in a former passage.

8. Meanwhile pieces with the character of the middle and new comedy were brought upon the stage, such as the Cocalus of Aristophanes, etc. See Platon. ubi sup. p. xi., and the Life of Aristophanes, p. xiv.; but the liberty of ridiculing persons by name continued unrestricted till the time of the Macedonians, as well as of imitating them on the masks. (Comp. Kanngiesser die alte Kom. Bühne, 128, sqq.) Examples of attacks upon individuals by name are Aristophanes, Plut. 84. 174. 176. 177. 179. 303. 319. Anaxandrides, Alexis, and Anaxilas,

who had attacked Plato by name, Diog. Laert. 3. 26. 27. 28. Isocrat. de Pac. 5. 161. D. W. remarks, οὐ ἔστι παρρησία, πλὴν ἐνθάδε μὲν (in the popular assembly) τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις—ἐν δὲ τῷ θεάτρῳ τοῖς κωμωδιδασκάλοις. This was in Olymp. 106. 356. B. C. The invectives of Antiphanes against Demosthenes ap. Plut. Demosth. 4. 9; conf. Ath. 6. 223. E. • Anaxandrides against Polyeuctus, Athen. 4. 166. D., Philetairus against Hyperides, Athen. 8. 342. A.; Timocles against those who had been bribed by Harpalus, Athen. 8. 341. F. sqq.

Even Stratocles was attacked as late as the time of Demetrius Poliorcetes by Philippides, Plut. Demetr. 12. Here indeed it is necessary, as Clinton justly remarks (xli.), to distinguish between an occasional attack upon an individual, as sometimes takes place upon the modern stage, and the holding a particular person up to ridicule through the whole piece, as Cleon in the Knights, Socrates in the Clouds, etc.; and in the case of such exhibitions as these, it is very possible that the law μὴ κωμωδεῖν asserted its full force.—The latter practice fell into disuse from the fear of giving umbrage to the Macedonians, in consequence of which the masks which had hitherto been used were discontinued, and caricatures began to be employed. Platon. xi.,—ἐπίτηδες τὰ προσωπεῖα πρὸς τὸ γελοιότερον ἐδημιούργησαν δεδοικότες τοὺς Μακεδόνας καὶ τοὺς οὐ πηρτημένους ἐξ ἐκείνων φόβους, ἵνα μὴδε ἐκ τύχης τινὸς ὁμοιότης προσώπου συμπέσῃ τινὶ Μακεδόνων ἄρχοντι, κ. τ. λ.—The custom of attacking persons by name terminated of itself as soon as comedy ceased to draw her subjects from public life, and began to turn her attention to the delineation of family scenes.

V.

The order in which the Informations were laid in the prosecution of the Hermocopidæ.

§ 65. n. 88.

Thucydides and Andocides differ in their account of the commencement of this affair: Thucydides states that

just as every thing was prepared for the departure of the armament (*καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν παρασκευῇ ἦσαν*, 6. 26,) the Hermæ were found mutilated; whereas Andocides relates that in the assembly which was convened by the three generals Nicias, Lamachus, and Alcibiades, Pythonicus arose, and accused Alcibiades of having profaned the mysteries. But these two statements are by no means irreconcilable. Thucydides goes further back, and prefaces his account with a description of the circumstance which gave the first cause for suspicion and alarm; Andocides begins with the first judicial proceeding against Alcibiades. Plutarch and Thucydides explain why the affair of the Hermæ was not mentioned, together with the profanation of the mysteries, upon that occasion. As soon as it was discovered that the Hermæ had been mutilated, the council immediately assembled, several meetings of the popular assembly took place (Plut. Alcib. 18, — *ἅπασαν ἐξήταζον ὑπόνοιαν πικρῶς ἢ τε βουλὴ συνιοῦσα περὶ τούτων καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις πολλάκις*), and proclamations were issued for the disclosure of other acts of impiety (Thuc. 6. 27, — *μεγάλαις μηνύτροις δημοσίᾳ οὗτοί τε* (the Hermocoridæ) *ἐζητοῦντο, καὶ προσέτι ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἴτις ἄλλο τι οἶδεν ἀσέβημα γεγενημένον, μηνύειν ἀδεῶς τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων καὶ δούλων*). The meeting for the Strategi was now held. Meanwhile nothing had been elicited respecting the mutilation of the Hermæ; but the enemies of Alcibiades had prepared themselves to charge him with another grave offence, namely, with the profanation of the mysteries; and in the sitting of the assembly in question, Pythonicus laid an Eisangelia against him, while his most inveterate enemy Androcles brought forward witnesses. The order of the several accusations I consider to have been as follows:

1. The Eisangelia of Pythonicus in the popular assembly, that Alcibiades and his associates had given mimic celebrations of the mysteries in their houses, Andoc. de Mys. 6. 7: the person to whose testimony he appealed was Andromachus, the slave of Alcibiades. It

is, however, probable that Androcles brought forward his charge at this time (Plut. Alcib. 19, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ δούλους τινὰς καὶ μετοίκους προήγαγεν Ἀνδροκλῆς ὁ δημαγωγὸς κ. τ. λ.), or at least he did so before the departure of Alcibiades.

2. The information (μήνυσις) of the slave, and the request of Alcibiades that the affair might be enquired into without delay; this was resisted by his enemies, who dreaded the soldiery, and by his friends, who probably feared that he might be deprived of the command; the affair was broken off, and the fleet set sail. Compare here Isocrat. de Big. 605.

3. The enquiry is resumed; the council entrusted with plenary powers (Andoc. 8, ἦν γὰρ αὐτοκράτωρ). To this period must apparently be referred the Eisangelia of Thessalus, a son of Cimon's. We learn from Plutarch, Alc. 19, that this embodied the depositions which had been made subsequently to Pythonicus' Eisangelia in the popular assembly, and this second Eisangelia must consequently be regarded as a more violent attack than the preceding one. Now followed

4. The μήνυσις of Teucer, Agariste, and Lydus, whom Androcles and Thessalus possibly had some share in bringing forward.

5. The information of Diocles, occasioned by the other Alcibiades and by Amias.

6. The information of Andocides. It was apparently at this juncture that the Peloponnesian army crossed the Isthmus; this added to the consternation and rage of the people, whereupon the Salaminian trireme was sent to fetch back Alcibiades.

VI.

*On the relation in which Diocles stood towards the
Italiot legislators.*

§ 67. n. 73.

It was remarked above that the narrative of Diodorus respecting Diocles exhibits traces of a transference from

the history of Charondas, and that Diocles probably borrowed many of his regulations from the legislation of Zaleucus and Charondas, and perhaps from certain of the institutions of Pythagoras. Besides the history of his voluntary martyrdom, in honour of the law, see the account which Diodorus gives of Diocles, 13. 35, *δίκαιος δ', ἐκ τοῦ περιττότερον τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκάστω τὸ ἐπιτίμιον ὑπάρξαι· πραγματικὸς δὲ καὶ πολὺπείρος ἐκ τοῦ πᾶν ἔγκλημά τε καὶ πρᾶγμα δημόσιόν τε καὶ ἰδιωτικὸν ἀμφισβητούμενον ὠρισμένης ἀξιῶσαι τιμωρίας*. Compare what Ephorus ap. Strab. 6. 260. relates of Zaleucus —*καινίσαι τοῦτον τὸν Ζάλευκον, ὅτι, τῶν πρότερον τὰς ζημίας τοῖς δικασταῖς ἐπιτρεψάντων, ὀρίζειν ἐφ' ἐκάστοις τοῖς ἀδικήμασιν, ἐκείνος ἐν τοῖς νόμοις διώρισεν, κ. τ. λ.* The *ἀκρίβεια τῶν νόμων* is commended by Aristotle, *Polit.* 2. 9. 8, also in speaking of Charondas. The succeeding statements leave it doubtful whether this transference is to be ascribed to Diocles himself (as Wesseling ad Diodor. 12. 21. conjectures) or to the writers who have treated of his life and actions. Phylarchus apud Athen. 12. 521. B. says, *ὅτι παρὰ Συρακοσίοις νόμος ἦν τὰς γυναῖκας μὴ κοσμεῖσθαι χρυσῷ, μηδ' ἀνθινὰ φορεῖν, μηδ' ἐσθῆτας ἔχειν πορφυρᾶς ἐχούσας παρυφάς, ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτῶν συγχωρῇ ἐταῖρα εἶναι κοινή. καὶ ὅτι ἄλλος ἦν νόμος τὸν ἄνδρα μὴ καλλωπίζεσθαι, μηδ' ἐσθῆτι περιέργῃ χρῆσθαι καὶ διαλλαττούσῃ, ἐὰν μὴ ὁμολογῇ μοιχεύειν ἢ κίναϊδος εἶναι. καὶ τὴν ἐλευθέραν μὴ ἐκπορεύεσθαι ἡλίου δεδυκότος, ἐὰν μὴ μοιχευθησομένην. Conf. Diod. 12. 21. on Zaleucus, *γυναικὶ ἐλευθέρᾳ μὴ πλείω ἀκολουθεῖν μιᾶς θεραπαινίδος, ἐὰν μὴ μεθύῃ· μηδὲ ἐξιέναι νυκτὸς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, εἰ μὴ μοιχευομένην· μηδὲ περιτίθεσθαι χρυσία, μηδὲ ἐσθῆτα παρυφασμένην* (conf. Suidas, *Ζάλευκος*) *ἐὰν μὴ ἐταῖραν· μηδὲ τὸν ἄνδρα φορεῖν δακτύλιον ὑπόχρυσον, μηδὲ ἱμάτιον ἰσομιλήσιον* (respecting this suspicious word see Wesseling and Heyne *Opusc.* 2. 34. n.), *ἐὰν μὴ ἐταιρεύηται ἢ μοιχεύηται*.*

VII.

Remarks illustrative of the notion of the Greeks with regard to the independence of a State.

§ 68. n. 80.

The notion attached to the term Isonomia, and others allied with it, was treated of above, page 26: the word Isonomia to designate the position of the citizen within the state of which he was a member; Autonomia concerned the people at large, and their relation to other states. The word *ἐλευθερία* was nearly synonymous: but the Greeks more frequently employed the more precise and expressive term Autonomia, which denoted the possession of the most important privilege of freedom; and they comprehended under it every thing that, according to the principles of international law, was essential to absolute independence upon the commands of another state. They however made use of various supplementary additions, periphrases, and synonymes, to express this favourite idea still more fully. The phrase by which the notion of liberty and equality was conveyed, and which more particularly designated the relation of individuals to the laws within their own states (e. g. Thuc. 4. 105. of Amphipolis, after its capture by Brasidas: τὸν μὲν βουλόμενον, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ, τῆς ἴσης καὶ ὁμοίας μετέχοντα, μένειν; Plut. Timol. 23, Κορίνθιοι—καλοῦσι—τὸν βουλόμενον οἰκεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἐλευθέρους καὶ αὐτονόμους ἐπ' ἴσοις καὶ δίκαιοις τὴν χώραν διαλαχόντας), was likewise employed to express agreements and the equitable adjustment of differences between various states: Thuc. 5. 27, πόλις ἥτις αὐτόνομός τε ἐστὶ καὶ δίκας ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας δίδωσι; 5. 79, the Spartans and Argives contracted an alliance, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ ὁμοίοις δίκας διδόντας κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, and afterwards ταὶ δὲ ἄλλαι πόλεις—κατὰ πάτρια δίκας διδόντες τὰς ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας. In another place αὐτόνομοι καὶ αὐτοπόλεις are classed together, with which corresponds αὕτῃ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἢ τῶν Κο-

ρινθίων πόλις ἐγένετο, Xenoph. Hell. 5. 1. 34, in opposition to συμπολιτεύειν, Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 12.—Thuc. 5. 18. the Delphians are to be αὐτονόμους—καὶ αὐτοτελείς καὶ αὐτοδίκους καὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἑαυτῶν, on which the Scholium remarks,—ἔχειν αὐτοτελείς αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ ἄλλοις συντελούντας· αὐτόδικοι ἄνθρωποι οἱ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὴν διαφορὰν δίκη λύοντες, καὶ μὴ μετάγοντες αὐτὴν εἰς ὑπερορίους ἀνθρώπους.—Αὐτοκράτωρ, generally used of the offices of a state, is applied to Thebes in Thucyd. 3. 62; ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις οὐκ αὐτοκράτωρ οὔσα ἑαυτῆς τοῦτ' ἔπραξεν. Αὐτάρκης—ἡ πόλις· τὸ δὲ δούλον οὐκ αὐταρκές, Aristot. Polit. 4. 5. 11, must be included in the same class.

VIII.

The passages of the Orators in which the names of Aristophon the Azenian and Aristophon the Colyttian occur.

§ 71. n. 101.

(Compare Ruhnken. Hist. Or. Gr. XLV.—XLVII.

An Aristophon was Archon Eponymus Olymp. 112. 2. (Diodor. 17. 49); we are destitute of exact particulars respecting him as well as a sycophant called Aristophon, mentioned by Demosthenes in Zanothem. 885. 9. Both appear to have been different persons from the Azenian and the Colyttian. Besides the passages cited in the text the following seem to refer to Aristophon the Azenian; Demosth. in Polycl. 1208. 8, where the archonship of Molon, Olymp. 104. 3; 362. B. C. is treated of; Dem. de Coron. 301. 18. 19. where Callistratus, Cephalus, Thrasybulus, are mentioned with Aristophon. Dem. in Eubulid. 1308. 12, where allusion is made to a psephism of Aristophon, apparently from the time of the restoration of democracy, prohibiting strangers from carrying on business in the market at Athens: Demosth. de Falsâ Legat. 436. 13, where Aristophon is named with Callistratus and Diophantus, and the word γεγόνασιν

implies that he was no longer living. Demosth. in Timocr. 703. 10. (conf. Argum. 646. 8.) Concerning a psephism framed by Aristophon during the social war, for instituting an enquiry concerning debtors to the state, Demosth. de Trierarch. 1230. 15. 20, where allusion is made to a sea-fight which had been lost against Alexander. This could have been no other than Alexander of Pheræ. Jason already had triremes, Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 21. Alexander was ἄδικος ληστής καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, Ibid. 6. 4. 35. His undertakings against Athens, the conquest of Tenos (Dem. in Polycl. 1207. 13,) fall about the time of the battle of Mantinea, before which he was the ally of Thebes, (Plut. Pelop. 34). Diodor. (15. 95.) gives an account of a predatory expedition of Alexander to the Cyclades, Olymp. 104. 4; Demosthenes (ubi sup.) mentions Molon's archonship; this was in Olymp. 104. 3; this expedition was probably fitted out at the beginning of the year 361. The Colyttian is probably alluded to, Demosth. in Mid. 554. 12, where Aristophon appears as the contemporary of Midias, and Dem. de Coron. 248. 8, where he is mentioned with Eubulus and Diopithes, demagogues of the age of Philip, as he is with Eubulus 281. 17, and with Chares and Diopithes—de Cherson. 97. 13. He is called the antagonist of Eubulus in the Oration de Falsâ Legat. 43. 4.

IX.

The sentence of the Amphictyons against the Phocians.

§ 76. n. 99.

The sentence of the Amphictyons is preserved to us in Diodor. 16. 60, but neither in its original form nor free from obscurities. Amongst the latter must be classed the inexplicable contradiction in the two passages: τῶν δ' ἐν Φωκεῦσι τριῶν πόλεων περιελεῖν τὰ τείχη, and afterwards, τὰς δὲ πόλεις ἀπάσας τῶν Φωκέων κατασκάψαι καὶ μετοικίσει εἰς κώμας. Wesseling states that Barbeyrac proposes to remove the difficulty by understanding *muni-*

tiones; Plotho adds τῶν ἐπικαιροτάτων to τριῶν πόλεων; Wesseling himself asks whether such a reading τῶν δ' ἐν Φωκεύσι δύο καὶ εἴκοσι πόλεων, etc., cannot be found. All the towns of Phocis were in fact destroyed, according to Pausan. (9. 3. 2), who mentions them by name: Lilæa, Hyampolis, Anticyra, Parapotamioi, Panopeus, Daulis, Erochus, Charadra, Amphiclea, Neon, Tithronium, Drymæa, Elatea, Thracis (Θρακίς τε καὶ Φωκικῇ), or according to Strabo 9. 423, Trachis (do not both forms remind us of the mythical Thracians? Conf. Müller, Orchom. 86. 381), distinguished by the epithet Phocian from the place of the same name on mount Œta; Medeon, Echedamea, Ambrysus, Ledon, Phlygonium, Sterris. Acæ was spared. But when the whole of them were demolished, which is attested by Demosth. (de Falsâ Legat. 361. 20, sqq.), what means the separate resolution for demolishing the walls of the *three* cities? And why is the article used? What three cities are to be considered as best known, and called κατ' ἐξοχήν, *the* three cities? Not those in particular which were fortified; for they were all fortified (Demosth. ubi sup. 379. 7). Does it perhaps mean three principal towns of the Phocian league, possibly Elatea, Hyampolis, and Panopeus, whose walls it was proposed to demolish first, as a striking preparation for what was to follow?

END OF VOL. II.

ERRATA.

FIRST VOLUME.

- Page 11, line 3, *for Phænicus read Phœnicus.*
— 16, — 2, *for wash read washes.*
— 37, — 7, *for population ; in Ion read population in Ion.*
— 41, note 9, *for thus read that.*
— 81, line 8, *for marts read mart.*
— 83, — 1, *for harbours read harbour.*
— 116, — 24, *for flights read flight.*
— 149, — 25, *for perverted read prevented.*
— 151, note 19, *for primitæ read primitiæ.*
— 158, line 19, *for Lacidia read Lacinia.*
— 159, — 10, *for Cleiton, read Cleitor.*
— 181, note 5, *for ὀποδοχῆς read ὑποδοχῆς.*
— 192, line 1, *for Antheden read Anthedon.*
— 192, note 34, *for term read town.*
— 194, line 24, *for dissolved read devolved.*
— 213, — 4, *for provoked read provoke.*
— 215, — 12, *for adventures read adventurers.*
— 277, — 15, *for order read orders.*
— 349, — 31, *for Phylæ read Phyle.*
— 381, — 3, *for Prytanies read Prytanes.*

SECOND VOLUME.

- 16, line 7, *for Acti read Actè.*
— 16, note 46, *for Herod. 7 read 6.*
— 41, line 6, *for as they had been altered read as they had not been altered.*
— 146, — 29, *for 82. 1 read 82. 2.*
— 152, note 5, *for subjects read subject.*
— 221, line 3, *for brickerings read bickerings.*
— 226, line 7, *for Merychides read Morychides.*
— 236, note 45, *for ὑφ' ἡμῶν read ὑφ' ὑμῶν.*
— 241, note 77, *for ἀνθρῶπον read ἀνθρῶπων.*
— 259, — 177, *for οὐτ' read οὐδ'.*
— 260, line 16, *for Entioneia read Eetioneia.*
— 389, note 50, *for eff. read aff.*
— 447, *for dockyards read dockyard.*
— 471, line 13, *for were read was.*
— 555, — 1, *for phraseology read nomenclature.*



